CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 décembre 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 18562/91                       by Maria KARPPINEN, Jari KARPPINEN,                          Thomas KARPPINEN, Carl KARPPINEN,                          Ulla JOHANSSON and Mikael JOHANSSON                       against Sweden         The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 1 December 1993, the following members being present:              MM.    S. TRECHSEL, President                  H. DANELIUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO              Mr.    K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 2 July 1991 by Maria KARPPINEN and Others against Sweden and registered on 19 July 1991 under file No. 18562/91;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.         The first and second applicants are a married couple, both of Swedish nationality.   They were born in 1958 and 1965 respectively and reside at Trollhättan.   The third and fourth applicants are their two sons, T and C, born in 1986 and 1989.   The fifth and sixth applicants are the first applicant's mother and brother.   Before the Commission all applicants are represented by Mrs Siv Westerberg, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg.   The application relates to the taking into care of the third and fourth applicants and their placement in a foster home.   A.     The care orders         At the age of six the first applicant developed epilepsy and was admitted to a home for underdeveloped children where she remained until the age of sixteen.   Following four years at another home she returned to her parents at the age of twenty.   She receives an early retirement pension (förtidspension) as from 1974.   She can neither read nor write.         The second applicant has been on the list of children entitled to special assistance from the Board for Help and Assistance to the Mentally Retarded (Omsorgsstyrelsen) from the age of twelve.         In 1984 the first and second applicants met and moved to Trollhättan.   The second applicant subsequently discontinued his educational training.   Since 1989 he has been unemployed.         The first and second applicants married in 1986, the year in which T was born.   Approximately three weeks after his birth, T was taken into care on a provisional basis and on 26 November 1986 the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) decided to take him into care. On 24 June 1987, however, the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) lifted the care order.   Although the Court found that the parents had problems with providing the necessary intellectual support for T, it found that this shortcoming could be overcome with appropriate assistance from the social authorities.   The social authorities' request for leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) on 28 September 1987. Accordingly, T was returned to his parents.         On 27 November 1989 C was born, and on 14 March 1990 the social authorities decided to take both children into care on a provisional basis.   The question of provisional care was brought before the County Administrative Court which decided, on 2 April 1990, following an oral hearing held on 30 March 1990, to lift the provisional care order as regards T and to maintain it in respect of C.   On 14 May 1990 the Administrative Court of Appeal also lifted the provisional care order in respect of C as it found it established that adequate care could be provided for with the necessary assistance from the social authorities.         Whereas the children were accordingly returned to their parents, the social authorities nevertheless pursued the question of care and submitted, on 9 April 1990 and 19 June 1990, an application to the County Administrative Court requesting that T and C be taken into care pursuant to the provisions of the 1980 Act containing Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen 1980:621 med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga - "the 1980 Act").         Following an oral hearing, held on 2 July 1990, the Court decided, by judgment of 13 July 1990, that T and C should be taken into care.         On 16 July 1990 the social authorities accordingly decided to place T and C in the children's home Lyckhem, a decision which was upheld by the County Administrative Court on 23 October 1990.         The first and second applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal against the care order and the placement at Lyckhem, both on their own behalf and also on behalf of their children. Hearings were held in court on 9 and 16 October 1990 during which the parents, represented by counsel, as well as a number of witnesses, were heard.   During these proceedings the children were represented by their own court appointed counsel.         By judgment of 4 December 1990 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the care order and the decision to place T and C at Lyckhem. In its judgment the Court stated inter alia:   (translation)         "The extensive material in the case does not give an unequivocal       picture of how the situation developed while the children stayed       with their parents.   On the one hand the material submitted by       the social authorities shows a picture of a very difficult       environment for the children.   On the other hand the statements       of relatives and friends of the parents leave the impression       throughout that the case concerns a quite normal family in which       the parents provide the children with a good and loving care.         The material referred to by the social authorities leaves a very       convincing impression.   The reports with different persons'       observations as to how the parents acted vis-à-vis their children       contain no contradictions but are very consistent.   The       correctness of the material has not been challenged by counsel       for the children either.         