CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 12 mai 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                    EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      Application No. 13427/87                     Stran Greek Refineries S.A.                               and                        Stratis Andreadis                               against                               Greece                      REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                      (adopted on 12 May 1993)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1 - 16). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The Application           (paras. 2 - 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The Proceedings           (paras. 5 - 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The Present Report           (paras. 12 - 16). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 17 - 45) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        A.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 17-41). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        B.    Relevant domestic law and practice           (paras. 42-45). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 46 - 89) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 46). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10        B.    Points at issue           (para. 47). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10        C.Fair trial by a tribunal           (paras. 48 - 66). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10        D.    Length of the proceedings           (paras. 67-73). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13        E.    Peaceful enjoyment of possessions           (paras. 74-89). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14        RECAPITULATION      (para. 88) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17   PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. STEFAN TRECHSEL AND SIR BASIL HALL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18   CONCURRING OPINION OF MR. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ. . . . . . . . . . 19   APPENDIX I      : HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . 21   APPENDIX II     : DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY                  OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 23   I.    INTRODUCTION   1     The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The Application   2     The application was introduced by Mr. Stratis Andreadis, a Greek citizen, and by the Stran Greek Refineries S.A., a company registered in Greece wholly owned by the former and currently under liquidation. The applicant Mr. Stratis Andreadis died in 1989. His son and heir, Peter Andreadis, expressed the wish to maintain the application. The applicants were represented before the Commission by Mr. Peter Martyr of Norton Rose, Solicitors, London.   3     The application is directed against Greece. The respondent Government were initially represented by their Agent, Mr. Constantinos Economides, Head of the Special Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are now represented by their Agent, Mr. George Sgouritsas, President of the Legal Council of the State (**miko *ymvouli* **n *ratons).   4     The case concerns domestic civil proceedings whereby the validity of an arbitration award in favour of the applicants was challenged by the Greek State and an interpretative law (Ermineitikos nomos) which was enacted while the above proceedings were pending and which provided that the award was invalid. It raises issues under Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No 1.   B.    The Proceedings   5     The application was introduced on 20 November 1987 and registered on the same date. Between November 1988 and December 1989 the member of the Commission appointed as Rapporteur requested the applicants to submit further information and documents relating to the then pending domestic proceedings. The applicants submitted the information on 25 January 1990.   6     On 2 April 1990 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application before 15 June 1990. After obtaining a prolongation of the above time limit the Government submitted their observations on 30 June 1990. The applicants submitted their observations in reply on 24 October 1990.   7     On 1 March 1991 the Commission decided to invite the Government to submit further written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. The Government submitted such observations on 6 May 1991.   The applicants' further observations in reply were submitted on 13 June 1991.   8     On 4 July 1991 the Commission declared the application admissible.   The text of the decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 15 July 1991 and they were invited to submit further evidence and additional observations on the merits of the application. The respondent Government submitted further observations on the merits on 10 September 1991. The applicants' further observations were submitted on 27 September 1991. The applicants completed their submissions on 3 December 1991.   9     On 10 September 1992 the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 53 of its Rules of Procedure to obtain the parties' oral submissions on certain issues arising in relation to the merits of the case. At the hearing, which took place on 20 October 1992, the respondent Government were represented by Mr. Fokion Georgakopoulos, Member of the Legal Council of the State, Acting Agent of the Government. The applicants were represented by Mr. Peter Martyr of Norton Rose Solicitors, as representative, and by Mr. Michael Beloff Q.C., Ms Tracy Forster, Solicitor, Professor K.D. Kerameus of the University of Athens and Mr. George Alexopoulos, liquidator of the applicant company, as Counsel.   