CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 14 mai 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                          Application No. 12884/87                                     O.                                   against                                   Austria                          REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                          (adopted on 14 May 1993)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                    Page I.     INTRODUCTION       (para. 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         A.    The application            (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         B.    The proceedings            (paras. 5 - 10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         C.    The present Report            (paras. 11 - 15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS       (paras. 16 - 22). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         A.    The particular circumstances of the case            (paras. 16 - 20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         B.    Relevant domestic law            (paras. 21 - 22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION       (paras. 23 - 48). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         A.    Complaints declared admissible            (para. 23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         B.    Points at issue            (para. 24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         C.    As to the applicability of Article 6            para. 1 of the Convention            (paras. 25 - 35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         D.    As to compliance with Article 6            para. 1 of the Convention            (paras. 36 - 45) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11              1.   Scope of the review by the                Administrative Court                (paras. 36 - 41) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11              2.   Fairness of the proceedings                (paras. 42 - 45) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13         E.    Recapitulation            (paras. 46 - 47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14   Concurring opinion of Mr. H.G. Schermers, Mrs. J. Liddy, MM. J-C. Geus and B. Marxer. . . . . . . . . . . . .15   Concurring opinion of Sir Basil Hall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17   APPENDIX I        : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . .18   APPENDIX II       : DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY. . . . . . . . . .19   I.     INTRODUCTION   1.     The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.     The application   2.     The applicant is an Austrian citizen, born in 1913.   She lives in Linz and was initially represented by Mr. R. Proksch, a lawyer in Vienna.   Since the application has been declared admissible, she has been represented by Mr. H. Blum, a lawyer in Linz.   3.     The Government were represented initially by their agent, Ambassador H. Türk, Head of the International Law Department at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and latterly by his successor, Ambassador F. Cede.   4.      The application concerns court proceedings in which the applicant attempted, without success, to challenge planning permission granted to her neighbours for the construction of houses on land adjoining the applicant's property.   The applicant invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   B.     The proceedings   5.     The application was introduced on 10 September 1986 and registered on 8 April 1987.   6.     After considering the case on 12 July 1989 and 2 July 1990, on 11 July 1991 the Commission decided to request observations of the parties in connection with the applicability of Article 6 to the proceedings at issue, and whether the scope of the Administrative Court's jurisdiction was sufficient to comply with that provision.   The Commission also asked whether the proceedings were "fair".   7.     The Government submitted their observations on 6 December 1991 and the applicant was set a time-limit of 2 February 1992 for submitting observations in reply.   On 7 February 1992 the applicant's representative requested an extension of the time-limit for submitting observations.   The request was refused on 20 February 1992.   8.     On 29 June 1992 the Commission declared admissible the application to the extent that it related to the proceedings before the Administrative and Constitutional Courts, and inadmissible as to the remainder.   9.     On 17 July 1992 the applicant's initial representative submitted observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.   On 28 August 1992 her present representative, Mr. Blum, submitted further comments.   10.    After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.     The present Report   11.    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:                MM.   C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS              Mrs. G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ RUIZ                   C. L. ROZAKIS              Mrs. J. LIDDY              MM.   J.-C. GEUS                   M. P. PELLONPÄÄ                   B. MARXER                   G.B. REFFI   12.    The text of this Report was adopted on 14 May 1993 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:   i)     to establish the facts, and   ii)    to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a       breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the       Convention.   14.    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   15.    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     The particular circumstances of the case   16.    