Generally speaking the parents have not submitted anything which       directly could give reason to doubt the correctness of the       observations contained in this material.   Neither has the oral       hearing, during which the parents were present, disclosed such       doubts.   Instead the parents have maintained that the social       authorities' allegations in the case express revenge, combined       with lies and sabotage.   However, the Court has not found any       basis for these accusations.         Accordingly, the Court considers that the environment in which       the children lived was essentially as described by the social       authorities.       ...       According to the report of 13 June 1990 from the child       psychiatric clinic at the Norra Älvsborg hospital the (parents')       treatment of their children, as observed by the social       authorities, must be characterised as aggravated mental       ill-treatment.   In the report it is further stated that an       environment of this kind without doubt endangers the children's       mental health and development.   The examiners at the clinic ...       unequivocally conclude that the lack of care and the       circumstances in the parental home constitute a great danger to       the children's mental health and development.         The Court does not find any reason to question the report and       accordingly concludes that the environment which (the parents)       offer their children is such as to constitute a serious danger       to their mental health and development.   The examination of the       case further shows that the circumstances prevailing in the       parental home constitutes a risk to the children, also from a       physical point of view.       ...       Previously the courts have found that the social authorities       ought to be able to solve the problems in the parental home.       However, the present case shows that this was not a realistic       view.       ...       The difficulties in assisting the parents adequately in their       role as parents are, in the Court's view, to a great extent due       to Siv Westerberg's way of handling the case.   Both in the       written submissions and during the oral hearing she has expressed       strong critical views as regards society's activities for the       protection of children.   Through this she rejects the views which       constitute the basis for the applicable legislation in this       field.   Her inclination to characterise the social authorities'       activities as revenge, sabotage and lies must be considered as       a result of her views.   The same applies as regards her demands       that contacts between the social authorities and the parents must       go through her and take place in her presence.   She has also       insisted on being present when the children and the parents were       examined at the child psychiatric clinic.   This has not only led       to a delay in the examination but also constituted the reason for       the fact that it could not be carried out in all its aspects in       a meaningful manner. ...       ...       In conclusion the Court finds that today, at least as long as       (the parents) rely on Siv Westerberg as counsel, there is no       reason to believe that a decisive improvement of the environment       in the parental home can be expected with the assistance of the       social authorities.       ...       The children have been placed at Lyckhem awaiting placement in       a family home.         The parents (submit) that the children are subjected to       continuing physical and mental damage due to the placement at the       children's home.   Staff there ill-treat the children, both       physically and mentally, and are emotionally indifferent towards       them.   In addition the placement at the home aims at preparing       for a lasting separation between parents and children.         What the parents have alleged concerning the treatment in the       children's home is not supported by the other investigations made       in this case.   Admittedly there is in the file information       indicating that the children have been scratched by other       children and that they have cried, but there is no reason to       believe that what has happened is anything but every day       incidents which have nothing to do with the conditions in the       children's home.         Counsel for the children has submitted that he has not found       support for the parents' allegations during his visits to the       home and during his conversations with the staff.         The Court accordingly finds that the parents' allegations       concerning the conditions at Lyckhem are unsubstantiated.   Their       request for another placement is therefore rejected."         The first and second applicants applied on their own behalf and on behalf of their children for leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.   Leave was refused by the Court on 8 February 1991.   B.     Question of access while at Lyckhem         Following the care order the social authorities established a programme of access.   The parents and other family members had the possibility to visit the children every day at Lyckhem and, together with staff from Lyckhem, the children visited their parents and grandmother, the fifth applicant.   As regards Christmas 1990 and the following New Year holiday the social authorities, partially granting a request by the applicants, decided to allow the children to be with their parents at their home on 24, 25 and 26 December during the day and on 31 December and 1 January also during the day.         All six applicants appealed against this decision to the County Administrative Court which, on 28 January 1991, decided not to deal with it, partly as the appeal had been submitted too late and, as regards the fifth and sixth applicants (the children's grandmother and uncle), since they had no right of appeal as the access decision did not concern them.         