CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 10 octobre 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21343/93                       by Mirja UUHINIEMI and 14 others                       against Finland         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 10 October 1994, the following members being present:              MM.    C.A. NØRGAARD, President                  S. TRECHSEL                  A. WEITZEL                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 9 December 1992 by Mirja UUHINIEMI and 14 others against Finland and registered on 5 February 1993 under file No. 21343/93;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicants, all Finnish citizens, are set out in the Annex. Before the Commission they are represented by Ms. Elina Lampi- Fagerholm, a lawyer of the National Association of the Fishing Industry ("Kalatalouden keskusliitto").         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.   Particular circumstances of the case         At an unofficial meeting on 30 May 1990 the Council of State (valtioneuvosto, statsrådet) adopted the principles to be applied in the further preparation of a shore conservation programme. A draft version had been adopted by an ad hoc working group at the Ministry for the Environment (ympäristöministeriö, miljöministeriet) appointed in 1988. The draft was based on information obtained through nature inventories and the opinion submitted by an ad hoc Committee in 1985.         On 6 June 1990 the Ministry for the Environment published a draft shore conservation programme and invited the municipalities concerned to submit comments on it before 31 August 1990. It also requested the municipalities to notify the property owners concerned of their right to submit individual comments before the same date. 4.692 property owners submitted such comments.         On 20 December 1990 the Council of State adopted "in principle" (periaatepäätös, principbeslut) the shore conservation programme, stating, inter alia:         "... [T]he programme includes 138 shore areas of       international or national value. The areas with sea nature       are 29 and cover about 1.500 kilometres of shore [about 4       per cent of the total seashore]. The areas with lakeside       nature are 109 and cover a total shore line of 7.300       kilometres [about 5 per cent of the total lakeside shore].       The areas included in the programme are nearly the same as       those indicated in the reference material of [the 1985       Committee]. ...         The ... programme will be implemented primarily through       voluntary conservation in accordance with the [1923] Nature       Conservation Act [luonnonsuojelulaki 71/23, lag 71/23 om       naturskydd; hereinafter "the 1923 Act"]. Measures will only       be taken on the property owner's initiative or in case of       construction or other activities damaging the conservation       values ...         The intention is to conserve the privately owned areas       primarily by establishing nature conservation areas in a       manner agreed to by the property owner and on [his] request       so that [he] receives full compensation for the       conservation in accordance with the principle of full       compensation. Alternatively, the area can be acquired by       the State, in which case full compensation will be paid for       it. ...         Measures for the conservation of an area or its acquisition       by the State in accordance with [the 1923 Act] will be       taken [either] on the property owner's   initiative [or] if       a request for a permit for construction in such an area has       been lodged, if the forestry in the area deviates from the       ... recommendations issued by the Central Forestry Boards       (keskusmetsälautakunnat, centralskogsnämnderna) with regard       to shore areas or if other measures damaging the       conservable values (luonnonarvot, naturvärdena) are being       taken.       ...       ... [R]estrictions on forestry [exceeding those indicated       in the above-mentioned recommendations] can be [applied]       only in areas with endangered and extremely rare animal and       plant species. ..."         In its judgment of 22 June 1992 following the applicants' appeal the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) considered that the decision of the Council of State of 20 December 1990 was appealable, stating, inter alia:         "... The decision contains, inter alia, internal       administrative orders addressed to the State authorities       ... in general. ... In this respect the decision must       partly be considered ... as an official order against which       no appeal lies, ... and partly as a decision of a       preparatory character ... against which no appeal lies       either ... .       ...       ... The decision of principle contains the position of the       Council of State that [certain] areas are conservable.       Given that the decision also focuses on individualised       areas and thus also on their owners as well as on holders       of a right of usufruct, it is not in this respect only an       internal administrative measure nor such a statute or order       as would be addressed to a group of individuals in general.       The actual importance of the decision is increased by the       fact that it has been made by the Council of State sitting       in plenary session, which is also competent to determine       the conditions for expropriating real property and separate       rights pursuant to section 5, subsection 1 of the [1977]       Redemption Act [laki 603/77 kiinteän omaisuuden ja       erityisten oikeuksien lunastuksesta, lag 603/77 om inlösen       av fast egendom och särskilda rättigheter; hereinafter "the       1977 Act"]. At issue is, however, not the confirmation of       a plan referred to in subsection 2 which would entail a       right to proceed to the expropriation of a property without       a permit [to that end].       ...       ... Although the programme does not in itself prevent the       granting of a building permit, an activity prohibition       issued by a County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus,       länsstyrelse) prevents the implementation of a construction       project for which a permit has already been granted. ...       Whilst the adoption of the programme has not [as such]       entailed the entry into force of a prohibition on building       or construction, it has resulted in a de facto       expropriation threat which forces the property owner not to       make use of his property in a manner contrary to the       programme. At the same time it gives the County       Administrative Board the right to issue an activity       prohibition pursuant to section 18 of [the 1923 Act] in       order to secure the aim of the redemption.         Having regard to the above-mentioned repercussions on the       use of the areas, ... the decision has such a legal effect       as to be appealable ... by a party who considers that his       right has been violated."         The Supreme Administrative Court went on to hold that the applicants had locus standi to lodge an appeal on account of the location of their particular properties.         The Supreme Administrative Court further found that the Council of State had been competent to adopt the conservation programme, having regard to, inter alia, the general competence afforded to it by section 41 of the 1919 Constitution Act (Suomen Hallitusmuoto 94/19, Regerings- form för Finland 94/19; hereinafter "the Constitution Act").         In regard to the general lawfulness of the decision of the Council of State the Supreme Administrative Court stated, in general, inter alia:         "... The programme is not such a national plan of higher       rank or other plan as would have a binding impact on       regional, general or other planning. The programme can       guide the planning as a document of reference on the basis       of which [the authorities] attempt, in pursuance of ... the       [1958] Building Act [rakennuslaki 370/58, byggnadslag       370/58; hereinafter "the 1958 Act"], to harmonise regional       and general planning with national planning within the       framework of State supervision. For these reasons ... the       decision of the Council of State is not unlawful as being       incompatible with the planning system set out in [the 1958       Act].         The effects ... on construction and forestry are not of       such immediate nature that they would follow in a legally       binding manner directly from the decision of the Council of       State. The immediate legal effects are caused only by       [subsequent] planning and building prohibitions for       planning purposes, by decisions made in accordance with       [the 1923 Act] on request by an individual property owner       or, if the property owner acts in a manner contrary to the       aims of the programme, by prohibitions and redemption       decisions issued in accordance with [the 1923 Act]. In all       these stages of the implementation of the programme the       parties are to be heard in accordance with legal       provisions, the decisions are to be made in a procedure ...       prescribed by law and the decisions are appealable. When       compulsory measures are resorted to pursuant to [the 1923       Act] the property owners and others who suffer damages       shall be entitled to full compensation for their losses.       Those seeking voluntary conservation may on request be       granted compensation for the restriction of their right of       usufruct to the land remaining in their possession. In       property exchanges and sales the compensation is based on       agreements. Building and activity prohibitions can only be       issued on the conditions prescribed in [the 1958 Act] and       they can only be limited in time. If an area ... is       reserved in a regional or general plan as a conservation       area and a building permit cannot therefore be issued, the       property owner is entitled to compensation for the refusal       of such a permit.         Having regard to the aim of the programme to protect       nationally valuable ... areas by resorting, in order to       further the aims of the conservation, to measures provided       for by current legislation which in an individual case       would also be at the authorities' disposal, ...   the       programme does not impose such unreasonable limitations on       the property owners and holders of a right of usufruct as       to render the decision to adopt the programme unlawful in       general.         The decision may, however, be unreasonable or otherwise       unlawful with regard to an owner of an individual area or       a holder of a right of usufruct to such an area, if the       programme would contain, for instance, shore areas which       due to their ... character do not fulfil the conditions for       a conservable ... area or which are too large, having       regard to, in particular, the aim of the programme, namely       the conservation of nature on the shore. Although the       decision-making concerning these questions will take place       only during the implementation of the programme, it is not       justified to retain an area which ... clearly cannot be       conserved in the [programme] with its de facto restrictions       on the use [of the area]."         As to the lawfulness of the decision of the Council of State in regard to the property Iso-Tilus 12:59 owned by applicants nos. 14 and 15 the Supreme Administrative Court carried out a detailed examination of the conservable values on the property, but found that sufficient reasons had been shown for reserving it as a conservable area.         In conclusion, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the decision of the Council of State did not violate the applicants' rights and rejected their appeals.         