10    At the hearing the Government requested the Commission to declare the application inadmissible for non compliance with the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies in Article 26 of the Convention. The Commission considered this request on the same day and found no basis for the application of Article 29 of the Convention.   11    After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The Present Report   12    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present:             MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                S. TRECHSEL                E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                J.-C. SOYER                H. DANELIUS           Sir   Basil HALL           MM.   F. MARTINEZ                C.L. ROZAKIS           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ   13    The text of this Report was adopted on   12 May 1993 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   14    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        i)    to establish the facts, and        ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   15    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   16    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   17    By a contract concluded on 22 July 1972 between the Greek State and Mr. Stratis Andreadis it was agreed that the latter would establish an oil refinery to process crude oil in Megara, Greece.   The contract was to be carried out by Mr Andreadis' wholly owned company, Stran Greek Refineries S.A., the establishment of which was contemplated by the contract.   Under the contract all rights and obligations of Mr. Andreadis were automatically to be transferred to the company upon its incorporation.   18    The Greek Government ratified the contract by legislative decree L.D. 1211 published in the Official Gazette on 26 July 1972.   Under Article 21 of the contract the Greek State undertook to acquire, not later than 31 December 1972, a plot of land in Megara for the building of the refinery.   19    However, the Greek State failed to acquire the land and, consequently, the applicant company was unable to proceed with the project.   20    On 14 October 1977 the contract was formally terminated by a decision of the democratically elected Government pursuant to Law 141/1975 concerning the termination of preferential contracts (Haristikes simvaseis) entered into during the military regime in Greece. This law, being enacted by special authorisation of the constitutional legislator under Article 107 of the Constitution of 1975, has superior force (aiksimeni tipki simami) and takes precedence over common legislation.   21    Prior to the discontinuation of the contract the company had already incurred expenditure in connection with the project. In particular, the company had incurred liabilities by entering into agreements with Greek and foreign firms for the supply of services, goods and materials and had arranged loans to finance the project.   A dispute arose between the company and the Greek State in which the former brought an action dated 10 November 1978 before the Athens First Instance Court (Polimeles Protodikeio) seeking reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred.   22    The Greek State challenged the competence of this jurisdiction arguing that the litigation should be referred to arbitration as provided in the contract.   23    However, by its judgment of 29 September 1979 (judgment No 13910/1979), the Athens First Instance Court rejected this argument, inter alia, on the ground that the arbitration clause in the contract had been annulled. As regards the merits of the claims, the court rejected the State's argument that the termination of the contract was the result of the company's shortcomings and ordered the parties, and in particular the applicant company, to submit further evidence relating to its claims.   24    On 12 June 1980 the Greek State referred the case to arbitration according to Article 27 of the contract paragraphs 1 and 9 of which read as follows:        "1. Any difference, dispute or disagreement arising between      the State and the concessionaire <Mr. Stratis Andreadis> as      to the application of this Agreement and relative to the      implementation or interpretation of the terms and      conditions thereof and the extent of the rights and      obligations deriving therefrom shall be resolved      exclusively by arbitration by three arbitrators according      to the following procedure, no other arbitration agreement      being required.        9. The arbitration award shall be definite, final and      irrevocable, and shall constitute an enforceable instrument      requiring no further action for enforcement or any other      formality.   It shall be liable to no regular or      extraordinary judicial remedy.   The party failing to comply      with the provisions of the arbitration award shall be      obligated to make good any and all damages (damnum emergens      or lucrum cessans) caused to the other party."   25    On 17 June 1980 arbitration proceedings commenced in accordance with the above clause at the initiative suit of the State.   