CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 17 février 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                          Application No. 14310/88                      Margaret Murray, Thomas Murray,                       Mark Murray, Alana Murray,                   Michaela Murray and Rossina Murray                                   against                             the United Kingdom                          REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                        (adopted on 17 February 1993)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                    Page   I.     INTRODUCTION       (paras. 1 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         A.    The Application            (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         B.    The Proceedings            (paras. 5 - 10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2         C.    The Present Report            (paras. 11 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS       (paras. 16 - 54). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-14         A.    The particular circumstances of the case            (paras. 16 - 46) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-12         B.    The relevant domestic law and practice            (paras. 47 - 54) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION       (paras. 55 - 101) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-24         A.    Complaints declared admissible            (paras. 55 - 56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15         B.    Points at issue            (para. 57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15         C.    As regards Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention            (paras. 58 - 64) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-17         D.    As regards Article 5 para. 2 of the Convention            (paras. 65 - 72) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-19         E.    As regards Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention            (paras. 73 - 76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19         F.    As regards Article 8 of the Convention            (paras. 77 - 85) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-22         G.    As regards Article 13 of the Convention            (paras. 86 - 94) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-24         H.    RECAPITULATION            (paras. 95 - 101). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. H.G. SCHERMERS . . . . . . . . . .25   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF SIR BASIL HALL . . . . . . . . . . 26-27   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY. . . . . . . . . . . . .28   APPENDIX I        : HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . .29-30   APPENDIX II       : DECISION ON ADMISSIBILITY                    OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-45   I.     INTRODUCTION   1.     The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.     The Application   2.     The applicants are Irish citizens, members of the same family, and reside in Belfast, Northern Ireland.   The first applicant was born in 1938 and she is a housewife.   The second applicant, born in 1935, is her husband.   The third applicant, born in 1964, is her son.   The fourth and fifth applicants are her eldest twin daughters, born in 1967.   The sixth applicant is her youngest daughter, born in 1970. The applicants were represented before the Commission by Messrs. Madden and Finucane, Solicitors, Belfast.   3.     The application is directed against the United Kingdom.   The respondent Government were represented by their Agents, Mrs. A. Glover and Mr. H. Llewellyn, both of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.   4.     The case concerns the entry into the applicants' home by an army team early one morning in 1982, the subsequent arrest of the first applicant, her detention for two hours for questioning and the taking and retention of records about her, including a photograph.   It raises issues under Articles 5, 8 and 13 of the Convention.         The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants also originally complained to the Commission of being required to assemble for half an hour in one room of their house while the first applicant prepared to leave with the army.   They further complained about the recording and retention of certain personal details about them, such as their names and relationship to the first applicant.   They claimed that they had no effective domestic remedies for these matters. However, the Commission declared these complaints inadmissible in its decision of 10 December 1991 (Appendix II to this Report).   B.     The Proceedings   5.     The application was introduced on 28 September 1988 and registered on 24 October 1988.   6.     After a preliminary examination of the case by the Rapporteur, the Commission considered the admissibility of the application on 5 September 1989.   It decided, pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure (former version), to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit their written observations on admissibility and merits.   The Government's observations were submitted on 7 February 1990, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicants replied on 11 April 1990.   The applicants withdrew complaints originally made under Article 3 and Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.   7.     The Commission considered the state of proceedings in the case on 7 September 1990 and decided to invite the parties to submit any comments they had on the significance of the Court's judgment in the case of Fox, Campbell and Hartley of 30 August 1990 (Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 182) for the admissibility of the application.   The applicants submitted their comments on 31 October 1990.   