CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 27 juin 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21482/93                       by Campbell CHRISTIE                       against the United Kingdom         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 27 June 1994, the following members being present:              MM.    C.A. NØRGAARD, President                  S. TRECHSEL                  A. WEITZEL                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  H. DANELIUS            Mr.    F. MARTINEZ            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 24 February 1993 by Campbell Christie against the United Kingdom and registered on 9 March 1993 under file No. 21482/93;         Having regard to :   -      reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the       Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       25 November 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 10 February 1994 ;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a British   citizen, born in 1937, and resident in Falkirk. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. John Wadham of the organisation "Liberty".         The facts of the present case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:   A.     Particular circumstances of the case         Since April 1986, the applicant has been the General Secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, a confederation of trade unions. In that capacity, the applicant has been in regular contact with trade unions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere and from time to time he has received telexes from trade unions in Eastern Europe.         In or about July 1991, it came to the attention of the applicant, in the context of a Granada television documentary "Defending the Realm", that telexes addressed to himself from East European trade unions were being routinely intercepted by GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) which is the United Kingdom's central intelligence-gathering centre. Information from these telexes had been collated and reported to other government agencies, including the Security Service. The evidence for these allegations was provided anonymously by a former GCHQ employee, who also stated that at a particular address in London all telexes passing in and out of London were intercepted and fed into a programme known as "the Dictionary", which picked out key names and words. He stated that "the Dictionary" was monitored by carefully vetted British Telecom employees to give the impression that GCHQ was not carrying out the interception and that warrants were not obtained for this activity.         In a letter dated 10 March 1992 to the applicant's representatives, the documentary presenter explained that at a time between 1984 and 1987 -most probably in 1985- one of the clerical staff at GCHQ had made a fuss when he found himself filing a report in which the applicant appeared. The clerk, who was in the same civil service union as the applicant, made an objection to the head of section and the incident was well-known within GCHQ.         On 19 June 1992, the applicant made an application to the Interception of Communications Tribunal complaining of the interception of his telexes. He also made an application to the Security Services Tribunal concerning Security Service involvement in the collection and retention of information derived from the telexes.         By letter dated 16 September 1992, the Interception of Communications Tribunal informed the applicant that his complaint had been investigated and that the Tribunal was satisfied that there had been no contravention of Sections 2 to 5 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 with respect to a relevant warrant or certificate.         By letter dated 4 December 1992, the Security Services Tribunal informed the applicant that his complaint had been investigated and no determination in his favour made.     B.    Relevant domestic law and practice   i.     Interception of communications         Interception of Communications Act 1985         Following the decision of the Court in the Malone case (Eur. Court H.R., Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82), the Interception of Communications Act 1985 was enacted. This came into force on 10 April 1986.         Pursuant to section 1 of the 1985 Act, a person who intentionally intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by post or by means of a public telecommunications system is guilty of an offence. A person convicted of this offence is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5000 and, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for up to two years and/or a fine.         A number of exceptions are made, the relevant one in this case relating to authorised interceptions:         "1.   (2) a person shall not be guilty of a criminal offence            under this section if-              (a) the communication is intercepted in obedience to a            warrant issued by the Secretary of State under section 2            below ..."         Warrants for interception         The Secretary of State may issue a warrant of interception subject to the provisions of the Act. These provide, inter alia, that he shall not issue a warrant unless he considers that the warrant is necessary:         "(a) in the interests of national security;        (b) for the purpose of detecting serious crime; or        (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of        the United Kingdom." (section 2(2)).         Warrants in respect of (c) are not considered necessary unless the information to be acquired relates to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Islands (section 2(4)).         