These decisions were subsequently upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 19 February 1991 and leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was refused on 14 June 1991.   C.     Placement in the foster home         Following the placement at Lyckhem the social authorities commenced their investigation as to whether or not the children, T and C, could be placed in a foster home (familjehemsplacering).   On 28 March 1991 the social authorities decided, in accordance with sections 11 and 14 of the 1980 Act, as amended in 1990, to place both children in the same foster home and to allow the parents access once a week and the grandmother and uncle once a month.         All six applicants appealed against this decision to the County Administrative Court and further requested that the appeal be given suspensive effect.   On 17 April 1991 the Court rejected the appeal in so far as it concerned the grandmother and the uncle as they had no right of appeal.   As regards the other applicants the request for suspensive effect was granted.   Legal aid was also granted, but Siv Westerberg was not accepted by the Court as court appointed counsel.   These decisions were upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 29 April 1991.   Leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court on 25 June 1991.                                 __________         In the meantime the social authorities had decided, on 11 April 1991, to reject the applicants' counsel, Siv Westerberg, as their privately engaged counsel as far as the administrative proceedings were concerned.   This issue was brought separately before the County Administrative Court which, on 31 May 1991, upheld the decision.   The Court stated inter alia:   (translation)         "From section 9, subsection 2, of the Code of Public       Administration (förvaltningslagen) the following appears.   If       counsel appears to be unqualified, shows incompetence or if he       appears inappropriate in any other way, the administrative       authority may reject him as counsel in the case.         The social authorities have in their submissions to the Court       stated the following.   Mrs F.W. reported to the social       authorities on a meeting between her, (the parents),       Siv Westerberg and (the foster parents) of 1 March 1991.   During       this meeting Siv Westerberg informed (the foster parents) among       other things that, if they were to become the foster family, they       would not have any private life.   Siv Westerberg also stated that       she would contact (the foster family's) employers and their       daughter's school teacher and the parents of their daughter's       classmates.   Mrs O. has informed the social authorities that (the       foster mother) on 5 April 1991 submitted that the dean of her       daughter's school had contacted her and told her that somebody       had requested a copy of the list of pupils in the daughter's       class.   The school complied with the request.   A letter, signed       by (the first and second applicants), has been sent to the       parents (of the children) in (the daughter's) school.       Cooperation with (the first and second applicants) is impossible       as long as Siv Westerberg remains counsel, which again has       negative consequences for the children.   Meetings and talks       between (the first and second applicants) and (the foster       parents) and between (the first and second applicants) and the       staff of the social authorities must take place when Siv       Westerberg has the time to be present.   (The first and second       applicants) do not get the opportunity to speak spontaneously       when Siv Westerberg is present.   Her use of tape recorders during       the talks does not create spontaneity.   Siv Westerberg submits       unsubstantiated allegations against the foster family.   Siv       Westerberg expresses strong critical views on society's       activities for the protection of children and on the efforts of       the foster parents.   Siv Westerberg's proclamation to (the foster       parents) that their daughter, her classmates and their parents       would become involved, has proved to be correct.         The Court decides as follows.         The act of sending letters to classmates and their parents with       the obvious aim of influencing (the foster parents' daughter) to       the extent that she would influence her parents to refrain from       accepting T and C in the home is not only particularly peculiar       but also inappropriate.   Siv Westerberg has not denied that she       is behind this.   Her statements to the Court on the contrary       confirm the social authorities' allegations in this respect.       Furthermore, the Court believes the social authorities' other       allegations as regards Siv Westerberg's actions in this case.       All in all the Court finds that Siv Westerberg has disclosed such       lack of competence and such lack of suitability that the social       authorities had reason to decide to reject her as counsel."         Siv Westerberg continued to act as privately engaged counsel as far as the court proceedings were concerned.   On 3 June 1991, however, the County Administrative Court also rejected her as counsel in the court proceedings pursuant to section 48, subsection 2, of the Code of Administrative Courts Procedure (förvaltningsprocesslagen) for similar reasons as stated above.   The Court appointed another lawyer as counsel for the first and second applicants.         On 12 June 1991 the County Administrative Court decided to lift the suspensive effect in force since 17 April 1991.   This decision was upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 18 June 1991. Accordingly, T and C were transferred from Lyckhem to the foster home.                                 __________         On 27 June 1991 the County Administrative Court examined the first, second, third and fourth applicants' appeal against the social authorities' above-mentioned decision of 28 March 1991 regarding placement in the foster home and access.   