CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 mai 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 18507/91                       by H.                       against Finland         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 12 May 1994, the following members being present:              MM.    A. WEITZEL, President                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 22 April 1991 by H. against Finland and registered on 15 July 1991 under file No. 18507/91;         Having regard to :         -     reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure       of the Commission;         -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       22 October 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 4 January 1993;         -     the observations submitted by the Government on       22 February 1994 and by the applicant on 6 and 16 March 1994;         -     the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 12 May 1994;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Swedish citizen born in 1947 and resident at Storvik, Sweden as from 1983. He is a carpenter by profession. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Peter Westdahl, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg, Sweden.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   Particular circumstances of the case         In 1988 administrative proceedings (tietoimitus, vägförrättning) were instituted for the execution of a road construction plan for a private forestry road which was to run over the applicant's property Tuntskog 4:43 at Iskmo in the municipality of Korsholm (Mustasaari) in Finland. The applicant has been the owner of the property as from 1959.         An initial request for the construction of a road had been lodged with the Forestry Board (metsälautakunta, skogsnämnden) of Ostrobotnia by certain property owners already in 1979. An outline of the road construction plan was drawn up by the Forestry Board following a meeting of property owners on 3 June 1988 and a further meeting on an unknown date, presumably in the summer of 1988. According to the plan the applicant's property was to be split by the road. The applicant was not summoned to these meetings and did not attend them. According to him, only some 10 to 15 persons were heard by the Forestry Board, whereas the total of number of property owners to be affected by the road amounted to approximately 120.         Having drawn up its plan, Forestry Board in the summer of 1988 carried out certain logging on the applicant's property in order to stake out the intended location of the road.         Following a request by an Executor of the road construction project (toimitusmies, syssloman), a representative elected at one of the meetings in 1988, the Head of the District Surveying Office (maanmittauskonttori, lantmäteribyrån) of Vaasa on 18 October 1988 appointed M.P. Expert (toimitusinsinööri, förrättnings-ingenjör) to conduct proceedings under the 1962 Act on Private Roads (laki 358/62 yksityisistä teistä, lag 358/62 om enskilda vägar, hereinafter "the 1962 Act") with a view to confirming and implementing the plan.         On 15 November 1989 the Environmental Office (ympäristötoimisto, miljövårdsbyrån) of the County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen) of Vaasa favoured the plan.         On 16 May 1990 T.K., Head of the District Surveying Office of Vaasa, took over the Expert's duties.         On 30 May 1990 the Expert summoned the applicant to a hearing of property owners on 27 June 1990 by way of a registered letter sent to Sweden to the address of the applicant's father at which the applicant had lived until 1983.         According to the applicant, the letter was never received by him, as his father, born in 1900, was in bad health and therefore unable to take care of the correspondence addressed to the applicant.         On 27 June 1990 the hearing was held before the Expert, assisted by two Trustees (uskottu mies, gode män). The applicant did not attend the hearing. At the hearing it was decided to confirm the plan adopted by the Forestry Board. The confirmation entailed, inter alia, the approval of the proposed location of the road except for certain points not relevant for the present case, the approval of the cost estimation, the establishing of road rights pertaining to the encumbered properties, the approval of the so-called road units (tieosuus, väg- enhet) indicating the relative distribution of the road costs between its owners and the founding of an association of road owners (tiekunta, väglag). It was further decided that no property owner should receive compensation, as the benefit of the road was considered to compensate the interference.         According to the applicant, he only subsequently, in August 1990, discovered that a hearing had been held. Thereafter he joined, as soon as possible, a joint appeal to the Land Court (maaoikeus, jord- domstolen) of Vaasa lodged by certain other persons on 23 July 1990. In this appeal it was requested that only part of the adopted plan be confirmed by the Land Court and that part of it be replaced by already existing roads. This alternative solution would allegedly have lowered the cost of the road from approximately 1,7 million FIM to 0,8 million FIM and required significantly less interference with the natural habitat.         