CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 septembre 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                                   FIRST CHAMBER                         AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 20317/92                       by Patricia HEWITT and Harriet HARMAN                       against the United Kingdom           The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 1 September 1993, the following members being present:              MM.    A. WEITZEL, President                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Sir    Basil HALL            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 9 July 1992 by by Patricia HEWITT and Harriet HARMAN against the United Kingdom and registered on 17 July 1992 under file No. 20317/92;         Having regard to :   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       25 February 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 28 May 1992;   -      the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The first applicant is a British citizen born in 1948 and resident in London. The second applicant is a British citizen born in 1950 and resident in London. The applicants are represented before the Commission by John Wadham of Liberty. The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.         The first applicant was General Secretary of the National Council of Civil Liberties (now known as "Liberty") between September 1973 and May 1983. She is now Deputy Director of the Institute of Public Policy Research.         The second applicant was employed as a legal officer by Liberty from 1978 until 1982.   She has been a Member of Parliament since 1983 and has become a leading member of the Labour Party.         Liberty is an unincorporated association which since its inception has worked to monitor and defend civil and political rights in the United Kingdom. Liberty's constitution requires the organization to remain non-party and non-denominational.   Its individual members, local groups and affiliates nominate and elect an executive committee which is responsible for the appointment of its staff and for ensuring that it carries out policies democratically determined by the membership at an Annual General Meeting.   Liberty works within the law to uphold human rights, by, inter alia, briefing and lobbying Members of Parliament, submitting evidence to official enquiries, conducting research and issuing publications, and taking test cases to local and international courts.   It sometimes sends impartial observers to monitor demonstrations as part of its function to defend the right of freedom of assembly, but it does not sponsor or organize demonstrations of any kind.   Its history, which has been the subject of several books, demonstrates that it has never been a subversive organization: on the contrary its concern has always been to uphold the unwritten constitution of the united Kingdom in relation to individual freedom, and to draw attention to any lapse by government agencies from treaty obligations in the field of human rights.         In 1985, evidence emerged that M15 (also known as the Security Service) was systematically infringing the applicants' rights under the Convention when a former officer of M15, Ms Cathy Massiter, made certain allegations to this effect on a television program.   According to Ms Massiter, the applicants had been classified as subversive and as communist sympathizers, and these grave libels were published within M15 and were available for publication to other agencies with whom M15 had a relationship.   Their files recorded details of passport applications, data from surveillance by local police, Special Branch and by special agents, and references to them or by them on telephone intercepts picked up under warrants issued in relation to other persons.   Such intercepts, in the second applicant's case, were likely to include confidential conversations which she, as a practising solicitor, had had with certain of her clients.   The first applicant's file included information about her personal relationship with a former member of the Communist Party.   Surveillance of both applicants was continued after they had left the National Council for Civil Liberties on the basis that they were both candidates for elected office.           On 19 May 1986, the applicants lodged an application with the European Commission of Human Rights against the United Kingdom government alleging breaches of their right to privacy (Article 8), their right to freedom of expression (Article 10), their right to freedom of association (Article 11) and their right to an effective remedy (Article 13) in respect of the violations arising from the nature and consequences of the surveillance to which they had been subjected by M15.   The application was declared admissible on 12 May 1988.         In its Report dated 9 May 1989 the Commission concluded by a majority that given the existence of practices in the United Kingdom permitting secret surveillance and given further the reasonable likelihood that the applicants were the subjects of surveillance the compilation and retention by the Security Service of information concerning the private lives of the applicants constituted an infringement of their right to privacy under Article 8 (1) of the Convention.   The Commission further concluded that the domestic law of the United Kingdom contained neither legal rules formulated with sufficient precision nor a framework indicating with the requisite degree of certainty the scope and manner of the exercise of discretion by the Security Service in the carrying out of secret surveillance activities to render interference "in accordance with the law" within Article 8 (2).   Finally the Commission concluded that since no information was forthcoming in relation to how the United Kingdom had chosen to provide an effective remedy under its domestic law that the applicants did not have an effective remedy as required by Article 13.         On 13 December 1990, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Resolution under Article 32 of the Convention agreeing with the opinions expressed by the Commission and decided that in relation to the gathering and storing of information about the applicants by M15, the United Kingdom had violated Article 8 and Article 13 of the Convention (see Resolution DH (90) 36).   