Whereas the first and second applicants contended that the foster home in question was unacceptable and that the foster parents were only interested in the financial aspects of such an arrangement and thus maintained that the children should not be placed in the foster home, the court appointed counsel for the third and fourth applicants requested that the appeal be rejected.         Following an evaluation of the relevant material the Court concluded that the foster home in question was best qualified for taking proper care of the children.   Furthermore, the Court quashed the social authorities' decision on access in so far as it concerned the grandmother and the uncle since the applicable legislation did not allow the authorities to regulate such access as these persons were not holders of parental rights.   As regards the first and second applicants, who were the holders of the parental rights, the Court considered the access arrangements made to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.   In this respect the Court stated:   (translation)         "Due to the way in which the parents' previous counsel has       handled the case, the situation is now such that time is needed       for establishing a well-functioning relationship between the       foster home and the children and in particular between the foster       home and the parents.   The children also need calm and quiet in       order to adapt to the foster home situation.   The restrictions       the social authorities have set for the access therefore appear       to be well-founded.   The appeal is accordingly rejected in this       respect."         The above decisions were upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 6 September 1991.   Leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was refused on 18 October 1991.   The children still live in the foster home. COMPLAINTS         All applicants complain that the decision to take T and C into care violated their right to respect for their family life in that the case did not disclose circumstances which would make such a measure necessary in a democratic society.   They invoke Article 8 of the Convention.         The applicants also complain that the decision first to place the children at Lyckhem and subsequently in a foster home amounts to an additional violation of Article 8 of the Convention.         Under the same provision the applicants further complain that their access rights have been reduced to an unacceptable minimum.         As regards the care proceedings the applicants complain that they did not get a fair hearing since the courts only relied on evidence hostile to them and disregarded the witnesses' statements which spoke in their favour.   They invoke in this respect Article 6 of the Convention.         They furthermore complain that in the proceedings concerning placement in the foster home, during which Siv Westerberg was refused permission to act as their counsel, they did not, for this reason, get a fair hearing.   They also maintain that the reasons for rejecting their counsel amounted to an unjustified interference with the right to freedom of expression.   They invoke in this respect Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention.         The fifth and sixth applicants complain that they were refused access to an effective remedy as guaranteed to them under Article 13 of the Convention when the courts rejected their appeal against the social authorities' decision on access.         As regards the conditions at Lyckhem the applicants complain that these were comparable to a children's prison, where the children were subjected to treatment which violated Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention.         The applicants further maintain that the authorities interfered with the right to education, to freedom of religion and freedom to found a family.   They refer in these respects to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Articles 9 and 12 of the Convention.         Finally, the applicants complain that the conditions in the foster home are such that the child T risks dying there.   They invoke Article 2 of the Convention in this respect.   THE LAW         The applicants complain of a variety of violations of the Convention and of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in relation to the decisions taken concerning the children T's and C's care.         Therefore the Commission recalls that it is clear from Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention that the Commission can receive an application from a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals only if such person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals can claim to be a victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention. Moreover, the Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention only with respect to its application in a concrete case, while it is not competent to examine in abstracto its compatibility with the Convention (cf. for example No. 11045/84, Dec. 8.3.85, D.R. 42 p. 247).         Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present case the Commission has not found it necessary to determine, in respect of the different complaints submitted, whether all applicants may claim to be victims, but will, for the purposes of this case, leave this question open unless it is otherwise expressly indicated.   1.     The applicants complain that the decision to take T and C into care violated Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention in so far as it guarantees the right to respect for family life.   This provision reads as follows:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and       family life, his home and his correspondence.         