CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 30 novembre 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 14006/88                       by Barbro JOHANSSON                       against Sweden         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 30 November 1992, the following members being present:              MM.    C.A. NØRGAARD, President                  J.A. FROWEIN                  S. TRECHSEL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs.   G. H. THUNE            Sir    Basil HALL            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                    Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 5 May 1988 by Barbro JOHANSSON against Sweden and registered on 8 July 1988 under file No. 14006/88;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 11 October 1990 and 24 April 1991 and the observations submitted by the applicant on 2 January, 15 April and 29 July 1991 and 20 May, 22 June 1992, 1 October and 15 November 1992;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows: THE FACTS         The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1932. She is a nurse resident at Mörlunda. Before the Commission she is represented by Mr. Göran Ravnsborg, a lecturer at the University of Lund.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   Particular circumstances of the case         In 1971 the applicant's husband bought an agricultural property called Brånstorp 1:6 in the municipality of Nässjö from Mrs. E.J. The property had previously been offered for sale to the owner of the neighbouring property, Mr. H.A., who refused it. The applicant's husband's subsequent request for a permit to acquire the property was rejected by the County Agricultural Board (lantbruksnämnden) of the County of Jönköping on the ground that the property was needed to promote the establishment of functional farm holding units. The purchase was considered void and Mrs. E.J. remained the official owner.         On 24 November 1982 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Eksjö found that Mrs. E.J. was the dummy-owner of the property and that the real owner was the applicant's husband.         On 5 July 1983 the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten) decided that the property was to be sold at a compulsory sale by auction (exekutiv auktion).         In January 1984 the property was sold at such an auction for 101.000 SEK. The applicant bid 100.000 SEK. As the purchase was never completed a second auction was held on 16 April 1984, at which the applicant bought the property for 100.000 SEK, hers being the sole bid. For the purposes of the 1979 Land Acquisition Act (jordförvärvslag 1979:230, hereinafter "the 1979 Act") the auction was regarded as a compulsory auction. The applicant therefore received information as to her obligation under Section 16 of the 1979 Act to obtain a permit to retain the property within two years in order to avoid a compulsory re-sale of the property.         The purchase was registered in the real estate register on 11 July 1984.         By letter of 5 September 1986 the County Agricultural Board reminded the applicant of the conditions under the 1979 Act attaching to her purchase.         On 3 November 1986 the applicant submitted a request to the County Agricultural Board that she be granted a permit to retain the property in accordance with the 1979 Act. She stated that she intended to work the land part-time in her leisure hours. On 3 February 1987 the County Agricultural Board rejected the request, considering that the property was needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and forestry.         In her appeal to the National Board of Agriculture (lantbruks- styrelsen) the applicant submitted that she intended to produce material for soil improvement.         On 20 May 1987 the appeal was rejected. The Board found that the property, which lacked buildings and covered about 21 hectars, was not, on its own, a farm holding suitable for development. Furthermore, Mr. H.A. had announced his interest in purchasing an additional property. The need for a rationalisation of H.A.'s farm holding clearly outweighed the applicant's interest in keeping the property.         The applicant's further appeal was rejected by the Government on 10 September 1987 on the ground that the use of the property in the rationalisation of forestry was in the general interest.         On 25 February 1988 the County Administrative Board (läns- styrelsen) of the County of Jönköping at the request of the County Agricultural Board ordered that the property be sold compulsorily by auction in accordance with Section 16 of the 1979 Act.         The applicant's appeal to the Government was rejected on 8 September 1988.         At the applicant's request a special valuation of the property was carried out. The estimated value was considered to be 300.000 SEK.         On 11 April 1990 the applicant requested that the Government reconsider its decisions of 10 September 1987 concerning the retention permit and of 8 September 1988 concerning the sale of the property. She also requested that the Government order the suspension of the sale. On 19 April 1990 the Government decided to take no further action, as it had already taken a final position concerning the retention permit and the auction.         The public auction took place on 27 April 1990 and the property was sold to the County Agricultural Board for 300,000 SEK.         The applicant appealed against the auction to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt), requesting inter alia that it set aside the sale of the property and declare void the administrative decisions resulting in the sale.         On 21 May 1990 the applicant received the purchase-price.         On 8 June 1990 the Göta Court of Appeal decided that the case should be considered on the basis of written submissions (föredragning).         On 26 June 1990 it rejected the appeal, stating that it had no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the administrative authorities concerning the retention permit or the decisions ordering the compulsory sale of the property.         On 3 December 1990 the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) granted leave to appeal. On 11 March 1991 it quashed the decisions by the Göta Court of Appeal of 8 and 26 June 1990 and referred the case back to that court, considering inter alia that the applicant should have been granted an oral hearing.         The Supreme Court further stated in its judgment:         "[The applicant's] appeal raises the question to what       extent an administrative decision taken on the basis of       [the 1979 Act] can be reviewed or annulled in subsequent       execution proceedings.         