CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 13 octobre 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                          APPLICATION No. 16002/90                                     K.                                   against                                   AUSTRIA                          REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                        (adopted on 13 October 1992)                              TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                    Page I.     INTRODUCTION       (paras. 1 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         A.    The application            (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         B.    The proceedings            (paras. 5 - 10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         C.    The present Report            (paras. 11 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS       (paras. 16 - 29). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         A.    Particular circumstances of the case            (paras. 16 - 26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         B.    Relevant Domestic Law            (paras. 27 - 29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION       (paras. 30 - 67). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10         A.    Complaints declared admissible            (para. 30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10         B.    Points at issue            (paras. 31 - 67) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10   IV.    RECAPITULATION       (para. 68). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17   Partially dissenting opinion of Sir Basil Hall joined by Mr. G. Jörundsson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18   APPENDIX I   : History of the proceedings before the Commission. . .20   APPENDIX II : Decision on the admissibility of the application. . .21                              I.   INTRODUCTION   1.     The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.     The application   2.     The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1952, and resident in Linz.   Before the Commission he was represented by Mr. W. Moringer, a lawyer practising in Linz.   3.      The application is directed against Austria whose Government were represented by their Agent, Ambassador Helmut Türk, Deputy Secretary General and Legal Counsel of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   4.     The case concerns a fine in the amount of 3.000 AS imposed on the applicant by an Austrian court for refusing to give evidence in a criminal matter concerning drug trafficking in which the applicant was himself involved as a suspected buyer.   It further concerns the applicant's detention from 30 May 1989 until 4 June 1989 which was ordered by the same court as the applicant continued to refuse to give evidence.   The applicant complains of the obligation to give evidence incriminating himself which in his submission violates Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   He further considers that in the particular circumstances his detention for refusing to give evidence violated Article 5 para. 1.   In addition he invokes Article 5 para. 4 as there was no possibility of obtaining judicial review of the detention order.   B.     The proceedings   5.     The application was introduced on 27 November 1989 and registered on 17 January 1990.   6.     On 8 June 1990 the Commission decided to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to submit observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   7.     On 26 February 1991 the Government submitted their observations to which the applicant replied on 18 April 1991.   8.     On 17 October 1991 the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   At the hearing which was held on 18 February 1992 the applicant was represented by Mr. Wolfgang Moringer, Counsel.   The respondent Government were represented by Mr. Wolf Okresek, Head of Department of the Federal Chancellery.   He was assisted by Mrs. Susanne Boigner, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and by Mrs. Irene Gartner, Federal Ministry of Justice.   9.     After the hearing the Commission declared the application admissible.   10.    Subsequently the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be affected.   C.     The present Report   11.    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:                MM.   C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   C.L. ROZAKIS                   L. LOUCAIDES                   J.-C. GEUS                   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ   12.    The text of this Report was adopted on 13 October 1992 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention is:         i)    to establish the facts, and         ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose            a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under            the Convention.   14.    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   15.    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.                       II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     Particular circumstances of the case   16.    The applicant was accused before the District Court (Bezirksgericht) in Linz of having bought between December 1988 and 18 January 1989 a total of 3 gr. of heroin from a couple, M. and Ch. W., who were being prosecuted in separate proceedings before the Regional Court (Landesgericht) in Linz.   