During the examination for the case, the Government of the United Kingdom informed the Committee that it had enacted the Security Service Act 1989 in order to place the Security Service on a statutory basis, define the purposes for which its activities might be carried out and establish a Security Service Commissioner and an independent Tribunal for the investigation of complaints about the Service.   Taking note of this information, the Committee decided that no further action was called for in the case.         In light of the proceedings before the Committee, the applicants' legal adviser wrote on 28 February 1990 to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the Government of the United Kingdom seeking assurances that the Security Service no longer held personal information on the applicants.   In a letter dated 27 March 1990, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office replied:         "It is the Government's established and published policy not to       give assurances of the kind sought on behalf of the applicants."         On 1 July 1991, written complaints were made under section 5 and Schedule 1 of the Security Service Act 1989 to the Security Service Tribunal on behalf of the applicants.   It was requested that the Tribunal investigate whether the Security Service continued to retain personal information on the applicants and if this proved to be the case to use its powers under the Act to order their removal or destruction.         In letters dated 18 October 1991, the Tribunal dismissed the complaints on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the alleged continued holding of personal information compiled before the Act came into force was in breach of its provisions.   The Tribunal further decided to refer the matter as a point of general principle to the Commissioner in accordance with paragraph 7 (2)(b) of Schedule 1 to the Act, namely, whether or not the Security Service had acted unreasonably in allegedly retaining files on the complainants. As regarded any investigations carried out since the Act came into force, the Tribunal informed the applicants that it made no determination in their favour.         On 17 January 1992, the applicants applied for leave in the High Court of Justice to apply for judicial review and seeking an order of mandamus requiring the Security Service Tribunal to investigate whether the Security Service continued to hold personal information about the applicants.   On 14 February 1992, the Court refused to grant leave.         In May 1992, the Security Service Commissioner's Report for 1991 was laid before Parliament. In it, the current Commissioner, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith referred to the references made to him by the Security Service Tribunal under Schedule 1 para. 7(2)b. as concerned the retention of files which contained information compiled before the Act came into force on 18 December 1989. He reported as follows:         "Three cases raise the same issue, namely whether or not the       Service have acted unreasonably in allegedly retaining files on       the complainants.   The retention of records per se is not a       matter which is covered by the 1989 Act. The Tribunal is       empowered by the Act to investigate whether a complainant has       been the subject of inquiries by the Service and, if so, whether       there were reasonable grounds for such inquiries. The Tribunal       is also empowered to investigate the circumstances under which       the Service may have disclosed information for use in determining       whether a person should be employed or continue to be employed.       The Tribunal is precluded by the Act from investigating       complaints relating to anything done before 18 December 1989. The       fact that the Service may hold a record on a complainant does       not, in itself, provide grounds under the Security Service Act       for investigation by the Tribunal.         Notwithstanding this it is clear that the retention of records       is a matter of concern to some complainants and I have therefore       thought it appropriate to inquire into the Service's policy in       this respect. With the full support of the Director General I       have investigated the matter and I have made a report to t       Secretary of State pursuant to paragraph 7(3) of the Schedule.       I have considered the Service's policy in relation to retention       of files and their motivations for doing so. It is obviously not       appropriate that I should discuss the details of individual       cases. But I think it is right that the general policy as I       describe it below should be known.         The Service's general policy is to retain records indefinitely       in case they are of relevance at any time in the future to the       Service's work. In the past, espionage investigations have been       seriously hampered because the Service's earlier practice had not       prohibited destruction. Reconstruction of a number of files was       attempted but this was not satisfactory. Since then the Service       has changed its policy and, save in exceptional cases, files are       retained. The Service instituted its present general policy on       retention of records on the basis that they are the key to their       work and they cannot accurately predict when files will ever be       needed again. In my opinion as a general policy this is       acceptable.         The procedure for opening a file is strictly controlled. It may       start as a temporary file, which has a maximum life of three       years, when there is uncertainty whether the criteria for opening       a permanent file are satisfied. These criteria have their basis       in the Service's functions and require high standards of       accuracy. If and when these criteria are satisfied, the permanent       file will be opened. The Service then applies a system of colour       coding which controls how files are used. Once a file is opened,       there is a period coded "green:, during which inquiries may be       made about the subject. The length of the green period varies       according to the reason why the particular file was made.   