CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 juillet 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                       Application No. 17486/90                     by J.L.                     against the Netherlands          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 1 July 1992, the following members being present:                MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS              Mrs. G. H. THUNE              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   L. LOUCAIDES                   J.-C. GEUS                  Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 4 October 1990 by J.L. against the Netherlands and registered on 26 November 1990 under file No. 17486/90;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:       THE FACTS        The applicant is a Dutch national born in 1937.   Before the Commission, he is represented by T.J. van Veen, a lawyer practising in Ede.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        In the course of an inquiry concerning fiscal and related offences, a search of the applicant's house was carried out on 3 December 1984.   The search began at 7.45 a.m. and ended at 10.30 a.m. The investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) left the house at 9.35 a.m.        It appears that the applicant was convicted and sentenced by the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Arnhem on 22 October 1984.        The applicant lodged an appeal before the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of Arnhem.   He submitted that the house-search had not been properly carried out because the investigating judge had left the house one hour before the end of the search.   Thus, the evidence obtained by the search - the essential evidence against him - had not been properly obtained and he should therefore be acquitted.        On 24 January 1989, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the Regional Court, convicted the applicant of forgery and repeated deliberate incorrect declarations for taxation purposes and gave him a 3 months' suspended sentence.   In reply to the applicant's submissions relating to the house-search, the Court of Appeal stated:   <Dutch>        "Blijkens het proces-verbaal van de huiszoeking op 3      december 1984 was de rechter-commissaris aanwezig bij de      aanvang van de huiszoeking te 07.45 uur, heeft hij      voorwerpen in beslag doen nemen en heeft hij voorts de      bewoner tot tweemaal toe gehoord, waarna hij het pand te      09.35 uur heeft verlaten, terwijl de huiszoeking te 10.30      uur is beëindigd.        Naar 's-hofs oordeel kan onder deze omstandigheden niet      gezegd worden, dat de huiszoeking niet onder leiding van de      rechter-commissaris heeft plaatsgevonden.   Anders dan de      raadsman heeft betoogd brengt de leidinggevende taak van de      rechter-commissaris niet steeds mede, dat hij voortdurend      c.q. zowel bij de introductie, het inbeslag nemen als bij      de afsluiting aanwezig is.   In casu is de rechter-      commissaris gedurende bijna twee van de bijna drie uur      durende huiszoeking aanwezig geweest, terwijl niet      aannemelijk is geworden dat de grenzen van de wettelijke      bevoegdheden zijn overschreden, dan wel dat daarbij      onzorgvuldig is gehandeld."   <Translation>        "According to the report on the house search of 3 December      1984, the investigating judge was present at the beginning      of the search at 7.45 a.m.,   ordered the seizure of items      and questioned the occupant twice, after which he left the      house at 9.35 a.m., whereas the search ended at 10.30 a.m.      In the Court's opinion it cannot be said in these      circumstances that the search did not take place under the      direction of the investigating judge.   Contrary to the      lawyer's opinion, the supervisory function of the      investigating judge does not require his constant presence,      i.e. from the beginning of the seizure to the end. In the      present case, the investigating judge was present during      almost two hours of a search which lasted nearly three      hours, whereas it cannot be established that the limits of      the relevant legal powers were exceeded, or that in this      respect the search was otherwise irregular."        On 1 May 1990 the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) rejected the applicant's appeal on points of law.   As to the alleged illegality of the search, the Supreme Court stated:   <Dutch>        "5.3.1. Een redelijke wetsuitlegging noopt ertoe aan te      nemen dat in het eerste lid van art. 112 Sv tot uitdrukking      wordt gebracht dat een huiszoeking dient te geschieden      onder leiding van de rechter-commissaris, welke leiding      mede ten doel heeft te waarborgen dat bij de huiszoeking de      grenzen van de wettelijke bevoegdheden niet worden      overschreden.        5.3.2. Dit in aanmerking genomen behoeft de omstandigheid      dat de rechter-commissaris na met de huiszoeking te zijn      aangevangen niet steeds ter plaatse blijft doch zich naar      elders begeeft terwijl intussen opsporingsambtenaren - in      tegenwoordigheid van de officier van justitie of van de      hulpofficier die hem vervangt - de tot de huiszoeking      behorende handelingen verrichten, niet uit te sluiten dat      de huiszoeking nochtans geschiedt 'door den rechter-      commissaris', aangezien immers de moderne      communicatiemiddelen het mogelijk maken enerzijds dat de      vorenbedoelde personen onderscheidenlijk de persoon bij wie      de huiszoeking geschiedt zich tijdens de huiszoeking tot de      rechter-commissaris wenden ten einde diens beslissing in te      roepen, anderzijds dat de rechter-commissaris desgewenst      nadere instructies met betrekking tot de huiszoeking kan      blijven geven, een en ander als ware hij ter plaatse      aanwezig.        5.4. Gelet op 's Hofs oordeel dat niet aannemelijk is      geworden dat bij de huiszoeking de grenzen van de      wettelijke bevoegdheden zijn overschreden dan wel dat      daarbij onzorgvuldig is gehandeld en in aanmerking genomen      dat door of namens de verdachte niet is gesteld dat hij      redenen heeft gehad om zich tijdens de huiszoeking tot de      rechter-commissaris te wenden ten einde diens beslissing in      te roepen, heeft het Hof het verweer kunnen verwerpen."   <Translation>        "A reasonable interpretation of the first paragraph of      Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would suggest      that a house search has to be carried out under the      direction of the investigating judge, which direction is      inter alia meant to guarantee that the limits of the      relevant legal powers will not be exceeded during the      search.        