Warrants must be issued under the hand of the Secretary of State or a permitted official of high rank with the written authorisation of the Secretary of State. If issued under the hand of the Secretary of State, the warrant is valid for two months; if by another official, it is valid for two days. Only the Secretary of State may renew a warrant. If the Secretary of State considers that a warrant is no longer necessary for the purposes set out in section 2 (2), he is under a duty to cancel it (section 4).         Use and retention of information         Section 6 provides that the Secretary of State is under a duty to ensure that the dissemination and retention of information obtained by interception under a warrant are strictly controlled. This includes the requirement that arrangements are made to ensure that material is disclosed only to the extent that it is necessary for the permitted purposes and that material is destroyed as soon as its retention is no longer necessary for the permitted purposes (section 6 (2)-(3)).         The Tribunal         Section 7 of the Act provides for a tribunal to investigate complaints from any person who believes that communications sent by or to him have been intercepted. Its jurisdiction, so far as material, is limited to investigating whether there is or has been a relevant warrant and, where there is or has been, whether there has been any contravention of sections 2-5 of the 1985 Act in relation to that warrant.         The Tribunal applies the principles applicable   by a court on an application for judicial review. If it finds there has been a contravention of the provisions of the Act, it shall give notice of that finding to the applicant, make a report to the Prime Minister and to the Commissioner appointed under the Act and, where it thinks fit, make an order quashing the relevant warrant, directing the destruction of the material intercepted and/or direct the Secretary of State to pay compensation. In other cases, it must give notice to the applicant stating that there has been no contravention of sections 2-5 of the Act.         The Tribunal consists of 5 members, each of whom must be a qualified lawyer of not less than 10 years standing. They hold office for a five year period and may be re-appointed. Its decisions are not subject to appeal.         Since its inception, the Tribunal has not found that any contravention of the provisions of sections 2-5 of the Act has occurred. During 1992, it received 45 complaints.         The Commissioner         Section 8 provides that a Commissioner be appointed by the Prime Minister. He is required to be a person who holds, or who has held, high judicial office. The present Commissioner is Sir Thomas Bingham, Master of the Rolls.         The Commissioner's functions include the following         - to keep under review the carrying out by the Secretary of State       the functions conferred on him by sections 2-5;         - to keep under review the adequacy of the arrangement under       section 6 for safeguarding intercepted material and destroying       it where its retention is no longer necessary;         - to report to the Prime Minister if there appears to have been       a contravention of sections 2-5 which has not been reported by       the Tribunal or if the arrangements under section 6 are       inadequate;         - to make an annual report to the Prime Minister on the exercise       of the Commissioner's functions. This report must be laid before       the Houses of Parliament. The Prime Minister has a power to       exclude any matter from the report if publication would be       prejudicial to national security, to the prevention or detection       of serious crime or to the well-being of the United Kingdom. The       report must state if any matter has been so excluded.         There have been seven annual reports published by the Commissioner to date. In these reports the Commissioner explains his exercise of his functions and the results of his review of the procedure for obtaining warrants and the adequacy of the safeguards in practice.         The Commissioner's reports         The 1986 Report         In the 1986 report, the Commissioner (then Lord Justice Lloyd, a member of the Court of Appeal) noted that while he was not concerned with the investigation of unlawful interception, the Secretary of State had said during the passage of the Bill through the House of Commons that he assumed that if the Commissioner came across a case of unlawful interception he would report it.         In the report, the Commissioner also explained his approach to the term "national security":         "27. National security is not defined in the Act, or in       Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and       Fundamental Freedoms where the same term is used. It has usually       been taken to include threats to the security of the Nation by       terrorism, espionage and major subversive activities, but it is       not confined to these three matters. Nor, of course, is       subversion defined. But I have taken as the test the well known       language of Lord Harris of Greenwich in February 1975 namely,       activities `which threaten the safety or well-being of the State       and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary       democracy by political, industrial or violent means' ..."         He continued that, given the sensitivity of the area of subversion which was less clear cut than terrorism or espionage, he had taken care to review all warrants issued on those grounds. He found no indication that the warrants issued had not satisfied the requisite test.         In relation to the ground of "economic well-being" the Commissioner noted that it also was undefined, but considered that there was an important negative qualification in that no warrant can be issued unless the information sought related to the acts or intentions of those outside the British Islands. His review revealed no case where a warrant had not been so directed.         