CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 8 juillet 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                          Application No. 18131/91                                   Stjerna                                   against                                   Finland   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                          (adopted on 8 July 1993)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                    Page   I.          INTRODUCTION            (paras. 1 - 14). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1              A.     The application                  (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1              B.     The proceedings                  paras. 5 - 9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1              C.     The present Report                  (paras. 10 - 14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1   II.         ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS            (paras. 15 - 46) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3              A.     The particular circumstances of the case                  (paras. 15 - 22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3              B.     Relevant domestic law and practice and                  legal co-operation                  (paras. 23 - 46) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4   III.        OPINION OF THE COMMISSION            (paras. 47 - 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10              A.     Complaints declared admissible                  (para. 47) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10              B.     Points at issue                  (para. 48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10              C.     Article 8 of the Convention                  (paras. 49 - 71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10              D.     Article 14 of the Convention                  (paras. 72 - 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13              E.     Recapitulation                  (paras. 80 - 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. TRECHSEL, MR. ERMACORA, MRS. THUNE, MR. ROZAKIS AND MR. NOWICKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. LOUCAIDES. . . . . . . . . . . . .18   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. PELLONPÄÄ. . . . . . . . . . . . .19   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. LIDDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21   APPENDIX I   :     HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . .22   APPENDIX II :     DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY. . . . . . . . . . .23   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.     The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.     The application   2.     The applicant is a Finnish citizen born in 1936 and resident in Helsinki. He is a customs inspector by profession. He is represented by Mr. Markku Fredman, a lawyer practising in Helsinki.   3.     The application is directed against Finland. The respondent Government are represented by Ambassador Tom Grönberg, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki.   4.     The application relates to the refusal of the applicant's request for permission to change his surname. The applicant complains under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention.   B.     The proceedings   5.     The application was introduced on 11 March 1991 and registered on 25 April 1991.   6.     On 2 December 1991 the Commission decided to invite the Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.   7.     The Government's observations were submitted on 28 February 1992 and the applicant's observations in reply on 13 April 1992.   8.     On 29 June 1992 the Commission declared the application admissible.   9.     After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement. Active consultations with the parties took place between 2 July and 10 August 1992. In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.     The present Report   10.    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:              MM.    C. A. NØRGAARD, President                  S. TRECHSEL                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. G. SCHERMERS                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs.   G. H. THUNE            Sir    Basil HALL            MM.    F. MARTINEZ RUIZ                  C. L. ROZAKIS            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M. P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  M. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO   11.    The text of this Report was adopted on 8 July 1993 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   12.    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:   i)     to establish the facts, and   ii)    to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a       breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the       Convention.   13.    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   14.    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     The particular circumstances of the case   15.    In March 1989 the applicant requested the County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen) of the County of Uusimaa to grant him permission to have his surname Stjerna (pronounced "Shaerna") changed to "Tawaststjerna", a name used by his ancestors.   