The applicant was charged with the offence (Vergehen) under Section 16 of the Drug Act (Suchtgiftgesetz) of having bought and possessed drugs.   M. and Ch. W. were charged with a crime (Verbrechen) under Section 12 of the Drug Act for dealing with drugs (Inverkehrsetzen von Suchtgift).   17.    The trial against the applicant started on 19 April 1989 but was adjourned after he had pleaded not guilty.   He was then summoned to appear on 30 May 1989 to give evidence at the trial against M. and Ch. W., who stood charges of drug dealing in several cases, namely having sold a total of 24 gr. of heroin between summer 1988 and December 1988 to W. and A. H.;   2 gr. of heroin to W. St.;   2 gr. of heroin to E. B. (sold only by M. W.) and 3 gr. of heroin to the applicant, and of having themselves used 11 gr. of heroin between summer 1988 and January 1989.   18.    At the hearing of 30 May 1989 before the Linz Regional Court M. W. denied having sold heroin to the applicant, while his wife admitted having done so.   Contrary to her initial confession she alleged, however, that the deal concerned 2 gr. and not 3 gr. of heroin.   19.    Subsequently the applicant was heard as a witness in the proceedings against M. and Ch. W.   He was informed of Section 153 of the Austrian Code on Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung - StPO) according to which a witness could refuse to answer questions if the answer risked to expose him to criminal prosecution, but which also empowered the Court to overrule the right of refusal.   20.    The applicant replied that in view of the criminal proceedings pending against himself he was not prepared to give evidence. Thereupon the Court gave an order denying him leave to abstain from giving evidence.   This order was based on the reasoning that a serious offence was at issue while the applicant faced a charge of minor importance and it was likely that the proceedings against him would be discontinued.   21.    The applicant nevertheless continued to refuse to answer the question put to him.   He was therefore fined 3,000 AS and eventually threatened with detention.   As he still persisted in refusing to give evidence, his detention for a period of five days was ordered and he was immediately arrested.   This decision was based on the ground that it was important to ascertain whether M.W. or Ch. W., or both, had sold heroin to the applicant.   An appeal (Beschwerde) was rejected by the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) in Linz on 2 June 1989 as being inadmissible.   22.    The applicant's detention lasted from 14.25 hrs. on 30 May 1989 to 14.25 hrs. on 4 June 1989.   The fine was paid on 6 March 1990.   23.    Following investigations in accordance with Section 17 of the Drug Act, showing that the applicant did not need medical treatment and care, the proceedings against him were provisionally discontinued on 20 December 1989 and a period of probation of two years was fixed.   24.    On 25 January 1990 the applicant gave evidence at a hearing   in the matter against M. W. and Ch. W.   He stated that on two occasions he had bought heroin of less than 1 gr. each time.   25.    Meanwhile, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General (Generalprokuratur) had lodged a plea of nullity for safeguarding the law (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zur Wahrung des Gesetzes) against the detention order of 30 May 1989. It was based on the following grounds:         - that the quantity of heroin sold to the applicant was unimportant while the total quantities in the remaining cases were sufficient to constitute an aggravating factor;         - that the applicant's evidence was not needed as in the investigation proceedings Ch. W. had confessed having sold 3 gr. of heroin to the applicant and the trial court based its conviction on this confession and not on the statement eventually made by the applicant as a witness;         - that as regards the accused M.W. the decisive evidence had been the result of a secret telephone surveillance and not the evidence given by the applicant;         - that in view of all these circumstances the trial court had wrongly considered that the interests of justice prevailed over the applicant's interest not to give evidence.   26.    On 19 December 1990 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) rejected the plea of nullity stating that the question of whether the applicant had correctly been obliged to give evidence could not be decided on the basis of the result of the trial; it had to be decided on the basis of the situation at the moment when the trial court took the decision of 30 May 1989.   At that moment it was not yet certain whether Ch. W.'s confession sufficed to convict her.   Furthermore the applicant's evidence appeared to be of relevance for determining whether Ch. W.'s husband was involved in the deal.   Therefore the trial court had not exceeded its discretionary power.   B.     Relevant Domestic Law   27.    The relevant provisions of the Drug Act (Suchtgiftgesetz) read:         [Translation]         Section 17         "(1) Where charges have been laid against a person for the only            reason that he or she has illegally acquired or possessed            for personal use an important amount of drugs, the Public            Prosecutor may, under the following conditions, drop the            charges provisionally for a period of probation of two            years.         ...         (3)   The dropping of the charge is possible under the            condition that:              1. information from the Ministry of Health and Environment               is obtained under Section 25, and              2. observations of the local health authorities are               submitted on the question whether                 a. the person charged needs medical treatment or                  supervision as to his/her state of health,                 b. the necessary treatment or supervision is in the                  given circumstances possible and not clearly without                  any chances of success.       ...         (6)   Before dropping the charges the local authorities and the            suspect have to be informed.   The latter has at the same            time to be instructed about the importance and legal            effects of the provisional discontinuance. The period of            probation is not taken into account in calculating the            period concerning the statute of limitations."         Section 19 (First sentence)         "Where an indictment has already been filed, Sections 17 and 18       apply accordingly for the purpose of a discontinuance of the       proceedings by the court."         [Original]         § 17         "(1) Wird eine Person ausschließlich deshalb angezeigt, weil sie            den bestehenden Vorschriften zuwider eine geringe Menge            Suchtgift zum eigenen Gebrauch erworben oder besessen hat,            so hat der Staatsanwalt unter den nachstehenden            Voraussetzungen und Bedingungen die Anzeige für eine            Probezeit von zwei Jahren vorläufig zurückzulegen.       ...         (3)   Die vorläufige Zurücklegung der Anzeige setzt voraus, daß              1.   eine Auskunft des Bundesministeriums für Gesundheit und                Umweltschutz im Sinne des § 25 und              2. eine Stellungnahme der Bezirksverwaltungsbehörde als               Gesundheitsbehörde darüber eingeholt worden ist, ob                 a. der Angezeigte einer ärtztlichen Behandlung oder                  Überwachung seines Gesundheitszustandes bedarf und                 b. eine notwendige Behandlung oder Überwachung nach                  den Umständen möglich und offenbar nicht aussichtlos                  ist.       ...         (6)   Von der Zurücklegung der Anzeige sind die            Bezirksverwaltungsbehörde und der Angezeigte zu            verständigen.   Der Angezeigte ist zugleich über Bedeutung            und rechtliche Wirkungen der Zurücklegung der Anzeige zu            belehren.   Die Probezeit wird in die Verjährungsfrist nicht            eingerechnet."         § 19 (Satz 1)         "Ist gegen den Angezeigten bereits ein Antrag auf Bestrafung       gestellt worden, so gelten die §§ 17 und 18 dem Sinn nach für       eine vorläufige Einstellung des Strafverfahrens durch das       Gericht."   28.    The relevant provisions of the Code on Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung - StPO) read as follows:         [Translation]         Section 56         "(1) In the case of several charges against the same person or            relating to the same offences committed by several people,            or in the case of one person having committed offences in            connection with others, joint proceedings do in principle            have to be instituted with regard to all persons and all            offences before the same court and this court should give            a judgment in all connected matters."       ...         Section 57         "(1) The court competent under Section 56 to deal with several            connected criminal matters may on application or ex officio            order the separation of proceedings concerning individual            offences or accused, if this appears to be indicated in            order to avoid delays or complications in the proceedings            or to shorten detention on remand of a suspect."       ...         Section 150         "In principle everyone summoned as a witness has the       obligation to appear and to give evidence on those       circumstances known to him and relating to the matter       under investigation."         Section 153         "(1) If giving evidence or replying to a certain question            implies ... the danger of criminal prosecution ..., and the            witness therefore refuses statements he can be obliged to            give evidence only if this is necessary in view of the            particular importance of   his statement."       ...         Section 160         "If the witness appears but refuses to give evidence or to take       the oath without statutory reasons the investigating judge may       impose a coercive penalty (Beugestrafe) of up to 10,000 AS and,       if the witness then persists, coercive detention of up to six       weeks may be ordered in important cases ..."         [Original]         § 56         "(1) Liegen demselben Beschuldigten mehrere strafbare Handlungen            zur Last oder haben sich an derselben strafbaren Handlung            mehrere Personen beteiligt oder hat eine von ihnen auch            noch in Verbindung mit anderen Personen strafbare            Handlungen begangen, so ist in der Regel das Strafverfahren            gegen alle diese Personen und wegen aller dieser strafbaren            Handlungen bei demselben Gerichte gleichzeitig zu führen            und über alle zusammentreffenden Strafsachen ein Endurteil            zu fällen."       ...         § 57         "(1) Das nach § 56 für mehrere zusammentreffende Strafsachen            zuständige Gericht kann auf Antrag oder von Amts wegen            verfügen, daß über einzelne strafbare Handlungen oder gegen            einzelne Beschuldigte das Strafverfahren abgesondert zu            führen und abzuschließen sei, sofern dies zur Vermeidung            von Verzögerungen oder Erschwerungen des Verfahrens oder            zur Kürzung der Haft eines Beschuldigten dienlich scheint."       ...         § 150         "In der Regel ist jeder, der als Zeuge vorgeladen wird,       verpflichtet, der Vorladung Folge zu leisten und über das, was       ihm vom Gegenstande der Untersuchung bekannt ist, vor Gericht       Zeugnis abzulegen."         § 153         "(1) Wenn die Ablegung des Zeugnisses oder die Beantwortung            einer Frage für den Zeugen ... die Gefahr            strafgerichtlicher Verfolgung ... mit sich brächte, und er            deshalb das Zeugnis verweigert, so soll er nur zum Zeugnis            verhalten werden, wenn dies wegen der besonderen Bedeutung            seiner Aussage unerläßlich ist."       ...         § 160         "Erscheint der Zeuge, verweigert er aber ohne gesetzlichen Grund,       ein Zeugnis abzulegen oder den Zeugeneid zu leisten, so kann ihn       der Untersuchungsrichter durch Verhängung einer Beugestrafe bis       zu zehntausend Schilling und bei weiterer Weigerung in wichtigen       Fällen durch Verhängung einer Beugehaft bis zu sechs Wochen dazu       anhalten ..."   29.    The relevant provisions of the Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch - StGB) read as follows:         [Translation]         Section 288         "(1) Everyone who as a witness ... gives false evidence in court            ... is punishable with imprisonment of up to three years."       ...         Section 290         "(1) He who gives false evidence (Sections 288, 289) ... in            order to avoid criminal prosecution against himself ... is            not punishable, if he had been granted a right not to give            evidence or could have been granted leave not to give            evidence and if              1. he did not know this,              2. he did not invoke the right not to give evidence               fearing that this alone would already cause the               consequences referred to above,              3. he was wrongly ordered to give evidence ...       ...         (3)   The perpetrator is nevertheless punishable even when the            requirements set out in para. (1) are fulfilled, if the            false evidence risks to cause serious disadvantages to a            third person and if he could reasonably have been expected            to tell the truth."         [Original]         § 288         "(1) Wer vor Gericht als Zeuge ... zur Sache falsch aussagt ...            ist mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren zu bestrafen."       ...         § 290         "(1) Wer eine falsche Beweisaussage (§ 288, 289) ablegt, um von            sich ... die Gefahr strafgerichtlicher Verfolgung ...            abzuwenden, ist nicht zu bestrafen, wenn er von der            Verbindlichkeit zur Ablegung eines Zeugnisses befreit war            oder hätte befreit werden können und wenn er              1. nicht wußte, daß dies der Fall war,              2. den Befreiungsgrund nicht geoffenbart hat, um die schon               aus der Offenbarung drohenden Folgen der bezeichneten               Art abzuwenden, oder              3. zur Ablegung der Aussage zu Unrecht verhalten worden ist.       ...         (3)   Der Täter ist jedoch auch bei Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen            des Abs. 1 zu bestrafen, wenn es ihm insbesondere im            Hinblick auf den aus der falschen Aussage einem anderen            drohenden Nachteil dennoch zuzumuten ist, wahrheitsgemäß            auszusagen."                       III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.     Complaints declared admissible   30.    The Commission has declared admissible all of the applicant's complaints, namely that the imposition of a fine constituted a punishment for his refusal to give evidence and violated his right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.   The applicant further considered that his detention was unjustified as in the circumstances he was not obliged to give evidence, and finally he complained that there was no possibility of obtaining judicial review in respect of the detention order.   B.     Points at issue   31.    The present case raises the following questions:         a.    Did the fine imposed on the applicant for his refusal to            give evidence constitute a criminal sanction which was            imposed in connection with and as a consequence of the            determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of            Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention?   If so, did            the applicant have a fair hearing before an impartial            tribunal?         b.    Was the applicant's right to a fair hearing within the            meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and/or the            applicant's right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by            Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) violated by the obligation            for the applicant to give evidence in respect of events in            connection with which criminal charges had been laid            against him?         c.    Was the applicant's detention in breach of Article 5            para. 1 (Art. 5-1)?         d.    