The Commissioner explained that he had adopted the practice of selecting warrants at random to examine save in the case of those pursuing the purpose of counter-subversion.         The Commissioner concluded that his overall impression was of the high value of the intelligence obtained from interception and also of the care taken by all concerned to observe not only the letter but also the spirit of the Act.         The 1987 Report         In this report the Commissioner indicated that he applied the test of "really needed" to the requirement under the Act of whether a warrant was "necessary". He found that all the warrants which he reviewed fulfilled this criterion. He recounted a number of incidents however where problems had occurred.         The 1988 Report         The Commissioner made further comments on the term "national security":         "10. Now national security, as I pointed out in my first report,       is not defined in the Act... It is narrower than the term "public       interest" which is found in section 4 of the Official Secrets Act       1920, now repealed. But it is obviously wider than the three       heads of   counter-terrorism, counter-espionage and       counter-subversion. To take a simple example, nothing could be       more directly related to national security than defence. So if       an interception is judged necessary for the defence of the realm       against a potential external aggressor, then clearly it is       necessary in the interests of national security. Further than       that I do not think it would be wise or indeed possible to go in       defining what is covered by national security. Each case must be       judged on its merits. That is what is done by the Secretary of       State; and this is what I do when fulfilling my functions as       Commissioner."         The 1989 Report         In this report, the Commissioner   referred to that fact that the Security Service Act 1989 had come into force and an independent Commissioner been appointed. He noted the similarity in the provisions of the two Acts and that they overlapped in some areas. He concluded that it was desirable that the two Commissioners applied the principles of judicial review in broadly the same way in exercising their functions and stated that they would consult together for this purpose.         The 1990 Report         The Commissioner referred to the evidence that interceptions were assisting in the prevention of crime and terrorism: over 40% of interceptions at the request of the police resulted in arrests and, in respect of HM Customs, the equivalent figure was just under 50%.         The 1991 Report         In this report, the former Commissioner at the end of his term of office reviewed the previous six years:              "... 3.   The Commissioner has two main functions.   His            principal function is to keep under review the system            whereby, subject to certain limited exceptions set out in            section 1 of the Act, interception cannot lawfully take            place without a warrant issued by the Secretary of State.            The grounds on which the Secretary of State can issue a            warrant, if he considers it necessary to do so, are set out            in section 2 of the Act, namely (i) national security, (ii)            the prevention or detection of serious crime, (iii)            safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.            During my six years in office I have not come across a            single warrant which could not be justified on one or other            of these grounds.              4.   The great majority of all warrants issued by the Home            Secretary are, and have always been, concerned with the            prevention or detection of serious crime, especially the            importation and distribution of dangerous drugs.   Success            in this field has been marked.   Thus half the record            quantity of cocaine and heroin seized by HM Customs in 1991            owed something to interception intelligence.              5.   The pattern of warrants issued on the ground of            national security has changed over the last six years.   In            particular the threat of subversion has steadily declined.            For example, in 1985 there were a number of warrants issued            against individual subversives who were regarded as being            a major threat to Parliamentary democracy.   Last year there            were only two.   Now there are none.   But just as the threat            of subversion has declined, so the threat of terrorism has            increased.   Over the same period the number of warrants            issued on the ground of counter-terrorism has, not            surprisingly, risen.              6.   There have never been more than a few warrants issued            on the ground of safeguarding the economic well-being of            the United Kingdom.   There is no question of this ground            being used for the purpose of industrial espionage within            the United Kingdom, as it is sometimes thought, or being            otherwise abused.   The Act requires that the information            sought must relate to the acts or intentions of persons            outside the United Kingdom.   This is how it works in            practice.              7.   I am confident that the Secretaries of State, who sign            warrants, take great care to satisfy themselves that the            warrants are necessary for the purposes stated in the Act.            If they are not so satisfied they decline to issue, or            renew, the warrant as the case may be.   