The latter requested the Arbitration Court to declare that all claims for compensation against the State brought by Stran in the action before the First Instance Court were unfounded (action for a declaratory award). The applicant company appeared before the Arbitration Court arguing that this court had no jurisdiction in the case. The company further refuted the State's submissions.   26    On 27 February 1984 the Court of Arbitration gave its award concluding that it was competent and accepting a part of the State's claims.   The Court of Arbitration found in particular that the claims of the company   were well founded up to Drachmas 116,273,442, US$ 16,054,165 and French Francs 614,627 and unfounded as far as they exceeded these sums.   27    On 24 July 1984 the company applied to the First Instance Court for an order for the return by the Greek State of a letter of guarantee. By its judgment No 3113/1985 the court adjourned the proceedings until a final judgment would be given on the company's original action before the same court (see para. 23 above)   28    On 2 May 1985 the State challenged the decision of the Court of Arbitration before the Athens First Instance Court requesting the arbitration proceedings and the award to be declared null and void. By its decision No 5526/1985 the Athens First Instance Court dismissed the State's action having found, by a majority, that the decision whereby the contract was annulled did not affect the validity of the arbitration clause.   29    On 4 November 1986 the Athens Court of Appeal (Efeteio) confirmed the above decision (judgment No 9336/1986).   30    On 15 December 1986 the State appealed to the Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos).   31    On 17 December 1986 the applicant company withdrew its original court action which was still pending before the Athens First Instance Court and requested the proceedings for the return of the letter of guarantee (cf. para. 27 above) to continue. Having regard to the State's appeal before the Court of Cassation, the Athens First Instance Court adjourned the examination of the case until the final judgment of the Court of Cassation.   32    Before the Court of Cassation a hearing was originally scheduled to take place on 4 May 1987 but it was subsequently adjourned to 1 June 1987.   33    On 25 May 1987 the Parliament enacted Law 1701/1987 by publication in the Official Gazette.   The principal stated object of this law was to expropriate the assets in certain oil companies and to provide for compensation.   Moreover, Article 12 of Law 1701/1987 provides as follows:        "1. The true and lawful meaning of the provisions of      Article 2 para. 1 of Statute 141/1975 concerning the      termination of contracts entered into between 21 April 1967      and 24 July 1974 is that, upon the termination of these      contracts, all their terms, conditions and clauses      including the arbitration clause, are ipso facto repealed      and the arbitration tribunal no longer has jurisdiction.        2. Arbitration awards and/or decisions referred to in      paragraph 1 are no longer valid or enforceable.        3. Any principal or ancillary claims against the Greek      State, expressed either in foreign or local currency, which      arise out of any of the contracts statutorily sanctioned      entered into between 21 April 1967 and 24 July 1974 and      terminated pursuant to Law No. 141/1975, are now      extinguished by prescription.        4. Any court proceedings at whatever level pending at the      time of the enactment of this statute, in respect of claims      referred to in the paragraph above, are cancelled."   34    On 10 July 1987 the First Chamber of the Court of Cassation gave its judgment No. 1387/1987 declaring, inter alia, that the provisions in Article 12 of Law 1701/1987 were unconstitutional. The Chamber noted in particular the following:        "The (provisions of the Constitution) afford superior force      to Law 141/1975 and also prohibit any subsequent amendment      or supplementation or even authentic interpretation of that      law by the ordinary legislator. The purpose of such      superior force and of the constitutional provision for a      'law to be issued once only within three months after the      Constitution enters into force' is to establish legislative      stability and international confidence in investments in      Greece.   This opinion is based on the only possible meaning      of the reference to '... a law to be issued once only ...'      and in the ease with which that condition could be breached      if amendments or supplementations or authentic      interpretations were permitted of the law which has been      issued."        The Chamber referred the matter to the Plenary Court of Cassation.   35    The Plenary Court of Cassation held a hearing on 25 February 1988.   In its judgment No 4/1989 of 16 March 1989 the Court of Cassation found that the interpretative provision of Article 12 para. 1 of Law 1701/1987 was not unconstitutional per se for the following reasons:        "<The Constitution> provides for the enactment of a law,      '... to be issued once ...', which - as to its nature -      carries a superior force in the sense that it may not be      amended or changed by a common law (...).   However, the      prohibition of amending or changing the content of laws      carrying a superior force does not also mean the exclusion      of the interpretation of such laws.   Their special nature      does grant to such laws a precedence over common laws, but      it does not also exclude their interpretation,... when this      is dictated by the necessity of circumstances.   