The Government submitted their comments on 24 November 1990, after an extension of the time limit.   8.     On 3 September 1991 the Commission decided, in accordance with Rule 50 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to invite the parties to submit further observations orally at a hearing.   The hearing was held on 10 December 1991.   The Government were represented by Mr. H. Llewellyn, Agent, Mr. N. Bratza, QC, Counsel, and Mr. R. Weatherup, Counsel.   They were assisted by three advisers.   The applicants were represented by Mr. R. Weir, SC, Counsel, Mr. S. Treacy, Counsel, and Mr. P. Madden, Solicitor.   Following deliberations on the same day, the Commission declared admissible all the first applicant's complaints and the other applicants' complaints under Article 8 of the Convention concerning the entry and search of the family home.   It declared inadmissible the remainder of the application (para. 4 above).   9.     The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 17 January 1992 and they were invited to submit further information about the case as well as any other evidence or additional observations relating to any aspect of the merits of the application that they wished.   On 14 April 1992, after an extension of the time limit, the Government submitted information and further observations.   No communication was received from the applicants.   10.    After declaring the case partly admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   It now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.     The Present Report   11.    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present:              MM.    C.A. NØRGAARD, President                  J.A. FROWEIN                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  H. DANELIUS                  Mrs. G.H. THUNE            Sir    Basil HALL            MM.    F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    J.-C. GEUS                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER   12.    The text of this Report was adopted on 17 February 1993 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:         i)    to establish the facts, and         ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose            a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under            the Convention.   14.    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   15.    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     The particular circumstances of the case   16.    The first applicant was arrested at her home on 26 July 1982 by a member of the armed forces under section 14 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.   She was arrested at 07.00 hours and detained continuously until 09.40 hours when she was released without charge.   The arrest operation was carried out by Corporal D., a member of the Women's Royal Army Corps.   Corporal D. had attended an army briefing at 06.30 hours that day at which she was told that the first applicant was suspected of involvement in the collection of money for the purchase of arms for the IRA in the United States of America, an offence under section 21 of the 1978 Act and section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976.   On 22 June 1982 two of the first applicant's brothers had been convicted of arms offences in the United States of America connected with the purchase of weapons for the IRA.   The Corporal was instructed to go to the first applicant's house to arrest her and to bring her back to the army screening centre at Springfield Road in Belfast.   17.    Corporal D., accompanied by four armed soldiers, entered the first applicant's house at 07.00 hours and asked her to get dressed. Corporal D. went upstairs and told the other applicants to get up and assemble in the living room.   18.    The soldiers did not search the contents of the house but recorded details concerning the interior of the home and personal details concerning the applicants.   19.    At 07.30 hours, when the first applicant came downstairs, Corporal D. stated, "As a member of Her Majesty's Forces I arrest you". On being asked by the first applicant under what Section, Corporal D. replied, "Section 14".   20.    The first applicant was then driven in a landrover to the army screening centre at Springfield Road.   She was escorted into a building and asked to sit for a short time in a small cubicle.   At 08.05 hours she was taken before Sergeant B. who asked her questions with a view to completing a standard form to record, inter alia, details of the arrest and screening procedure and personal details. The first applicant refused to answer any questions save to give her name.   The interview ended four minutes later.   She was then examined by a medical orderly and again refused to answer any questions.   21.    At 08.20 hours she was taken to an interview room and questioned by a soldier in civilian clothes in the presence of Corporal D.   She was asked, inter alia, about her brothers and her contacts with them, but she still refused to answer questions.   She was photographed without her knowledge or consent.   This photograph and the personal details about her, her family and her home were kept on record.   She was released at 09.45 hours.   22.    The standard record form, called the screening proforma, recorded the first applicant's name, address, nationality, marital and tenancy status, the chronological details about her arrest, the names of the army officers involved, the names of the other applicants and their relationship to her, her physique and her attitude to the interview. Nothing was recorded under the heading "suspected offence".   It noted that the applicant had refused to answer questions and that no information had been gained from the interview.   23.    Some 18 months later, on 9 February 1984, the first applicant brought an action for false imprisonment and other torts against the Ministry of Defence.   24.    