Hearings were held before the Land Court on 16 and 24 October 1990. The applicant had not been summoned to, and did not attend, any of them. At the first hearing a written submission relating to the joint appeal of 23 July 1990 and signed by, among others, the applicant, was presented. It is stated in the Land Court's judgment that it heard fourteen property owners. It appears that these had not appealed against the decision of the Expert and Trustees. The Land Court further heard the three Executors and had regard to opinions submitted by the Expert and two representatives of the Forestry Board. It also carried out an inspection on the spot (katselmus, syn). The applicant asserts that at the second hearing the Land Court heard only the Forestry Board.          In its judgment of 24 October 1990 the Land Court dismissed the joint appeal of 23 July 1990 without examining it on its merits as far it has been lodged by, among others, the applicant. The Land Court considered that he had not been legally represented. The Land Court rejected the joint appeal as far as lodged by a number of other persons considered to have legal standing. It found that the road would not create any significant inconvenience for the property owners and that there were no weighty reasons for changing the proposed location. Regard was had to the opinion by the Environmental Office of the County Administrative Board and and the Land Court further noted that none of the appellants had questioned the need for a road to the area.         The Land Court was presided by a judge and further consisted of four members, namely the Head of the County Surveying Office (lääninmaanmittausinsinööri, länslantmäteriingenjören), a Land Court Surveyor (maaoikeusinsinööri, jordrättsingenjör) and two lay judges.         On 25 March 1991 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal.         In a letter of 9 January 1992 addressed to the Forestry Board the applicant requested to be excluded from his road ownership and exempted from his obligation to participate in the road maintenance costs pursuant to section 28, subsection 2 of the 1962 Act.         In a letter of 16 January 1992 the Forestry Board informed the applicant that a so-called road agreement (tiesopimus, vägavtal) had been signed by all affected by it except for the applicant and the applicant in Application No. 18595/91. The Board recalled that the proceedings before the Expert and Trustees had determined the location and width of the road as well as the relative financial responsibility of each party. As all relevant decisions had acquired legal force, the plan including its financial implications could no longer be amended. Accordingly, the Forestry Board had no competence to amend the applicant's share of the overall road costs.         On 16 January 1992 the applicant authorised one of the Executors to sign the road agreement on his behalf, although reserving his position stated in his application to the Commission.         On 30 March 1992 the applicant's request for an annulment of the Land Court's judgment was rejected.         The applicant has submitted a list drawn up by the Forestry Board on 19 June 1990 stating the costs of the road pertaining to each property owner. The total area of the properties affected by the road amounts to 1.312,50 hectares. The size of the applicant's property is 4,1 hectares and his relative share of the total area is 0,31 per cent. The estimated total cost of the road construction is 1.695.000 FIM. The applicant's share is 5.933 FIM, which corresponds to 0,35 per cent of the total cost.         The road construction works commenced in 1991.   Relevant domestic law and practice         The relevant legislation at the time of the proceedings at issue may be summarised as follows. Part of the legislation has subsequently been amended.         a.    General provisions on the construction and the maintenance            of a private road         A road shall be constructed so as to achieve the purpose of the road in an optimal manner while at the same time not causing more than necessary damage or harm to anyone. A road shall not be constructed, if it cannot be regarded as necessary, having regard to the use of existing private and public roads and other important general considerations. The above considerations shall also apply to other measures taken in connection with a road construction (section 7 of the 1962 Act, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         Anyone who has been given permission to use a road or whose property is located either partly or completely within the area which the road must be considered to serve shall participate in the construction and maintenance costs for the road (section 22, subsection 1).         If a significant number of those who would be obliged to participate in the costs for the maintenance of the road oppose its construction and provided the road would clearly serve only a minor purpose for several properties, it may be decided to construct the road only at the expense of those who wish to have it constructed (section 22, subsection 2).         If the road to be constructed would only serve a property to a limited extent, due to, for instance, another already existing road serving the property, the owner shall be exempted from participating in the costs for the new road provided he states that he will abstain from using it (section 22, subsection 3).         The financial responsibility for the road shall be distributed between the participants in the road construction according to their individual benefit from the road. In this assessment regard should be had to, among other things, the size of the properties and to what extent the road will be used by each participant (section 23, subsection 1).         