This is so      because interpretation does not change the content of a law      being interpreted, but reveals its original meaning and      resolves the differences that arose from its application or      that may arise in the future.   The need for (such      interpretation) will be finally judged by the Court, which      has a duty to check whether the law being interpreted has      actually created a doubt as to its meaning justifying the      legislative intervention.        (...)        Therefore, in principle, the interpretation of Law 141/1975      is not contrary to the Constitution on the mere premise      that such Law carries a superior force.   However, the      issues arise on the one hand, whether there was a need for      interpretation in this specific case and on the other hand,      whether or not the other non-interpretative provisions of      that law are contrary to the Constitution.        As noted hereinabove, the wording of Article 2, paragraph 5      of Law 141/1975 is unclear and this creates a doubt as to      whether -following the termination of the agreement- the      arbitration clause retains its force.   In the present case      the doubt originally arose when the interested parties      resorted to the civil court and subsequently (following the      issuance of a preliminary judgment by the First Instance      Court) when that action was abandoned and the parties      resorted to arbitration.   Diametrically opposite views were      then presented and were also expressed in the arbitration      award issued.   However, irrespective of the doubts which      arose in this case, the matter relates to the acceptance or      non-acceptance of the doctrine of the independence of an      arbitration clause and the extent of such independence.      The issue has long created a serious difference of opinions      in international case-law ..., the result being that in      certain countries the principle of the survival of the      arbitration clause prevails ..., while in other countries      the prevailing view is that the termination of an agreement      also leads to the cancellation of the arbitration clause      and to the consequent reference of all disputes to the      ordinary courts, and yet in other countries the principle      prevails that the separation of the arbitration agreement      from the contract applies only to disputes of a certain      nature.        Therefore, there was a need to interpret Law 141/1975.   The      interpretation resolved the matter, as concerns the Greek      State, by ruling in favour of the cancellation of the      arbitration clause after the termination of the agreements      which were concluded during the dictatorship period, as      well as of the termination of any jurisdiction of the court      of arbitration.   The need for such action by the legislator      is not ruled out by the fact that the legislative      intervention emerged ... five days before the hearing of      the case before the First Chamber of this Court following      an adjournment, because the instant case served as the      occasion for settling an already existent issue.        Given the above, it cannot be considered that the action of      the legislator to proceed to an interpretation constitutes      an intervention in and encroachment on the competence of      the ordinary courts in this specific dispute.   In view of      the above, the provision of Article 12, para. 1 of Law      1701/1987 does not overstep the limits which have been set      by the Constitution."   36    As regards para. 2 of Article   12, the Court of Cassation found that this provision was not unconstitutional since it essentially supplemented the provision of para. 1 aiming at "rendering powerless any arbitration awards which may have been issued after the termination of the contracts and which would not have been issued if the true meaning of Law 141/1975 had been clarified in time".   37    The Court of Cassation refused to examine the constitutionality of para. 3, since this provision was not applicable in the litigation before it.   38    Finally, the Court of Cassation found that the application of Article 12 para. 4 to the present case constituted an "intervention in and an encroachment on the competence of the courts" since the enactment of this provision just prior to the hearing of the cassation appeal was aiming at excluding the judicial investigation of the validity of the challenged award. It was therefore contrary to the constitutionally secured principle of the separation of powers.   39    The matter was accordingly remitted back to the First Chamber of the Court of Cassation for an examination of the State's appeal.   40    A hearing before the First Chamber of the Court of Cassation took place on 12 February 1990.   41    The Court gave its judgment on 11 April 1990.   It quashed the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeal and declared the arbitration award null and void pursuant to the provisions of Article 12 of Law 1701/1987.   B.    Relevant domestic law and practice   42    Article 26 of the Constitution (Separation of Powers)        "1. Legislative power shall be vested in Parliament and the      President of the Republic.        2. Executive power shall be vested in the President of the      Republic and the Government.        3. Judicial power shall be vested in the courts of law, the      decisions of which shall be executed in the name of the      Greek People."   