Taking this into account, the fact that the investigating      judge is not constantly on the spot after the beginning of      the search but goes elsewhere, whereas the investigators      continue the search measures in the meantime, in the      presence of the public prosecutor or the assistant      prosecutor who stands in for him, does not mean that the      search has not nevertheless taken place 'under the      direction of the investigating judge', since in any case      modern means of communications make it possible, on the one      hand, that the above-mentioned persons or the person whose      property is searched can apply to the investigating judge      during the search in order to obtain a decision from him      or, on the other hand, that the investigating judge, if      required, can go on giving instructions with regard to the      search, in both cases as if he were present on the spot.        The Court of Appeal could reject the objection, as it was      of the opinion that it was not established that the limits      of the relevant legal powers were exceeded or that the      search was for this reason negligently performed, and as it      was not submitted by or on behalf of the defendant that he      had some reason to apply to the investigating judge during      the search in order to obtain a decision from him."     COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains that the house search to which he was subjected on 3 December 1984 is contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.   He claims that the interference with his right to respect for his home was not in accordance with the law because the search had not been carried out under the direction of the investigating judge throughout.   2.    Claiming that his conviction was mainly based on the evidence obtained by the house search, the applicant further complains that he has not been proved guilty according to law since the search had not been properly carried out because the investigating judge was not present throughout the search.   He invokes Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that the search to which he was subjected on 3 December 1984 is contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention guarantees to everyone, inter alia, the right to respect for his home.        The question arises whether the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. The mere fact that the applicant has submitted his case to the various competent courts does not in itself constitute compliance with this rule.It is also required that the substance of any complaint made before the Commission should have been raised during the proceedings concerned (No. 10307/83, Dec. 6.3.84, D.R. 37 pp. 113-120; No. 10563/83, Dec. 5.7.85, D.R. 44 p. 113). In this respect the Commission notes that the applicant failed to invoke Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention before the national courts although he invoked the alleged illegality of the search.        However, the Commission does not find it necessary to determine whether, in these circumstances, the applicant can be considered to have complied with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, since his complaint relating to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention is in any case inadmissible for the following reason.                The Commission considers that the search interfered with the applicant's right to respect for his home within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.   It must therefore examine whether this interference was justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        The Commission recalls that it is primarily the task of national authorities to interpret domestic law, but that the Convention organs have a limited jurisdiction to control the manner in which it is done (cf. No. 10689/83, Dec. 14.5.84, D.R. 37 p. 225).        In its judgment of 1 May 1990 the Supreme Court examined the applicant's claim that the search was illegal and considered that the search had taken place in accordance with Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        The Commission is of the opinion that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be considered as an authoritative interpretation of Dutch law on this point.   The interpretation cannot be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable.   It follows that the interference with the applicant's right under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention was in accordance with the law.   The Commission further considers that the interference complained of was necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime.        The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the interference with the applicant's right under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention was justified under para. 2 of this provision.        It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    Invoking Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the applicant also complains that he has not been proved guilty according to law since the search had not been carried out in accordance with the requirements of the law.        Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention which lays down the principle of presumption of innocence has been interpreted by the Commission as requiring firstly "that court judges in fulfilling their duties should not start with the conviction or assumption that the accused committed the act with which he is charged" (cf. No. 988/60, Austria v. Italy, Yearbook 6 p. 785; No. 5523/72, Dec. 5.10.74, Collection 46 pp. 99,106). In other words this provision is primarly concerned with the attitude of mind of the judges at the outset of the trial, but not with the way in which the evidence has been obtained, the latter falling to be examined as an element of fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        However in view of its above finding under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission finds no indication that the applicant's trial has in any way been unfair.          It follows that this part of the application must also be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       Secretary to the Second Chamber        President of the Second Chamber                  (K. ROGGE)                         (S. TRECHSEL)