Land adjoining the applicant's property in Leonding (Upper Austria) was re-designated as building land by the Leonding municipal council in an area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) of 12 September 1980.   On 30 January 1981 a building plan (Bebauungsplan) permitted the construction of terraced houses on the land.   Individual planning consents were granted in respect of three houses.   The applicant challenged these consents before the local authorities, the final decisions of the authorities being decisions of the Upper Austrian Provincial Government of 27 May 1982 (parcel 725/7), 8 July 1982 (parcel 725/6), 3 September 1982 (parcel 725/5), 14 October 1982 (parcel 725/4) and 22 October 1982 (parcel 725/3).   She then made two constitutional complaints to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof, parcels 725/6 and 725/7) and three administrative complaints to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof, parcels 725/3, 725/4 and 725/5).   17.    In her constitutional complaints, the applicant alleged that the planning consents relating to two of the plots (numbers 725/6 and 725/7) interfered with her constitutional rights and that they applied unlawful norms (gesetzwidrige Verordnungen).   On 2 October 1985 the Constitutional Court interrupted its proceedings as it had doubts as to the compatibility of the area zoning plan and the building plan with the Upper Austrian Regional Planning Act (Oberösterreichisches Raumordnungsgesetz).   The Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to include the parcels of land under consideration by it (numbers 725/3, 725/4 and 725/5) in the norm control proceedings (Verordnungsprüfungsverfahren).   18.    On 19 March 1986 the Constitutitional Court found both the area zoning plan and the building plan to be lawful.   On the same date it also rejected the applicant's individual complaints and referred them to the Administrative Court.   19.   On 30 September 1986 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant's complaint relating to parcel 725/5.   It found, inter alia, as follows:         [Original]         "Da dem Nachbar auf die Einhaltung der ... Bestimmung [Art. 23       Abs. 2 der OÖ Bauordnung 1976] ein subjektiv-öffentliches, im       Baubewilligungsverfahren grundsätzlich zu berücksichtigendes       Recht zusteht ..., war im gegebenen Zusammenhang zu prüfen, ob       der auf dem zu errichtenden Zufahrtsweg entlang der Grenze der       Liegenschaft der Beschwerdeführerin zu erwartende, durch den       geplanten Bau verursachte zusätzliche Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen       eine erhebliche Belästigung der Beschwerdeführerin herbeiführen       wird...         Den der Lärmfrage gewidmeten Ausführungen in den schon erwähnten       Äusserungen der Unterabteilung Immissionsschutz des Amtes der OÖ       Landesregierung (vom 23 Mai 1982) ist zu entnehmen, daß der       Fahrweg aus der Garage bis zur Einbindung in die Zaubertal-Straße       im vorliegenden Fall 48 m lang sei ... und unter der Annahme, daß       dieser Fahrweg mit einer durchschnittlichen Geschwindigkeit von       5 km/h zurückgelegt werde, die Zeit, welche von der Ausfahrt aus       der Garage bis zur Einbindung in das öffentliche Gut verstreiche,       rund 35 Sekunden betrage...         ... Angesichts des Umstandes, daß die Beschwerdeführerin den       dargestellten Erwägungen des Sachverständigen während des       Verfahrens nicht durch konkrete Angaben entgegengetreten ist,       kann der Gerichtshof dem Unterbleiben der von der       Beschwerdeführerin geforderten Messung des Grundgeräuschpegels       sowie dem relevierten Mangel der Äußerung des medizinischen       Sachverständigen keine im Sinne des Art. 42 Abs. 2 Z. 3 lit. b       und c VwGG wesentliche und damit zur Aufhebung des angefochtenen       Bescheids führende Bedeutung beimessen, zumal die       Beschwerdeführerin auch gar nicht dargetan hat, warum die       Baubehörden anderfalls zu dem Ergebnis gekommen wären, daß der       erwähnte zusätzliche - unwidersprochen äußerst geringfügige -       Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen zu einer erheblichen   Belästigung der       Beschwerdeführerin auf ihrer Liegenschaft führen werde. ...              Auf die in der Beschwerde vorgebrachte Behauptung, die       Annahme eines durchschnittlichen Verkehrsaufkommens auf der       Zaubertal-Straße mit 40 Kraftfahrzeugen pro Tag sei wesentlich       erhöht, kann der Gerichtshof auf Grund des sich aus Art. 41       Abs. 1 VwGG ergebenden Neuerungsverbotes nicht eingehen.       ...       Die Beschwerdeführerin hat weder in der Vorstellung gegen diesen       Bescheid noch in der Beschwerde konkret dargetan, inwiefern ihren       gegenständlichen Einwendungen Berechtigung zukomme, weshalb die       vorligende Verfahrensrüge schon mangels Erkennbarkeit der       Wesentlichkeit der relevierten Verletzung von       Verfahrensvorschriften im Sinne des Art. 42 Abs. 2 Z. 3 VwGG       nicht zur Aufhebung des angefochtenen Bescheides führen kann.       ...       Die vorliegende Beschwerde erweist sich daher insgesamt als       unbegründet, weshalb sie gemäß Art. 42 Abs. 1 VwGG abzuweisen       war."         [Translation]         "As the neighbour has a public law, subjective right to       compliance with the ... provision [Section 23 (2) Upper Austrian       Building Regulations Act 1976], which right must, in principle,       be considered in the planning proceedings, ... the Court was       required in the present case to consider whether the additional       traffic caused by the proposed development on the proposed access       drive along the boundary of the applicant's property will give       rise to considerable nuisance for the applicant ...         