This question is connected with the general question to       what extent executable deeds can be annulled in execution       proceedings. This problem has been noted both in the case-       law and in the doctrine. It has been considered that the       execution authorities - both the Enforcement Offices and       the superior organs - have a right of review but that this       right is very limited. However, according to what has been       stated in one case, there may be good reasons to extend the       review of executable deeds somewhat more than usual when       the deeds are administrative decisions, in particular when       these decisions cannot be appealed to an administrative       court. ...         It is also justified, in this context, to take into account       the provisions of the 1950 European Convention on Human       Rights as well as the case-law developed by the European       Court of Human Rights. On 21 February 1990 the European       Court decided a case against Sweden where - as in the       present case - the issue concerned a compulsory sale of       real property after a permit to acquire the property under       [the 1979 Act] had been refused (the Håkansson and       Sturesson case). In its judgment (Series A no. 171), the       Court found that questions of permits to acquire property       as well as questions of compulsory sales concerned the       individual's "civil rights and obligations" and that the       individual who was affected had a right under the       Convention to have the issue examined by a court.         In order to satisfy fully the requirements of the European       Convention, a court review would seem to be required which       is different from that which can be effected as part of       execution proceedings. In a proposal which has recently       been submitted to the Law Council (lagrådet) it has       therefore been suggested that, in cases under [the 1979       Act], the decisions of the central agricultural authority       shall be subject to appeal to the Administrative Court of       Appeal (kammarrätten). Pending a reform of such kind the       possibility for a court review which exists at the stage of       the execution should be used as far as possible.         It follows that a review should take place of the       administrative decisions which resulted in the auction of       27 April 1990".         On 1 April 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's request that the former Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the County Agricultural Board and a real estate agent be heard as witnesses. Referring to the Supreme Court's finding in its decision of 11 March 1991 the Court found, however, that the applicant herself should be heard as well as the official of the County Agricultural Board who had been in charge of the applicant's case.         On 4 August 1992 the Göta Court of Appeal struck the appeal out off its list of cases, the applicant having withdrawn it in view of the settlement reached between her and the County Administrative Board on 30 July 1992. Under the settlement the applicant was granted a right to repurchase the property Brånstorp 1:6 under the condition that she would withdraw her appeal.   Relevant domestic law         The acquisition of agricultural real property is subject to the regulations of the 1979 Act. The aim of the 1979 Act was to implement new agricultural guidelines adopted by Parliament (Riksdagen) in 1977 and to further the policy goals of forestry and regional planning.         On 1 July 1987 amendments to the 1979 Act entered into force, the purpose of which was to make it easier to obtain a permit for the purchase of agricultural holdings. The aim of the amended 1979 Act was to support appropriate development of farm holdings in the general interest and to form well-adapted holdings in conformity with the aims of regional policy.         On 1 July 1991 further amendments to the 1979 Act entered into force. The provisions below of the 1979 Act refer to their wording up to 1 July 1991.         Under Sections 2 and 3 of the 1979 Act a permit is required for the acquisition of an agricultural holding. No permit is required inter alia if the property is acquired at a compulsory auction. A request for a permit shall in principle be made within three months from the purchase (Section 12). Under Section 4, first paragraph, a permit may be refused inter alia if it is in the general interest that the property be used for rationalisation of agriculture or forestry (sub-section 1) or if it is obvious that the purchase price or other compensation considerably exceeds the market value of the property (sub-section 4).         Under Section 16, first paragraph, a property acquired at a compulsory auction - in circumstances which in the case of an ordinary purchase would have required a permit - shall be re-sold within two years, unless the said circumstances have by then ceased to exist or the purchaser has obtained a permit from the County Agricultural Board to retain the property. The granting of such a permit is subject inter alia to the regulations in Sections 3 and 4, with the exception of Section 4, sub-section 4. The sale contract established after the compulsory auction shall contain a note recalling the obligation laid down in Section 16. A decision by the County Agricultural Board not to grant permission to retain a property may be appealed to the National Board of Agriculture and ultimately to the Government (Section 18).         If, in a case where this is required under Section 16, the property has not been resold within the prescribed time-limit, the County Administrative Board shall, at the request of the Country Agricultural Board, order that the property be sold at a public auction by the Enforcement Office. At such an auction the property may only be sold to someone who has received an acquisition permit or who is, like the County Agricultural Board, exempted from the permit requirement.         Section 17 specifies that no sale at an auction under that Section may take place unless the purchase price offered amounts at least to the value to be attributed to the property in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Code of Enforcement (utsöknings- balken). This value is to be fixed by the Enforcement Office or, if the owner of the property makes a timely request for a special valuation, by valuers appointed by the County Administrative Board. In both cases the valuation shall be made in consultation with the County Agricultural Board. If the property is not sold at the auction the County Agricultural Board may, within a period of two years, request the County Administrative Board to hold a new auction. If no such request is made, or if no acceptable bid is made at the second auction, the owner is no longer required to sell the property.         