CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 octobre 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 18989/91                       by Nicholas PHILIS                       against Greece           The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 12 October 1994, the following members being present:              MM.    A. WEITZEL, President                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 16 October 1991 by Nicholas PHILIS against Greece and registered on 24 October 1991 under file No. 18989/91;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Greek citizen born in 1937 and residing in Athens. He has introduced nineteen applications before the Commission. The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 6 in respect of certain of the applicant's complaints in three cases (Nos. 12750/87, 13780/88 and 14003/88). These complaints concerned the applicant's rights of access to a court, which was limited by domestic laws giving the Technical Chamber of Greece (Tehniko Epimelitirio Ellados) exclusive capacity to take legal proceedings for the recovery of fees payable to engineers, being subrogated to their rights for this purpose. The Committee of Ministers found a violation in respect of certain of the applicant's complaints in two other cases (Nos. 15264/89 and 16598/90). These complaints concerned the length of criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant for issuing cheques without funds. The present application relates in part to facts already examined in the applicant's previous applications No. 12750/87, 13780/88 and 15068/89.         The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:   I.     SUCCESSFUL PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT       AGAINST THE OEK         In the period 1971-1978 the OEK (Organismos Ergatikis Katoikias), a public body responsible for the construction of houses for working class families, entrusted the applicant with the design of electro- mechanical installations and the supervision of the relevant work. In March 1978 the OEK decided to free itself from all the engagements it had with the applicant. The applicant instituted court proceedings against the OEK, claiming remuneration for the design and supervision projects. The litigation centred on the issue of the legal nature of the applicant's relationship with the OEK. The applicant argued that he had concluded a number of agreements with the OEK as an independent engineer and that he was, as a result, entitled to the minimum fees prescribed by a series of laws protecting the income of engineers. The OEK, on the other hand, argued that the applicant was an employee who was only entitled to the salary agreed upon.         The applicant lodged thirteen actions with the First Instance Civil Court (Protodikeio) of Athens between 30 October 1978 and 28 December 1982. The Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE), which under domestic law has exclusive capacity to take legal proceedings on behalf of engineers, brought another eight actions against the OEK on behalf of the applicant between 16 December 1977 and 24 December 1982.         On 13 April 1983, while the above-mentioned proceedings were still pending, law 1346/83 came into force. In accordance with this law, all agreements concluded between the OEK and independent engineers or engineers employed by the state or legal persons incorporated under public law before the entry into force of the law were deemed to be lawful. The engineers in question should be remunerated in accordance with the terms of each contract, notwithstanding the provisions of the royal decree 19/21.2.38, the legislative decree 694/74 and law 716/77, which guaranteed a minimum level of remuneration for engineers. Law 1346/83 explicitly provided that its provisions would also apply in proceedings pending before the courts.         Notwithstanding the provisions of law 1346/83, one of the eight actions instituted against the OEK by the TEE on behalf of the applicant was successful. This action was introduced on 13 April 1981. On 30 November 1981 the First Instance Civil Court of Athens ordered the OEK to pay to the TEE 898.697 GrDrs plus interest and legal costs (decision 479/81).         On 23 May 1987 the Court of Appeal (Efeteio) of Athens, pronouncing on an appeal brought by the OEK, upheld decision No. 479/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens. The Court of Appeal considered that the OEK had not concluded with the applicant an agreement of the type envisaged in law 1346/83. The applicant had been entrusted with the project in accordance with the provision of law 716/77, which the court applied in the case before it. On 7 July 1987 the OEK appealed in cassation against the judgment of the Court of Appeal.         On 17 January 1989 the Court of Cassation rejected the OEK's appeal.         On 18 April 1989 the TEE asked the OEK to pay in execution of decision 479/81 a total sum of 2.721.647 GrDrs, broken down as follows: 898.697 GrDrs in respect of capital, 1.759.950 GrDrs in respect of interest and 63.000 GrDrs in respect of costs. It also informed the applicant, who was claiming a much larger sum, that it was impossible under Greek law to institute enforcement proceedings against the OEK, that an action for adjustment of the sum awarded to the applicant in accordance with the rate of inflation would be ill-founded and that an action for capitalization of interest "would be clearly devoid of any moral basis".         