CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 4 juillet 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                    EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      Application No. 15346/89                                A.M.                      Application No. 15379/89                               J.v.Z.                               against                           the Netherlands                      REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                      (adopted on 4 July 1994)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1 - 23)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The applications           (paras. 2 - 6)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The proceedings           (paras. 7 - 18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The present Report           (paras. 19 - 23). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 24 - 40) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        A.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 24 - 34)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        B.    Relevant domestic law           (paras. 35 - 40)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 41 - 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 41)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        B.    Points at issue           (para. 42)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        C.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           (paras. 43 - 73)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             1.    The applicability of Article 6 para. 1                of the Convention                (paras. 44 - 54) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             2.    Compliance with Article 6 para. 1                of the Convention                (paras. 55 - 72) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13             CONCLUSION           (para. 73)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16        D.    As regards Article 13 of the Convention           (paras. 74 - 77)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16             CONCLUSION           (para. 77)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16        E.    Recapitulation           (paras. 78 - 79)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16   DISSENTING OPINION OF MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, F. ERMACORA, H.G. SCHERMERS, F. MARTINEZ, MRS. J. LIDDY, MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, I. BÉKÉS, J. MUCHA AND D. SVÁBY . . . . 17   APPENDIX I      : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . 18   APPENDIX II     : PARTIAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                  ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATION No. 15346/89. 20   APPENDIX III    : PARTIAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                  ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATION No. 15379/89. 27   APPENDIX IV     : FINAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                  ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATIONS. . . . . 33   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The applications   2.    The first applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1926 and at present residing in Rijswijk, the Netherlands. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. A.J.L.J. Pfeil, a lawyer practising in Maastricht, the Netherlands.   3.    The second applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1919 and at present residing in Meeuwen-Gruitrode, Belgium.   He is represented by Mr. A. Duynstee, a lawyer practising in Maastricht.   4.    The applications are directed against the Netherlands. The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr. Karel De Vey Mestdagh, of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   5.    The applications relate to the proceedings concerning the applicants' claims under Sections 89, 591 and 591 (a) para. 2 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure.   Under these provisions an acquitted accused may claim compensation for detention on remand (Section 89 of the Code) and the reimbursement of legal and subsidiary costs (Section 591 of the Code).   6.    Before the Commission, the applicants complain under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that their respective requests for compensation for detention on remand and reimbursement of their costs were not examined fairly and in public by an impartial tribunal.        The first applicant also invokes Article 13 of the Convention on this point.   B.    The proceedings   7.    The first application was introduced on 8 June 1989 and registered on 4 August 1989.   The second application was introduced on 2 June 1989 and registered on 18 August 1989.   8.    On 1 April 1992, the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to give notice of the applications to the respondent Government inviting them to submit observations in writing on the admissibility and merits in respect of the applicants' complaint that the proceedings concerning their request for compensation and reimbursement of their legal and subsidiary costs after acquittal were not in conformity with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   The Commission declared the remainder of both applications inadmissible.   9.    