In those proceedings one of the principal allegations made by the first applicant was that her arrest and detention under section 14 of the 1978 Act had been effected unlawfully and for an improper purpose. The applicants' allegations were summarised in the judgment of Murray J. given on 25 October 1985:         "The plaintiff's Counsel launched a series of attacks on the       legality of the plaintiff's arrest and detention which varied in       thrust between the very broad and the very narrow.   In the former       class, for example, was an attack in which they alleged that the       use of s.14 of the EPA in this case was an example of what they       called 'an institutionalised form of unlawful screening' by the       military authorities, with the intention of obtaining what       Counsel termed 'low level intelligence' from the plaintiff, and       without (a) any genuine suspicion on the part of those       authorities that she had committed a criminal offence or, (b) any       genuine intention on their part of questioning her about a       criminal offence alleged to have been committed by her.   In this       connection the plaintiff herself alleged that Sergeant B.       actually told her in the centre in so many words that they knew       she had not committed any crime but that her files had been lost       and they wanted to 'update' them."   25.    In support of this case the first applicant's Counsel not only called and examined the applicant herself but extensively cross-examined the two witnesses called on behalf of the defendants, namely Corporal D., who had effected the arrest of the applicant and who had attended the interview of the applicant at Springfield Road RUC Station, and Sergeant B., who had questioned the applicant on her arrival at Springfield Road with a view to completing Part 1 of the form headed "Screening Proforma".   26.    As appears from the transcript of her evidence, Corporal D. gave an account of her briefing on the morning of the arrest.   She stated that at the briefing she had been told the first applicant's name and address and the grounds on which she was wanted for questioning, namely her suspected involvement in the collection of money for the purchase of weapons from America.   She stated that, having been given this briefing,         "... my suspicions were aroused by my briefing, and my belief was       that Mrs. Murray was suspected of collecting money to purchase       arms."   27.    Under cross-examination Corporal D. denied that the purpose of an arrest and detention under section 14 was to gather intelligence: she maintained that the purpose of the arrest was to question a suspected person about an offence.   She stated that her suspicion of the first applicant had been formed on the basis of everything she had been told at the briefing and which she had read in a document which had been supplied to her then.   Corporal D. stated that she would not have effected the arrest unless she had been given the grounds on which she was expected to arrest the person.   Under repeated questioning, Corporal D. maintained that she had been informed at the briefing, and that she had formed the suspicion, that the applicant had been involved in the collection of money for the purchase of arms from America.   28.    Corporal D. was further examined about the interrogation of the first applicant at Springfield Road.   She stated that she recalled that questions had been asked of the applicant by the interviewer and that the applicant had refused to answer any questions put to her.   She recalled that the interviewer asked a few more questions when he returned to the room after leaving it but that she could not really remember what they were about.   Counsel for the defence returned to the question of the interview of the applicant towards the end of his examination of Corporal D. in the following exchange:         Q.    "... Now while you were, just going back for a moment to       the time when what I might call the interview, that's when the       three of you were in the room, and the two occasions you've said       she had to leave, you took her to, she wanted to go to the       lavatory.   Do you just have no recollection of any of the       questions that were asked?"         A.    "I don't remember the questions as they were asked.   There       was a question regards money.   A question regards America."   29.    No cross-examination by the first applicant's counsel was directed to this reply of the witness.   30.    Sergeant B. was examined and cross-examined about his completion of Part 1 of the Screening Proforma when standing at the Reception desk.   He stated that the first applicant had given her name but refused to give her address or date of birth or any further information.   He expressly denied the applicant's allegation that he had said to her that he knew she was not a criminal and that he just wanted to update her files which had been lost.   The information previously recorded in 1980 had in any event not been lost since Sergeant B. gave evidence that it had been used to complete the details on the first page of the Proforma when the applicant had refused to answer any questions.   31.    Under cross-examination Sergeant B. did not accept that the main purpose of screening was to gather general information about the background, family and associates of the arrested person.   He expressly denied that the members of a family of persons with suspected terrorist connections might be arrested for the purposes of gathering general intelligence or that an associate of a known member of an illegal organisation might be brought in and screened for the purposes of gathering information.   Sergeant B. maintained that a person was only arrested and detained if there existed a suspicion against the person accused of involvement in a criminal offence.   32.    