On 1 August 1989 OEK paid to the TEE a total sum of 1.328.248 GrDrs, broken down as follows: 898.697 GrDrs in respect of capital, 429.551 GrDrs in respect of interest calculated on the basis of 6% since 8.6.91, and 83.000 GrDrs in respect of costs.         On 16 October 1989 the TEE addressed a letter to the OEK in which TEE accepted that the amount to be paid in respect of costs was 83.000 GrDrs. It questioned, however, the OEK's calculation of the interest due. The TEE considered that the interest rate of 6% normally applicable in claims against state entities did not apply in connection with claims in respect of studies for public works. The TEE invoked a decision of the Court of Cassation to the effect that in such cases the interest applicable was 25%. In accordance with TEE's calculation, interest on the capital due on 31 July 1989 amounted to 1.825.700 GrDrs. Another 43.087 GrDrs were due in respect of interest between 1 August 1989 and 10 October 1989 and 166.049 GrDrs in respect of VAT. A sum of 1.065.198 GrDrs, therefore, remained to be paid.         The TEE's refusal to institute on several occasions proceedings against the OEK on behalf of the applicant formed the basis of complaints which were declared admissible by the Commission on 7 December 1988 in the context of Application No. 12750/87. On 27 August 1991 the Court considered that the Greek laws which gave the TEE exclusive capacity to take legal proceedings on behalf of engineers violated Article 6 of the Convention.   II.    UNSUCCESSFUL PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT       AGAINST THE OEK         The provisions of law 1346/83 were applied by the Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos) in five of the twenty-one actions which the TEE and the applicant had introduced against the OEK between 16 December 1977 and 28 December 1982. In five decisions given between 17 January and 22 June 1984 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's and the TEE's claims on the ground that they were based on legal provisions which were not any longer in force.         Following these decisions, the applicant and the TEE discontinued all the remaining fifteen actions. Both the applicant and the TEE, however, considered that all the actions should be re-introduced before the First Instance Civil Court of Athens, the claims being based this time on law 1346/83.         However, before re-introducing its actions against the OEK, the TEE requested the applicant to pre-pay the court fees. If the court fees were not paid before the first court hearing, the applicant was informed that the actions would be converted to actions for declaratory judgments (anagnoristikes agoges) for which pre-payment of fees was not required. The applicant refused. As a result, the TEE re-introduced most of its actions as actions for declaratory judgments: two actions on 27 March 1984 and one action on 26 February 1986, in which four of its previous actions were grouped. Only one of the original actions was re-introduced on 2 April 1984 as an action which could result in an enforceable judgment (katapsifistiki agogi).         On 16 September 1985 the First Instance Civil Court of Athens rejected the action lodged by the TEE on 2 April 1984. On 15 November 1985 and 27 May 1986 it rejected the two actions lodged by the TEE on 27 March 1984. The court considered that the claims had been prescribed under Greek law on the basis of the following reasoning. The period between the end of the financial year in which the claims arose and could be brought before the courts and the date of the introduction of the court actions exceeded five years. The dates of the introduction of the original court actions should not be taken into consideration, since the original court actions had a different legal basis and were not identical with the actions they were seized with.         On 15 October 1986, 19 November 1986 and 24 November 1986 the Court of Appeal of Athens rejected the appeals lodged by the TEE against the above-mentioned decisions. The TEE introduced on behalf of the applicant appeals in cassation. By three judgments pronounced on 7 March and 1 May 1989 the Court of Cassation confirmed the decisions given by the Court of Appeal on 15 October 1986, 19 November 1986 and 24 November 1986.         The applicant complained for the first time about the effects of law 1346/83 in the application which was registered under file No. 12750/87. He argued, inter alia, that Parliament, by enacting law 1346/83, cancelled in effect the dispute between him and the OEK which had been submitted to the courts prior to the enactment of this law, compromised the independence and impartiality of the courts, deprived him of his claims and discriminated against him. He invoked in this connection Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         On 7 December 1988 the Commission rejected these complaints. It considered that it lacked competence ratione temporis, in accordance with the terms of the declaration of Greece under Article 25 of the Convention, to examine complaints concerning events, such as the enactment of law 1346/83, which had occurred prior to 19 November 1985.         