CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 octobre 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 17443/90                       by C. B. and A. M.                       against Switzerland         The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 12 October 1994, the following members being present:              MM.    H. DANELIUS, Acting President                  S. TRECHSEL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY              Mr.    K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 22 May 1990 by C. A. and A. M. against Switzerland and registered on 19 November 1990 under file No. 17443/90;         Having regard to:   -      reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the       Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       1 April 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicants on 14 May 1993;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The first applicant is a German citizen born in 1948.   The second applicant is a Swiss citizen born in 1949.   Both applicants are business consultants residing in Zurich.   Particular circumstances of the case                                     I.         The applicants were members of the board (Verwaltungsrat) of Cominta Holding, a company dealing inter alia with investments in, and the administration of, commercial companies.         In 1981 the Federal Tax Administration (Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung) undertook an auditing of the accounts (Buchprüfung) of Cominta Holding.   As a result, on 8 December 1981 the Administration claimed compensation taxes (Verrechnungssteuer) amounting to 2,408,560 SFr.         By decision of 17 March 1982 the Federal Tax Administration confirmed its claim.   The applicants filed an objection (Einsprache) against this decision.         On 29 April 1982 the Federal Tax Administration informed the applicants that it had instituted criminal proceedings against them on account of tax evasion or tax fraud.         By letter of 5 December 1984 the Federal Tax Administration informed the applicants that it was terminating the criminal proceedings and pursuing the objection proceedings.         By decision of 16 October 1985 the Federal Tax Administration partly upheld the applicants' objection against the decision of 17 March 1982.   Against this decision the applicants and other persons filed an administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwerde) with the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) which the latter partly upheld on 21 April 1986.         Proceedings were then resumed before the Federal Tax Administration which by decision of 18 May 1988 rejected the applicants' remaining objection against the decision of 17 March 1982. The Administration found that the applicants and other persons were jointly liable to pay taxes amounting to 2,211,125 SFr.         The applicants and other persons filed a further administrative law appeal which, insofar as it concerned the applicants, was dismissed by the Federal Court on 20 October 1989.   The Court found in particular that the applicants and a third person were jointly liable with Cominta Holding for the amount of 2,211,125 SFr plus 5% interest.                                     II.         Against the decision of the Federal Court of 20 October 1989 the applicants filed a request for the reopening of proceedings (Revision). Therein they claimed inter alia that in fact no profits had arisen from the liquidation of Cominta Holding.         On 5 September 1990 the Federal Court dismissed the applicants' request to reopen the proceedings.   The Court also imposed an administrative fine of 100 SFr on each applicant and their lawyer.   The relevant part of the judgment states in this respect:   <Translation>         "6.   Both a party and its representative shall be fined       with a disciplinary fine up to 100 SFr if in their       communications with the Court they breach propriety       required by public policy (Section 131 <recte: 31> para.       1 Federal Judiciary Act).   The applicants have stated that       the Court registrar participating in the preparation of       the case <S.> prepared the judgment together with the       competent administrator of the Federal Tax Administration       <H.-P. H.> and that the 'team H.-P. H./S.' had succeeded       in influencing the Court.   This statement amounts to a       serious defamatory insinuation, which the applicants do       not justify by means of so-called (not mentioned)       'determinations';   the Federal Court has no indication as       to how they arrived at such a statement.   The applicants,       who have declared the insinuation as being an integral       part of their request, and their lawyer thus seriously       violate the necessary propriety.   They must therefore each       be punished by a disciplinary fine of 100 SFr."   <German>         "6.   Sowohl die Partei als auch ihr Vertreter sind mit       einer Ordnungsbusse bis zu Fr. 100. -- zu bestrafen, wenn       sie im Verkehr mit dem Gericht den durch die gute Sitte       gebotenen Anstand verletzen (Art. 131 <recte: 31> Abs. 1       OG).   Bei der Behauptung, der an der Instruktion       mitwirkende Gerichtsschreiber <S.> habe das Urteil       zusammen mit dem Sachbearbeiter der Eidgenössischen       Steuerverwaltung <H.-P. H.> vorbereitet bzw. es sei dem       'Team H.-P. H./S.' gelungen, das Gericht zu vereinnahmen,       handelt es sich um eine grob ehrverletzende Unterstellung,       welche die Gesuchsteller durch angebliche (nicht genannte)       'Feststellungen' nicht begründen; das Bundesgericht hat       keine Anhaltspunkte, wie sie zu einer solchen Behauptung       kommen.   Die Gesuchsteller, welche die Unterstellung zum       integrierenden Bestandteil ihres Gesuchs machen, und ihr       Anwalt verletzen damit den gebotenen Anstand schwer.   Sie       sind daher je mit einer Ordnungsbusse von Fr. 100.-- zu       bestrafen."   Relevant domestic law         Section 31 of the Federal Judiciary Act (Organisationsgesetz) stated in the version applicable at the relevant time:   <Translation>         "1.   Whosoever in his oral or written communications       breaches propriety required by public policy, or disturbs       the conduct of proceedings, shall be punished with a       reprimand or a disciplinary fine of up to 100 SFr.         2.    Both the party and its representative may be punished       by   means of a disciplinary fine of up to 200 SFr, in case       of relapse up to 500 SFr, on account of malevolent or       wanton conduct of the proceedings."   <German>         "1.   Wer im mündlichen oder schriftlichen Geschäftsverkehr       den durch die gute Sitte gebotenen Anstand verletzt oder       den Geschäftsgang stört, ist mit einem Verweis oder mit       Ordnungsbusse bis auf 100 Franken zu bestrafen.         2.    Wegen böswilliger oder mutwilliger Prozessführung       kann sowohl die Partei als deren Vertreter mit einer       Ordnungsbusse bis auf 200 Franken und bei Rückfall bis auf       500 Franken bestraft werden."   COMPLAINTS         The applicants complain that the Federal Court in its decision of 5 September 1990 imposed a fine on the applicants in secret proceedings and in violation of fundamental principles.   There was no possibility of appeal.         The applicants invoke Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 22 May 1990 and registered on 19 November 1990.         On 2 December 1992 the Commission decided to communicate the complaint about the proceedings regarding the fine imposed on the applicants and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application.         