The Government submitted their observations on 12 June 1992 as to the first application and on 19 June 1992 as to the second application.   The first applicant replied on 10 September 1992 and the second applicant on 9 October 1992.   10.   On 8 January 1993, the Commission decided to join the two applications and declared them admissible.   11.   On 19 February 1993, the parties were invited, should they so desire, to submit further observations regarding the merits of the applications.   12.   The first applicant did not avail himself of this possibility. The second applicant submitted such observations on 2 April 1993, the Government on 4 May 1993.   13.   On 29 June 1993, the respondent Government forwarded to the Commission a copy of the writ issued on 27 May 1993 on behalf of the second applicant and a copy of the writ issued on 7 June 1993 on behalf of the first applicant by which the State was summoned to appear in court in relation to a civil claim for compensation for tort.   The Government submitted that the legal actions by the applicants could be a reason for the Commission to reject their applications on the basis of Article 29 in conjunction of Article 26 of the Convention, for non- exhaustion of domestic remedies.   14.   The Commission later considered the Government's request under Article 29 of the Convention, but found no basis for rejecting the application under that provision. The Commission recalled that it had already examined the Government's submissions at the admissibility stage.   15.   On 20 October 1993 the Commission decided to put an additional question to the parties.   16.   The Government submitted their reply to the additional question on 25 January 1994. The second applicant's reply was submitted on 21 February 1994 and the first applicant's reaction was submitted on 31 March 1994.   17.   On 29 June 1994 the Second Chamber of the Commission decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Plenary Commission.   18.   After declaring the cases admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   19.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission (Second Chamber) in pursuance of Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present:             MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                A. WEITZEL                F. ERMACORA                E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                J.-C. SOYER                H.G. SCHERMERS                H. DANELIUS           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           MM.   F. MARTINEZ                C.L. ROZAKIS           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                B. MARXER                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                B. CONFORTI                N. BRATZA                I. BÉKÉS                J. MUCHA                E. KONSTANTINOV                D. SVÁBY   20.   The text of this Report was adopted on 4 July 1994 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   21.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        i)    to establish the facts, and        ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found      disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations      under the Convention.   22.   A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the applications as Appendix II.   23.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   24.   The first applicant was arrested on 10 May 1984 and detained on remand.   On 15 May 1984, he was brought before the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) who charged him with having accepted bribes, and with fraud, forgery and use of forged documents.   On 22 February 1985 the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Maastricht decided that the first applicant should henceforth be under house arrest (huisarrest). The Regional Court ordered the termination of the house arrest on 25 March 1986. In its judgment of 21 May 1987, the Regional Court convicted the first applicant of having accepted bribes and of the use of forged documents and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment.   25.   In the same factual context, the second applicant was arrested on 11 May 1984, placed in detention on remand and charged with bribery of a public official, forgery and use of forged documents.   On 29 January 1985 he was released on bail and on the condition that he report to the investigating judge every week. This condition was lifted on 14 February 1986. On 24 June 1987, the Regional Court of Maastricht convicted the applicant of bribery and forgery and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment.   26.   Both the applicants and the public prosecutor appealed against the judgments.   On 7 June 1988, the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of 's-Hertogenbosch declared some of the charges against the first applicant null and void and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The second applicant was acquitted of all charges.   27.   On 5 September 1988, the second applicant presented a request for compensation under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) which, inter alia, allows for the possibility of compensation by the State for material and non-material damage caused by the detention on remand, if an accused is acquitted.   28.   On the same day, the second applicant also presented a request for reimbursement of the legal and subsidiary costs provisionally estimated at 486.394,60 Dutch guilders - including 470.000 guilders for lawyers' fees - under Sections 591 and 591 (a) para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   29.   