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with       the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with       the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests       of national security, public safety or the economic well-being       of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the       protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the       rights and freedoms of others."         The Commission assumes that the taking into care of T and C interfered with the applicants' right to respect for their family life as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.   It has therefore examined whether this interference was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).   In this respect the Commission recalls that three conditions must be fulfilled: the interference must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those legitimate aims.         As regards the first condition, the Commission finds that the relevant provisions in Swedish law satisfy the requirements as to the quality of the law (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 30-31, paras. 60-63). Furthermore, the issue of care was examined by the competent administrative courts up to the Supreme Administrative Court which refused to grant leave to appeal, and there is nothing to suggest that the decisions taken by the courts in the present case were contrary to Swedish law.         The Commission also finds that the interference had a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests of the children, which in this case fall under the expression "for the protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (cf. also above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p. 31, paras. 64-65).         It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the children.         According to the established case-law of the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (cf. above-mentioned Olsson judgment, pp. 31-32, para. 67).   That does not mean, however, that the Commission's review is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith.   Furthermore, it cannot confine itself to considering the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them in the light of the case as a whole.   It must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (cf. Olsson judgment, p. 32, para. 68).         In the present case, the Commission recalls that the applicants allege that the care order was based on irrelevant and insufficient circumstances.         Before considering the substance of this issue, the Commission recalls that both the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal held oral hearings during which the possibility existed of presenting all the views which could be decisive for the outcome of the case.   Having regard to these facts, the Commission finds that, in so far as certain procedural requirements are implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8), these requirements were satisfied since the applicants were involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests.         As regards the actual care order, the Commission recalls in particular the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal of 4 December 1990.   The Court found no reason to question a report in which it had been found that the parental home environment to which T and C were subjected could be characterised as aggravated mental ill-treatment constituting a danger to the children's mental health and development.   Furthermore, the Court concluded that the circumstances prevailing in the parental home also constituted a risk to the children's physical well-being.         Such conditions are clearly relevant to a decision to take a child into care.   Furthermore, the Commission recalls that prior to the taking into care of the children the social authorities had been involved for a considerable length of time in supporting their parents. It cannot therefore be said that the authorities intervened without adequate knowledge of the background.         In the light of this the Commission finds that the decision to take T and C into care was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary to take the children into care.   Accordingly, the Commission concludes that this decision can be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention in the interest of the children.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicants also complain of the way in which the care order was implemented.   More specifically they maintain that the placement at Lyckhem, and the restriction imposed on their access rights during that period of time, was in violation of Article 8 (Art. ) of the Convention.   Furthermore, they maintain that the conditions at Lyckhem were such that they could be compared with a children's prison where the children were subjected to treatment which violated Articles 3 and 4 (Art. 3, 4) of the Convention.   The applicants also complain about the restrictions on access after the children's transfer to the foster home and finally allege, as regards the implementation of the care order, that the conditions in the foster home were such as to endanger T's life.         As a starting-point the Commission finds that it has not been substantiated that the conditions at Lyckhem and in the foster home, and the quality of the care given to the children there, were not and are not satisfactory.   The applicants' complaints under Articles 2, 3 and 4 (Art. 2, 3, 4) of the Convention therefore disclose no appearance of a violation of these articles.         As for the remaining aspects of the implementation of the care order the Commission notes that there appears to be no question of the children being adopted, and the parents have not been deprived of their parental rights.   Nevertheless the restriction on access was an interference with the right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention for which reason the Commission must examine whether this interference complied with para. 2 of this provision.         