The proposed location of the road shall, as far as necessary, also be marked in the terrain pursuant to the 1962 Ordinance on Private Roads (asetus 690/62 yksityisistä teistä, förordning 690/62 om enskilda vägar) (section 48, subsection 2 of the 1962 Act, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         A road owner may request to be excluded from his ownership and exempted from his obligation to participate in the road maintenance costs if the road is no longer needed by the property at issue (section 28, subsection 2 of the 1962 Act). If the circumstances affecting his obligation to participate in the maintenance of the road or his share of the maintenance costs have considerably changed, the relative distribution of those costs between the road owners shall be revised on request. Regardless of such circumstances he may request a revision of the cost responsibility if it has remained unchanged during at least five years (section 29). The above requests shall be examined at the general meeting of the association of road owners (section 64, subsection 2, para. 2). The decision of the meeting can be appealed to the Road Board (section 70, subsection 1). The decision of the Road Board may be appealed to the Land Court (section 55, as amended by Act no. 521/75). Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court may subsequently be requested (section 333, subsection 2 of the 1951 Act, as amended by Act no. 509/84).         b.    The proceedings before the Forestry Board         The Forestry Board is a public body governed by the 1987 Act on the Central Forestry Boards and Forestry Boards (laki 139/87 keskusmetsälautakunnista ja metsälautakunnista, lag 139/87 om centralskogsnämnder och skogsnämnder) and, as from 1 March 1991, by the 1991 Act on Forestry Centres and Forestry Boards (laki 265/91 metsäkeskuksista ja metsälautakunnista, lag 265/91 om skogscentraler och skogsnämnder).         Under both Acts the members of the Forestry Boards shall be appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The planning- meetings held at the initial stage of the proceedings with a view to outlining a road construction plan are governed by the 1987 Forest Improvement Act (metsänparannuslaki 140/87, skogsförbättringslag 140/87).         c.    The proceedings before the Expert and Trustees         Proceedings for the execution of a road construction plan may be instituted by the property owner or municipality concerned or by the relevant association of road owners (section 39, subsection 1, as amended by Act no. 498/82, and subsection 4, as amended by Act no. 521/75). Others who have been allowed to use a road for economic purposes as well as possessors of rights of usufruct may express their opinions during the proceedings (section 39, subsection 2).         The proceedings are conducted by an Expert assisted by two Trustees (section 43, subsection 1 of the 1951 Partition Act (jakolaki 604/51, lag 604/51 om skifte, hereinafter "the 1951 Act"), as amended by Act no. 321/72)). The Expert is normally an official of the District Surveying Office, either the Head of the Office or another land surveyor appointed by him.         The Trustees are appointed by the Expert from a list of at least six persons adopted by the relevant Municipal Council (kunnanvaltuusto, kommunfullmäktige) for a period of four years (section 43, subsection 1, as amended by Act no. 321/72, and section 44 of the 1951 Act, as partly amended by Act no. 321/72). Instead of appointing the Trustees the Expert may choose to be assisted by two members of the Municipal Road Board (tielautakunta, vägnämnd) (section 40, subsection 1 of the 1962 Act, as amended by 322/72). The Trustees shall be acquainted with property matters and fulfil the conditions of lay judges in District Courts (section 45, subsection 1 of the 1951 Act, as amended by Act no. 321/72). There is no requirement that the Expert or any of the Trustees should be a lawyer.         The request for proceedings to be instituted before the Expert and Trustees shall, as far as possible, contain a list of all those affected by the proceedings as well as a sufficiently detailed map showing the location of the road. The request shall further contain the addresses of those applying for proceedings to be instituted and, as far as possible, the addresses of all those affected by the proceedings (section 41, subsection 2 of the 1962 Act, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         If the Expert is of one opinion and the Trustees jointly of another, the Trustees' opinion shall prevail. If all three disagree, the Expert's opinion shall prevail (section 49 of the 1951 Act).         If the proceedings concern a forestry road, the Expert shall inform the Central Forestry Board which shall, if necessary, appoint an expert to represent the Board in the proceedings (section 42, subsection 1 of the 1962 Act, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         The parties to the proceedings shall be summoned by the Expert at least fourteen days in advance by means of a public notice (kuulutus, kungörelse) on the municipal notice board. The proceedings shall further be advertised in one or two local newspapers. Parties resident in another municipality and whose addresses are indicated in the documents or otherwise known to the Expert shall be summoned in writing by a registered letter handed in to a post office at least fourteen days before the hearing. All parties may be summoned in writing, this rendering the advertisements unnecessary. The summons shall be sent as registered mail at least fourteen days prior to the day of the hearing (section 43, subsections 1 to 3 and 6, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         The hearing before the Expert may be held despite a failure to comply with the requirements concerning the public notice and the summonses, on the condition that all parties attend the hearing or, if a party is not present, provided there is evidence that