It may       be extended as a result of the receipt of new information. At the       end of the green period it changes to "amber", under which       inquiries are prohibited, but any relevant information that the       Service receives about the subject may be added to the file.       After the designated amber period the file is coded "red". During       this period, inquiries continue to be prohibited and any addition       of substantive information is also prohibited. Finally, after a       period of red coding, the file is microfilmed. The hard copy is       destroyed and the entry for the file in the Service's central       index is transferred from the Live Index to the Research Index.       The Research Index is usually consulted only when it is thought       that old files may exist which are relevant to current work. In       practice the volume of check against the Research Index is small:       for instance, it is not consulted in vetting checks.         It may be argued that it is not the continued retention of files       that is damaging to an individual, provided that the use which       is made of them is consistent with the Service's functions and       responsibilities under the Act.         It is true that the Act, and particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 of       the first Schedule, are concerned with enquiries and the use made       of them, and do not deal with the question of retention. But I       take the view that for the Service to retain a file on a subject,       even if it is only on microfilm, no use is made of it and the       subject is unaware of its existence, retention must in each case       be justified. In the great majority of cases it will be justified       by the general principle stated above, but the Service must       assess each case on its merits. It is then my function to       consider the Service's decision and, applying the principles of       judicial review, decide when it is unreasonable."   Relevant domestic law and practice   The Security Service         The Security Service Act 1989 places the Security Service on a statutory basis.         It provides inter alia:         "1. (1) There shall continue to be a Security Service (in this       Act referred to as "the Service") under the authority of the       Secretary of State.         (2) The function of the Service shall be the protection of       national security and, in particular, its protection against       threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the       activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended       to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political,       industrial or violent means.         (3) It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the       economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed       by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British       Islands.         2. (1) The operations of the Service shall continue to be under       the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of       State.         (2) The Director-General shall be responsible for the efficiency       of the Service and it shall be his duty to ensure              (a) that there are arrangements for securing that no            information is obtained by the Service except so far as            necessary for the proper discharge of its functions or            disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose            or for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious            crime; and              (b) that the Service does not take any action to further            the interests of any political party.         (3) The arrangements mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above shall       be such as to ensure that information in the possession of the       Service is not disclosed for use in determining whether a person       should be employed, or continue to be employed, by any person,       or in any office or capacity, except in accordance with       provisions in that behalf approved by the Secretary of State.         (4) The Director-General shall make an annual report on the work       of the Service to the prime minister and the Secretary of State       and may at any time report to either of them on any matter       relating to its work.         3.    (1) No entry on or interference with property shall be       unlawful if it is authorized by a warrant issued by the Secretary       of State under this section.         (2) The Secretary of State may on an application made by the       Service issue a warrant under this section authorizing the taking       of such action as is specified in the warrant in respect of any       property so specified if the Secretary of State              (a) thinks it necessary for the action to be taken in order            to obtain information which                    (i) is likely to be of substantial value in assisting                  the   Service to discharge any of its functions; and                    (ii) cannot reasonably be obtained by other means; and              (b) is satisfied that satisfactory arrangements are in            force under section 2(2)(a) above with respect to the            disclosure of information obtained by virtue of this            section and that the information obtained under the warrant            will be subject to those arrangements."   The Security Service Tribunal         The Act also provides for a tribunal, known as the Security Service Tribunal, to deal with complaints:         "5. (1) There shall be a Tribunal for the purpose of       investigating complaints about the Service in the manner       specified in Schedule 1 to this Act...         (4) The decisions of the Tribunal and the Commissioner under that       Schedule (including decisions as to their jurisdictions) shall       not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any       court."         Schedule 1 to the Act provides, inter alia :         "1.   Any person may complain to the Tribunal if he is aggrieved       by anything which he believes the Service has done in relation       to him or to any property of his; and, unless the Tribunal       consider that the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, they shall       investigate it in accordance with this Schedule.         