The Commission finds that the interference was in accordance with law and had a legitimate aim (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Margareta and Roger Andersson judgment of 25 February 1992, Series A no. 226-A, pp. 25-28, paras. 74-87).   What remains is accordingly to consider whether it was "necessary".   In this respect the Commission recalls that T and C were placed together at Lyckhem and their parents and other family members had the possibility of visiting them daily.   Moreover the social authorities arranged for the children to visit their parents and grandmother.   The Commission has in this respect not overlooked that the social authorities did not fully comply with certain requests for access, for example at Christmas 1990.   However, the implementation of the care order at Lyckhem was nevertheless such that easy and regular access was provided for and thus the access regulation did not, in the Commission's view, exceed what could be regarded as "necessary" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.         As regards the possibilities of access after the children's placement in the foster home, the Commission recalls that this was limited to once a week as far as the parents were concerned and to once a month as far as other family members were concerned.   Although the appeal against this limitation was unsuccessful, nothing has been submitted which shows that such a regular access was not in fact established.   Furthermore, the Commission recalls the reasons given by the courts, in particular by the County Administrative Court in its judgment of 27 June 1991, for partially accepting the access arrangements fixed by the social authorities.   In the particular circumstances of this case the Commission finds that these reasons were both relevant and sufficient.         In conclusion the Commission thus finds that the measures taken in implementation of the care order were supported by reasons justifying them as proportionate to the aim pursued (cf. also Eur. Court H.R., Olsson (No. 2) judgment of 27 November 1992, Series A no. 250, pp. 35-37, paras. 89-92).         It follows that the applicants' complaints relating to the implementation of the care order as submitted under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8 (Art. 2, 3, 4, 8) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     Under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the applicants complain of a number of alleged procedural shortcomings in respect of the court hearings involved.   Article 6 para. 1, first sentence (Art. 6-1-1), which is of relevance in this report, reads as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,       everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a       reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal       established by law."   a)     First the applicants complain that the hearings, in which the questions of care were determined, were unfair in that the courts only relied on evidence hostile to them.         With regard to this particular complaint the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention.   In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.   The Commission refers, on this point, to its established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).         In the care proceedings the Commission has not, however, found any appearance of such possible violations of the Convention.   b)     The applicants also complain that they did not get a fair hearing in the proceedings concerning the issue of placement in the foster home, due to the fact that the courts rejected Siv Westerberg as their counsel.         Although Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not expressly guarantee the right to legal assistance of one's own choosing, the Commission will not exclude that situations could arise whereby an arbitrary or unreasonable rejection of counsel could raise issues under this provision.   However, in the present case the Commission does not consider that the rejection of Siv Westerberg as counsel for the applicants was arbitrary or unreasonable.   Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the Court appointed another counsel to assist the applicants and the Commission has found no substantiated evidence which shows that this counsel did not fulfil his tasks in an acceptable way.         In these circumstances the Commission finds no evidence to support the conclusion that the hearing concerning the placement in the foster home was unfair or that the Swedish courts otherwise failed to comply with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         It follows that the applicants' complaints, as submitted under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.     The fifth and sixth applicants (the children's grandmother and uncle) complain of the lack of a remedy in respect of their complaints of lack of access to the children.   They refer in this respect to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.         The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as requiring a remedy in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as "arguable" in terms of the Convention (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).         Having regard to its above conclusions in respect of the Convention complaints submitted, the Commission considers that the applicants do not have any "arguable claims" of a violation of the provisions invoked for these complaints.   In these circumstances it finds no appearance of a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.     Finally, the Commission has examined the applicants' complaints under Articles 9, 10 and 12 (Art. 9, 10, 12) of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention, as submitted by them.   However, this examination has not disclosed any appearance of a violation of these provisions and it follows that this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Second Chamber        President of the Second Chamber           (K. ROGGE)                            (S. TRECHSEL)