The County Administrative Board's decision to order a public auction may be appealed to the Government.         The Enforcement Office's decisions in respect of an auction may, according to Chapter 18 Section 1 of the Code of Enforcement, be brought before a court of appeal and ultimately, with leave to appeal, before the Supreme Court. However, according to Section 6 para. 2 of the same Chapter, an appeal against a decision that is merely a preparatory step for a final decision may, in general, be lodged only in connection with an appeal against the latter. Appeals follow the rules of the 1986 Administrative Act (förvaltningslagen) and those of the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken), as far as the latter are relevant.         In the event that the purchase of agricultural property becomes void as a result of a refusal of permission to acquire the property on the ground that it is needed for the rationalisation of agriculture and forestry, the State is, according to Section 14 of the 1979 Act, obliged to redeem the property at the purchase price agreed upon in the invalid sale, if so requested by the seller. However, no such obligation exists where the purchase price considerably exceeds the value of the property in view of its yield and other circumstances, or if the terms are unreasonable in other respects. A request for redemption should be made to the County Agricultural Board. An action for redemption may be brought before the Real Estate Court (fastighetsdomstolen). The decision of that court can be appealed to a court of appeal and from there an appeal lies to the Supreme Court.         Under Chapter 52, Section 10, para. 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure the Court of Appeal shall, where it is necessary for the purposes of the investigation of a case that a party or other person be heard orally, decide on such a hearing as it finds appropriate. According to Chapter 56, Section 12 the same provision applies in respect of proceedings before the Supreme Court.     COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains that there is no court remedy against the decision to refuse her a permit to retain her property. She alleges that the absence of such a remedy constitutes violations of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention.   2.     She also complains that the refusal of a retention permit violated her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In her submissions of 2 January 1991 she further complained of the 1990 compulsory sale of Brånstorp 1:6.   3.     She finally complains of violations of Article 14 of the Convention, separately as well as in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and of Articles 18 and 60 of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 5 March 1988 and registered on 8 July 1988.         On 14 December 1988 the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the application to the respondent Government but not to invite them at that   stage to submit written observations. The Commission also decided to adjourn further examination of the application pending the outcome of the case of Håkansson and Sturesson before the European Court of Human Rights.         On 21 February 1990 the Court delivered judgment in that case (Eur. Court H.R., Håkansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A. no. 171).         On 2 July 1990 the Commission decided to invite the respondent Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, limited to the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Procotol No. 1 to the Convention.         The Government submitted observations on 11 October 1990 and the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 2 January 1991. Additional observations were submitted by the Government on 24 April 1991 and by the applicant on 15 April and 29 July 1991 and 20 May, 22 June, 1 October and 15 November 1992.         On 8 July 1992 the Commission rejected the applicant's request for disqualification of some members of the Commission in the further examination of the case.     THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains that there is no court remedy against the decision to refuse her a permit to retain her property. She alleges violations of Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention.   (a)    Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights and       obligations..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ...       by an independent and impartial tribunal..."         The Government first submit that the complaint is inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Following the Supreme Court's decision of 11 March 1991 it is now possible for the applicant to have both the question of her right to a retention permit and the subsequent auction proceedings re-examined by the Göta Court of Appeal.         The Government secondly submit that the complaint is inadmissible as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention. They refer to the case of Håkansson and Sturesson (loc.cit., p. 19, para. 60) in which the Court found that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention was applicable, as it was         "quite clear that the applicants considered themselves       entitled, under the relevant statutory provisions, to the       grant of the necessary permit. In the light of the Court's       established case-law, 'civil rights and obligations' were       at stake in the ensuing dispute before the administrative       authorities on the permit issue and before the ... Court of       Appeal on the lawfulness of the terms of the ... auction       ... In addition, nothing suggests that the applicants had       waived their right to a court, even assuming that this       would have been permissible."         The Government submit that the situation in the present case is considerably different from that in the Håkansson and Sturesson case, as the applicant's husband had earlier been refused a permit to acquire the same property on the grounds that it was needed to promote the establishment of functional farm holding units. The applicant must have been aware of this fact and also of the fact that, subsequently, Mrs. E.J.'s ownership was considered by the District Court to have been of a dummy-owner character. When the applicant bought the property she had no reason to believe that the position of the administrative authorities in her case would differ from that in her husband's case. Her chances of being granted a retention permit being very slim, the applicant had no arguable case when applying for a permit. Moreover, the fact that the applicant failed to apply for a permit within the prescribed time-limit also indicates that she was well aware of the fact that she would not be able to keep the property. Thus, there was no serious and genuine dispute before the administrative authorities in respect of the applicant's alleged right to a retention permit.         If Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention were to be found applicable, the Government admit a violation in that the applicant had no access to a court for the determination of that dispute.         The applicant contends that only after the auction the authorities stressed the "public interest" in the consolidation of the neighbouring property, this leading to a genuine and serious dispute between the applicant and the authorities regarding the ownership of her property.         The Commission has first examined whether the applicant's complaint is inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It considers, however, that the objection raised by the Government in this regard, which relates to the possibilities of having the right to a retention permit re-examined in subsequent auction proceedings, does not concern the exhaustion of domestic remedies but the substance of the issue under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).         The Commission has made a preliminary examination of the complaint relating to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in the light of the parties' submissions. It considers that the issues raise questions of fact and law which are of such a nature as to require an examination on the merits. The complaint cannot therefore be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. As no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established the application is in this regard admissible.   (b)    The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:         "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this       Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy       before a national authority notwithstanding that the       violation has been committed by persons acting in an       official capacity."         The Commission considers that the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is closely linked to the complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which the Commission has found above to be admissible.   This complaint is therefore also admissible.     2.     The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which reads:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of       his possessions except in the public interest and subject       to the conditions provided for by law and by the general       principles of international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it       deems necessary to control the use of property in       accordance with the general interest or to secure the       payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."         The Government first submit that this complaint is also inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in view of the Supreme Court's judgment of 11 March 1991.         Should the Commission find that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies the Government admit an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions in that she was refused a retention permit for the property. This interference amounted to a control of use of her property aiming at a subsequent deprivation of the property, provided the applicant did not choose to sell it herself. The refusal of the retention permit was aimed at promoting a structural rationalisation of agriculture and forestry, this being a legitimate aim in the general interest. It was based on the 1979 Act and was thus lawful. In view of the applicant's neighbour's interest in purchasing the property, the need for rationalisation of his farm holding clearly outweighed the applicant's interest in keeping the property. Furthermore, the applicant was aware of her obligation to sell the property if she was not granted a retention permit. As her husband had previously not been granted such a permit for the same property, the refusal of her own request cannot have taken her by surprise. Thus, the refusal of the retention permit was a measure proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.         Should the Commission consider the refusal of the retention permit as a deprivation of the applicant's property, the Government submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. They refer to the case of Håkansson and Sturesson, in which the Court found that the promotion of the rationalisation of agriculture constituted a legitimate public interest for the purposes of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), even to the extent that it may imply the compulsory transfer of property from one individual to another. The Court, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), furthermore found that the applicants had not been made to carry an individual and excessive burden, notwithstanding the fact that as a result of the public auction they received a sum considerably less than the purchase price they had paid (loc.cit., p. 15, para. 44, and p. 18, paras. 54-55). In the present case the applicant bought the property for 100.000 SEK, while she received 300.000 SEK for the property as a result of the public auction. Thus, the refusal of the retention permit had a legitimate aim, was not disproportionate to that aim and was lawful for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         The applicant contends that she has been deprived of her property by means of both the administrative decisions leading to the 1990 auction as such and that auction. Furthermore, she considers the purchase price of 300.000 SEK to be unacceptable, the market value being much higher. Moreover, no legitimate "public interest" as defined exhaustively in the 1979 Act could justify depriving her of her ownership in favour of Mr. H.A. Both the County Agricultural Board and Mr. H.A. could, once in 1971 and twice in 1984, have satisfied that interest without subsequently intruding upon the applicant's property rights. Mr. H.A. indicated already in 1971 that he was not interested in acquiring the property Brånstorp 1:6. However, subsequently he announced his interest in acquiring the property to the County Agricultural Board. He seems to have been present at both auctions in 1984, without bidding, this also revealing his private interest in acquiring the property at a substantially lower price than would have been possible in a sale on the open market. This is further supported by an opinion of the County Agricultural Board of 29 October 1990 to the Supreme Court, in which it was admitted that, at the time of the 1990 auction, a neighbour was still interested in buying the applicant's property but was not prepared to pay the price of 300.000 SEK paid by the Board. It further appears from the opinion that the Board, after having contacted the neighbour, decided that it would use means from the Land Fund (jordfonden) to achieve the rationalisation. Thus, Mr. H.A. was the predestinated owner of the property.         