Did the fact that the applicant did not have any            possibility of obtaining judicial review of the detention            order constitute a violation of Article 5 para. 4            (Art. 5-4)?   I.   Alleged violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) in the fine proceedings         A.   Applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) in the fine proceedings   32.    The applicant argues that the fine imposed upon him for his refusal to testify was a criminal sanction which may be imposed on any citizen refusing to give evidence.   For this reason he considers Article 6 (Art. 6) to be applicable to the proceedings leading to the imposition of the fine.   He submits that Article 6 (Art. 6) was violated because he could not avail himself, in the fine proceedings, of the guarantees set out in the Article and in particular in para. 3 lit. a to c.   33.    The Government deny the applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) with respect to the fine proceedings as the applicant was not a co-accused but only a witness in the proceedings against M. and Ch.W.   They also pointed out that the evidence which the applicant eventually gave in the proceedings against M. and Ch.W. was not used against him in any way in his own criminal proceedings which have been discontinued.   That they would be discontinued was already to be expected at the moment when the measures in question were taken against the applicant. Furthermore the fine did not constitute a criminal sanction but was imposed only with a view to enforcing a legal obligation, namely to give evidence.   34.    Article 6 (Art. 6) provides, so far as relevant, as follows:         "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge            against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public            hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and            impartial tribunal established by law.         2. ...         3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following            minimum rights:              a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he               understands and in detail, of the nature and cause               of the accusation against him;              b. to have adequate time and facilities for the               preparation of his defence;              c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance               of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient               means to pay for legal assistance, be given it free               when the interests of justice so require;            ..."   35.    The question whether the fine proceedings relate to a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be decided, according to the criteria established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (see Engel and Others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22;   Öztürk judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A no. 73 and Weber judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A No. 177), on the basis of three criteria, namely         - the nature of the provisions defining the offence,         - the character of the offence itself, and         - the nature and degree of severity of the penalty incurred.   36.    The legal basis of the fine imposed on the applicant was provided by Section 160 of the Code on Criminal Procedure and not by the Criminal Code.   The word "coercive penalty" (Beugestrafe) in this Section gives an indication but is not decisive.   37.    As to the character of the offence itself, i.e., the refusal to give evidence,   it has to be noted that in some countries it may under certain circumstances be punishable under penal law (see e.g. Section 420 of the Spanish Code on Criminal Procedure in conjunction with Sections 237 and 372 of the Penal Code;   see also Section 193 of the Spanish Judiciary Act - Ley Organica del Poder Judicial 6/1985), while in others it is exclusively the Code on Penal Procedure which, as a measure of coercion, provides for the possibility of imposing a fine (see Section 438 of the French Code on Criminal Procedure; Section 80 of the Belgian Code on Criminal Procedure) or, alternatively, detention (see e.g. Section 70 of the German Code on Criminal Procedure).   38.    In the present case, the character of the fine imposed must be seen within the context of Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a whole.   The purpose of this rule consists in providing the presiding judge with two instruments to put recalcitrant witnesses under pressure, namely the coercive fine and detention for up to six weeks.   As far as the detention is concerned, it constitutes a typical example for deprivation of liberty to secure the fulfillment of an obligation prescribed by law.   The coercive aim of the interference with personal liberty is thus clearly distinguished, by the Convention itself, from punitive detention.   39.    It follows, in the Commission's view, that the coercive fine also falls to be distinguished from punitive fines.   Therefore, the fine imposed upon the applicant is not penal in character and Article 6 (Art. 6) does not apply.         Conclusion   40.    The Commission concludes by 7 votes to 5 that there has been no violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) with regard to the proceedings in which a fine was imposed upon the applicant.   II.    Alleged violation of the Convention by the denial of the right       to keep silent   41.    The applicant further complains of the imposition of a fine and detention for his refusal to give evidence on an issue which concerned the substance of a charge pending against him before the District Court of Linz.         