The Government submitted their observations on 1 April 1993 and the applicants their observations in reply on 14 May 1993.   THE LAW   1.     The applicants' remaining complaints are that the Federal Court in its decision of 5 September 1990 imposed a fine on the applicants in secret proceedings and in violation of fundamental principles and that there was no possibility of appeal.   2.     The Commission has first examined the applicants' complaint that a fine was imposed on them in secret proceedings and in violation of fundamental principles under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), first sentence of the Convention which states:              "In the determination of ... any criminal charge       against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public       hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal       established by law."         The Government submit, with reference to the judgment of Engel and others (see Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 35, para. 82), that under Swiss law the fine was disciplinary in nature.   Moreover, the nature of the offence was not criminal in that it only concerned particular persons and particular proceedings, namely those appearing before the Federal Court, and did not affect general interests of society.   The degree of severity of the penalty, amounting to 100 SFr, was also not such as to bring it under the sphere of criminal law.   Finally, the fine was not listed in the criminal register and could not be replaced by a prison sentence.         The applicants submit that the exclusive purpose of the fine was to punish them for allegedly insulting the honour of the Federal Court. While in defamation proceedings the accused has the opportunity to prove the truth of the remarks, the present applicants could not do so. The degree of severity of the punishment, a fine amounting to 100 SFr, is irrelevant to the applicants.   In view of its position towards citizens, the Federal Court should exercise extreme caution regarding the observance of the rights enshrined in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         In order to determine whether Article 6 (Art. 6) was applicable in the present case, the Commission has had regard to the three alternative criteria laid down in the case-law (see Eur. Court H.R., Ravnsborg judgment of 23 March 1994, Series A no. 283-B, paras. 30 et seq.; judgment of Engel and others, loc. cit.).         The Commission must first ascertain whether the provision defining the offence at issue, namely Section 31 of the Federal Judiciary Act, belongs according to the Swiss legal system to criminal law.   The Commission notes that, when such conduct as described in Section 31 occurs, it is for the Federal Court to examine in the particular case of its own motion and without the involvement of the public prosecutor whether there has been an offence under that provision.   Moreover, the provision only deals with offences against the good order of proceedings before the Federal Court.   Finally, the fines at issue were not entered in the criminal register and could not be replaced by a prison sentence.         As a result, the Commission cannot find it established that the provision concerning sanctions against disturbance of the good order of court proceedings belongs to criminal law under the Swiss legal system (see Eur. Court H.R., Ravnsborg judgment, loc. cit., para. 33).         It is therefore necessary to turn to the second criterion, namely the very nature of the offence.   The Commission notes that Section 31 applies to persons who make oral or written communications to the court and thereby breach propriety or disturb the conduct of the proceedings. This provision does not concern statements made in a different context or by persons falling outside the circle of people covered by that provision.   It is for the court in the particular proceedings in which the misconduct has occurred to examine of its own accord whether the misconduct falls within Section 31.         However, such rules enabling a court to sanction disorderly conduct in proceedings derive from the indispensable power of a court to ensure the proper and orderly functioning of its own proceedings and are a common feature of legal systems of Contracting States.   Such measures come closer to the exercise of disciplinary powers than to the imposition of a punishment for committing a criminal offence (see Eur. Court H.R., Ravnsborg judgment, loc. cit. para. 34).   As a result, the kind of proscribed conduct for which the applicants were fined falls in principle outside the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         Finally, the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring - the third criterion - may bring the matter into the "criminal" sphere.   However, in the Commission's opinion, the maximum fine which the applicant risked incurring, i.e. 100 SFr, did not attain a level such as to warrant classification of the offence as criminal.   The Commission also notes that the fine could not be replaced by a prison sentence.         It follows that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings at issue.   This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     In respect of this above complaint the applicants have also invoked Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention.   Their further complaint that they did not have the possibility of an appeal falls to be examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) to the Convention.         Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention states:              "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence       on account of any act or omission which did not constitute       a criminal offence under national or international law at       the time when it was committed.   Nor shall a heavier       penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the       time the criminal offence was committed."         Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) states:         "1.   Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a       tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or       sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.   The exercise of       this right, including the grounds on which it may be       exercised, shall be governed by law.         2.    This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to       offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in       cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first       instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted       following an appeal against acquittal."         The Commission has just found that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention did not apply to the proceedings at issue, in particular that they did not concern the "the determination of ... any criminal charge against (the applicants)" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         As there was no "criminal offence" at issue, Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) also do not apply.   This part of the application is therefore also incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission by a majority         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.        Secretary to the                    Acting President of the       Second Chamber                          Second Chamber           (K. ROGGE)                            (H. DANELIUS)