CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 9 septembre 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                       Application No. 19028/91                     by Hans Richard NIELSEN                     against Denmark          The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 9 September 1992, the following members being present:             MM.   J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President                C. A. NØRGAARD                S. TRECHSEL                F. ERMACORA                E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                J. C. SOYER                H. G. SCHERMERS                H. DANELIUS           Mrs. G. H. THUNE           Sir   Basil HALL           MM.   F. MARTINEZ                C.L. ROZAKIS           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                B. MARXER             Mr.   H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission.        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 1 October 1991 by Hans Richard NIELSEN against Denmark and registered on 14 November 1992 under file No. 19028/91;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        The applicant is a Danish citizen, born in 1959. He is at present serving a prison sentence of indefinite duration (forvaring) at Herstedvester prison, Denmark.   A. The particular facts of the case        On 24 April 1990 the applicant was arrested, suspected of having assaulted and threatened a woman. He denied the charges. By indictment of 17 August 1990 the applicant was charged with attempted homicide and his case was therefore, in accordance with Danish law, brought before the High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret) sitting with a jury. By judgment of 13 December 1990 the applicant was found guilty of assault and of having threatened another person, contrary to Sections 244 and 266 of the Penal Code, whereas the Court did not find that the facts disclosed a violation of Section 237 in conjunction with Section 21 of the Penal Code (attempted homicide). Having regard to the applicant's previous convictions of a similar nature he was subsequently sentenced to imprisonment of indefinite duration and to pay damages to the woman in question.        The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Højesteret) requesting the Court to impose a sentence of fixed duration. He did not base his appeal on other grounds. Although the applicant maintained his innocence he could not, under Danish law, appeal against his conviction as such as the evaluation of evidence in respect of the question of guilt or innocence in jury trials in Denmark is finally determined by the jury and the professional judges of the High Court (cf. Chapter 82 of the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven)).        By judgment of 24 May 1991 the Supreme Court upheld the sentence of imprisonment of indefinite duration.     B.    Relevant domestic law        Chapter 82 (Sections 940-961) of the Administration of Justice Act concerns the possibilities of appeal to the Supreme Court against judgments pronounced by the High Court as a first instance court. Section 943 provides that an appeal may be based on the allegation that procedural rules have been disregarded or applied wrongly, the latter, however, provided objections were lodged timely before the lower instance. Section 945 furthermore provides that in addition to the above an appeal may be based on the allegation that the court has wrongly decided a matter which lies outside the jury's competence to decide upon, that the jury's finding, upon which the judgment is based, is wrong due to an incorrect instruction from the presiding judge as to the legal aspects of the case (urigtig vejledning i loven), that the questions put to the jury suffer from errors or are based on an incorrect interpretation of the Penal Code and, finally, that the sentence goes beyond the limits of the law or is obviously disproportionate to the offence.   COMPLAINTS        The applicant invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. He complains that his conviction by the High Court of Western Denmark cannot be reviewed by a higher tribunal and maintains that Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 should be interpreted so as to leave the choice of review of either the conviction or the sentence to him.     THE LAW        Relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention the applicant complains of the fact that his conviction by the High Court of Western Denmark sitting with a jury cannot be reviewed by a higher tribunal.        Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) reads as follows:        "1.   Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal      shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed      by a higher tribunal.   The exercise of this right, including the      grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.        2.    This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to      offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases      in which the person concerned was tried in the first instance by      the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against      acquittal. "        The Commission recalls first of all that at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention Denmark made the following reservation:        "... Article 2, paragraph 1 (Art. 2-1) does not bar the use      of rules of the Administration of Justice Act according to      which the possibility of review by a higher court - in      cases subject to prosecution by the lower instance of the      prosecution (`politisager') - is denied        a.    when the prosecuted, having been duly notified, fails      to appear in court;        b.    when the court has repealed the punishment; or        c.    in cases where only sentences of fines or      confiscations of objects below the amount or value      established by law are imposed."        The present case, however, does not concern a case "subject to prosecution by the lower instance of the prosecution" but was of such a nature that it was tried in the High Court sitting with a jury. It follows that the Danish reservation does not prevent the Commission from examining the issues raised by the applicant.        Whereas Article 14 para. 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that "everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law," Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention states that everyone has the right to have his conviction or the sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.   This could be understood to imply that the States under this provision have a choice and may limit the review guaranteed for everyone either to concern the sentence alone or conviction and sentence. However, the use of the word "or" could also be interpreted as referring to the possible choice by the individual concerned, taking into account that some national systems permit an application for review to be limited to the sentence.        The Commission notes that the explanatory report on Protocol No. 7 to the Convention refers to proceedings where the accused has pleaded guilty to explain the use of the word "or" in Article 2 para. 1 (Art. 2-1). This would support the view that the provision does not give a choice to the State. Whereas the second sentence of Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2-1) requires that the exercise of the right to a review by a higher tribunal shall be governed by law, the Article does not specify its scope or actual implementation. As the reference to the grounds for the review to be governed by national law clearly shows the States have a discretion as to the modalities for the exercise of the right of review. It is this part of the Article which gives States the possibility to limit the review in several ways.        Indeed different rules govern review by a higher tribunal in the member States of the Council of Europe. In some countries such review is in certain cases limited to questions of law, such as the "recours en cassation" (in French law) or "Revision" (in German law). In others there is a right to appeal against findings of fact as well as on questions of law; and in some States a person wishing to appeal to a higher tribunal must in certain cases apply for leave to appeal.        Having regard to this the Commission does not find it necessary to determine the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) in general. Assuming that a review within the meaning this provision guarantees to everyone the right to bring before a higher tribunal his conviction or sentence or both such examination by this tribunal may be a limited review, provided the limitations under the law would not make such a review meaningless.        In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant could under Danish law appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Western Denmark to the Supreme Court.   Such an appeal could be based on the allegations that procedural rules were disregarded or applied wrongly.   The applicant could also have based his appeal on allegations that the High Court had wrongly decided matters which fell outside the jury's competence, that the jury had received wrong instructions as to the legal aspects of the case, or that the questions put to the jury suffered from errors or were based on an incorrect interpretation of the Penal Code. Finally, the applicant could, and did, base his appeal on the allegation that the sentence was disproportionate to the offence committed.        This shows that the limitation of the review was in line with the typical rules governing the procedures before Supreme Courts which sit only to control the legality of the judgment of the trial court. The Commission, therefore, considers that the exercise of the applicant's right to review as provided for under Danish law satisfied the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention.        It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.          For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     Secretary to the Commission           Acting President of the Commission             (H.C. KRÜGER)                           n(J.A. FROWEIN)