But this is not            all.   As part of my duties, I make regular visits to HM            Customs, the police, and the security and intelligence            agencies in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.   From            the start I have been impressed by the determination of the            agencies not only to obey the letter of the law, but also            the spirit.   I have given illustrations of this from time            to time in previous reports.   Where mistakes have been            made, they have been acknowledged.   On doubtful points they            have asked for guidance.   I am satisfied that the system is            working as intended by Parliament, and is working well.              8.   What I have said about the agencies applies equally to            those operating the postal and public telecommunications            services.   Unless they have a warrant in their hands, or            are satisfied that it has been signed, they do not carry            out the interception.   This is one of the main safeguards            built into the Act.              9.   My second function is, as I see it, to reassure members            of the public that interception of communications is            serving an important public objective, and that it is not            being abused by the Government, the police or anybody else.            This function is not spelt out in the Act.   But I regard it            as implicit in my appointment.              10. The task of reassuring the public would have been            easier if I could publish everything which has appeared in            the unpublished appendices to my report.   I could then give            chapter and verse.   But for obvious reasons I cannot do            that.   I can only attempt to reassure in general terms.              11. In this connection, I may be allowed to mention certain            comments which have appeared in the press, and on the radio            or television during the last year.   On 14 June 1991, in a            radio interview, John McWilliam, MP for Blaydon, a former            telephone engineer, said that police officers down to the            rank of superintendent could in certain circumstances issue            warrants.   This is simply not so.              12.   On the same day, the Guardian carried an article which            estimated that the number of interceptions had reached a            record level of 35,000 lines.   This was based on an alleged            increase in the number of specialist engineers employed by            British Telecom to 70.   Since the Home Secretary and the            Secretary of state for Scotland had together only issued            539 warrants during 1990, the implication was that there            were thousands of unauthorised interceptions.   Mr.            McWilliam was quoted as saying:                    "My suspicion is that a lot of perfectly innocent                  citizens are being subject to surveillance for no                  particularly good reason."              It cannot be said too strongly that there is no basis            whatever for this speculation.              13. On 15 July a programme was shown by Granada in the            World in Action series.   I cannot comment in this part of            my report on the individual allegations in the programme;            but there is not the slightest truth in the suggestion,            repeated in the Guardian on 16 July, that the law is being            "bent" by GCHQ, and that British businessmen are being            "ambushed" as a matter of routine."         The 1992 Report         The current Commissioner, Sir Thomas Bingham, the Master of the Rolls, referred to the safeguards in operation against abuse of power. He was impressed by the scrupulous adherence to the statutory provisions of those involved in the procedures. He commented on the stories which occasionally circulated in the press with regard to the interceptions by GCHQ and MI5 and MI6, stating that in his experience they were without exception false and gave an entirely misleading impression to the public both of the extent of official interception and of the targets against which interception is directed.         The Commissioner detailed a number of contraventions and errors which had occurred during the year. These included incidents where mistakes were made in relation to the telephone number to be intercepted and where there were delays in acting on the cancellation of warrants being acted on. On discovery of such errors, the intercepted material was destroyed. The Commissioner stated that steps were being taken to remedy deficiencies in the procedures which had allowed errors to occur and hoped that he would find fewer such errors in the following year.         Number of warrants issued and in force         Each of the Commissioner's reports includes the statistics for the number of warrants in force and issued by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland each year.         In relation to interceptions of telecommunications over the year 1992, authorised by warrant of the Home Secretary, there were 265 warrants in force on 31 December 1992, while 756 had been issued during the year.   ii.    The Security Service         The Security Service Act 1989         The Security Service Act 1989 places the Security Service on a statutory basis under the authority of the Secretary of State. The function of the Service is "the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means" (section 1(2)). It also has the function to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands (section 1(3)).         