On 10 April 1989 the applicant lodged a second application with the Commission, which was registered under file No. 15068/89. On 5 November 1990 the Commission declared the application inadmissible. The applicant's complaints concerning the outcome of the proceedings instituted by him or on his behalf prior to the enactment of law 1346/83 were considered to be essentially the same as the complaints rejected in application No. 12750/87. The applicant's new complaint under Article 6 para. 1 concerning the rejection of the actions lodged on his behalf by the TEE after the enactment of law 1346/83 was rejected as incompatible ratione temporis. The Commission considered that the prescription of the applicant's claims was the direct consequence of the entry into force of law 1346/83 on 13 April 1983 and of the judgements given by the Court of Cassation in 1984 rejecting the applicant's original court actions.   III. PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE OEK WHICH ARE STILL PENDING         On 27 May 1986 the First Instance Civil Court of Athens rejected the fourth action lodged by the TEE on 26 February 1986. On 7 October 1986 the applicant, who had intervened in the proceedings, lodged an appeal. However, on 17 March 1987 the Athens Court of Appeal refused to hear the appeal, the TEE and the OEK not having appeared for the hearing.         On 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986 and 7 February 1986 the applicant introduced three actions which could give rise to enforceable judgments (katapsifistikes agoges) against the OEK in which his thirteen original actions were grouped. In the first action the applicant was claiming 26.600.724 GrDrs, in the second 28.133.280 GrDrs and in the third 36.178.312 GrDrs.         On 1 April, 15 April and 13 May 1986 the First Instance Civil Court of Athens decided to adjourn the hearing of the above-mentioned actions for 27 May 1986 and 10 June 1986. However, no progress was made in the proceedings on these dates either, the court being forced to apply Article 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the hearing is cancelled when the parties are not present or do not participate regularly.         On 29 May 1989 the applicant introduced a further action against OEK asking for 175.913.698 GrDrs in respect of readjustment claims and interest due which had not been included in his actions of 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986 and 7 February 1986. On 1 December 1989 the applicant introduced another action against the OEK asking for the recovery of fees for supervision work and reparation claims for the OEK's illegal acts against him. The action involved a claim of 67.299.761 GrDrs.         On 13 December 1989 the First Instance Civil Court of Athens rejected the applicant's action of 29 May 1989 on the ground that he had not pre-payed the court fees. The court considered that the compulsory pre-payment of the court fees did not hinder the exercise of the applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 of the Convention. On 11 April 1990 the same court rejected the applicant's action of 1 December 1989 Athens on the same ground.         On 12 December 1991 the applicant instituted yet another action against the OEK claiming 1.062.820.534 GrDrs. Relying on the Philis judgment of 27 August 1991 of the European Court of Human rights, the applicant re-introduced all the actions which had been brought by the TEE on his behalf in the past, including those which were still pending.         On 16 December 1991 the applicant summoned the OEK to appear before the First Instance Civil Court of Athens on 7 April 1992 in connection with the three actions (katapsifistikes agoges) he had introduced on 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986 and 7 February 1986. However, the hearing of 7 April 1992 had to be cancelled under Article 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the applicant did not participate regularly in the proceedings, not having pre-paid the court fees. The hearing of the action instituted by the applicant on 12 December 1991 was also adjourned on that date for the same reasons.         On 1 October 1993 the applicant appealed against the decisions of the First Instance Court of 13 December 1989 and 11 April 1990. No hearing has been fixed.         In the application he lodged on 5 January 1987, which was registered under file No. 12750/87, the applicant complained about the length of the proceedings which had been instituted either on his behalf or by him against the OEK until that date. These complaints were rejected by the Commission on 7 December 1988 either as incompatible ratione temporis, or for failure to observe the six months rule, or as manifestly ill-founded.         On 10 April 1989 the applicant lodged a second application with the Commission, which was registered under file No. 15068/89, complaining once again of the length of the proceedings which were then pending. On 5 November 1990 the Commission rejected these complaints as manifestly ill-founded.   IV.    INTERIM MEASURES ORDERED AGAINST THE OEK         In the context of the proceedings instituted against the OEK before the enactment of law 1346/83, the applicant obtained a decision from the First Instance Civil Court of Athens (No. 16.527/78) ordering, by way of interim measures, the OEK to supply the applicant with a copy of several documents necessary for the litigation at OEK's own expense. By October 1980 the OEK had not complied with the above-mentioned decision and the applicant introduced a second application for interim measures. The First Instance Court issued a second decision (No. 1879/81) on 10 February 1981 ordering the OEK to pay the applicant 30.000 GrDrs if it continued to refuse to comply with the decision No. 16.527/78. The court, however, did not grant the applicant's other request to rule that the representatives of the OEK should be arrested if they continue to refuse to comply with the above-mentioned decision. The court considered that the OEK, as a legal person incorporated under public law, enjoyed all the privileges of the state.   