The issue of the interview of the first applicant was specifically addressed in the final submission of defence counsel, in which the following exchange is partially recorded in the transcript:         "MR. CAMPBELL    My Lord ... your Lordship has the grounds upon                       which the arresting officer carries out                       (inaudible) she then gives evidence and is                       present throughout the interview ... now I talk                       about the interview on the very last stage.         JUDGE            At the table?         MR. CAMPBELL     At the table, and said that in the course of that                       interview money and arms that these matters were                       raised, I can't ... hesitate to use the                       (inaudible) now that is one point.   The other                       point is this, that this was a lady who on her                       own admission was not going to answer any                       questions.   She agreed during cross-examination                       that that was the attitude and so one finds that                       an interview takes place with somebody who is                       not prepared to answer any questions but at                       least the questions are raised with her                       concerning the matter on which she was arrested.         JUDGE            Is the substance of that then that because of her                       fairly firm refusal you would say to answer any                       questions there was never any probing                       examination of her collecting money for example?         MR. CAMPBELL     No my Lord because she ... as she said she wasn't                       going to answer any questions."   33.    In his judgment Murray J. gave detailed consideration to the evidence of Corporal D. and Sergeant B., on the one hand, and the first applicant on the other.   Murray J. rejected the applicant's claim that she had been told by Sergeant B. that she was not suspected of any offence and that he was just updating his records.   He similarly rejected the applicant's claim that Corporal D. at no time genuinely suspected the applicant of having committed an offence.   On the basis of the evidence of Corporal D. herself, who was described as a "transparently honest witness", the judge stated that he was         "... quite satisfied that on the basis of her briefing at       Musgrave Park she genuinely suspected the plaintiff of having       been involved in the offence of collecting money in Northern       Ireland for arms."   34.    Murray J. also rejected the first applicant's claim that section 14 of the 1978 Act had been used for the purpose of screening to gain low level intelligence: he accepted the evidence of Corporal D. and Sergeant B., which had been tested in cross-examination, that the purpose of the applicant's arrest and detention under the section had not been to gather intelligence but to establish facts concerning the offence of which she was suspected.   Murray J. also accepted the evidence of Corporal D. that there were questions addressed to the matters of which the applicant was suspected, but found that in a situation in which the applicant had decided not to answer any questions "... and with the short detention period permitted by the section, there was little that the interviewer or any of the other staff in the centre could do to pursue their suspicions."   35.    In the judgment, Murray J. also dealt with the photographing of the first applicant as follows:         "As I have explained, the plaintiff, unknown to herself, was       photographed by a hidden camera while in the Centre.   When this       emerged at the hearing (the applicant's lawyer) asked for leave       (which I granted) to amend the Statement of Claim to include that       photograph as an additional tort.   (The lawyer) argued that the       existence of an express power to photograph an arrested person       under s.11(4) of the EPA impliedly excludes a power to photograph       a person arrested under s.14.   I do not think this argument is       sound: s.11(4) allows reasonable force to be used to obtain a       photograph but I do not think it permissible to   reason from this       that merely taking a photograph of a person without interfering       physically with the person is in any way whatever tortious.   In       Salmond & Heuston on Torts (18th ed.) in a passage dealing with       the invasion of privacy, the learned authors, relying on a       passage in the judgment of Greer L.J. in Tolley v. Fry [1930]       1 KB 467 and 478, express the view that merely taking a       photograph of a person without in any way defaming him is not       actionable.   I have always understood this to be the law in this       country."   36.    The first applicant's action before the High Court was therefore dismissed.   An appeal to the Court of Appeal was also dismissed on 20 February 1987.   37.    In the Court of Appeal, the first applicant again challenged the legality of her arrest on the grounds, inter alia         "... (1) that the arresting officer did not have, or was not       sufficiently proved to have, the requisite suspicion ; (2) that       she did not have sufficiently detailed knowledge or understanding       of what was alleged against the plaintiff to warrant the       conclusion that it was an offence which would justify arrest."   38.    The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected both grounds of the appeal, holding that the judge had found         "... and his finding was amply justified by the evidence, that       (Corporal D.) genuinely suspected the plaintiff of having been       involved in the offence of collecting money in Northern Ireland       for arms to be purchased in America for use by a proscribed       organisation."   39.    The Court of Appeal further unanimously rejected the first applicant's complaint that the purpose of her arrest and detention, and the whole purport of her questioning, was a fishing expedition unrelated to the matters of which she was suspected and designed to obtain low grade intelligence about the applicant and others.   