On 20 October 1990 the Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens justitieombudsman) rendered his decision in response to a complaint lodged by applicant no. 14. The Ombudsman considered, inter alia,         - that the threat of expropriation following from the       adoption of a nature conservation programme as well as       possible building and activity prohibitions are likely to       result in the absence of other buyers than the State, this       negatively affecting the property owner's position in the       negotiations concerning the price of his property;         -   that provided the property owner does not, by       endangering the conservation values, force the State to       take measures, the de facto expropriation threat will       remain in force indefinitely;         - that the decision of principle to adopt the shore       conservation programme contains the position of the Council       of State in regard to, inter alia, the areas which, if       necessary, can be acquired by the State;         - that the decision does not entail any right to       expropriate a property without a permit to that end issued       in pursuance of the 1977 Act;         - that the programme has not entailed the transfer of any       property or rights; but         - that it has resulted in a de facto expropriation threat       forcing the property owners and others concerned to abstain       from using their properties in a manner contrary to the       programme, thus creating de facto restrictions on their       right to use their properties;         - that domestic law contains no provisions on national       conservation programmes;         - that it could therefore be questioned whether in the       light of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention it       is sufficient that the decisions of principle concerning       nature conservation programmes have been made on the basis       of the general competence of the Council of State as       prescribed in section 41 of the Constitution Act;         - that the decision of the Council of State to adopt the       shore conservation programme cannot be considered as being       clearly contrary to section 6 of the Constitution Act or       Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; but         - that, considering the de facto effects of the decision,       the shore conservation programme should justifiably have       been prescribed by law.   Relevant domestic law   1.     The competence of the Council of State to adopt a conservation       programme         The Council of State shall ensure that the decisions of the President of the Republic are being implemented, decide matters which it has been empowered by law to decide as well as such government and administrative matters which have neither been reserved in the Constitution Act or in any other law or decree for decision by the President nor delegated for decision by a minister in his capacity of Head of a Ministry or to an authority of a lower rank (section 41, subsection 1 of the Constitution Act).   2.     The conditions for the establishment of conservation areas         Section 1 of the 1923 Act (as amended by Act no. 399/41) concerns State-owned real property. Such property may be reserved as a general conservation area for the purpose of protecting it from interferences by man (subsection 1). A specific conservation area may also be established in order to protect a place of great natural beauty or with otherwise remarkable nature or in order to protect a particular animal or plant species (subsection 2). A conservation order made in accordance with the above-mentioned provisions shall not limit a right of a private party which was acquired prior to the conservation (section 8).         Section 9 of the 1923 Act (as amended by Act no. 672/91) concerns private properties. On request by the property owner the County Administrative Board may declare a property of significant importance from the point of view of nature conservation as a specific conservation area pursuant to section 1, subsection 2 (subsection 1).   3.     Expropriation         Under the Constitution Act the right of Finnish citizens to their possessions shall be secured by law (section 6, subsection 1). Expropriation of property in the public interest against full compensation shall be governed by law (subsection 3).          The State may expropriate real property in accordance with the 1977 Act for the purpose of creating a conservation area (section 18, subsection 1 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act no. 672/91).         A property may be expropriated if there is a general need therefor. Expropriation shall, however, not be resorted to, if its aim may also be achieved in another manner or if the inconvenience caused to a private interest is more significant than the benefit to the general interest (section 4, subsection 1 of the 1977 Act).         Expropriation permits are granted by the Council of State or, in certain cases, by the competent County Administrative Board or another administrative authority (section 5, subsection 1 of the 1977 Act). A permit is not needed if another decision already entails a right to proceed to expropriation (subsection 2, as amended by Act no. 1110/82).         A property owner is entitled to full compensation for the economic losses caused by the expropriation. The sum shall be fixed on the basis of the market price of the property (sections 29 and 30 of the 1977 Act).   4.     Restrictions on the use of real property         The County Administrative Board may, provisionally and for a maximum period of two years, prohibit an area from being used in a manner which could jeopardise the aim of an expropriation in accordance with the 1923 and 1977 Acts. The prohibition is immediately enforceable irrespective of appeal proceedings, unless the appeal body decides otherwise. If no expropriation takes place a compensation shall be fixed by the Board for any damage or inconvenience caused by the prohibition (section 18, subsection 2 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act no. 672/91).         