From the statements concerning noise in the comments ... of the       Immission Protection Sub-division of the Office of the Upper       Austrian Provincial Authority (of 23 May 1982) it can be seen       that the drive runs 48 m from the garage to the junction with the       Zaubertal Road ... and that, assuming an average speed of 5 km/h,       it takes 35 seconds to get from the garage to the junction with       the public road ...         ... In the light of the circumstance that the applicant has not       contested the above conclusions of the expert with reference to       concrete facts, the Court cannot find any failing of importance       within the meaning of Section 42 (2) (3) (b) or (c) of the       Administrative Court Act, which would lead to the challenged       decision being quashed, either in the failure to take a reading       of the background noise level, or in the alleged failure of the       medical expert to express an opinion.   The Court notes that the       applicant has not stated how, if the planning authorities had       ordered these matters, it would have come to the conclusion that       the additional - uncontestedly very minor - vehicular traffic       would lead to considerable nuisance for the applicant on her       property...              The Court is not entitled to consider the applicant's       contention that the assumption that an average of some 40 vehicle       movements per day was considerably exaggerated, by virtue of the       rule prohibiting new matters before the Administrative Court       contained in Section 41 (1) of the Administrative Court Act.       ...       Neither in her complaint against the decision challenged, nor in       her (administrative) complaint has the applicant stated in       concrete terms in what way her complaints are justified, and       therefore, in the absence of indications of the importance of the       alleged violation of procedural rules as provided for by       Section 42 (2)(3) of the Administrative Court Act, the present       procedural complaint cannot lead to the challenged decision being       quashed.       ...       Accordingly, the present complaint is ill-founded as a whole, and       is to be rejected pursuant to Section 42 (1) of the       Administrative Court Act."         The complaints relating to parcels 725/3 and 725/4 were rejected on 14 October 1986.   The reasoning repeated that of 30 September 1986.     20.    On 28 October 1986 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant's complaints which had been remitted to it by the Constitutional Court concerning parcels numbers 725/6 and 725/7.   Its reasoning in each judgment followed closely that in the judgment of 14 October, save that the Court recited the Constitutional Court's decisions and finally dismissed the complaints under Section 35 (1) of the Administrative Court Act, which provides for dismissal, without further proceedings, of cases in which it is apparent that the alleged violation of the law did not take place (Beschwerden, deren Inhalt erkennen läßt, daß die ... behauptete Rechtsverletzung nicht vorliegt, sind ohne weiteres Verfahren ... als unbegründet abzuweisen).   B.     Relevant domestic law   21.    Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act provides, in so far as relevant:         [German]         "(1)   Der Verwaltungsgerichtshof hat, soweit er nicht       Rechtswidrigkeit wegen Unzuständigkeit der belangten Behörde oder       wegen Verletzung von Verfahrensvorschriften gegeben findet (§ 42       Abs. 2 Z. 2 und 3) ..., den angefochtenen Bescheid auf Grund des       von der belangten Behörde angenommenen Sachverhaltes im Rahmen       der geltend gemachten Beschwerdepunkte ... zu überprüfen.   Ist       er der Ansicht, dass für die Entscheidung über die       Rechtswidrigkeit des Bescheides in einem der Beschwerdepunkte       ... Gründe massgebend sein könnten, die einer Partei bisher nicht       bekanntgegeben wurden, so hat er die Parteien darüber zu hören       und, wenn nötig, eine Vertagung zu verfügen."         [Translation]         "(1)   In so far as the Administrative Court does not find       unlawfulness on account of a lack of jurisdiction of the       authority against which the appeal is directed or on account of       a violation of procedural provisions (Section 42 para. 2 (2) and       (3)) ..., the Court must examine the contested decision on the       basis of the facts as accepted by the authority against which the       appeal is directed within the framework of the alleged complaint       ...   If it is of the opinion that reasons would be relevant for       the decision on the unlawfulness of the contested decision ...       which were so far not known to a party, it must hear the parties       thereupon and, if necessary, adjourn the proceedings."         Section 42 (2) of the Administrative Court Act provides, in so far as relevant:         [German]         "(2) Der angefochtene Bescheid ist aufzuheben       1.    wegen Rechtswidrigkeit seines Inhaltes,       2.    wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Unzuständigkeit            der belangten Behörde,       3.    wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Verletzung von            Verfahrensvorschriften, und zwar weil            a)     der Sachverhalt von der belangten Behörde                  in einem wesentlichen Punkt aktenwidrig                  angenommen wurde oder            b)     der Sachverhalt in einem wesentlichen                  Punkt einer Ergänzung bedarf oder            c)     Verfahrensvorschriften ausser acht gelassen                  wurden, bei deren Einhaltung die belangte                  Behörde zu einem anderen Bescheid hätte                  kommen können."         [Translation]         "(2) The contested decision must be quashed       1.    on account of the unlawfulness of its content,       2.    