In rejecting this complaint, the Court of Appeal took full account of the evidence which had been adduced on both sides as to the purpose and nature of the interview of the applicant:         "Corporal D. who was present during the interview had very little       recollection of the course of the questions.   The only other       witness as to the conduct of this interview was the plaintiff.       Her account also is sketchy, though in somewhat more detail.       What is clear from both witnesses is that the plaintiff was       deliberately unhelpful and refused to answer most of the       questions.   What is certain is that she was asked about her       brothers who in the previous month had been convicted of offences       connected with the purchase of firearms in the USA for use by the       IRA and for which offences they had been sentenced to terms of       2 and 3 years imprisonment.   It is clear that it was for such a       purchase that the plaintiff was suspected of having collected       money, as she stated the interviewer asked her whether she was       in contact with them.   There is no doubt, therefore, that the       interviewer did attempt to pursue the subject of the suspicion       which had been the occasion for her arrest but was unable to made       any headway."   40.    The first applicant's appeal to the Court of Appeal also concerned certain related matters such as the legality of the search of the applicant's house, in respect of which the Court of Appeal found that there was a sufficient basis in section 14(3) of the 1978 Act. The Court of Appeal further found that the army's powers included the right to interrogate a detained person and that the "screening proforma" contained no information which might not have been relevant to the resolution of the suspicion.   As regards the applicant's complaint regarding the taking of a photograph of her, the Court of Appeal stated as follows:         "The complaint that the plaintiff was photographed without her       knowledge can be quickly disposed of.   While in the reception       room she was asked if she would agree to be photographed and she       refused.   However, it would appear that later, unknown to her,       she was secretly photographed and this only became known to her       when part 1 of the screening proforma containing that information       was produced.   The act of taking the photograph involved nothing       in the nature of a physical assault.   Whether such an act would       constitute an invasion of privacy so as to be actionable in the       United States is irrelevant, because the plaintiff can only       recover damages if it amounts to a tort falling within one of the       recognised branches of the law on the topic.   According to the       common law there is no remedy if someone takes a photograph of       another against his will.   Reliance was placed on section 11(4)       of the Act by counsel for the plaintiff.   This provides:              'Where a person is arrested under this section, an officer            of the Royal Ulster Constabulary not below the rank of            chief inspector may order him to be photographed and to            have his finger and palm prints taken by a constable, and            a constable may use such reasonable force as may be            necessary for that purpose.'         This provision gives power to the police to order the taking of       finger prints without the necessity of charging the person       concerned and applying for an order of the magistrate under       article 61 of the Magistrates Courts (Northern Ireland)       Order 1981, which contains no comparable provision as to the       taking of photographs.   The taking of finger prints otherwise       than by consent must involve an assault and I am satisfied that       section 11(4) was enacted not to legalise the taking of       photographs without consent, but to legalise the taking of       photographs or finger prints in circumstances where there would       otherwise have been an illegal assault.   It does not involve the       implication that the taking of a photograph without violence and       without consent is actionable."   41.    The first applicant was granted leave by the Court of Appeal to appeal to the House of Lords.   This appeal was rejected in a decision of 25 May 1988.   42.    In the House of Lords, the applicant did not pursue the allegation that she had not been arrested on the basis of a genuine and honest suspicion that she had committed an offence.   As Lord Griffiths noted:         "This primary attack failed because the judge held that he was       satisfied that Corporal D. was an entirely honest witness and       that after her briefing she did suspect the plaintiff of the       offences involved in collecting money for the IRA, and thus had       the limited power of arrest and detention conferred on members       of the armed forces by section 14 of the Act of 1978.   No appeal       is pursued before your Lordships in respect of this finding of       the judge."   43.    The applicant did however pursue an allegation in the House of Lords that since she was only lawfully arrested at 07.30 hours she had been unlawfully detained between 07.00 and 07.30 hours.   The House of Lords found that a person is arrested from the moment he is subject to restraint and that the first applicant was therefore under arrest from the moment that Corporal D. identified her on entering the house at 07.00 hours. It made no difference that the words of arrest were communicated to the applicant at 07.30 hours.   In this respect Lord Griffiths stated as follows:         "... Therefore, the plaintiff submits, the period of detention       before arrest was unlawful and the Ministry of Defence liable for       the tort of unlawful imprisonment during that period of half an       hour whilst she was getting dressed. If the plaintiff had been       told she was under arrest the moment she identified herself, it       would not have made the slightest difference to the sequence of       events before she left the house.   