2. (1) The Tribunal shall investigate whether the complainant has       been the subject of inquiries by the Service.         (2) If the Tribunal find that the Service has made inquiries       about the complainant but that those inquiries had ceased at the       time when the complaint was made, they shall determine whether,       at the time when the inquiries were instituted, the Service had       reasonable grounds for deciding to institute inquiries about the       complainant in the discharge of its functions.         (3) If the Tribunal find that inquiries by the Service about       the complainant were continuing at the time when the complaint       was made, they shall determine whether, at that time, the Service       had reasonable grounds for deciding to continue inquiries about       the complainant in the discharge of its functions...         5. (1) Where the Tribunal determine under paragraph 2 or 3 above       that the Service did not have reasonable grounds for the decision       or belief in question, they shall              (a) give notice to the complainant that they have made a            determination in his favour under that paragraph; and              (b) make a report of their findings to the Secretary of            State and to the Commissioner.         (2) The Tribunal shall also give notice to the complainant of any       determination in his favour by the Commissioner under paragraph       4 above.         (3) Where in the case of any complaint no such determination as       is mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) or (2) above is made by the       Tribunal or the Commissioner the Tribunal shall give notice to       the complainant that no determination in his favour has been made       on his complaint.         6. (1) Where the Tribunal give a complainant notice of such a       determination as is mentioned in paragraph 5(1) above the       Tribunal may              (a) if the determination is under paragraph 2 above, order            inquiries by the Service about the complainant to be ended            and any records relating to such inquiries to be destroyed;              (b) if the determination is under that paragraph or            paragraph 3 above, direct the Secretary of State to pay to            the complainant such sum by way of compensation as may be            specified by the Tribunal.         (2) Where the Tribunal give a complainant notice of such a       determination as is mentioned in paragraph 5(2) above the       Tribunal may                (a) quash any warrant in respect of any property of the            complainant which the Commissioner has found to have been            improperly issued or renewed and which he considers should            be quashed;              (b) if the Commissioner considers that a sum should be paid            to the complainant by way of compensation, direct the            Secretary of State to pay to the complainant such sum as            the Commissioner may specify."         Pursuant to para. 9(1) of Schedule 1, the competence of the Tribunal is limited as follows:         "9. (1) No complaint shall be entertained under this Schedule if       and so far as it relates to anything done before the date on       which this Schedule comes into force."         Pursuant to Schedule 2, the Tribunal consists of 3-5 members each of whom must be a barrister, solicitor or advocate of not less than ten years' standing. Members are appointed for a period of five years by Her Majesty by royal warrant and may be removed from office by Her Majesty on an address presented to her by both Houses of Parliament.   The Security Service Commissioner         Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, the Prime Minister appoints as a Commissioner a person who holds or has held high judicial office. He has the role, inter alia, of keeping under review the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under Section 3 to issue warrants. He makes an annual report to the Prime Minister on the discharge of his functions and the report is then laid before Parliament.         Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, matters may be referred to the Commissioner by the Tribunal:         "7. (1) If in a case investigated by the Tribunal under       paragraph 2 above they consider that the Service may not be       justified in regarding all members of a particular category as       requiring investigation they shall refer that matter to the       Commissioner.         (2) If in any case investigated by the Tribunal -              (a) the Tribunal's conclusions on the matters which they            are required to investigate are such that no determination            is made by them in favour of the complainant; but              (b) it appears to the Tribunal from the allegations made by            the complainant that it is appropriate for there to be an            investigation into whether the Service has in any other            respect acted unreasonably in relation to the complainant            or his property,         they shall refer that matter to the Commissioner.           (3) The Commissioner may report any matter referred to him under       this paragraph to the Secretary of State who may take such action       in the light of the report as he thinks fit, including any action       which the Tribunal have power to take or direct under paragraph 6       above."     COMPLAINTS   Article 8 of the Convention         The applicants complain about the continued holding of personal information about the applicants by the Security Service and submit that this has breached the applicants' rights to have their private lives respected.   There is no legal basis for such retention which, in the applicants' cases, is not necessary in a democratic society because they are not subversive or in any way threatening to public order, morality or the freedom of fellow citizens.         Furthermore, the retention of personal information in relation to the applicants cannot be justified under Article 8 (2) because it is not "in accordance with the law".   