43    Article 77 of the Constitution (Authentic Interpretation)        "1. The authentic interpretation of the laws shall rest      with the legislative power.        2.   A law which is not truly interpretative shall enter      into force as of its publication."   44    Article 93 para.4 (Control of constitutionality of laws)        "The Courts shall be bound not to apply laws, the contents      of which are contrary to the Constitution."   45    Article 107 of the Constitution and Law 141/1975        Following the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974, the legislator decided the revocation of various administrative acts issued during the 7-year military regime   which concerned capital investments. This was deemed necessary since by such acts the military regime had granted benefits to various investors which were regarded as excessive or preferential and inconsistent with the general public interest. Article 107 para. 2 of the Constitution of 1975 provided that "a law which will be issued once only within three months from the date of entry into force of the Constitution, shall determine the terms and the procedure for the revision or termination of ... the contracts concluded from 21 April 1967 to 23 July 1974 concerning foreign investments...".        Law 141/1975 was issued for this purpose and provided, inter alia, that the termination of such contracts could take place by a unilateral decision of the Ministerial Economic Committee. Article 2 para. 5 of Law 141/1975 reads, in as far as relevant, as follows:        "Following the termination of the contract ... the      privileges and the special arrangements ... cease and the      enterprise or the investment is subject to the common      legislation concerning ordinary enterprises and      investments..."   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   46    The Commission has declared admissible the following complaints by the applicants:        a) that as a result of the enactment and the application of Law 1701/1987 in their case they have not been entitled to a fair hearing in the determination of their civil rights to compensation ;          b) that their case has not been determined within a reasonable time ;        c) that as a result, on the one hand, of the provisions of Article 12 of Law 1701/1987 and, on the other hand, of the lengthy and dilatory proceedings instituted by the Greek State they are deprived of their property rights which have been recognised by the arbitration award.   B.    Points at issue   47    The following points are at issue in the present application:        - whether there has been a violation of the applicants' right to a fair hearing by a tribunal under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention;        - whether the length of the proceedings exceeded the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention;        - whether there has been a violation of the applicants' right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.   C.    Fair trial by a tribunal   48    The applicants allege a violation of their right to a fair hearing in the determination of their civil right to compensation under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal      established by law."   49    The applicants submit that they participated in the arbitration proceedings in reliance upon the good faith of the State which called for and took part in these proceedings.   On the contrary the State, having failed in the arbitration proceedings, embarked upon a series of dilatory appeals which failed.   50    The applicants observe that Law 1701/1987 was enacted five days before the hearing in their case before the Court of Cassation.   They find that the purpose of this Law was to bar the applicants from having their claims resulting from the discontinuation of the contract determined. In this respect they submit that Article 12 of Law 1701/1987 constitutes an unfair and calculated attempt to interfere with and encroach upon the powers of the judiciary.   51    The applicants submit that the judgment of the Plenary of the Court of Cassation by declaring Article 12 para. 4 of Law 1701/1987 inapplicable to their case did not remedy the situation.   The sole effect of that judgment was that the domestic proceedings were not cancelled.   However, the applicability of paras. 1 to 3 of Article 12 of Law 1701/1987 in fact put an end to the litigation since under these provisions the arbitration award is no longer valid or enforceable and their claims are extinguished by prescription.           The applicants consider that this constitutes an infringement of the rule of law.   52    The Government argue that an action by the legislator involving an authentic interpretation of Law 141/1975 was necessary in order to settle the controversies as to the meaning of the provisions of this Law.   It was not, therefore, an interference with the applicants' case before the courts.   53    The Government submit that the abolition of the arbitration clause in the contract was an obvious consequence of Law 141/1975. However, a dispute arose as to the real will of the legislator, which dispute was expressed in the legal writings of distinguished lawyers and in the contradictory decisions of the courts. The parties to the present litigation alternatively supported different opinions and views. It was a matter of principle for the legislator to make clear that his will was to eliminate from the economic and public life the consequences of the military regime and not to tolerate the exercise of rights or privileges acquired in non-democratic political situations.   