If an expropriation permit has been granted the property at issue shall not be used in a manner which could jeopardise the aim of the expropriation. This prohibition is in force until the expropriation proceedings have terminated or until the moment when the expropriation matter is struck off. In the last-mentioned case compensation for losses or inconvenience caused by the prohibition shall be paid by the State (section 18, subsection 3 of the 1923 Act, as amended by Act no. 672/91).      Under the 1959 Building Decree (rakennusasetus 266/59, byggnads-förordning 266/59; hereinafter "the 1959 Decree") the competent County Administrative Board shall be heard by the local Building Board in respect of a request for a building permit pertaining to a property located, inter alia, within an area included in a conservation programme adopted by the Council of State. The County Administrative Board's opinion shall be given within six months (section 52, subsection 3, as amended by Decree no. 480/90 which entered into force on 1 June 1990). Section 124, subsection 3 of the 1959 Decree (as amended by Decree no. 480/90) provides for similar conditions in respect of a request for a building permit pertaining to a property covered by a building plan (rakennuskaava, byggnadsplan). Finally, section 137 (as amended by Decree no. 480/90) provides for a similar procedure with regard to a request for a building permit within an area not covered by a town plan (asemakaava, stadsplan), building plan or shore plan (rantakaava, strandplan).         The Ministry for the Environment may, if it deems it necessary, order a municipality to adopt or amend a certain plan within a fixed period of time. The order entails a building prohibition and an activity prohibition applicable to the area indicated in the order. If necessary, the Ministry may proceed to having the municipality comply with the order under threat of an administrative fine (uhkasakko, vite) (section 143, subsection 1 of the 1958 Act, as amended by Act no. 626/69, and subsection 7, as amended by Act no. 556/81).   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complain that they have no access to a court in order to challenge, within a reasonable time, the alleged interference with their property rights, nor do they have any other effective remedy at their disposal. They submit that their appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was not examined on its merits insofar as it related to the alleged unlawfulness of the conservation programme and its related repercussions. They invoke Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   2.     The applicants further complain that their right peacefully to enjoy their possessions has been violated in several respects as a result of the adoption of the shore conservation programme. The programme has allegedly no basis in domestic law, since its adoption was not an executive measure falling within the general competence of the Council of State. In any case, the Council of State had not been specifically empowered by Parliament (eduskunta, riksdagen) to adopt the programme. The programme is also claimed to be incompatible with the planning monopoly afforded to the municipalities by law, since it is alleged that subsequent planning would only amount to an enforcement of the programme.         Moreover, already the publication of the draft shore conservation programme had the immediate effect of restricting the applicants' use of their properties for an indefinite period of time, thus causing them financial losses, but without their receiving any compensation. The restrictions were partly based on the allegedly unlawful amendments to the 1959 Decree which entered into force on 1 June 1990. In particular, the value of the applicants' properties as securities has decreased and the properties are now impossible to sell except to the State which may therefore "dictate" the conditions. In the above circumstances the ownership of the applicants' properties has become so precarious that the properties have been de facto expropriated by the State. The applicants invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   3.     The applicants furthermore complain that the expropriation threat imposed on them amounts to an unlawful criminalisation of the use of their properties. They point out that already the lodging of a request for a building permit could entail the expropriation of their properties. In this respect they invoke Article 7 of the Convention.   4.     The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy against the alleged violations of their Convention rights. They invoke Article 13 of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.   The applicants complain that they have no access to a court in order to challenge, within a reasonable time, the interference with their property rights, nor do they have any other effective remedy at their disposal. They submit that their appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was not examined on its merits insofar as it related to the alleged unlawfulness of the conservation programme and its related repercussions. They invoke Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         Insofar as it is relevant to the present case Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) reads as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations       ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing       within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial       tribunal established by law. ..."         