on account of unlawfulness due to the lack of            jurisdiction of the authority against which the            appeal is directed,       3.    on account of unlawfulness due to a violation of            procedural provisions in particular because            a)     the authority against which the appeal is                  directed has determined the facts on an                  important point contrary to the case-file, or            b)     the facts require to be supplemented on an important                  point, or            c)     procedural provisions have been disregarded                  which, if taken into consideration by the authority                  against which the appeal is directed, could have led                  to a different decision of the authority."   22.    Section 23 of the Upper Austrian Building Regulations Act (Ober- österreichische Bauordnung) provides as follows:         [German]         "(1) Bauliche Anlagen müssen in allen ihren Teilen nach den       Erfahrungen der technischen Wissenschaften so geplant und       errichtet werden, daß sie den normalerweise an bauliche       Anlagen der betreffenden Art zu stellenden Anforderungen       der Sicherheit, der Festigkeit, des Brand-, Wärme- und       Schallschutzes, der Gesundheit und der Hygiene, des       Umweltschutzes und der Zivilisation entsprechen und das       Orts- und Landschaftsbild nicht gestört wird...         (2) Im besonderen müssen bauliche Anlagen in allen ihren Teilen       so geplant und errichtet werden, daß schädliche       Umwelteinwirkungen möglichst vermieden werden.   Schädliche       Umwelteinwirkungen sind solche, die geeignet sind, ... erhebliche       Belästigungen für die Allgemeinheit und im besonderen für die       Benützer der Bauten und die Nachbarschaft herbeizuführen, wie       durch ... Lärm ..."         [Translation]         "(1) All parts of the building development must be planned and       constructed in all aspects so as to correspond to the state of       the technical sciences such that the development meets the normal       requirements of such buildings as regards safety, rigidity, fire       protection, insulation (sound and warmth), health, hygiene,       environmental protection and civilisation, and not to disturb the       visual amenity of town and country ..."         (2) In particular, all parts of building development must be so       planned and constructed as to avoid, as far as possible, harmful       environmental effects.   Harmful environmental effects are those       which are likely to give rise to ... considerable nuisance for       the generality and, in particular, for users of the buildings and       the neighbourhood, such as ... noise ..."         Section 46 provides:         [German]         "(2) Nachbarn können gegen die Erteilung der Baubewilligung       mit der Begründung Einwendungen erheben, daß sie durch das       Bauvorhaben in subjektiven Rechten verletzt werden, die       entweder in der Privatrechtsordnung (privatrechtliche       Einwendungen) oder im öffentlichen Recht (öffentlich-       rechtliche Einwendungen) begründet sind.         (3) Öffentlich-rechtliche Einwendungen der Nachbarn sind im       Baubewilligungsverfahren nur zu berücksichtigen, wenn sie       sich auf solche Bestimmungen des Baurechtes oder eines       Flächenwidmungsplanes oder Bebauungsplanes stützen, die       nicht nur dem öffentlichen Interesse sondern auch dem       Interesse der Nachbarschaft dienen.   Hierzu gehören       insbesondere alle Bestimmungen über die Bauweise, die       Ausnutzbarkeit des Bauplatzes, die Lage des Bauvorhabens,       die Abstände von den Nachbargrenzen und Nachbargebäuden,       die Gebäudehöhe, die Belichtung und Belüftung sowie jene       Bestimmungen, die gesundheitlichen Belangen oder dem Schutz       der Nachbarschaft gegen Immissionen dienen."         [Translation]         "(2) Neighbours may make objections to the grant of       planning permission on the ground that their subjective       rights have been affected.   Such subjective rights may be       based on private law (private law objections) or public law       (public law objections).         (3)   Public law objections of neighbours shall only be       taken into consideration in proceedings for the grant of       planning permission if they are based on provisions of the       building regulations, the area-zoning plan or the building       plan which serve not merely the general public interest but       also the interests of the neighbourhood.   These include, in       particular, all provisions concerning the type of building,       the use of the building land, the situation of the proposed       development, distances from adjoining boundaries and       buildings on adjoining properties, height of buildings,       light and air and provisions which are concerned with       health matters or protection of the neighbourhood against       emission."   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.     Complaints declared admissible   23.    The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints concerning the proceedings before the Administrative and Constitutional courts.   B.     Points at issue   24.    The issues to be determined are:         - whether there has been a violation of the applicant's right to       have her case determined by a tribunal within the meaning of       Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, and         - whether there has been a violation of the applicant's right to       a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)       of the Convention.   C.     As to the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)       of the Convention   25.    Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), insofar as relevant, provides         "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and       obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public       hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal       established by law."   26.    