he has been summoned by the Expert at least fourteen days in advance (section 43, subsection 7, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         If all parties indicated in section 43 have not been summoned to the hearing and provided they do not attend the hearing nevertheless, the proceedings shall be suspended and a summons be sent in accordance with section 43 (section 45, subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         At the hearing the Expert and Trustees shall decide, among other matters,         -     whether the road shall be constructed over another property            and whether a road easement shall be established;       -     the location and width of the road;       -     those financially responsible for the construction and            maintenance of the road;       -     how this responsibility is to be distributed between the            participants; and       -     whether compensation shall be granted, to whom, in what            amount and whether the compensation shall be paid by all or            only part of the participants (section 48, subsection 1).         If a decision has been made to construct a road, a map and a road description and, if necessary, a cost estimation shall be drawn up. The location of the road shall further be marked in the terrain (section 48, subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         If the parties have reached an agreement on questions regarding the right to the road as well as its maintenance, the Expert and Trustees shall consider whether that agreement or part of it can be confirmed (section 49, subsection 1). If the agreement is contrary to the requirements in section 7, subsections 2 and 3, or would clearly encumber a property significantly more than allowed by the Act, these parts of the agreement shall not be confirmed (section 49, subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         If the administrative proceedings concern a forestry road which has been planned with State funds and provided the road construction plan has subsequently been adopted, the location of the road shall not be altered unless there are weighty reasons therefor (section 49, subsection 3, as amended by Act no. 521/75).         The notice of appeal against decisions made by the Expert and Trustees shall be read out to the parties attending the proceedings, handed over to a representative of theirs as well as to any party on request (section 51, subsection 3 of the 1962 Act and section 316 of the 1951 Act). The appeal shall be lodged within thirty days from the date when the proceedings were announced as terminated or the decision was given. The notice of appeal or a copy thereof shall be appended to the appeal (sections 313 and 314 of the 1951 Act, the last-mentioned as amended by Act no. 509/84).         d.    The proceedings before the Land Court         Up to the entry into force of Act no. 506/91 on 1 September 1991 the Land Court was presided by a judge and further consisted of four lay judges, namely the Head of the County Surveying Office ex officio, a Land Court Surveyor and two lay judges appointed by the President of the Land Court out of four persons elected by the relevant Municipal Assembly.         As from 1 September 1991, when an overall restructuring of the county surveying administration entered into force, the Land Court consists of only four members, the Head of the County Surveying Office no longer sitting on the Court (section 293, subsection 1 of the 1951 Act, as last amended by Act no. 506/91, and subsection 294, subsection 3, as amended by Act no. 267/78).         The rules governing bias of a member of a Land Court are the same as those applicable to other professional and lay judges (section 299, subsection 1 of the 1951 Act, as amended by Act no. 321/72, and chapter 13, section 1 of the Code on Judicial Procedure (Oikeudenkäymiskaari, Rättegångs Balk). However, as long as the Head of the County Surveying Office sat on the Land Court he was not considered biased for having previously dealt with matters relating to the administrative proceedings in a particular case (section 299, subsection 2 of the 1951 Act, as repealed by Act no. 506/91).         In the Government Bill to Parliament proposing the above- mentioned 1991 amendments to the 1951 Act it was stated that the Land Court should be an impartial and independent tribunal and that the participation of the Head of the County Surveying Office on that court "constituted an exception from the general practice" (Bill No. 199/90, p. 3). Following the amendments the members of the Land Court would be "totally independent from the county surveying authority responsible for the administrative proceedings" (ibid., p. 9).         The notification of a hearing before the Land Court shall be placed on the municipal notice board and advertised in one or two local newspapers at least fourteen days before the hearing. Appellants whose addresses are known to the Court should further be summoned in writing at least fourteen days beforehand (section 320 of the 1951 Act, as amended by Act no. 321/72).         The Expert shall attend the Land Court's hearing in order to reply to its questions regarding the administrative proceedings conducted by him. He shall further be heard in regard to the submissions made by the parties. The Expert's absence shall, however, not prevent the Land Court from examining and deciding the case (section 324, as amended by Act 321/72). If considered necessary, the Land Court may invite other experts to submit information at its hearing (section 300, as amended by Act no. 321/72).         