V.     PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BY THE APPLICANT AGAINST THE PNP         On 1 August 1984 the applicant instituted proceedings against the PNP (Paidiko Nosokomeio Pentelis), the Children's Hospital of Penteli, and the PIKPA (Patriotiko Idrima Koinonikis Pronoias kai Antilipseos), the Patriotic Foundation for Social Welfare and Assistance, before the Court of Appeal of Athens claiming remuneration for a project entrusted to him by the above-mentioned hospital. On 16 November 1987 the Court of Appeal dismissed his action on the basis that Greek law granted the TEE exclusive capacity to bring proceedings to recover payment of fees, being subrogated to the rights of the engineer.         On 6 April 1988 the applicant brought an application before the Commission complaining, inter alia, that his right of access to a court had been violated. The application was registered under file No. 15068/89. On 11 October 1989 the Commission declared the complaint admissible. On 27 August 1991 the Court pronounced a violation of Article 6 in this respect.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains of the fact that under Greek law no enforcement proceedings against the OEK may be instituted. As a result, the OEK has refused the enforcement of the decision No. 479/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens ordering it to pay the applicant 897.797 GrDrs plus interest and costs and expenses. Although the OEK paid the TEE on 1 August 1989 1.328.248 GrDrs, the applicant considers that a much larger sum should have been paid. The applicant claims interest calculated on the basis of 25% as well as re-adjustment of the total amount awarded to him on the basis of market prices as on 1 August 1989. To substantiate the latter claim the applicant invokes decision 443/81 of the Court of Cassation. According to his calculations, the sum due amounted on 31 December 1992 to 60.800.466 GrDrs. The applicant invokes in   connection with this complaint Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 6, 8, 14 and 17 of the Convention.   2.     The applicant complains of the application of law 1346/83 in his case, as a result of which he has suffered additional prejudice beyond that which arose directly and immediately from the initial enactment of the measure. According to the applicant, this complaint is submitted for the first time by the present application.         The applicant relies on the fact that law 1346/83 remained in force after 19 November 1985 when Greece recognized the right of individual petition and on the unreasonable character of most of the judgments given in his case. The assumption of the Greek courts was that an action brought under law 1346/83 would not have fallen under prescription only if the original actions had been grounded on law 1346/83. This law, however, had not yet been enacted when the original proceedings had been introduced.         He also relies on the fact that the Greek courts could have avoided applying law 1346/83 in the various claims he had submitted. The applicant refers, in this connection, to the decisions of the Court of Appeal of Athens and the Court of Cassation, which upheld decision No. 479/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens, refusing to apply law 1346/83 in the action brought on behalf of the applicant on 13 April 1981.         The applicant argues that, by applying retroactive legislation in proceedings which were actually pending to reject his actions, the courts deprived him of the right of access to a court and the right to have his civil rights determined by an independent and impartial tribunal.         The applicant further argues that, by denying him the right to the minimum obligatory tariff, the courts deprived him of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. The applicant refers in this connection to a series of claims against the OEK, the existence of which he considers sufficiently established, and to the capital gain he would have realized had the violation of the Convention not occurred.         The applicant further complains of the effects the above- mentioned violations had on his personal life, home and professional activities. His rights to practise his profession and earn a living, to receive payment for his work, to live in security and to be protected by the law in the course of his business activities have all been violated.         The applicant invokes, in connection with the above, Articles 6 para. 1, 8, 14 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone or in conjunction with each other. He claims that he is a victim of a continuous violation.   3.     The applicant complains of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, on its own and in connection Articles 6 para. 