54    The Government further note that the exercise by the legislator of his right to interpret a law is expressly provided by the Constitution. The exercise of this right is controlled by the courts which are bound not to apply a law which is unconstitutional. In the present case the constitutionality of the provisions of Law 1701/1987 was challenged before the Plenary of the Court of Cassation and this court found the provisions of Article 12 paras. 1 and 2 to be in conformity with the Constitution, while at the same time it declared para. 4 unconstitutional. Consequently, contrary to the applicants' allegations, the decision as to the validity of the arbitration clause and award was not taken by the legislator but by the Court of Cassation.   55    The Commission first observes that the issue which was under litigation before the domestic courts was the validity of the arbitration award given in the applicants' favour. The question raised under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is whether the matter was decided by an independent and impartial court after a fair hearing. This provision does not only require that the parties' arguments are heard by the courts in adversarial proceedings. It also guarantees the principle of equality of arms and requires that the matter under litigation is decided by the courts on the basis of the relevant existing legislation and without any interference by any of the parties or by any other State authority.   56    The Commission notes that the   constitutionality of the provisions complained of was debated before and decided by the Plenary of the Court of Cassation after both parties had been heard. The proceedings were not cancelled and the litigation ended by a judgment of the First Chamber of the Court of Cassation.   57    However, the Commission also observes that the issue as to the validity of the award, which was the subject matter of the litigation, was expressly addressed by the legislator while the proceedings were pending. By interpreting the existing law in favour of the invalidity of the arbitration clause and by providing that the award was null and void Article 12 paras. 1 and 2 of Law 1701/1987 left no room for a decision by the court and in reality determined the outcome of the proceedings.   58    The Commission notes the Government's argument that such a legislative intervention was necessary, since not only the parties to this case but also the courts, individual judges and distinguished lawyers had expressed differing opinions on the disputed point.   59    The Commission cannot however follow this approach. The fact that contradictory or differing views are expressed is rather common in court litigations. Courts are often required, in the exercise of their judicial functions, to clarify the will of the legislator by interpreting the laws. Moreover, the Government have been unable to present a single case, other than that of the applicants, to which the challenged provisions have been applied.   60    The Commission finds no sufficient explanation for the fact that this interpretative legislative action was not taken until 1987, i.e. 12 years after the enactment of Law 141/1975 and 9 years after the commencement of the litigation, at a moment when the proceedings were reaching their end.   61    It observes, furthermore, that no explanation was given for the apparent inconsistency between the State's position in 1979, when it called for arbitration, and action taken in 1987, when the legislator intervened in favour of the invalidity of the arbitration clause and proceedings.   62    To sum up, the Commission finds nothing to support the submission that the legislative intervention was necessary at the time it occurred.   63    In this respect the Commission recalls the following remarks in the Golder judgment (Eur. Court H.R., Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 17, paras. 34-35):        "One reason why the signatory Governments decided to 'take the      first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the      Rights stated in the Universal Declaration' was their profound      belief in the rule of law.   It seems both natural and in      conformity with the principle of good faith (Article 31 para. 1      of the Vienna Convention) to bear in mind this widely      proclaimedconsideration when interpreting the terms of Article 6      para. 1 (Art. 6-1) according to their context and in the light      of the object and purpose of the Convention.        This is all the more so since the Statute of the Council of      Europe, an organisation of which each of the States Parties to      the Convention is a Member (Article 66 of the Convention), refers      in two places to the rule of law; first in the Preamble, where      the signatory Governments affirm their devotion to this      principle, and secondly in Article 3 which provides that 'every      Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principle of the      rule of law ...        The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being      submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally 'recognised'      fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle      of international law which forbids the denial of justice.      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must be read in the light of these      principles."   