On 6 September 1988, the first applicant presented a request for compensation under Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a request for reimbursement of the legal and subsidiary costs provisionally estimated at 822.316,04 Dutch guilders - including 804.090,99 Dutch guilders for lawyers' fees - under Sections 591 and 591 (a) para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   30.   On 9 December 1988, the Court of Appeal of 's-Hertogenbosch, sitting in chambers (in Raadkamer), rejected the requests for compensation for detention on remand, finding no reasonable ground for granting it.   31.   On the same day the President of the Regional Court, sitting in chambers, awarded the first applicant 5.853,55 Dutch guilders and the second applicant 3.559,80 Dutch guilders for travelling and subsistence costs under Section 591(a) para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and rejected the remainders of the respective requests.   32.   The rejection of the compensation under Section 89 and the rejection of the remainders of the requests under Sections 591 and 591(a) were based on the grounds that both applicants had been arrested and detained on remand on suspicion of having committed certain offences; that this suspicion had continued during the examination of the charges before the Court of Appeal; and that from the very beginning of the investigation the applicants had misled the officers involved in the investigation and the trial courts and had thus caused an exceptionally elaborate inquiry. In these circumstances, no reasons were found to compel the State to compensate the costs, which were mainly due to the applicants' own misleading behaviour and which had not only caused great expenses for the applicants, but also for the State.   33.   On 27 May 1993, the second applicant started civil proceedings against the State for tort (onrechtmatige daad) before the Regional Court of The Hague, claiming compensation for the damages resulting from alleged unlawful acts committed during the criminal proceedings in which he had been acquitted.   The compensation claimed amounted to 1.572.000,60 Dutch guilders including compensation for the damage caused by the detention on remand and the legal and subsidiary costs incurred in the criminal proceedings against him.   These civil proceedings are still pending.   34.   On 6 June 1993, the first applicant also started civil proceedings against the State for tort before the Regional Court of The Hague, claiming compensation for the damage resulting from unlawful acts allegedly committed during the criminal proceedings against him. The compensation claimed included compensation for the damage caused by the detention on remand and the legal and subsidiary costs incurred in the criminal proceedings against him.   These civil proceedings are still pending.   B.    Relevant domestic law   35.   Section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in so far as relevant, provides:   <Dutch>      "1.   Indien de zaak eindigt zonder oplegging van straf of      maatregel of met zodanige oplegging, doch op grond van een feit      waarvoor voorlopige hechtenis niet is toegelaten, kan de rechter,      op verzoek van de gewezen verdachte, hem een vergoeding ten laste      van de Staat toekennen voor de schade welke hij tengevolge van      ondergane verzekering of voorlopige hechtenis heeft geleden.      Onder schade is begrepen het nadeel dat niet in vermogensschade      bestaat.        (...)        3.    Het verzoek kan slechts worden ingediend binnen drie      maanden na de beëindiging van de zaak.   De verzoeker wordt      gehoord, althans opgeroepen, en kan zich bij het verhoor      door een advocaat doen bijstaan.   De advocaat wordt bij de      verhoren in de gelegenheid gesteld de nodige opmerkingen te      maken.        4.    De raadkamer is zoveel mogelijk samengesteld uit de leden      die op de terechtzitting over de zaak hebben gezeten.        5.    Tot de toekenning is bevoegd het gerecht in feitelijke      aanleg, waarvoor de zaak tijdens de beëindiging daarvan werd of      zou worden vervolgd of anders het laatst werd vervolgd, of,      indien dat gerecht is een kantongerecht, de rechtbank van het      arrondissement.        (...)."   <Translation>      "1.   If a case comes to an end without the imposition of a      punishment or measure or when such a punishment is imposed, but      on the basis of a fact for which detention on remand is not      allowed, the court may, at the former suspect's request, grant      him compensation at the expense of the State for the damage he      has suffered as a result of the detention on remand.   The term      damage includes non-pecuniary damage.        (...)        3.    This request can only be submitted within three months      following the termination of the case.   The petitioner shall be      heard, at least summoned, and can be assisted by a lawyer during      the hearing.   The lawyer will be provided with the opportunity      to make the necessary statements at the hearings.        4.    The Court sitting in chambers shall consist, insofar as      possible, of the judges who have dealt with the case at the      trial.        5.    