In the above court proceedings the applicant attempted to prevent construction on land adjoining her property by claiming - before the Constitutional Court - that the planning consents relating to two of the houses interfered with her constitutional rights and that they applied unlawful norms.   The Constitutional Court, after norm control proceedings to review the area zoning plan and the building plan at issue, rejected the applicant's constitutional complaints. Before the Administrative Court she made public law objections that her subjective rights had been affected.   In particular, she alleged that the noise which would affect her property as a result of traffic movements along the proposed private drive (which ran immediately next to the applicant's property) would constitute a "considerable nuisance".   27.    The applicant submits that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention applies.   28.    The Government submit that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not applicable to these proceedings.   The sole link between the proceedings and any property rights of the applicant was the public law interest which she was able to put forward in the proceedings.   29.    The Commission recalls that the Constitutional Court is exclusively called upon to review the constitutionality of the decisions of the administrative authorities concerned.   Its procedure does not as such involve a determination of civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, and it therefore falls outside the scope of this provision (cf. Ettl and others, Comm. Rep. 3.7.85, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 117, p. 24 with further reference to Eur. Court H.R., Sramek judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 84, p. 17, para. 35).   This position is not affected by the Commission's findings in the case of Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain (No. 12592/87, Comm. Rep. 14.1.92, pending before the European Court of Human Rights), in which the Commission found that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention applied to proceedings before the Spanish Constitutional Court because those specific proceedings and proceedings before the civil courts were inextricably interwoven.   30.    As to the proceedings before the Administrative Court, the Commission recalls that it is sufficient for the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) that proceedings are "pecuniary" in nature and that the action is founded on an alleged infringement of rights which were likewise pecuniary rights (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Editions Périscope judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-B, p. 66, para. 40) or that the outcome is "decisive for private rights and obligations" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., H. v. France judgment of 24 October 1989, Series A no. 162-A, p. 20, para. 47 with further references).   31.    The Commission must therefore determine whether the proceedings in the present case, which gave the applicant the opportunity to challenge the planning consent granted to her neighbours for the construction of terraced houses on land adjoining the applicant's, were directly or indirectly "pecuniary", or decisive for such private rights and obligations.   It notes, first, that there is no dispute in the present case as to the right at issue, namely the right under Section 46 of the Upper Austrian Building Regulations Act for neighbours to object to planning permission on the ground that their subjective rights have been affected.   32.    The applicant thus had a right to make such objections under Austrian law, and that right was clearly determined by the proceedings in the present case.   33.    The question remains whether the right so determined was "civil" within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, bearing in mind that the question of the classification of rights cannot be determined solely be reference to domestic law (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Feldbrugge judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 99, p. 12, para. 26). The Commission recalls that the Upper Austrian Building Regulations Act distinguishes between subjective rights which are based on private law and those which are based on public law.   The applicant based her complaint on public law objections, that is, that Section 23 (2) of the Upper Austrian Building Regulations Act had not been complied with. However, the applicant's intention in making her complaint was to prevent development on the land adjoining her house, as she considered that the development would adversely affect both her enjoyment of the property and its market value.   34.    Bearing in mind the close link between the proceedings which the applicant brought and the impact the result of those proceedings would have on her property, the Commission finds that the right at issue before the Administrative Court in the present case was "civil" in character.   35.    The Commission therefore finds that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention was applicable to the proceedings by which the applicant challenged her neighbours' planning consents.   D.     As to compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)       of the Convention   1.     The scope of the review by the Administrative Court   36.    The Commission must next examine the scope of the review afforded by the Austrian judicial authorities in this determination of civil rights in order to establish whether the applicant had access to a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   37.    