64    In the Commission's view where a court is dealing with a dispute between an individual and the State over civil rights and obligations, the legislator must not take action with a view to resolving that particular pending dispute. Were Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) to permit such action, a Contracting State could, without acting in breach of that text, prevent its courts from exercising in practice their jurisdiction to determine civil actions brought against the State. Such assumption, indissociable from a danger of arbitrary power, would have serious consequences which are incompatible with the rule of law.   65    The Commission finds therefore that by enacting and applying Article 12 paras. 1 and 2 of Law 1701/1987 in the applicants' case the Greek authorities denied the applicants the right to have their civil rights and obligations determined after a fair hearing by a tribunal.        Conclusion   66    The Commission finds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) as regards the applicants' right to a fair hearing by a tribunal.   D.    Length of the proceedings   67    The applicants further complain that their case was not determined within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   68    According to the consistent case-law of the Court and the Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings falling within the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and that of the competent authorities (cf., for example, Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no 198, p. 12, para. 30).   69    As regards the proceedings which the applicants instituted before the First Instance Court of Athens on 10 November 1978, the Commission notes that these proceedings are still pending. It recalls that the period for which it is competent began on 20 November 1985, when Greece recognised the Commission's competence to receive individual applications. However,   in assessing the reasonableness of the proceedings account must be taken of the state of the proceedings on the above-mentioned date (cf. Eur.Court H.R., Foti and Others judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no 56, pp. 18-19, para. 53) The Commission observes that these proceedings were in practice discontinued when the case was referred to arbitration. Moreover, on 17 December 1986 the applicants declared that they wished to withdraw these proceedings and since that date they have taken no further procedural steps.   70    In view of the above elements the Commission finds that the length of these proceedings is essentially due to the fact that the applicants were no longer interested in their continuation.   71    The Commission further notes that it is competent ratione temporis to examine the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings concerning the validity of the arbitration award but not the arbitration proceedings as such. It recalls in this respect that the arbitration proceedings as such ended before 20 November 1985, when recognition by Greece of the right of individual petition took effect.   72    The proceedings concerning the validity of the arbitration award commenced on 2 May 1985 and terminated on 11 April 1990. They lasted nearly 5 years. The first instance and appeal proceedings lasted 18 months.   The total length of the cassation proceedings is more than 3 years but during this period the Court of Cassation gave three judgments in the case. Having regard to the complexity of the issues dealt with by the Court of Cassation, the Commission finds that the length of these proceedings can still be considered as reasonable.        Conclusion   73    The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 2, that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as regards the length of the proceedings.   E.    Peaceful enjoyment of possessions   74    The applicants complain that as a result, on the one hand, of the lengthy and dilatory proceedings and, on the other hand, of the provisions of Article 12 of Law 1701/1987 they have been deprived of their property rights recognised by the arbitral award. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of      his possessions except in the public interest and subject      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general      principles of international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it      deems necessary to control the use of property in      accordance with the general interest or to secure the      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."   75    The applicants submit that the arbitral award, although of a declaratory nature, represents a financial asset and a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (P1-1). As a result of the entry into force of Law 1701/1987 this award was annulled and all their claims were extinguished by prescription.   76    The Government submit that the arbitral award was based on a very precarious legal ground and was finally invalidated. The applicants were aware of the precarious nature of the award since they knew and had themselves pleaded for the incompetence of the arbitration court. Nevertheless, the applicants did not take any steps to accelerate the proceedings before the ordinary courts in order to avoid any disadvantages which might result from a possible nullity of the arbitration proceedings.   77    The Government further observe that the prescription of the applicants' claims is a necessary limitation in the exercise of their rights. As the applicants' claims resulted from a preferential contract prejudicial to the public interest, prescription of the claims after 10 years cannot be considered unre