Notwithstanding the Security Service Act 1989, the retention of personal information gathered before the commencement of the Act is still not "in accordance with the law". The statute does have the force of law.   However, its contents do not constitute legally enforceable rules concerning the retention of information gathered before the commencement.   Nor does the statute provide the requisite degree of certainty concerning the scope and manner of the exercise of discretion by the authorities in deciding whether or not to retain information gathered before the statute's commencement date.   Article 13 of the Convention         The applicants also submit that there is no effective remedy for their complaints contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.   The Security Service Act 1989, gives the Security Service Tribunal no power to investigate the applicants' complaints.   No complaint to the Tribunal may be entertained if and so far as it relates to anything done before that date (Schedule 1 paragraph 9).   Mr. Justice Kennedy rejected submissions by the applicants that the retention of records or information constituted a form of continuing inquiry.         The Tribunal referred to the Security Service Commissioner the applicants' complaints about the retention of information concerning them.   However, such investigation as the Commissioner may carry out is not an effective remedy.   The applicants will not know the outcome of the investigation, what conclusion the Commissioner comes to or his reasons for reaching the views at which he arrives.   Furthermore the Commissioner has a discretion as to whether or not to report to the Secretary of State, who in turn has a discretion to take such action as he thinks fit in the light of the Commissioner's report.       PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 9 July 1992 and registered on 17 July 1992.         On 10 September 1992,   the Commission decided to communicate the application to the Government and to ask for written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.         The Government's observations were submitted on 25 February 1993 after one extension in the time-limit and the applicant's observations in reply were   submitted on 28 May 1993 also   after one extension in the time-limit.     THE LAW   1.     The applicants complains that information concerning their private life has been compiled and retained by the Security Service. They invoke Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides insofar as relevant:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private ...       life...         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with       the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with       the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests       of national security, public safety or the economic well-being       of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the       protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the       rights and freedoms of others."         The Government, in line with their policy of not disclosing information about the operations of the intelligence services, have neither confirmed nor denied the applicants' allegations.         The Commission notes that the applicants have no concrete proof to support their allegation that the Security Service continues to retain a file of personal information about them.   The Commission recalls however that "an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures ... without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him" (Eur. Court H.R., Klass judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 18 para. 34).         Similarly, in the Malone case, the Court agreed with the Commission that the existence of laws and practices permitting and establishing a system for effecting secret surveillance amounted in itself to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, apart from any measures actually taken against him (Eur. Court H.R., Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, p. 31 para. 64).           The Commission has held that this case-law cannot be interpreted so broadly as to encompass every person in the United Kingdom who fears that the Security Service may have compiled information about him.   An applicant however cannot be reasonably expected to prove that information concerning his private life has been compiled and retained. It is sufficient, in the area of secret measures, that the existence of practices permitting secret surveillance be established and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Security Service has compiled and retained information concerning his private life (see e.g. Application No. 12015/86, Dec. 6.7.88, D.R. 57 p.108).         In the present case, the respondent Government, noting the Commission's finding in the applicants' previous application, states that it is content to deal with the application on the basis that the applicants have established a "reasonable likelihood" that the Security Service has compiled and retained information concerning their private lives.   In these circumstances the Commission finds   that there has been an interference with the applicants' rights to respect for their private lives guaranteed under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.         The Commission must next determine whether this interference is justified under the second paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, namely whether it was "in accordance with the law" and if so, whether it was necessary in a democratic society for one or more of the reasons specified.   "in accordance with the law"         This expression has been interpreted by the Court as importing three requirements - the interference must have some basis in domestic law, the law in question must be accessible to the individual concerned and its consequences for him must also be foreseeable. The Court has further held that the requirement of foreseeability in the special context of employment "vetting" in sectors affecting national security cannot be the same as in many other fields. In the LEANDER case (Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116) it stated:         "Thus, it cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to       foresee precisely what checks will be made in his regard by the       Swedish special police service in its efforts to protect national       security.   