If a matter has been brought before the Land Court by way of an appeal, a party who is not an appellant shall be allowed to present claims before the court on the ground that the matter also affects his rights (section 322, subsection 1, as amended by Act no. 321/72).         e.    Supreme Court practice         In a case decided by the Supreme Court (No. 1983 II 169) a Land Court's judgment was quashed on the ground that a party to administrative proceedings who had appealed to the Land Court had not been summoned to attend its hearing, even though his address had been known to the Court and despite the fact that his representative had been summoned.         In another case (No. 1983 I 2) a party to administrative proceedings had appealed to the Land Court but without appending a notice of appeal or a copy thereof to his appeal. The President of the Land Court had declined to present the appeal to the full court. The Supreme Court quashed the President's decision, considering that the omission of a notice of appeal should not immediately result in the appellant's lack of legal standing, but that the appellant should be given an opportunity to supplement his appeal by submitting the notice within a certain time-limit. The Supreme Court considered that the notice could also be obtained ex officio by the President.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 of the Convention         (a)   that the Land Court was partial, one of its members being the Head of the County Surveying Office and thereby a superior of the Expert; and         (b)   that the proceedings were unfair in several respects, in particular in that although his address was known to the authorities, he was neither summoned to the initial proceedings conducted by the Forestry Board nor to the hearings before the Expert and Trustees and the Land Court; that the Land Court wrongly dismissed the appeal as joined by the applicant, considering that he had not been properly represented; and in that the Land Court did not properly hear any of the property owners who objected to the Forestry Board's plan, but merely those who supported it as well as the Executors of the plan and the Forestry Board itself.   2.     The applicant further complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention that his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions has been violated in two respects.         (a)   Firstly, the Forestry Board in 1988 unlawfully carried out logging on his property for the purpose of staking out the planned road on his property.         (b)   Secondly, the construction of the road interfered in an unjustified manner with the applicant's property rights. It did not pursue any general interest, as it was an exclusively private road. In any case, the alternative road plan supported by the applicant would have been a considerably cheaper solution and would not have affected his property in as serious a way. The applicant finally claims that his responsibility for the road costs is excessive.   3.     In his observations at the Commission's hearing on 12 May 1994 the applicant also lodged a further complaint with regard to the composition of the Land Court in that also the two lay judges sitting on that court were partial, given that they had allegedly been chosen by the municipality of Korsholm following influence by three high- ranking members of the municipality who also owned properties in the vicinity of the planned road. He again invoked Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 22 April 1991 and registered on 15 July 1991.         On 1 July 1992 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits with the exception of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         The Government's observations were submitted on 22 October 1992 and the applicant's observations in reply on 4 January 1993.         On 11 January 1994 the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaints under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. It further decided to invite the Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         The Government's observations on the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were submitted on 22 February 1994 and the applicant's observations on 6 and 16 March 1994.         On 8 March 1994 the applicant was granted legal aid.         On 13 April 1994 the Commission decided to extend the scope of its hearing to include the question of the admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         At the hearing, which was held on 12 May 1994, the parties were represented as follows:   The Government:         Mr. Tom Grönberg                  Ambassador, Director-General for                                        Legal Affairs, Ministry for                                        Foreign Affairs, agent         Mr. Arto Kosonen                  Legal adviser, Ministry for                                        Foreign Affairs, co-agent         Mrs. Leea Vikman                  Land surveyor, District                                        Surveying Office of Southern                                        Savo, expert         The applicant:         Mr. Peter Westdahl                Member of the Swedish Bar                                        Association, counsel         Mr. Roger Loo                     Engineer, assistant   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention         (a)   that the Land Court was partial, one of its members being the Head of the County Surveying Office and thereby a superior of the Expert; and         (b)   that the proceedings were unfair in several respects, namely in that although his address was known to the authorities, he was neither summoned to the initial proceedings conducted by the Forestry Board nor to the hearings before the Expert and Trustees and the Land Court; that the Land Court wrongly dismissed the appeal as joined by the applicant, considering that he had not been properly represented; and in that the Land Court did not properly hear any of the property owners who objected to the Forestry Board's plan, but merely such who supported it as well as the Executors of the plan and the Forestry Board itself.         Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, as far as relevant:         "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and obligations       ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an       independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."         Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads:         "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this       Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a       national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been       committed by persons acting in an official capacity."         a)    The presence of the Head of the County Surveying Office on            the Land Court         The Government submit that this aspect of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. Under domestic law in force at the relevant time the Head of the County Surveying Office was not biased as a member of the Land Court, given that this Office was merely responsible for registering the proceedings and keeping their records. He did not appoint the officials of the District Surveying Office and had no right to influence the outcome of the administrative proceedings.         The applicant contends that the participation of the Head of the County Surveying Office in the Land Court rendered the Court partial, given that he was the Expert's superior and considering that he was the official finally responsible for the road construction plan confirmed by the Expert and Trustees.         b)    The applicant's access to the Land Court and the fairness            of its proceedings         The Government consider that the complaint is manifestly ill- founded. The applicant was not placed at a substantial disadvantage in the proceedings which were therefore fair as a whole. Admittedly, the applicant was not summoned to the meetings arranged by the Forestry Board, although his address was known. However, although the Forestry Boards often invite property owners and others affected by a proposed road to such meetings, the applicant had no right under domestic law to be heard at this stage. In any case, the proceedings before the Forestry Board fall as such outside the Commission's competence ratione temporis and did not determine the applicant's civil rights or obligations. The plan drawn up by the Forestry Board on the basis of the meetings was not binding under the 1962 Act, although it had a significant bearing on the final outcome of the road construction proceedings, given that section 49, subsection 3 of the 1962 Act presupposes weighty reasons for its amendment.         As regards the fairness of the proceedings before the Expert and Trustees, the Government refute the applicant's allegation that he was not summoned to the hearing on 27 June 1990 and refer to the letter of 30 May 1990.         As regards the fairness of the proceedings before the Land Court, the Government admit that no notice of appeal was served on the applicant. They consider, however, that the applicant, nevertheless, had an opportunity to appeal to the Land Court. As the applicant did not lodge any formal appeal, he was not summoned to the Land Court's hearings. The Government underline that the written submission presented to the Land Court at its hearing on 16 October 1990 and which related to the joint appeal of 23 July 1990 did not have the effect of making the applicant a party to the proceedings as an appellant.         The applicant maintains that the proceedings as a whole were unfair. In particular, the summons issued by the Expert on 30 May 1990 never reached him, although his present address was known to the authorities. The applicant was therefore informed about the road construction project only subsequent to the termination of the administrative proceedings. As allegedly a majority of all parties were not summoned, no proper examination pursuant to section 49, subsection 1 of the 1962 Act of a possible agreement between the parties took place.         As to the fairness of the proceedings before the Land Court, the applicant submits that it did not properly examine whether all parties had been summoned to the administrative proceedings, although two appellants considered to have standing before the Land Court had complained about the lack of summonses. The applicant joined the appeal of 23 July 1990 as soon as he had been informed about the administrative proceedings and their outcome. However, given that he had not been summoned to the Land Court's hearings, he could not possibly have been granted standing before it even if he had ensured his legal representation.         The applicant finally submits that the proceedings were also unfair in that he has never been able to obtain information as to how many parties and who supported the Forestry Board's road construction plan. Its supporters were de facto represented by the Forestry Board itself, although its role, in particular in the proceedings before the Land Court, should have been limited to that of an independent expert. Consequently, those who objected to the plan, allegedly constituting a clear majority of those affected by the road, were not placed on an equal footing with those supporting the plan.         