The competent court for granting compensation is the trial      court which has dealt with, would deal with or was dealing with      the case at the moment it came to an end, or, in case that court      is a District Court, the Regional Court of that judicial district      shall be competent.        (...)."   36.   Section 90 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:   <Dutch>      "1.   De toekenning van een schadevergoeding heeft steeds plaats,      indien en voorzover daartoe, naar het oordeel van de rechter,      alle omstandigheden in aanmerking genomen, gronden van      billijkheid aanwezig zijn.        2.    Bij de bepaling van het bedrag wordt ook rekening gehouden      met de levensomstandigheden van de gewezen verdachte.        3.    De beslissing is met redenen omkleed. De beschikking wordt      onverwijld aan de gewezen verdachte of aan zijn erfgenamen      betekend, doch, indien het een afwijzende beslissing betreft, met      weglating van de redenen. In dat geval kan de gewezen verdachte      of kunnen zijn erfgenamen van de redenen ter griffie inzage      bekomen."   <Translation>      "1.   Compensation is awarded where, and insofar as, in the      opinion of the judge, taking all circumstances into account,      there are equitable grounds for it.        2.    In the determination of the amount also the living      conditions of the former suspect are being taken into account.        3.    The decision is reasoned.   The decision is immediately      notified to the former suspect or to his heirs, but, in case of      a rejection, with omission of the reasons.   In that case the      former suspect or his heirs can consult the reasons at the      registry."   37.   Section 591 the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:   <Dutch>      "1.   Aan de gewezen verdachte of zijn erfgenamen wordt uit 's      Rijks kas een vergoeding toegekend voor de kosten, welke      ingevolge het bij en krachtens de Wet tarieven in strafzaken      bepaalde ten laste van de gewezen verdachte zijn gekomen,      voorzover de aanwending dier kosten het belang van het onderzoek      heeft gediend of door de intrekking van dagvaardingen of      rechtsmiddelen door het openbaar ministerie nutteloos is      geworden.        2.    Het bedrag van de vergoeding wordt op verzoek van de      gewezen verdachte of zijn erfgenamen vastgesteld. Het verzoek      moet worden ingediend binnen drie maanden na het eindigen van de      zaak. De vaststelling geschiedt bij het gerecht in feitelijke      aanleg, waarvoor de zaak tijdens de beëindiging daarvan werd      vervolgd, of anders het laatst werd vervolgd, en wel door de      kantonrechter of door de voorzitter van het gerecht. De      voorzitter kan een der raadsheren of een der rechters die over      de zaak hebben gezeten, daartoe aanwijzen. De kantonrechter of      rechter geeft voor het bedrag van de vergoeding een bevelschrift      van tenuitvoerlegging af.        3.    Degenen, die het verzoek hebben ingediend, kunnen worden      gehoord. Indien zij dit verlangen, worden zij gehoord, althans      opgeroepen. Zij kunnen zich doen bijstaan door een advocaat.      Artikel 24, laatste lid, is van toepassing.        (...)."   <Translation>      "1.   To the former suspect or his heirs compensation will be      awarded at the expense of the State for costs, which are to be      borne by the former suspect pursuant to the provisions of the Act      on Fees in Criminal Cases, insofar as the appropriation of these      costs has served the investigation or has become useless by the      withdrawal of summonses or remedies by the public prosecution.        2.    The amount of the compensation shall be determined at the      request of the former suspect or his heirs. This request must be      submitted within three months following the termination of the      case. The determination shall be made by the trial court which      has dealt with or, otherwise, was dealing with the case at the      moment it came to an end, and in fact by the District Court judge      of by the president of the court. Thereto the president can      appoint one of the judges of the Court of Appeal or the Regional      Court, who have dealt with the case. The District Court judge or      the Regional Court judge will issue an execution order for the      amount of the compensation.        3.    Petitioners can be heard. If they so wish they will be      heard, at least summoned. They can be assisted by a lawyer.      Section 24, last paragraph, applies.        (...)."   38.   The last paragraph of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:   <Dutch>      "De raadsman of de advocaat wordt bij de verhoren in de      gelegenheid gesteld de nodige opmerkingen te maken."   <Translation>      "The counsel or the lawyer will be provided with the opportunity      to make the necessary statements at the hearings."   39.   Section 591 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:   <Dutch>      "1.   Indien de zaak eindigt zonder oplegging van straf of      maatregel (...) wordt aan de gewezen verdachte of zijn erfgenamen      uit 's Rijks kas een vergoeding toegekend voor zijn ten behoeve      van het onderzoek en de behandeling der zaak gemaakte reis- en      verblijfkosten, berekend op de voet van het bij en krachtens de      Wet tarieven in strafzaken bepaalde.        2.    Indien de zaak eindigt zonder oplegging van straf of      maatregel (...) kan aan de gewezen verdachte of zijn erfgenamen      uit 's Rijks kas een vergoeding worden toegekend voor de schade      welke hij ten gevolge van tijdverzuim door het gerechtelijk      vooronderzoek en de behandeling der zaak ter terechtzitting      werkelijk heeft geleden, alsmede in de kosten van een raadsman.      