It would have been wholly       unreasonable to take her off half-clad, to the army centre, and       the same half-hour would have elapsed while she gathered herself       together and completed her toilet and dressing.   It would seem       a strange result that in these circumstances, whether or not she       has an action for false imprisonment should depend upon whether       the words of arrest are spoken on entering or leaving the house,       when the practical effect of the difference on the plaintiff is       non-existent."   44.    The first applicant had also maintained that the failure to inform her that she was arrested until the soldiers were about to leave the house rendered the arrest unlawful.   This submission was also rejected by the House of Lords.   Lord Griffiths held as follows:         "It is a feature of the very limited power of arrest contained       in Section 14 that a member of the armed forces does not have to       tell the arrested person the offence of which he is suspected,       for it is specifically provided by section 14(2) that it is       sufficient if he states that he is effecting the arrest as a       member of Her Majesty's forces.   Corporal D. was carrying out       this arrest in accordance with the procedures in which she had       been instructed to make a house arrest pursuant to Section 14.       This procedure appears to me to be designed to make the arrest       with the least risk of injury to those involved including both       the soldiers and the occupants of the house.   When arrests are       made on suspicion of involvement with the IRA it would be to       close one's eyes to the obvious not to appreciate the risk that       the arrest may be forcibly resisted.         The drill the army follow is to enter the house and search every       room for occupants.   The occupants are all directed to assemble       in one room, and when the person the soldiers have come to arrest       has been identified and is ready to leave, the formal words of       arrest are spoken just before they leave the house.   The army do       not carry out a search for property in the house and, in my view,       they would not be justified in doing so.   The power of search is       given 'for the purpose of arresting a person', not for a search       for incriminating evidence.   It is however a proper exercise of       the power of search for the purpose of effecting the arrest to       search every room for other occupants of the house in case there       may be those there who are disposed to resist the arrest.   The       search cannot be limited solely to looking for the person to be       arrested and must also embrace a search whose object is to secure       that the arrest should be peaceable.   I also regard it as an       entirely reasonable precaution that all the occupants of the       house should be asked to assemble in one room.   As Corporal D.       explained in evidence, this procedure is followed because the       soldiers may be distracted by other occupants in the house       rushing from one room to another, perhaps in a state of alarm,       perhaps for the purpose of raising the alarm and to resist the       arrest.   In such circumstances a tragic shooting accident might       all too easily happen with young, and often relatively       inexperienced, armed soldiers operating under conditions of       extreme tension.   Your Lordships were told that the husband and       children either had commenced or were contemplating commencing,       actions for false imprisonment arising out of the fact that they       were asked to assemble in the living-room for a short period       before the plaintiff was taken from the house.   That very short       period of restraint when they were asked to assemble in the       living room was a proper and necessary part of the procedure for       effecting the peaceable arrest of the plaintiff.   It was a       temporary restraint of very short duration imposed not only for       the benefit of those effecting the arrest, but also for the       protection of the occupants of the house and would be wholly       insufficient to found an action for unlawful imprisonment.         It was in my opinion entirely reasonable to delay speaking the       words of arrest until the party was about to leave the house.       If words of arrest are spoken as soon as the house is entered       before any precautions have been taken to search the house and       find the other occupants, it seems to me that there is a real       risk that the alarm may be raised and an attempt made to resist       arrest, not only by those within the house but also by summoning       assistance from those in the immediate neighbourhood.   When       soldiers are employed on the difficult and potentially dangerous       task of carrying out a house arrest of a person suspected of an       offence in connection with the IRA, it is I think essential that       they should have been trained in the drill they are to follow.       It would be impracticable and I think potentially dangerous to       leave it to the individual discretion of the particular soldier       making the arrest to devise his own procedures for carrying out       this unfamiliar military function.   It is in everyone's best       interest that the arrest is peaceably effected and I am satisfied       that the procedures adopted by the army are sensible, reasonable       and designed to bring about the arrest with the minimum of danger       and distress to all concerned.   I would however add this rider:       that if the suspect, for any reason, refuses to accept the fact       of restraint in the house he should be informed forthwith 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