The applicant further referred to practical inconveniences in using his present name of old Swedish form, as it is less known and, because of pronunciation difficulties, easily misspelt, as "Stjärna", "Säärna", "Saarna", "Seerna", "Sierna", "Tierna", "Tsäärna" and "Stjerba".   16.    By an advisory opinion of 19 April 1989 to the County Administrative Board the Advisory Name Board (nimilautakunta, nämnden för namnärenden) objected to the change, as it had not been shown that the proposed name had been in established use by his ancestors.   The Board noted that one of the ancestors had been born out of wedlock. It further had regard to the fact that the name had belonged to very distant ancestors of the applicant and that the expression "ancestor" in the Surname Act (sukunimilaki 694/85, släktnamnslagen 694/85) does not include all direct ancestors of an applicant, without any limitations.   The Board referred to Section 10 para. 2 of the Act.   17.    During the subsequent exchange of views between the applicant and the Name Board the applicant on 14 June 1989 stated that his present name had given rise to a pejorative nickname, "kirnu" (Eng. churn) derived from "Tsäärna".   He contended that the distant relationship with his ancestors could not be interpreted to his detriment.   He further contested that his ancestor had been born out of wedlock and referred to the result of a genealogical investigation submitted to the County Administrative Board.   18.    The Name Board on 25 October 1989 contended that the proposed name was inappropriate and that the request should be refused. It noted that the applicant had put forward a weighty reason for his request, that is the obscure character of his present name.   However, although he was a descendant of an ancestor named Tavaststjerna who had died in 1773, the relationship between the applicant and that ancestor was remote. Moreover, the proposed name could result in inconveniences similar to those caused by the applicant's present name.   19.    On 21 November 1989 the applicant complained that an expert opinion submitted to the Name Board by a member of that Board was partial.   He further stated that his present name was causing delays in his mail because of spelling difficulties. He changed, however, the proposed name to "Tavaststjerna" in order to comply with the spelling form recommended by the member of the Name Board.   20.    On 26 January 1990 the applicant made further submissions to the County Administrative Board, arguing that he had complied with all criteria set out by the Name Board.   He further referred to a telephone conversation with a member of the Name Board according to whom a further criterion taken into account by the Board was the old-fashioned character of the proposed name.   This criterion, however, had not been stated in its opinions.   21.    On 12 February 1990 the County Administrative Board, in application of Section 10 para. 2 of the Surname Act, rejected the applicant's request, finding that it had not been shown that the proposed name had been in established use by his ancestors, as the first ancestor to carry his present name had been born out of wedlock to the last ancestor carrying the proposed new surname. On the other hand, the Board found that the name had been used by very distant ancestors, for which reason the proposed change could not be considered appropriate.   22.    On the applicant's appeal the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) on 14 November 1990 (by 4 votes to 1) upheld the County Administrative Board's decision.   The Court stated:         "From the documents in the case it is established that [the       applicant's] ancestor, Mr. Fredrik Stjerna, born in ...       1764, was the child of Mr. Magnus Fredrik Tavaststjerna       born out of wedlock.   However, merely for this reason the       proposed name cannot be considered to have belonged to [the       applicant's] ancestors in such an established way as       prescribed in Section 10 para. 2 of the Surname Act.       Having regard to this as well as to the reasons stated in       the County Administrative Board's decision .. there is no       reason to change that decision..."         The dissenting member stated, inter alia:         "From the documents in the case it is established that the       proposed name Tavaststjerna has belonged in an established       way to the applicant's ancestors.   The fact that ...       Fredrik, ... starting from whom the surname of the       applicant's ancestors ... has been "Stjerna", was born out       of wedlock, has no legal relevance... (As) [the applicant]       has established that [his] present surname is causing [him]       inconvenience I quash the County Administrative Board's       decision and refer the case back for new examination."   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice and legal co-operation   a.     Finland   aa.    Name changes   23.    Section 10 of the Name Act (nimilaki, namnlagen; the title of the Act amended by Act no. 253/91) reads:         (Finnish)         "Sukunimen muuttamisen edellytykset. Sukunimi voidaan muuttaa       uudeksi sukunimeksi, jos hakija selvittää,         1) että hänen nykyisen sukunimensä käytöstä nimen       vierasperäisyyden, sen yleiskielen merkityksen tai nimen       yleisyyden johdosta taikka muusta syystä aiheutuu haittaa;         2) että uudeksi sukunimeksi esitetty nimi on aikaisemmin ollut       hänellä tai vakiintuneesti kuulunut hänen esivanhemmilleen ja       sukunimen muuttamista on pidettävä tarkoituksenmukaisena; tai         3) että uuden sukunimen ottamista on muuttuneiden olosuhteiden       tai muiden erityisten seikkojen johdosta pidettävä perusteltuna."         (Translation)         "Conditions for changing a surname. A surname may be       changed, if the applicant can show         1) that the use of his present surname is causing him       inconvenience because of its foreign origin, its meaning in       common usage, its common appearance or for any other reason;         2) if the proposed surname has previously been used by himself       or, in an established way, by his ancestors and provided the       change may be considered appropriate; or         3) if a change of surname can be considered justified because of       changed circumstances or for other particular reasons."   24.    According to Finnish doctrine a refusal under Section 10 para. 2 should state why the requested name is considered inappropriate (Kangas, Urpo: Ihmisen nimi, p. 100. Helsinki 1991).   25.    Section 11, as amended by Act no. 253/91, prescribes:         (Finnish)         "Uuden sukunimen hyväksymisen yleiset esteet. Uudeksi sukunimeksi       ei voida hyväksyä sukunimeä, joka on sopimaton tai jonka käyttö       muutoin voi aiheuttaa ilmeistä haittaa.         Ilman erityistä syytä ei uudeksi sukunimeksi voida hyväksyä       nimeä:         1) joka muodoltaan tai kirjoitustavaltaan on kotimaisen       nimikäytännön vastainen;         2) jota yleisesti käytetään etunimenä; tai         3) joka on muodostettu yhdistämällä kaksi sukunimeä."         (Translation)         "General obstacles to the change of a surname. A surname which       is improper or whose use can otherwise cause clear inconvenience       cannot be accepted as a new surname.         In the absence of a particular reason the following categories       of names cannot be accepted:         1) a name which by virtue of its form or spelling is       incompatible with domestic name practice;         2) a name commonly used as a first name; or         3) a name created by combining two surnames."   26.    Section 12 para. 1, as amended by Act no. 253/91, provides, insofar as it is relevant:         (Finnish)         "Suojatut nimet ... Uudeksi sukunimeksi ei voida hyväksyä       sukunimeä, joka on Suomessa merkitty väestörekisteriin, eikä       nimeä, jonka yleisesti tiedetään vakiintuneen määrätyn kotimaisen       tai vierasmaalaisen suvun nimeksi, ellei tähän ole olemassa       erityistä syytä."         (Translation)         "Protected names ... A surname registered in the Finnish       population register or commonly known as being used by a       particular Finnish or foreign family cannot be approved as a new       surname in the absence of a particular reason."   27.    Section 13 para. 2 no. 1 provides:         (Finnish)         "[Erityiset syyt uuden sukunimen hyväksymiselle.] Uusi sukunimi,       joka ei vastaa 11 §:n 2 momentissa tai 12 §:ssä asetettuja       vaatimuksia, voidaan hyväksyä,         1) jos hakija osoittaa, että hänen tai hänen esivanhempansa ovat       aikaisemmin laillisesti käyttäneet hakijan uudeksi sukunimeksi       esittämää nimeä [;]"         (Translation)         "[Particular reasons for permitting a new surname.] A new surname       which does not comply with the requirements in Section 11 para. 2       or Section 12 may be permitted,         1) if the applicant can show that the proposed new name has       previously been lawfully used by him or his ancestors [;]"   bb.    The population register   28.    The Finnish population registration is based on a national register administered by the Population Register Centre (väestörekisterikeskus, befolkningsregistercentralen) (Chapter 3, Section 8 of the 1970 Act on Population Registers, väestökirjalaki 141/69, lag 141/69 om befolkningsböcker).   29.    The national population register contains not only the names and the personal identitity number of an individual, but also a large amount of other information by virtue of which he can be traced. For instance, if his name is unknown but his personal identity number appears, his name and address can be found by virtue of electronic data processing. If not even his personal identity number is known, it can be found by processing other information pertaining to the individual. The register is updated five times a week. Public authorities including the police have access to the register (see "Le système d'information de l'état civil finlandais", pp. 32-34 in "Journée internationale de l'état civil". Commission Internationale de l'Etat Civil, 1992).   30.    Population registers on the municipal level are administered by the local evangelical-lutheran and orthodox parishes or the local registration office, if the person concerned is not a member of any parish (Chapter 2, Sections 3, 6 and 26).   31.    Everyone who has been included in a population register is given a personal identity number by the Population Register Centre. The number consists of the birth date, month and year, an individual number and a control number (Sections 4 and 5 of the 1970 Decree on Population Registers (väestökirja-asetus 198/70, förordning 198/70 om befolkningsböcker)).   32.    For someone not registered in a evangelical-lutheran or an orthodox parish a register card will be created, including, among other information, his surname, first name and personal identity number (Section 7 para. 1 of the 1970 Decree).   33.    When a decision granting permission for a name change has been rendered, the County Administrative Board shall immediately inform the Civil Registration Centre of the new name once the decision has acquired legal force. If permission is granted on appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court shall report the new name to the Centre (Section 8 para. 1 of the 1991 Name Decree (nimiasetus 254/91, namnförordning 254/91)).   