The Commission has proceeded to a preliminary examination of the whole of the applicant's above-mentioned complaint in the light of the parties' submissions. It considers that the complaint raises questions of fact and law which are of such a complex nature that their determination requires an examination of the merits. The complaint cannot therefore be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.   2.     The applicant further complains that his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions has been violated in two respects.         (a)   Firstly, the Forestry Board in 1988 unlawfully carried out logging on his property for the purpose of staking out the planned road on his property.         (b)   Secondly, the construction of the road interfered in an unjustified manner with the applicant's property rights. It did not pursue any general interest, as it was an exclusively private road. In any case, the alternative road plan supported by the applicant would have been a considerably cheaper solution and would not have affected his property in as serious a way. The applicant finally claims that his responsibility for the road costs is excessive.         In all the above-mentioned respects the applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and the above-cited Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.         Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his       possessions except in the public interest and subject to the       conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of       international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair       the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary       to control the use of property in accordance with the general       interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions       or penalties."         a)    The Forestry Board's logging in 1988         The Government argue that the complaint of the logging carried out by the Forestry Board is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention, given that it took place in 1988.         The applicant considers the logging to form an inherent part of the road construction proceedings as a whole which terminated only after the entry into force of the Convention with regard to Finland.         The Commission observes that the logging at issue took place in 1988, i.e. prior to 10 May 1990, which is the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to Finland.         It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         b)    The other interference with the applicant's property rights            due to the construction of the road         The Government submit that this complaint is manifestly ill- founded. The interference caused by the road was a control of use of the applicant's property rights which was justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). In particular, the distribution of the road costs was not based exclusively on the size of properties affected by the road, but also on the distance between each property and the beginning of the road as well as the amount of forest on the property. The applicant's cost responsibility was therefore not excessive. The Government further consider that by authorising the signing of the road agreement the applicant must be considered to have accepted, at the latest on 16 January 1992, that he would receive no compensation for the interference with his property rights. Finally, the proceedings for the construction of the road were fair and did not therefore prevent the applicant from putting his case to the relevant authorities.         The applicant contends, in particular, that the Government have not shown any document indicating the relative distribution of these costs between the property owners affected by the road. He asserts that not all identities of those obliged to share the road costs have been made known. Finally, the Forestry Board has not properly dealt with his request for an exemption from the road ownership and costs.         The Commission has proceeded to a preliminary examination of this complaint in the light of the parties' submissions. It considers that also this complaint raises questions of fact and law which are of such a complex nature that their determination requires an examination of the merits. The complaint cannot therefore be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.   3.     In his observations at the Commission's hearing on 12 May 1994 the applicant also lodged a further complaint with regard to the composition of the Land Court in that also the two lay judges sitting on that court were partial, given that they had allegedly been chosen by the municipality of Korsholm following influence by three high- ranking members of the municipality who also owned properties in the vicinity of the planned road. He again invoked the above-cited Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         The Commission is not required to decide whether or not these facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, as it follows from Article 26 (Art. 26) that it may only deal with a matter which has been brought to the Commission's attention within six months from the decision or incident constituting the subject-matter of the complaint. In the present case the proceedings at issue terminated with the Supreme Court's refusal of leave to appeal on 25 March 1991, which is more than six months before the date of the introduction of the present complaint. An examination of the complaint does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.         It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission,         unanimously,       DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging their merits, the       complaint concerning the