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He submits, in this connection, that law 1346/83 was not applied in the case of any other engineer suing the OEK. Moreover, he did not enjoy equality of arms in the proceedings: the other party being the State, it had the possibility of cancelling the dispute by enacting retroactive legislation; moreover, no enforcement proceedings could be instituted against the OEK.   4.     The applicant claims that the fact that his actions before the courts remained pending for more than sixteen years amounts to a violation of his right to proceedings within a reasonable length under Article 6.   5.     The applicant further complains of the fact that, under Greek law, he had to pay in advance the court fees for all actions which could result in enforceable judgments (katapsifistikes agoges) and of the fact that his failure to do so resulted in the dismissal of two actions he had instituted against the OEK on 29 May and 1 December 1989 and in the conversion of his other actions in declaratory actions. Court fees amounting to 0.9 % of the amount claimed, the applicant claims that he would have had to prepay a sum equivalent to 13.270.000 GrDrs, which amounts to a limitation of his right of access to a court and his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. In accordance with the established case-law of the Court of Cassation, the compulsory prepayment of court fees is in accordance with the Constitution. The applicant invokes in connection with this complaint Articles 6 para. 1, 8, 14 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   6.     The applicant further complains that the OEK refused the enforcement of decisions No. 16527/78 and 1879/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens which ordered OEK to produce by way of interim measures, certain evidence which the applicant intended to use in the context of court proceedings he had instituted against the OEK. He invokes, in this connection, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 6, 8, 14 and 17 of the Convention.   7.     The applicant also complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the outcome of the proceedings he instituted against the PNP.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains of the fact that under Greek law no enforcement proceedings against the OEK may be instituted. As a result, the OEK has refused the enforcement of the judgment No. 479/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens ordering it to pay the applicant 897.797 GrDrs plus interest and costs and expenses. He invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 6, 8, 14 and 17 (P1-1, Art. 6, 8, 14, 17) of the Convention.         The Commission recalls its case-law that a claim may constitute "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14 p. 146; No. 7775/77, Dec. 5.10.78, D.R. 15 p. 143). It also recalls that it has considered on several occasions that the failure of the state to pay sums due creates an ongoing situation in which the six-months rule does not apply (No. 11698/85, 11.12.86, unpublished; No. 11966/86, 8.12.88, unpublished) and that applications concerning the impossibility of obtaining the execution of a final judgment ordering the State to pay a particular sum to a private individual raise serious issues under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which call for an examination on the merits (No. 9676/82, Dec. 14.10.82, D.R. 29 p. 245; No. 11698/85, Dec. 11.12.86, unpublished; No. 11966/86, Dec. 8.12.88, unpublished).         The Commission observes, however, that the applicant complains in reality of the failure of the OEK to apply a particular interest rate, when calculating the amount to be paid in execution of the judgment No. 479/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens, and to re-adjust the amount on the basis of current market prices. In these circumstances and in the absence of any domestic court decision pronouncing on the dispute between the applicant and the OEK as to the manner of calculating the amount due in execution of the judgment of the First Instance Court of Athens, the Commission does not consider that the above situation constitutes an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         Insofar as the applicant complains about the Greek laws granting the TEE competence to institute proceedings on behalf of engineers for the recovery of their fees and the fact that, as a result, he could not institute the above-mentioned proceedings himself, the Commission notes that this issue has been already examined by the European Court in its Philis judgment of 27 August 1991.         In these circumstances, this part of the application, insofar as it raises issues which are not substantially the same as those examined in the Philis judgment of 27 August 1991, must be considered as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant complains of the application of law 1346/83 in his case and the effects this had on his rights to a fair trial in the determination of his civil rights by an independent tribunal, protection in the enjoyment of his family and private life and peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. He invokes in this connection, Articles 6 para. 1, 8, 14 and 17 (Art. 6-1, 8, 14, 17) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). He claims that he is a victim of a continuous violation.         