34.    If a surname has been changed, the decision of the authority having permitted the change shall be noted on the person's register card (Section 7 para. 4 of the 1970 Decree).   b.     Other member States of the Council of Europe   aa.    Legislation governing name changes and population registration in the member States of the International Commission on Civil Status   35.    The name laws in the twelve member States of the International Commission on Civil Status (Commission Internationale de l'Etat Civil), all of which are also member States of the Council of Europe, show the following similarities. In Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland the reason invoked for a surname change should be of a weighty character. Spanish law expressly mentions the possibility to request permission to change a name which is contrary to the dignity of the person or to decency. In Greece a name change can be permitted, if someone's present name is causing him difficulties in his legal or social relations. In Italy a name change can be permitted, if the present name is ridiculous. In the Netherlands a name may be changed, if it is indecent or ridiculous. In Belgium, France, Portugal and Turkey any reason may be invoked in support of a name change request (Guide pratique international de l'état civil. Paris 1992).   36.    In ten of the States name changes are automatically noted in at least part of the population records kept by the authorities. In two States this takes place either at the request of the name holder (Belgium) or of a representative of the State (France)(ibid.).   bb.    Cooperation within the Council of Europe   37.    At the 1982 Conference of European Ministers of Justice proposals were made for the updating of the surname laws of the member States to the effect that "the new law[s] on surnames must be less rigid in character and afford the individuals concerned greater freedom of choice than is the case in many systems [in the member States of the Council of Europe]". It was acknowledged, however, that "the new law[s] ... must also take account of social and administrative considerations by setting reasonable limits on the freedom to change names". Among the reasons supporting greater freedom of choice was the importance of allowing the individual "to express his identity through the choice of a surname" (pp. 20-21 in "Acquisition of the surname". Report submitted by the Netherlands' Delegation. Thirteenth Conference of European Ministers of Justice. Strasbourg 1982).   38.    The Ministers of Justice acknowledged "the value of the surname at a national and international level as a means of identifying a person and his family", but also recognised "the personal and social importance of the surname for each person" (Resolution No. 2 on acquisition of the surname. Annex III to "Conclusions and Resolutions of the Conference. Strasbourg 1982).   cc.    English and United Kingdom law   39.    Under English law a person is entitled to adopt a surname of his own choosing and to use this name without any restrictions or formalities, except in connection with the practice of some professions where the use of a new name may be subject to certain formalities (Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 35, paras. 1173-1176).   40.    For the purposes of record and to obviate any doubt or confusion caused by a name change a declaration can be made in the form of a "deed poll" which may be enrolled with the Central Office of the Supreme Court (see Eur. Court H.R., Cossey judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 184, p. 9, para. 16). The new name is valid for purposes of legal identification, may be used in public documents and is entered on the electoral roll (ibid.).   41.    The United Kingdom has no civil status certificates or equivalent current identity documents (see the above-mentioned Cossey judgment, loc.cit., para. 17).   42.    The absence in English law of formalities governing name changes has, however, not resulted in a large number of such changes (Killerby, Margaret: "Précisions sur le droit anglais du nom", pp. 183-184 in "La nouvelle loi sur le nom". Paris 1988).   dd.    Swiss jurisprudence   43.    In a case before the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) of Switzerland a family requested permission to change its surname from "Kliebenschädel" to "Kliby", an artist name used by one of the family members (judgment of 22 September 1988, reproduced in Revue de l'état civil 1989:12, pp. 373-374). The family argued that "Kliebenschädel" had unpleasant connotations such as the German equivalent of "split skull". Moreover, the name was distorted, in particular when pronounced quickly. Reference was made to twelve other surnames which had appeared on envelopes of letters addressed to the family.   44.    The Federal Court recalled that under Swiss law a name change may be permitted provided there are weighty reasons. It further recalled case-law and doctrine according to which this condition is met, "if someone's interest in taking a new name is more important than the interest of the administration and the public in the static character of a name acquired and registered as well as in the unambiguous identification and distinction of individuals". "The name should render [the individual's] well-being possible and facilitate [it]; ... not [create] significant disadvantages or serious inconveniences ...".   45.    