Nevertheless, in a system applicable to citizens       generally, as under the Personnel Control Ordinance, the law has       to be sufficiently clear in its terms to give them an adequate       indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions       on which the public authorities are empowered to resort to this       kind of secret and potentially dangerous interference with       private life (ibid., p. 32, para. 67)...         In addition, where the implementation of the law consists of       secret measures, not open to scrutiny by the individuals       concerned or by the public at large, the law itself, as opposed       to the accompanying administrative practice, must indicate the       scope of any discretion conferred on the competent autho       sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the       measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection       against arbitrary interference (see the above-mentioned Malone       judgment, Series A no. 82, pp. 32-33, para. 68)."         The Commission recalls that the legal framework governing the functioning and supervision of the Security Service is now contained in the Security Service Act 1989 which placed the Security Service on a statutory footing for the first time.         The applicants have submitted however that the domestic law nonetheless lacks the requisite accessibility and foreseeability. In this context they refer to the 1989 Act's only partially defined term of "the interests of national security" and the fact that this definition extends to actions intended to overthrow parliamentary democracy by non-violent means.         The Commission considers however that the principles referred to above do not necessarily require a comprehensive definition of the notion of "the interests of national security". Many laws, which by their subject-matter require to be flexible, are inevitably couched in terms which are to a greater or lesser extent vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice. The Commission notes that the exercise of the Security Service's functions is subject to express limitations and to the supervision of a tribunal and commissioner appointed pursuant to the 1989 Act. The fact that a number of other jurisdictions restrict security service activity to a narrower ambit ie to those persons or organisations which advocate the use of force (see e.g. Leander judgment loc. cit.) does not thereby render the wider terms of the 1989 Act unacceptably vague.         The applicants also complain in this context that there is no proper legal basis for the retention by the Security Service of information compiled before the entry into force of the 1989 Act, which is intended to cover the subsequent activities of the Security Service. The Commission would however agree with the Government's contention that it is implicit from the terms of the Act that the Service may retain the information which it has complied insofar as it is necessary for the proper discharge of its functions. While the Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the continued holding of information gathered before the Act came into force, the Commission recalls that this problem was referred to the Security Service Commissioner who held that he could and would review the Service's decision to retain a particular file, applying the principles of judicial review to decide whether or not it was unreasonable.         In light of the above, the Commission considers that in the present case the law is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicants to anticipate the role of the Security Service with regard to the collection, recording and retention of information relating to themselves.   "necessary in a democratic society ..."         The Commission recalls that the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Regard must also be had in this context to the margin of appreciation of the respondent state which in the area of assessing the requirements of and means of pursuing interests of national security has been held by the Court to be wide (Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment, loc. cit., p. 25 paras. 58-59).         The aim pursued by the interference in the present case was the "interests of national security". The Court has acknowledged that States may find it necessary to collect and store information on persons and to use this information when assessing the eligibility of persons for posts of importance for national security. It is however crucial given the potential seriousness of resulting invasions of a person's private sphere that there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse (Eur. Court H.R., Klass judgment, loc. cit., p. 23 para. 50).         The Government have pointed to the framework of supervision set up under the 1989 Act.         The applicants contend that the protection offered is inadequate and ineffective. They allege, inter alia,   the following defects:         - the wide scope of the term "interests of national security";         - the Director-General of the Security Service and the Secretary       of State are not independent;         - the fact that the Tribunal does not give reasons for its       failure to make a determination in favour of an applicant;         - the inability of an applicant to verify or correct information       recorded;         - the limited scope of the Tribunal's inquiries, in particular,       it cannot decide whether the Service was justified in fact in       instituting inquiries (it may only investigate whether there were       reasonable grounds);         - the Tribunal cannot hear witnesses on oath and gives only a       one-sentence determination from which an applicant is told       nothing of the substantive outcome of an investigation;         - the inability of the Commissioner to make binding decisions or       to order the destruction of records where he finds it       unreasonable to retain them.         Insofar as the applicants have also referred to other systems whose security legislation are alleged to provide much greater respect for the rights of the individual, the Commission again finds this to be of limited relevan