The Commission must first ascertain whether Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable in the instant case and, notably, whether there was a dispute over a "civil right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law. The dispute must be genuine and serious and its outcome must be directly decisive for the right in question (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Oerlemans judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 219, pp. 20-21, paras. 45-49).         In the present case the Commission considers that there existed a dispute concerning the lawfulness of the shore conservation programme and the allegedly related restrictions on the applicants' use of their properties, the right of property clearly being a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Zander judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A no. 279-B, p. 40, para. 27; cf. e.g. O. v. Austria, Comm. Report 14.5.93, para. 34, pending before the European Court of Human Rights and to be published in Series A).         The Commission finds that the conservation programme did not in itself entail any de jure activity prohibition served on individualised property owners and restricting the applicants' right to use their properties without seeking prior authorisation (cf., a contrario, the above-mentioned Oerlemans judgment, p. 10, para. 16; Eur. Court H.R., de Geouffre de la Pradelle judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 253-B, pp. 42-43, para. 33; Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 23 October 1989, Series A no. 163, pp. 19-20, paras. 68-71). Nor did the programme entail a refusal to authorise certain use of the properties (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment of 8 June 1990, Series A no. 180-B, pp. 36-37, para. 28) or a revocation of any permit already permitting certain use of the properties (cf., a contrario, Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), Comm. Report 6.11.89, paras. 90-91, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 192, p. 34, and the above-mentioned de Geouffre de la Pradelle judgment, p. 43, para. 34). Finally, the programme neither constituted the issuing of an expropriation permit nor did it amount to an amendment of a plan capable of otherwise extinguishing any of the applicants' property rights (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 29-30, para. 80, and Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 180-A, pp. 13-14, para. 33). It has not been shown that the use of any of the applicants' properties has been restricted solely on the basis of the conservation programme.         The Commission therefore concludes that in the particular circumstances of the present case the dispute at issue was not directly decisive for the applicants' "civil rights". Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not applicable. This position is not affected by the forestry recommendations appended to the programme which, as their substance shows, are also of a non-binding character.         It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.     The applicants further complain that the shore conservation programme allegedly affecting their properties had no basis in domestic law. It is further claimed that the programme has restricted the applicants' use of their properties for an indefinite period of time, but without their receiving any compensation for the financial losses allegedly suffered by them. The applicants therefore assert that their properties have been de facto expropriated by the State. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads as follows:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of       his possessions except in the public interest and subject       to the conditions provided for by law and by the general       principles of international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it       deems necessary to control the use of property in       accordance with the general interest or to secure the       payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."         The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (e.g., the above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 16, para. 53).         The Commission finds that the shore conservation programme did not entail such serious consequences to the applicants' properties as to amount to a de facto expropriation (cf., a contrario, Eur. Court H.R., Papamichalopoulos judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B, p. 70, paras. 45-46). The applicants have thus not been "deprived" of their properties within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1).         Referring to its above conclusion with regard to the complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the Commission furthermore finds that the situation complained of does not constitute a control of the use of the applicants' properties to be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).         The Commission does not consider it necessary to determine whether the situation complained of amounts to an interference with the right guaranteed in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1), as, even if it did, a fair balance has been struck between the various public and private interests involved (cf., a contrario, the above-mentioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment, p. 24 et seq., para. 61 et seq.).         The Commission accepts that the aim of the shore conservation programme was to protect valuable shore areas. This aim must be considered as reflecting the demands of the general interest of the community, the protection of the environment constituting an increasingly important consideration in today's society (Eur. Court H.R., Fredin judgment (no. 1) of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 16, para. 48). The decision to adopt the programme was, moreover, made by the Council of State on the basis of its general competence according to the Constitution Act. The Commission cannot find that domestic law has thereby been breached.         