The operations of the Service are under the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of State. He has the responsibility for the efficiency of the Service. He has the duty of ensuring that there are arrangements for securing that no information is obtained by the Service except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its functions, that no information is disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose or for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, and that the Service does not take any action to further the interests of any political party (sections 2(1)-(2)). The Director-General must also make an annual report on the work of the Service to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State and may at any time report to either of them on any matter relating to its work.         The Security Service Tribunal         The Act also provides for a tribunal, known as the Security Service Tribunal, to deal with complaints. Its decisions are not subject to appeal.         Schedule 1 to the Act provides, inter alia, that any person may complain to the Tribunal if he is aggrieved by anything which he believes the Service has done in relation to him or to any property of his.         Under paragraph 2 of the Schedule 1, the Tribunal has the role of investigating whether a complainant has been the subject of inquiries by the Service and, if so, whether the Service had reasonable grounds for deciding to institute inquiries about the complainant in the discharge of its functions and, if the inquiries are continuing, whether the Service had reasonable grounds for deciding to continue inquiries about the complainant in the discharge of its functions. Where the Tribunal determines that the Service did not have reasonable grounds for the decision or belief in question, it is provided that they shall give notice to the complainant that they have made a determination in his favour under that paragraph and make a report of their findings to the Secretary of State and to the Commissioner. Where in the case of any complaint no such determination is made, the Tribunal shall give notice to the complainant that no determination in his favour has been made on his complaint.         Where a determination has been made in favour of a complainant, the Tribunal may order inquiries by the Service about the complainant to be ended and any records relating to such inquiries to be destroyed. They may also direct the Secretary of State to pay to the complainant such sum by way of compensation as they may specify. In addition, the Tribunal may quash any warrant in respect of any property of the complainant which the Commissioner has found to have been improperly issued or renewed and which he considers should be quashed. If the Commissioner considers that a sum should be paid to the complainant by way of compensation, the Tribunal may direct the Secretary of State to pay to the complainant such sum as the Commissioner may specify.         Pursuant to Schedule 2, the Tribunal consists of three to five members each of whom must be a barrister, solicitor or advocate of not less than ten years' standing. Members are appointed for a period of five years by Her Majesty by Royal Warrant and may be removed from office by Her Majesty on an address presented to her by both Houses of Parliament.         Pursuant to para. 9(1) of Schedule 1, the Tribunal is limited as follows:         "9. (1) No complaint shall be entertained under this Schedule if       and so far as it relates to anything done before the date on       which this Schedule comes into force."         The Security Service Commissioner         Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, the Prime Minister appoints as a Commissioner a person who holds or has held high judicial office. He has the role, inter alia, of keeping under review the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under section 3 to issue warrants in respect of entry on and interference with property.         Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Schedule 1, matters may be referred to the Commissioner by the Tribunal:         "7. (1) If in a case investigated by the Tribunal under       paragraph 2 above they consider that the Service may not be       justified in regarding all members of a particular category as       requiring investigation they shall refer that matter to the       Commissioner.         (2) If in any case investigated by the Tribunal -              (a) the Tribunal's conclusions on the matters which they            are required to investigate are such that no determination            is made by them in favour of the complainant; but              (b) it appears to the Tribunal from the allegations made by            the complainant that it is appropriate for there to be an            investigation into whether the Service has in any other            respect acted unreasonably in relation to the complainant            or his property,         they shall refer that matter to the Commissioner.         (3) The Commissioner may report any matter referred to him under       this paragraph to the Secretary of State who may take such action       in the light of the report as he thinks fit, including any action       which the Tribunal have power to take or direct under paragraph 6       above."         The Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime Minister on the discharge of his functions and the report is then laid before Parliament.   COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains that his correspondence from East European trade unions has been intercepted by GCHQ, or that it is reasonably likely that such interception has taken place, and information from it collated and reported to other government agencies, including the Security Service. He submits that this constitutes an interference with his right to respect for his correspondence contrary to Article 8 of the Convention. He further submits that this interference cannot be justified under the second paragraph for the following reasons:         The interference was and is not "in accordance with the law" since the interception of communications and functions of the Security Service are still not sufficiently regulated by legislation. In particular:         - the definition of the type of activity likely to be susceptible       to interception is not precise;         - the circumstances in which information gathered is destroyed       and in which use may be made of the information are not defined;         - the function of the Security Service provided for in the 1989       Act, namely "the protection of national security", is not       adequately defined and includes protection against threats from       actions intended to undermine parliamentary democracy by       political means;         - the function of the Security Service to safeguard the economic            well-being of the United Kingdom is undefined;         - the safeguards provided by the two Tribunals are grossly       inadequate.         The interference was and is not "necessary" since there is no pressing social need for the measures in this case and there are no adequate and effective safeguards against abuse in existence. In particular:         1. Concerning the Interception of Communications Tribunal         i. the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to investigate       interceptions which ceased before 10 April 1986;         ii. the   Tribunal has no power to consider the correctness of the       Secretary of State's decision to issue a warrant, only whether       the decision was one which no reasonable Secretary of State could       have reached; it also has no jurisdiction to investigate cases       where no warrant has been issued;         iii. the Tribunal is prevented from giving reasons for a decision       which is not in the applicant's favour and its decisions are not       subject to any appeal to a court;         iv. the Tribunal has never upheld any of the complaints made to       it;         v. Parliamentarians, as such, play no role in the process;         2. Concerning the Security Service Tribunal:         i. the Tribunal has no competence to consider complaints where       the inquiries ceased before 18 December 1989;         ii. the Tribunal has no power to consider the correctness of the       Service's decision that inquiries were justified in the discharge       of its functions, only whether it had reasonable grounds for so       deciding;         iii. if inquiries are made by the Service on the basis that a       person is a member of a particular group, the Tribunal's       examination is limited to whether the Service had reasonable       grounds for believing the person to be a member of the group. The       question of whether it is justifiable to regard all members of       a group as requiring investigation can be referred by the       Tribunal to the Security Service Commissioner, but he has only       the ability to make recommendations to the Secretary of State;         iv. the same points as are made concerning the Interception of       Communications Tribunal in   1. iii.-v. above.           The applicant also complains that he has no effective remedy for his complaints as required by Article 13 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 24 February 1993 and registered on 9 March 1993.         On 6 July 1993, the Commission decided to communicate the application to the Government and to ask for written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.         The Government's observations were submitted on 25 November 1993, after two extensions in the time-limit fixed for this purpose, and the applicant's observations in reply were   submitted on 10 February 1994.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains that his correspondence has been interfered with contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for ... his       correspondence.         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with       the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with       the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests       of national security, public safety or the economic well-being       of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the       protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the       rights and freedoms of others."         The applicant alleges that his telexes from East European trade unions were intercepted by GCHQ.         The Government neither confirm nor deny that such interception took place. They are, however, willing for the applicant's complaints to be dealt with on the basis that there is a reasonable likelihood that the communications which referred to the applicant may have been intercepted by GCHQ and come to the attention of the Security Service.         The Commission therefore considers that an interference with the applicant's correspondence under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) may be assumed in this case. It has accordingly examined whether this interference is justified under the second paragraph, namely, whether it was "in accordance with the law" and if so, whether it was necessary in a democratic society for one or more of the reasons specified.   "In accordance with the law"         This expression has been interpreted by the Court, firstly, as requiring that the interference must have some basis in domestic law and secondly, as referring to the quality of the law (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., Kruslin and Huvig judgments   of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A, p. 20, paras. 26-27, and no. 176-B, p. 52, paras. 54-55).      &#x