CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 13 octobre 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                           AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 18273/91                       by the Estate of J.G.                       against Austria           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 13 October 1993, the following members being present:              MM.    S. TRECHSEL, President                  H. DANELIUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO              Mr.    K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 17 May 1991 by the Estate of J.G. against Austria and registered on 28 May 1991 under file No. 18273/91;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.         The application was introduced by the estate of Mrs. J. G.. Mrs. G. was an Austrian national born in 1914 who died in 1991.   She resided in Steyrermühl (Austria).   Before the Commission the estate is represented by Mr. K. Meingast, a lawyer practising in Gmunden (Austria), who already represented Mrs. G. in the domestic proceedings to which this application is related.         Mr. Meingast informed the Commission that on 5 July 1991 the estate had been assigned to Mrs. G. H. as heir and that she wished to pursue the application.   A.     Particular circumstances of the case                                      I         On 28 June 1974 the Upper Austria Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann) expropriated land owned by Mrs. G. and her husband, who subsequently died on 25 May 1987, for the purpose of constructing a new road.   The expropriation concerned 3000 square-metres of lot 886 and 600 square-metres of lot 887, both situated in the cadastral community (Katastralgemeinde) of Viechtwang.   The expropriation was ordered notwithstanding subsequent more accurate   measuring (unbeschadet genauerer Vermessungen in der Natur).   By the same decision compensation for expropriation was fixed.         On 18 November 1974 the Federal Minister for Construction and Technique (Bundesminister für Bauten und Technik) dismissed Mrs. G.'s appeal.   She did not file a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) or the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).                                     II         On 11 October 1985 the Gmunden District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) informed Mrs. G. that the coercive enforcement of the expropriation order was envisaged, as she neither expressly nor tacitly had consented to the expropriator taking possession of the land.         On 4 December 1985 the District Administrative Authority issued an enforcement order against Mrs. G..   The Authority found that the expropriation order had become enforceable and that Mrs. G. had not yet transferred possession of the land to the Federal Roads Administration (Bundesstrassenverwaltung).         On 23 January 1986 the Regional Governor dismissed Mrs. G.'s appeal but amended the District Authority's decision.   She was now ordered to tolerate that Federal Roads Administration took possession of the land.         On 10 March 1986 Mrs. G. lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court and requested it to grant suspensive effect to her complaint. She submitted that the expropriation decision was unenforceable as it mentioned neither the size nor the position of the expropriated area exactly.         The Federal Roads Administration submitted its observations on 16 May and on 10 June 1986, the Regional Governor on 20 May and on 10 June 1986.         On 21 August 1986 the Administrative Court decided not to grant suspensive effect to the complaint.         On 12 October 1987 Mrs. G. filed a new request for suspensive effect.   On 22 March 1988 she urged the Court to decide on her request of 12 October 1987 and on the complaint itself.         On 19 October 1990 the Administrative Court quashed the Regional Governor's decision of 23 January 1986.   The Court held that the area to be expropriated must result in a clear manner from the authority's decision.   If only parts of lots of land were concerned, the necessary specification must be given by reference to a plan attached to the decision or to another sufficiently detailed plan on which the expropriation proceedings were based.   In the present case, the expropriation order did not contain such a reference and, thus, was not sufficiently clear as to which land precisely was claimed by the expropriating authority.   Therefore, enforcement proceedings relying on such a decision were inadmissible.         On 3 December 1990 the Regional Governor quashed the District Administrative Authority's enforcement order.         Meanwhile the construction works had apparently been carried out on the expropriated land.                                     III         On 29 October 1985 Mrs. G. applied to the Regional Governor for retransfer of the expropriated land invoking Section 20a of the Federal Roads Act (Bundesstrassengesetz).         On 25 April 1986 the Regional Governor decided to interrupt the proceedings for retransfer of property and instructed the Federal Road Administration to finish the road construction by 30 September 1987.         On 12 May 1986 Mrs. G. appealed against this decision.   On 12 October 1987 she lodged a complaint (Säumnisbeschwerde) with the Administrative Court against the inactivity of the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs (Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten) in dealing with her appeal of 12 May 1986.   The Administrative Court ordered the Minister to decide on the appeal.         On 18 January 1988 the Minister dismissed the appeal and fixed 30 July 1988 as the new time limit for finishing the construction works.         On 7 March 1988 Mrs. G. introduced a complaint with the Constitutional Court.         On 27 September 1988 the Constitutional Court refused to entertain the complaint and transferred it to the Administrative Court.         On 14 September 1989 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint.     B.     Relevant domestic law         Section 20 paras. 1 to 4 of the Federal Roads Act (Bundesstraßengesetz), insofar as relevant to the case, reads as follows:   <Translation>         "(1) The Regional Governor acting as Federal Roads Authority       (Section 32) decides on the necessity, the object and the extent       of an expropriation ...         (2)   The expropriation order must also contain provisions on the       amount of compensation. ...         (3)   An appeal against the Regional Governor's decision on the       necessity, the object and the extent of the expropriation can be       lodged with the Federal Ministry for Construction and Technique.       An appeal against the amount of compensation granted in the       administrative proceedings is inadmissible.   However, both       parties are free to request the District Court, in whose judicial       district the object of the expropriation is situated, to decide       on the amount of the compensation.   Such a request has to be       filed within three months from the time the expropriation order       has come into force.   Once the court has been seized, the       administrative authority's decision on the amount of compensation       ceases to apply. ...         (4)   The enforcement of the expropriation order cannot be       prevented once the amount of compensation as decided by the       Regional Governor or a security for compensation payable after       the enforcement of the expropriation has been deposited with the       courts."   <German>         "(1) Über die Notwendigkeit, den Gegenstand und Umfang der       Enteignung entscheidet der Landeshauptmann als       Bundesstraßenbehörde...         (2)   Der Enteignungsbescheid hat zugleich eine Bestimmung über       die Höhe der Entschädigung zu enthalten. ...         (3)   Gegen die Entscheidung des Landeshauptmannes über die       Notwendigkeit, den Gegenstand und den Umfang der Enteignung ist       die Berufung an das Bundesministerium für Bauten und Technik       zulässig.   Eine Berufung bezüglich der Höhe der im       Verwaltungswege zuerkannten Entschädigung ist unzulässig.   Doch       steht es jedem der beiden Teile frei, binnen drei Monaten nach       Rechtskraft des Enteignungsbescheides die Entscheidung über die       Höhe der Entschädigung bei jenem Bezirksgericht zu begehren, in       dessen Sprengel sich der Gegenstand der Enteignung befindet.   Mit       Anrufung des Gerichtes tritt die verwaltungsbehördliche       Entscheidung über die Höhe der Entschädigung außer Kraft. ...         (4)   Der Vollzug des rechtskräftigen Enteignungsbescheides kann       jedoch nicht gehindert werden, sobald der vom Landeshauptmann       ermittelte Entschädigungsbetrag oder eine Sicherheit für die erst       nach Vollzug der Enteignung zu leistende Entschädigung       gerichtlich erlegt ist."         According to the amendment of the Federal Roads Act 1987, Federal Gazette 1987/78, the Ministry for Construction and Technique was replaced by the Ministry for Economic Affairs.         Section 20a para. 1 of the Federal Roads Act reads as follows:   <Translation>              "If the expropriated land or a part of it has not been used       for the purpose of the expropriation, the expropriated person may       request a written decision on the retransfer of the property       right to this land or the part concerned.   Such a request may be       filed with the authority which decided on the expropriation after       three years have elapsed from the time the decision on the       expropriation has come into force.   In deciding on the request       the authority has to apply the provisions on the expropriation       mutatis mutandis (Section 20).   A claim for retransfer of       property is heritable and saleable; it becomes extinct if the       expropriated person does not file his claim with the authority       within one year after having been invited by the expropriator to       do so, but at the latest ten years after the expropriation order       has come into force.   The authority has to set a reasonable time       limit for the realisation of the project, if the expropriator       furnishes prima facie evidence that the use of the expropriated       land for the purpose of the expropriation is imminent, or that,       for reasons for which he is not responsible, it cannot be used       for the time being, but will be used in the near future.   The       request has to be dismissed if the expropriator complies with the       time limit.   It is, however, inadmissible to set a time limit if       the fault for not putting the land to its appropriate use lies       with the expropriator."   <German>         "Wird der Enteignungsgegenstand ganz oder zum Teil nicht für den       Enteignungszweck verwendet, so kann der Enteignete die       bescheidmäßige Rückübereignung des Enteignungsgegenstandes       beziehungsweise dessen Teiles nach Ablauf von drei Jahren ab       Rechtskraft des Enteignungsbescheides bei der Behörde beantragen,       die unter sinngemäßer Anwendung der im Enteignungsverfahren zu       beachtenden Bestimmungen (Paragraph 20) zu entscheiden hat.       Dieser Anspruch ist vererblich und veräußerlich; er erlischt wenn       der Enteignete dieses Recht nicht binnen einem Jahr ab       nachweislicher Aufforderung durch den Enteigner bei der Behörde       geltend macht, spätestens jedoch zehn Jahre nach der Rechtskraft       des Enteignungsbescheides.   Macht der Enteigner glaubhaft, daß       die Verwendung des Enteignungsgegenstandes für den       Enteignungszweck unmittelbar bevorsteht oder die Verwendung aus       Gründen, die der Enteigner nicht zu vertreten hat, vorläufig       nicht möglich ist, aber in absehbarer Zeit erfolgen wird, hat die       Behörde dem Enteigner eine angemessene Ausführungsfrist zu       bestimmen.   Bei deren Einhaltung ist der Antrag auf       Rückübereignung abzuweisen.   Eine Fristsetzung ist jedoch in       jedem Fall unzulässig, wenn den Enteigner an der bislang nicht       entsprechenden Verwendung ein Verschulden trifft."         According to Section 26 of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz) and Section 82 of the Constitutional Court Act (Verfassungsgerichtshofgesetz) complaints to these Courts have to be lodged within six weeks from the time when the decision of the administrative authority was served on the applicant.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the expropriation proceedings have not been conducted within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   2.     The applicant further complains that the expropriation proceedings were not conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law as required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   3.     The applicant finally complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the right to property was violated because the Administrative Court's inactivity in dealing with Mrs. G.'s complaint against the enforcement order prejudiced her claim for retransfer of property.     THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the expropriation proceedings were not conducted within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides, as far as relevant, as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of       any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair       and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and       impartial tribunal established by law."   a)     The Commission first notes that the application was introduced by the estate of Mrs. J. G. who died in 1991, that on 5 July 1991 the heir was put into possession of the estate and that this heir wishes to pursue the application.   The Commission notes further that the present application concerns proceedings for the expropriation of land and the enforcement of the expropriation.         The Commission, having regard to its case-law, finds that the pecuniary nature of the claim allows that claim to be considered transferable (No. 10747/83, Dec. 6.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 106).   b)     The Commission considers that the applicant's complaint about the length of the expropriation proceedings refers to two sets of domestic         proceedings.   The first set of proceedings concerned the Regional Governor's expropriation order of 28 June 1974, while the second concerned the District Administrative Authority's enforcement order of 4 December 1985.         As regards the expropriation proceedings, the Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it can only deal with this complaint after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.         The Commission notes that Mrs. G. did not introduce a complaint to the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court against the Federal Minister's decision of 18 November 1974 on the expropriation of her land and that the expropriation order therefore became final in the beginning of 1975, when the time limit of six weeks for the introduction of a complaint to the Administrative or Constitutional Court expired.   The Commission notes further that the present application was introduced on 17 May 1991.         It follows that the applicant has not complied with the time limit stipulated by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   This part of the application must, therefore, be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   c)     As regards the enforcement proceedings, the Commission notes that the District Administrative Authority issued an enforcement order on 4 December 1985, that the Regional Governor dismissed Mrs. G.'s appeal on 23 January 1986 and that the Administrative Court quashed the Regional Governor's decision on 19 October 1990.   The Commission considers that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine whether there has been a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) as regards the length of the enforcement proceedings without the observations of both parties.         The Commission therefore adjourns this part of the application.   2.     The applicant further complains that the expropriation proceedings were not conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it can only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the general generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.         The Commission notes that Mrs. G. did not introduce a complaint to the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court against the Federal Minister's decision of 18 November 1974 on the expropriation of her land and that therefore the expropriation order became final. The Commission notes further that the application was lodged on 17 May 1991.               It follows that the applicant did not comply with the time limit stipulated by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   This part of the application must therefore also be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.         As regards the enforcement proceedings, the Commission recalls that under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention it may only deal with an application if the applicant can claim to be a victim of a violation, by one of the High Contracting Parties, of the rights set forth in the Convention or its Protocols.         On the question whether the applicant may claim to be a victim of an alleged violation as regards the requirements of a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the Commission observes that on 19 October 1990 the Administrative Court quashed the Regional Governor's decision which had dismissed the applicant's appeal against the enforcement order and that on 3 December 1990 the Regional Governor quashed the District Administrative Authority's enforcement order.         In these circumstances the Commission concludes that the applicant's complaint was resolved before the introduction of the present application in such a way that she could not claim to be a victim within the terms of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention.   It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     The applicant finally complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention that the right to property was violated because the Administrative Court's inactivity in dealing with Mrs. G.'s complaint against the enforcement order prejudiced her claim for retransfer of property.         Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:         "(1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his       possessions except in the public interest and subject to the       conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of       international law.         (2)   The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems       necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the       general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other       contributions or penalties."         The Commission considers that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) without the observations of both parties.         This part of the application must therefore be adjourned.         For these reasons, the Commission unanimously       DECIDES TO ADJOURN its examination of the complaint under Article       6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as to the length of the       enforcement proceedings and the complaint under Article 1 para.       1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1);         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.   Secretary to the Second Chamber         President of the Second Chamber             (K. ROGGE)                             (S. TRECHSEL)