The Federal Court considered that a justified personal interest in a name change is, for instance, to avoid ridiculous connotations of a name. A name change could also be considered, if the name is ugly, indecent or constantly distorted. The fact that the proposed new name had already been used in the family as an artistic name did not as such justify a change.   46.    The Federal Court observed, however, that the name "Kliebenschädel" was not only mixed up with other names, but also distorted. As the name holders' personal feelings had been encroached upon by virtue of the serious effects of the use of that name, the proposed name change should be permitted. Moreover, no particular public interest had been shown against a name change or against the taking of the name proposed by the family.   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.     Complaints declared admissible   47.    The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints that the refusal to grant him permission to change his surname violates his right to respect for his private life and discriminates against him.   B.     Points at issue   48.    Accordingly, the issues to be determined are:   -      whether there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8)       of the Convention; and   -      whether there has been a violation of Article 14 of the       Convention taken together with Article 8 (Art. 14+8).   C.     Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention   49.    Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads, insofar as it is relevant:         "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ...       life ...         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with       the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with       the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests       of national security, public safety or the economic well-being       of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the       protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the       rights and freedoms of others."   50.    The applicant argues that Article 8 (Art. 8) is applicable in the particular circumstances of his case. He accepts that the Name Act does not provide any absolute right to a name change, but points out that his present surname is causing him great inconveniences in his everyday life such as pejorative nicknames and delays in his mail.   51.    The applicant further submits that the refusal to let him take the name "Tavaststjerna" pursued none of the aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2). Nowadays the wide-spread use of personal identity numbers should decrease the State's interest in restricting the right to name changes. Criminal records and other means for social control are already based on a specific number afforded to each person. Thus, the control function of the name legislation is being invoked in excess.   52.    The applicant finally argues that the refusal was disproportionate to the alleged aims. His genealogical link to a number of ancestors carrying the name "Tavaststjerna" was considered established. Undue regard was had to the fact that the first ancestor to carry the applicant's present name had been born out of wedlock to the last ancestor carrying the name "Tavaststjerna". As a result, the proposed name was considered not to have belonged to the applicant's ancestors in an established way. Moreover, contrary to the applicant's present name, the name "Tavaststjerna" is well-known to Finns and would therefore not create the inconveniences suffered from the name "Stjerna".   53.    The Government primarily argue that Article 8 (Art. 8) is not applicable, as there has been no interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life. Reference is made to the case of Hagmann-Hüsler v. Switzerland (No. 8042/77, Dec. 15.12.77, D.R. 12 p. 202).   54.    The Government further submit that the refusal of the applicant's request was based on sufficient and precise provisions in the Name Act and was, thus, lawful. Although the applicant's request was only examined under Section 10 para. 2 of the Name Act and not under para. 1 of that provision, this is of no relevance to the examination of his application before the Commission. Whilst the purpose of Section 10 para. 2 is to ensure that a person can use the name he feels closest to himself, a further requirement is that the name proposed by him is deemed appropriate. The Government acknowledge that the increasing use of personal identity numbers might reduce the need to restrict the right to a change of name. The refusal was, however, made in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.   55.    The Government finally argue that, particularly in view of the control function of name legislation, the refusal complained of was "necessary in a democratic society". Many other Contracting Parties have enacted similar restrictions on name changes. The applicant's request was also examined under Section 12 para. 1 of the Name Act. As the name "Tavaststjerna" had been entered into the Population Register and was commonly known to have been established as the name of a given Finnish family, the applicant's request could have been granted only for a special reason as set out in Section 13 para. 2 of the Name Act.   56.    The Commission recalls that the right to respect for private life as enshrined in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) ensures a sphere within which everyone can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of one's personality. The right to develop and fulfil one's personality necessarily comprises the right to an identity and, therefore, to a name (Burghartz and Schnyder Burghartz v. Switzerland, Comm. Report 21.10.92, para. 47).   