The applicant considers that the Austrian Administrative and Constitutional Courts do not have the comprehensive jurisdicition to determine questions of fact and law, which is required by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   She points out that before the Constitutional Court the parties submit their arguments, the Constitutional Court receives the files from the administrative authorities, and the Court then decides.   The Court does not take proofs, but merely undertakes a cursory review (Grobprüfung) of whether the formal requirements for, for example, an area zoning plan have been complied with.   The Administrative Court is not permitted to consider the legality of an area zoning plan or a building plan at all, but is limited to referring the case to the Constitutional Court if questions of legality arise.   She adds, by reference to the Obermeier judgment (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 179) that in respect of its limited consideration of a case, the Administrative Court does not constitute a "court" because it is not able to take cognisance of factual matters.   38.    The Government contend that the applicant had access to two courts, namely the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court. With regard to the scope of the Administrative Court's review reference is made to Section 42 (2) 3 (a) - (c) of the Administrative Court Act according to which the Court can undertake a far-reaching review of the facts in a concrete case.   In the present case the Administrative Court undertook this examination with reference to the relevant provisions of the Upper Austrian Building Regulations Act.   39.    The Commission has had occasion recently to consider questions concerning the scope of review by the Administrative Court in the case of Zumtobel v. Austria (No. 12235/86, Comm. Rep.30.6.92, now pending before the European Court of Human Rights).   In that case, the Commission found as follows:         "68.   There remains the Administrative Court which decided on       the applicants' complaints about the expropriation.   These       complaints related inter alia to the adequacy of the envisaged       stretch of road within the meaning of Section 44 of the       Provincial Road Act and thus raised issues of both facts and law.         69.   The Commission recalls that in the case of Ettl and Others       it found, having regard in particular to Section 41 of the       Administrative Court Act, that the abstract possibility of a       limited review of the facts which the Administrative Court       enjoyed was not sufficient to establish its full jurisdiction       concerning the determination of the civil rights at issue (see       Comm. Report, loc. cit., p. 24, para. 85).   In the Obermeier case       the Court found that, if the relevant legislation contained no       precise provisions for the decision to be taken by the       administrative authorities, and the Administrative Court could       only examine whether the authorities had used their discretion       in a manner compatible with the law, such a limited review was       not an effective judicial review under Article 6 para. 1       (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., judgment of       28 June 1990, Series A no. 179, p. 23 para. 70).         70.   The Commission recalls that Section 42 para. 2 subpara. 3       of the Administrative Court Act, relied on by the Government in       the present case, played no part in the case of Ettl and Others       v. Austria. In the present case this provision enabled the       Administrative Court to quash the contested decision as being       unlawful due to procedural defects, if the Court found that the       administrative authority had determined the facts on an important       point contrary to the case-file; or that the facts required to       be supplemented on an important point; or that procedural       provisions had been disregarded which, if taken into       consideration, would have led to a different decision (cf.       para. 47 above).         71.   Thus, the Administrative Court was able to review the facts       of the case in that it could examine inter alia whether they had       been incorrectly or incompletely established by the Provincial       Government.   While the purpose of this review was to determine       any procedural defects leading to the unlawfulness of the       decision, Section 42 para. 2 subpara. 3 of the Administrative       Court Act did not restrict the Administrative Court in its power       to review the facts.   In particular, this provision sets no       limits in respect of the assessment and supplementation of the       facts.         72.   It is true that the Administrative Court in its decision of       22 September 1989 referred to Section 41 of the Administrative       Court Act (see above, para. 32).   Section 41 provides that the       Court is bound by the facts as accepted by the authority;       however, this provision expressly reserves Section 42 para. 2       subpara. 3 of the Administrative Court Act (see above, para. 46).       It follows that Section 41 does not restrict the Administrative       Court's powers under Section 42.         73.   Moreover, in its decision the Administrative Court       explained its powers of review, in particular that it could 'take       evidence for examining the question whether a procedural defect       is essential or whether the incriminated authority might have       arrived at a different decision by avoiding the alleged       procedural defect; the Administrative Court may resort to these       measures also in order to control the assessment of evidence'       (see above, para. 36).   The Commission sees no indication here       that the Administrative Court regarded itself as being restricted       in its review of the facts.         74.   The Commission