A.   Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention   42.    The Commission has first considered this complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which guarantees the right to freedom of expression.   In the present case this right has to be interpreted also in the light of the guarantees laid down in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         Article 10 (Art. 10) provides:         "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This            right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive            and impart information and ideas without interference by            public authority and regardless of frontiers ...         2.    The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it            duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such            formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are            prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic            society, in the interests of national security, territorial            integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder            or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the            protection of the reputation or rights of others, for            preventing the disclosure of information received in            confidence, or for maintaining the authority and            impartiality of the judiciary."   43.    The applicant argues that the freedom of expression also includes the negative freedom to withhold information and that this freedom prevails over the interest of the judiciary to obtain evidence from a person who by giving evidence would run the risk of self-incrimination.   44.    The Government underline the right of the accused that all evidence, including evidence in his favour, be obtained.   It is this right and the corresponding interest of the judiciary to establish the true facts that prevailed in the applicant's case, in view of the seriousness of the charge against the accused, M. and Ch.W., and the probability at the relevant time that the criminal proceedings against the applicant would be discontinued.   45.    The Commission is of the opinion that the right to freedom of expression by implication also guarantees a "negative right" not to be compelled to express oneself, i.e. to remain silent (cf. mutatis mutandis Eur. Court H.R., Young, James and Webster judgment of 13 August 1989, Series A no. 44 p. 21 para. 51).   However, just as the "positive right", this "negative right" may be subject to interferences, provided that they are prescribed by law, that they pursue one of the aims set out in Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) and can be considered necessary in a democratic society.   46.    In the present case, the applicant was forced, by the use of a fine and of detention for five days, to testify against his will.   The Commission finds that this constituted an interference with the negative aspect of his right to freedom of expression.   47.    It is uncontested that this interference was in accordance with the law (Article 160 StPO - see para. 28 above) and served the legitimate interest of preventing crime which includes repression of crime by way of criminal prosecution.   48.    It remains to be ascertained whether the interference complained of can be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society", in other words, whether it corresponded to a "pressing social need" and was "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 38 para. 62; Observer and Guardian judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A, no. 216 para. 59).   49.    In this context the Commission has first noted that the principle of protection against self-incrimination is, like the principle of presumption of innocence, one of the most fundamental aspects of the right to a fair trial.   It has also noted that at the relevant time criminal proceedings were pending against the applicant and that it was not certain that they would be discontinued.   50.    The Government argue that nevertheless in the present case the interests of the judiciary and the public in general to have the true facts in an important criminal case established as well as the interests of the accused possibly to prove their innocence prevailed over the applicant's interest in protection against self-incrimination.   51.    It is however clear from the reasoning given by the Regional Court in the detention order (see above para. 21) that the applicant's testimony was considered to be necessary to convict M. and Ch.W., not to establish their innocence.   It has further to be noted that, according to the grounds stated in the Attorney General's plea of nullity for safeguarding of law, the quantity of heroin sold to the applicant was relatively unimportant, as the total quantities in the remaining cases were sufficient to constitute an aggravating factor. There is nothing to show, and in particular it does not follow from the Supreme Court's decision of 19 December 1990 rejecting the plea of nullity (see above para. 26), that this situation did not yet prevail at the moment the applicant's detention was ordered by the Regional Court.   52.    In these particular circumstances, and without expressing an opinion on whether in all arguable cases the risk of self-incrimination precludes the duty to testify, the Commission does not find that the interference with the applicant's right to remain silent was "necessary in a democra