57.    The Commission further recalls that the notion of "respect" enshrined in Article 8 (Art. 8) is not clear-cut. This is the case especially where the positive obligations implicit in that concept are concerned. Its requirements will vary considerably from case to case according to the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States. In determining whether or not such an obligation exists regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual (Eur. Court H.R., B. v. France judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A no. 232-C, p. 47, para. 44).   58.    In the above-cited case of B. v. France the Court found a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) in a case concerning the non- recognition in law of the new sexual identity of a post-operative transsexual. The Court considered that the refusal to allow the applicant to change her forename was "also a relevant factor from the point of view of Article 8 (Art. 8)". The Court further found that the inconveniences suffered by B. in her everyday   life "reach[ed] a sufficient degree of seriousness to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 8 (Art. 8)". The Court concluded that B.'s everyday situation, taken as a whole, was not compatible with the respect for her private life and that, even having regard to the State's margin of appreciation, the fair balance which has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual had not been attained (ibid., pp. 52-54, paras. 58-63).   59.    In the case of Burghartz and Schnyder Burghartz v. Switzerland the Commission found Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention to be applicable. The applicants complained of the refusal to allow the second applicant (the husband of the first applicant), who had taken his wife's surname, to place his own surname in front of that name (loc.cit., para. 51).   60.    The case of Hagmann-Hüsler referred to by the Government concerned a parliamentary candidate's unsuccessful request to stand for election under a name known to the public, namely her maiden name. The Commission was satisfied that the applicant had a "reasonable possibility of precise identification available to her" since she could have added her maiden name after her surname as an "alliance name" (loc. cit., p. 205).   61.    In a more recent case, Boij v. Sweden, the applicant complained of the refusal to allow her to take a surname used by ancestors some two hundred years ago. The Commission saw no lack of respect, and therefore no interference with, her rights under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, as the applicant was still using her former husband's surname and could have availed herself of the possibility to take back her maiden name. Moreover, although wishing to manifest a closer link to her ancestors she did not refer to any particular inconvenience caused by her present name (No. 16878/90, Dec. 29.6.92, to be published in D.R.).   62.    The present case resembles the case of Boij in that the genealogical link between the applicant's present surname and the new name proposed by him was considered established. It differs, however, in that the present applicant invokes several inconveniences caused by the use of his present surname, the existence of which is not contested.   63.    The Commission observes, however, that in many countries stability in the use of surnames is considered important, and the right to change such names is therefore restricted in different ways. Particular considerations apply when there is a question of changing to a surname which is already carried by other persons or which has specific historical or cultural connotations.   64.    The Commissions accepts that there could be exceptional cases where the carrying of a particular name creates such suffering or such practical difficulties that the right under Article 8 (Art. 8) is affected. There are, however, good reasons for restrictions in this area, and a right to change one's surname cannot, in principle, be considered to be included in the right to respect for private life, as protected by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   65.    In the present case, the Commission observes that the applicant's name "Stjerna" is the old spelling of the Swedish word "stjärna", meaning "star". Those who understand the meaning of the name are likely to consider it an attractive or even beautiful name, and the name has in no way any ridiculous or otherwise unpleasant connotations.   66.    The problems invoked by the applicant relate to the fact that for a Finnish-speaking person, not acquainted with the Swedish language, the name may be difficult to pronounce or easily misspelt, because the combination of consonants "stj", which is common in Swedish, does not exist in the Finnish language.   67.    The Commission does not consider, however, that such inconveniences could be sufficient to give a right under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention to change a surname.   68.    The Commission further notes that Swedish names are quite common in Finland and that the Swedish language, although spoken only by a minority of the population, cannot be considered to be alien to the Finnish society, since it is the second official language of Finland.   69.    