Een vergoeding voor de kosten van een raadsman gedurende de      verzekering en de voorlopige hechtenis is hierin begrepen.   Een      vergoeding voor deze kosten kan voorts worden toegekend in het      geval dat de zaak eindigt met oplegging van straf of maatregel      op grond van een feit, waarvoor voorlopige hechtenis niet is      toegelaten.        (...)      4. De artikelen 90 en 591, tweede tot en met vijfde lid zijn van      overeenkomstige toepassing."   <Translation>      "1.   If a case comes to an end without imposition of a      punishment or measure (..) compensation will be granted to the      former suspect or his heirs for his travel and subsistence costs      incurred for the investigation and the examination of his case,      calculated on the basis of the Act on Fees in Criminal Cases.        2.    If a case comes to an end without imposition of a      punishment or measure (...) compensation may be granted to the      former suspect or his heirs for the damage which he has actually      suffered as a result of the loss of time due to the judicial      investigation and the examination of his case at the trial, as      well as the costs of counsel.   This will include compensation for      the costs of counsel during the detention on remand.   A      compensation for such costs may furthermore be granted when a      case ends with imposition of a punishment or measure on the basis      of a fact for which detention on remand is not allowed.        (....)        4. Sections 90 and 591, paras. 2 to 5, apply by analogy."   40.   Tort is dealt with in Sections 162 and 163 of Book 6 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), which as from 1 January 1992 replaced Section 1401 of the (former) Civil Code. Sections 162 and 163 of Book 6 of the Civil Code provide as follows:   <Dutch>      "162.1.    Hij die jegens een ander een onrechtmatige daad      pleegt, welke hem kan worden toegerekend is verplicht de schade      die de ander dientengevolge lijdt, te vergoeden.             2.    Als onrechtmatige daad worden aangemerkt een inbreuk      op een recht en een doen of nalaten in strijd met en wettelijke      plicht of met hetgeen volgens ongeschreven recht in het      maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt, een of een ander behoudens de      aanwezigheid van een rechtsvaardigingsgrond.             3.    Een onrechtmatige daad kan aan de dader worden      toegerekend, indien zij te wijten is aan zijn schuld of aan een      oorzaak welke krachtens de wet of de in het verkeer geldende      opvattingen voor zijn rekening komt.        163. Geen verplichting tot schadevergoeding bestaat, wanneer de      geschonden norm niet strekt tot bescherming tegen de schade zoals      de benadeelde die heeft geleden."   <Translation>      "162.1.    He who has committed a tortious act against another      person, which can be imputed to him, shall compensate the damage      the other person has suffered as a result thereof.             2.    An interference with a right and an action or omission      contrary to a legal obligation or to that which, according to      unwritten law, is proper in society is considered as a tortuous      act, barring the existence of a ground for justification.             3. A tortious act may be imputed to the person who      committed it if it results from his fault or from a cause for      which, by virtue of the law or of views held in society, he is      accountable.        163. There is no obligation to pay compensation when the      violated norm does not aim at protection against the kind of      damage which has been suffered by the aggrieved party."   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   41.   The Commission declared admissible   -     the applicants' complaint that their respective requests for compensation for detention on remand and reimbursement of their legal and subsidiary costs were not examined fairly and in public by an impartial tribunal;   -     the first applicant's complaint that he had no effective remedy against the decisions complained of.   B.    Points at issue   42.   The points at issue are accordingly:   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention; and   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, as regards the first applicant.   C.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention   43.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of      any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair      and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and      impartial tribunal established by law.   Judgment shall be      pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from      all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order      or national security in a democratic society, where the interests      of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties      so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion      of the court in special circumstances where publicity would      prejudice the interests of justice."   1.    The applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)      of the Convention      --------------------------------------------------------   44.   