The Commission observes that the applicant's initial complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) only pertained to the refusal of the retention permit. In her observations of 2 January 1991 the applicant expanded her complaint to include also the 1990 auction in order to facilitate the drawing of a comprehensive picture of all measures with the common aim to deprive her of the property.         The question may be raised whether the applicant, by not pursuing the proceedings before the Göta Court of Appeal, has failed to exhaust the domestic remedies and whether she can still, in view of the settlement, be regarded as a victim of the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The Commission does not find it necessary to examine these issues in detail, since the complaint regarding Article 1 (Art. 1) is in any case inadmissible for the following reasons.         It is not in dispute that the refusal of the retention permit constituted an interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine separately whether the refusal of the retention permit as such violated the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), as the property at issue was subsequently sold compulsorily at the 1990 auction. This sale constituted a deprivation of the applicant's property which should be examined under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         The Commission must thus decide whether this deprivation was "in the public interest" and "subject to the conditions provided for by law" and "by the general principles of international law".         As regards the general principles of international law the Commission recalls that this condition does not apply to the taking by a State of the property of its own nationals (Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 50, para. 119). Consequently, this condition is not applicable in the present case since the applicant, who was deprived of her property by S is of Swedish nationality. It remains to be examined whether the interference satisfied the other two conditions.         As regards the question whether the deprivation was carried out in the "public interest" the Commission observes that the purpose of the deprivation, as stated in the 1979 Act, was to promote the rationalisation of agriculture, this being a legitimate "public interest" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), even to the extent that it may imply the compulsory transfer of property from one individual to another (above-mentioned Håkansson and Sturesson judgment, p. 15, para. 44, with further references). The finding that the deprivation was carried out in the public interest is not affected by the fact that the applicant has subsequently been allowed, as part of the settlement of a dispute, to repurchase the property.         As regards the lawfulness of the interference the Commission recalls that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited (e.g. above-mentioned Håkansson and Sturesson judgment, p. 16, para. 47). It finds no evidence in support of the applicant's allegation that the authorities' real concern was not to rationalise agriculture by merging the applicant's property with Mr. H.A.'s farm holding, in accordance with the 1979 Act.         Accordingly, the interference with the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) pursued a legitimate aim and was lawful for the purposes of that provision.         Finally, as regards the proportionality of the interference, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) requires a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. This implies that the individual shall not have to bear "an individual and excessive burden" (above-mentioned Håkansson and Sturesson judgment, p. 17, para. 51, with further references).         The Commission finds that the applicant, at least when concluding the purchase, must have been aware of her obligation to re-sell the property if she could not obtain a retention permit. Having also regard to the previous refusal of a similar permit for the applicant's husband to retain the property, the applicant deliberately took a risk of having to re-sell the property. Furthermore, as a result of the 1990 auction, the applicant received 300.000 SEK for her property, while the price paid by her in 1984 was 100.000 SEK. It has not been shown that the applicant did not regain the money invested by her in the property. Having regard to the Court's finding in the case of Håkansson and Sturesson (loc.cit., p. 18, para. 54) the price received by the applicant must be considered reasonable in relation to the value of her estate.         In these circumstances, and having regard to the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission concludes that the applicant has not been made to carry an individual and excessive burden.         Consequently, the interference with the applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions was justified under the terms of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention separately as well as in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1). She finally complains of violations of Articles 18 and 60 (Art. 18, 60) of the Convention.         The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, either separately or in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (Art. 14+P1-1) Furthermore, there is no appearance of any violation of Articles 18 or 60 (Art. 18, 60) of the Convention.         It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,           DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,       the complaint relating to the absence of a court remedy against       the refusal of a retention permit;         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.        Secretary to the Commission       President of the Commission              (H.C. KRÜGER)                     (C.A. NØRGAARD)