In so far as the applicants' properties may have been adversely affected as a result of their inclusion in the shore conservation programme, the Commission notes that the applicants have not submitted any evidence showing that the value of their properties has been so substantially diminished on account of the outline objective as to result in an unfair balancing of interests (cf., mutatis mutandis, No. 9310/81, Dec. 16.7.86, D.R. 47 pp. 5-15, at p. 14). With reference to the ever increasing importance attached to nature conservation the Commission considers that some repercussions on landowners' property rights cannot in themselves prevent the publication of a conservation intention such as the conservation programme at issue in the present case.         The Commission further observes that the inclusion of the applicants' properties in the shore conservation programme resulted in an obligation pursuant to sections 52, 124 and 137 of the 1959 Decree on the part of the relevant municipal Building Boards to hear the County Administrative Board in regard to proposed construction within the area. It has not been shown, however, that this obligation has caused any substantial adverse effects on any of the applicants' properties.         The Commission concludes therefore that no such adverse effects which could render the balancing of interests unfair have been shown to exist as a result of the shore conservation programme. Accordingly, there is no appearance of an improper balance between the protection of the applicants' property rights and the demands of the general interest and, consequently, no appearance of a violation of the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.         It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     The applicants furthermore complain that the expropriation threat imposed on their properties amounts to an unlawful criminalisation of their use of those properties. They invoke Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention which reads as follows:         "1.   No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on       account of any act or omission which did not constitute a       criminal offence under national or international law at the       time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be       imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the       criminal offence was committed.         2.    This Article shall not prejudice the trial and       punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at       the time when it was committed, was criminal according to       the general principles of law recognised by civilised       nations."         The Commission considers that any use of the applicants' properties contrary to the shore conservation programme cannot as such be considered a "criminal offence" within the meaning of Article 7 (Art. 7). Accordingly, Article 7 (Art. 7) is not applicable.         It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   4.     The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy against the alleged violations of their Convention rights. They invoke Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention which reads as follows:         "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this       Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy       before a national authority notwithstanding that the       violation has been committed by persons acting in an       official capacity."         In view of its conclusions under nos. 1 and 3 above in regard to the complaints under Articles 6 and 7 (Art. 6, 7) of the Convention the Commission considers that the related aspect of the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) must also be considered incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.         In view of its conclusions under no. 2 above in regard to the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) the Commission considers that the applicants have no "arguable claim" of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which would warrant a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) (see Eur. Court H.R., Powell and Rayner judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 20, para. 46).         It follows that the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, partly as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and partly as being manifestly ill-founded.         For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Commission                  President of the Commission          (H.C. KRÜGER)                                (C.A. NØRGAARD)                                  ANNEX         The applicants are:   1.     Ms. Mirja Uuuhiniemi, a housewife born in 1920 and resident at Kuhmoinen;   2.     Mr. Kauko Konivuori, a farmer born in 1917 and resident at Kuhmoinen;   3.     Mr. Matti Helenius, a farmer born in 1947 and resident at Puukkoinen;   4.     Mr. Urho Lampinen, a farmer born in 1949 and resident at Puukkoinen;   5.     Ms. Maili Antila, a physician born in 1920 and resident in Turku;   6.     Ms. Kaija-Leena Kosonen, a teacher in a day nursery for children, born in 1926 and resident in Pori;   7.     Mr. Allan Flinck, a farmer born in 1928 and resident at Puukkoinen;   8.     Mr. Ari Uuhiniemi, a farmer born in 1952 and resident at Puukkoinen;   9.     The estate of Mr. Olavi Savijärvi represented by Ms. Helvi Savijärvi, a housewife born in 1923 and resident at Kuhmoinen;   10.    Mr. Vesa Savijärvi, a farmer born in 1953 and resident at Puukkoinen;   11.    Mr. Veikko Koskinen, a farmer born in 1934 and resident at Puukkoinen;   12.    Mr. Risto Rannisto, a lumberjack born in 1944 and resident at Länkipojha;   13.    Ms. Rauha Janhonen, a housewife born in 1916 and resident at Länkipohja;   14.    Ms. Riitta Tilus, a city clerk born in 1949 and resident at Himanka; and   15.    Mr. Seppo Tilus, a farmer born in 1948 and resident at Himanka.