The Commission also notes that the name which the applicant wished to adopt, "Tavaststjerna", is a well-known name in Finland, carried by a family, certain of whose members have been distinguished literary and cultural personalities. The fact that the applicant's ancestors more than 200 years ago had carried the name "Tavaststjerna" would not seem to be of any particular relevance insofar as Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention is concerned.   70.    In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the refusal to let the applicant change his name from "Stjerna" to "Tavaststjerna" does not constitute a lack of respect for his private life within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   Conclusion   71.    The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 9, that there has been no violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   D.     Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention   72.    Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads:         "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this       Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any       ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,       political or other opinion, national or social origin,       association with a national minority, property, birth or       other status."   73.    The Commission recalls that Article 8 (Art. 8) and the other provisions of the Convention defining substantive rights are supplemented by Article 14 (Art. 14) prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of such rights.   A measure which as such could be in conformity with one of the normative provisions may nevertheless violate that provision taken in conjunction with Article 14 (Art. 14), if it is applied in a discriminatory manner.   However, there can be no room for the application of Article 14 (Art. 14), unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one of the other substantive provisions of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Inze judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 17, para. 36 with further reference).   74.    The Commission has found above that the applicant's complaint, that he was refused permission for the proposed name change, falls within the ambit of Article 8 (Art. 8). Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention is therefore also applicable.   75.    For the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it "has no objective and reasonable justification", that is, if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim", or if there is no "reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised".   The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law.   The scope of the margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background (ibid., p. 18, para. 41).   76.    The Commission must determine whether the way in which the Name Act was applied in the applicant's case discloses a discrimination contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14).   77.    The Commission observes that the fact that the applicant's ancestor, who had carried the name proposed by the applicant, had been born out of wedlock was not as such decisive for the outcome of the applicant's request. Regard was further had to the fact that the name "Tavaststjerna" had been carried by very distant ancestors of the applicant.   78.    In these circumstances the Commission finds no substantiation of the applicant's allegation that the refusal discriminated against him by virtue of the fact that a particular ancestor of his had been born out of wedlock.   Conclusion   79.    The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8).   E.     Recapitulation   80.    The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 9, that there has been no violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (para. 71).   81.    The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) (para. 79).   Secretary to the Commission         President of the Commission          (H.C. KRÜGER)                      (C.A. NØRGAARD)     PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. TRECHSEL, MR. ERMACORA, MRS. THUNE,                      MR. ROZAKIS and MR. NOWICKI         We regret that we cannot agree with the majority of the Commission that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.         We accept, in principle, the State's right to regulate and limit changes of surnames. A name change should, however, in our view be permitted, if an individual can show the existence of particular inconveniences suffered from the use of his or her present name and provided no weighty reasons militate against the taking of the new name proposed. Such reasons could, for instance, be that the proposed name could affect the interests of a family carrying that particular name.         In the present case we agree with the majority of the Commission that the translation of the applicant's present surname into English can be considered an attractive one, without ridiculous or unpleasant connotations. In our view, however, the principal issue to be considered is not the meaning of the word "stjerna" but that of its pejorative connotation "kirnu" (the Finnish equivalent to "churn") and the practical problems caused by the distortion of the name "Stjerna" (the delays in the applicant's mail). These inconveniences have not been contested by the Government.         It may well be that not everybody would feel disturbed by the particular nickname "kirnu" or by delays in his or her mail. This, however, is not of relevance to the Commission's consideration of the present case. The essential fact is that the applicant himself resents those