The applicants are of the opinion that the proceedings concerning their requests for compensation under Sections 89 and 591(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure determined a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   The first applicant submits that the compensation request at issue can be considered on a par with a claim under civil law. The second applicant recalls that the concept of "civil right" is autonomous and must be interpreted independently of the legislation in the State concerned.   45.   The applicants further refer to the Supreme Court's judgment of 26 January 1990 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990, No. 794) where it was held that the State must compensate damages arising from the conduct by investigation authorities which later appeared to be unfounded. This, in the applicants' view, supports the argument that the proceedings for compensation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which have a similar object, namely compensation for lawful - though wrongful, as it later appeared - detention, and compensation for the damage caused by the prosecution, determine a "right" which is "civil" in nature.   46.   The Government submit that the objective of the proceedings at issue is to compensate damage in cases where an accused person has been lawfully - though wrongfully, as it later appears - subjected to a criminal investigation and prosecution. The Government are of the opinion that the requests of the applicants can neither be seen as based on an established right under Dutch law nor on a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, as, contrary to Section 591(a) para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states that compensation for travel and subsistence costs shall be awarded, Sections 89, 90 and 591(a) para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure state that compensation for detention on remand and reimbursement of the legal and subsidiary fees may be awarded insofar as the court finds equitable grounds for such an award. Such equitable grounds were not found insofar as the applicants' claims for compensation were rejected.   47.   Referring to a previous decision of the Commission (No. 10923/87, Dec. 6.5.85, unpublished), the Government submit that a claim for compensation under the Code of Criminal Procedure does not require that the law has been violated and thus is in no way assimilated or comparable to private law claims for damages relating to tort liability, whereas, furthermore, the right to liberty is no civil right within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   48.   The Government therefore consider that the proceedings at issue fall outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   49.   The Commission must, in order to determine the issue in question, ascertain whether there was a dispute ("contestation" in the French text) concerning a "right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute must be a genuine and serious one; it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise, and the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 180-B, pp. 36 and 37, paras. 27 and 29).   50.   As to the question whether or not such a right is of a "civil" character, the Commission recalls that the concept of "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not to be interpreted solely by reference to the respondent State's domestic law and that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies irrespective of the parties' status, be it public or private, and of the nature of the legislation governing the manner in which the dispute is to be determined (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Baraona judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 122, pp. 17-18, para. 42). It is sufficient that the action was "pecuniary" in nature and that it was founded on an alleged infringement of rights which were likewise pecuniary rights (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Editions Périscope judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-B, pp. 65-66, paras. 39-40) or that the outcome of the proceedings was be "decisive for private rights and obligations" (cf. Eur. Court H.R., X. v. France judgment of 31 March 1992, Series A no. 234-C, p. 90, para. 30).   51.   The Commission finds that there was a "dispute" in the present case. The dispute was over the question whether or not the applicants have any right at all to recover financial compensation for the damage flowing from the criminal proceedings against them.   According to the applicants they were entitled to such compensation following their acquittal, whereas the Government are of the opinion that no such right exists, as an award of compensation is fully dependent on the discretionary finding by a court that there are equitable grounds for granting such compensation.   52.   The Commission notes that, according to the wording of Sections 89 and 591 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an acquitted person is entitled under Dutch law to seek compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of his detention on remand and reimbursement of the legal and subsidiary costs incurred in the criminal proceedings against him. The applicants could thus claim on arguable grounds to have a right that is recognised under Dutch law. This, in the Commission's opinion, constitutes a "right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   53.   As to the question whether or not the right at issue is "civil", the Commission notes that the right claimed consisted of financial reparation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. It was therefore a "civil right", notwithstanding the origin of the dispute and the jurisdiction of the criminal courts (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Neves e Silva judgment of 27 April 1989, Series A no. 153-A, p. 14, para. 37).   54.   The Commission is therefore of the opinion that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is applicable to the proceedings at issue.   2.    Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention      --------------------------------------------------------------   55.   The applicants complain that their requests for compensation under the Code of Criminal Procedure were not examined fairly and in public by an impartial tribunal.   56.   The applicants submit that their requests for compensation were rejected in chambers by one or more judges who had been involved in the criminal case against them, which makes their impartiality open to doubt, the more so since their requests were rejected on the basis of a finding that they had misled the investigation by the prosecution and judiciary authorities.   57.   They further submit that the proceedings in chambers did not fulfil the requirement of publicity. The fact that recently a Bill has been submitted to the Dutch Parliament, proposing to reform proceedings in chambers by making them public, seems to indicate that the Government are of the opinion that proceedings in chambers are not in conformity with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   58.   The Government submit that anyone making a request for compensation under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure is given the opportunity to submit documents and to study the available documents, and is summoned to be heard by the court. He may be assisted by counsel, who will be allowed by the court to make comments. Furthermore the court's decision is pronounced in public, whereas the grounds on which it is based are made available to the petitioner.   59.   The Government further submit that at no stage of the proceedings at issue the applicants objected to the non-public nature of the hearing. Neither did they request a public hearing.   60.   As to the impartiality of the judges who rejected the requests at issue, the Government, referring to the Hauschildt judgment of 24 May 1989 (Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 154), argue that the fact that the same court may be involved at different stages of proceedings does not in itself violate the principle of impartiality. In the present case the aim of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal was to determine whether or not the applicants were guilty of the charges against them. Following the applicants' acquittal, which meant that the Court of Appeal found that the charges could not be proven, the question in the proceedings on the applicants' subsequent request for compensation concerned a different point of law, i.e. whether or not there were any equitable grounds for granting the compensation requested.   61.   The Government, noting that at no point in the proceedings at issue the applicants challenged the judges or requested that other judges take over the proceedings, are of the opinion that there is no evidence whatsoever of partiality on the part of the judges involved.   62.   The Commission recalls that the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention must be determined according to a subjective test and also to an objective test (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Hauschildt judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, para. 46)   63.   As to the subjective test, the applicants have not alleged that the judges involved in the proceedings at issue acted with personal bias. In any event, the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary and in the present case there is no such proof.   64.   Under the objective test, it must be determined whether there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to the judges' impartiality. This implies that it must be established whether there was a legitimate reason to fear that they lacked impartiality. The view of the applicants was important but not decisive. What is decisive is not the subjective apprehensions of the petitioners, however understandable, but whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, their fears can be held to be objectively justified (cf. Eur. Court H.R.. Nortier judgment of 24 August 1993, Series A no. 267, p. 22, para. 58).   65.   The Commission considers that the mere fact that a judge has already taken decisions in the preceding criminal proceedings cannot in itself be regarded as justifying anxieties about his impartiality in subsequent compensation proceedings. What matters is the scope and nature of the decisions taken by the judge before deciding on the applicants' requests for compensation.   66.   The Commission notes that the Court of Appeal's previous decision in the criminal proceedings against the first applicant was to declare some of the charges against him null and void and to acquit him of the remaining charges.   As regards the second applicant, the Court of Appeal's previous decision in the criminal proceedings against him was to acquit him of all charges.   67.   In these circumstances, the Commission cannot find that the applicants' fears as to the impartiality of the judges deciding on their respective requests for compensation can be regarded as objectively justified