The Commission recalls that under Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention it shall not deal with an application which is substantially the same as a matter which has already been examined by the Commission and contains no relevant new information. It finds that the above complaints are substantially the same as the complaints rejected in Applications No. 12750/87 and 15068/89.         It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention.   3.     The applicant complains of a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, on its own and in connection Articles 6 para. 1 and 8 (Art. 6-1, 8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He submits, in this connection, that law 1346/83 was not applied in the case of any other engineer suing the OEK. Moreover, he did not enjoy equality of arms in the proceedings: the other party being the State, it had the possibility of cancelling the dispute by enacting retroactive legislation; moreover, no enforcement proceedings could be instituted against the OEK.         However, insofar as the matters complained of have been substantiated and are within its competence, the Commission finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.         It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.     The applicant claims that the fact that his actions before the courts remained pending for more than sixteen years amounts to a violation of his right to proceedings within a reasonable time under Article 6 (Art. 6).         The Commission notes that the applicant has sued the OEK on many occasions before the Greek courts. Each time one of his actions was rejected for substantive or formal reasons the applicant re-introduced it using a different procedural possibility. Insofar as it can be gauged from the applicant's submissions on this matter, all these actions appear to be connected in one way or the other with the decision of the OEK to free itself in March 1978 from all the engagements it had with the applicant. The ensuing proceedings are, however, sufficiently distinct from each other and must be examined separately in connection with the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         The Commission recalls that in Application No. 12750/87 it rejected the applicant's complaints regarding the length of the proceedings instituted by either himself or the TEE against the OEK before the enactment of law 1346/83 for incompatibility ratione temporis or failure to comply with the six months rule. It also rejected as manifestly ill-founded the complaints concerning the length of the proceedings instituted by either the applicant or the TEE after the enactment of law 1346/83 and the complaint concerning the successful proceedings instituted by the TEE on behalf of the applicant on 13 April 1981. In Application No. 15068/89 the Commission rejected as manifestly ill-founded the applicant's complaints concerning the length of the proceedings which had been terminated by the decisions of the Court of Cassation of 17 January 1989 and 7 March and 1 May 1989.         The Commission recalls that in complaints concerning length of proceedings the time which has elapsed since the examination of the first application constitutes in itself a new fact for the purposes of Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention (cf. No. 8233/78, Dec. 3.10.79, D.R. 17 p. 122).         In the light of the above, the Commission can examine, in the context of the present application, the length of those proceedings which either remain pending since the decisions of the Commission on Applications No. 12750/87 and 15068/89 or have been introduced since. In the conduct of this examination the Commission will be guided by its constant case-law to the effect that, in civil matters, the exercise of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time is dependent on the diligence of the interested party (No. 7370/76, 28.2.77, D.R. 9, p. 95).         As regards the action lodged by the TEE on behalf of the applicant against the OEK on 26 February 1986 the Commission notes that the applicant has not taken any steps whatsoever to reset the proceedings in motion after the hearing of his appeal was cancelled on 17 March 1987.         As regards the three actions lodged by the applicant on 20 December 1985, 26 January 1986 and 7 February 1986, the Commission notes that the applicant has failed to provide any specific information as to the circumstances which led to the adjournment of the hearings of 1 April, 15 April and 13 May 1986 and the cancellation of the hearings of 27 May and 10 June 1986. The Commission further notes that the applicant waited for five and a half years before attempting to reset the proceedings in motion and that the hearing of 7 April 1992 was cancelled as a result of his failure to pre-pay the court fees.         Insofar as the two actions the applicant introduced on 29 May 1989 and 1 December 1989 are concerned, the Commission notes that a decision was issued at first instance on 13 December 1989 and 11 April 1990 respectively, ie within less than seven and five months. The applicant did not appeal before 1 October 1993. He does not appear to have undertaken any steps towards fixing a date for the hearing of his appeal.         Insofar as the action introduced by the applicant on 12 December 1991 is concerned, the Commission notes that the hearing of 7 April 1992 was cancelled as a result of the applicant's failure to pre-pay the court fees.         In the light of all the above, the Commission considers that the applicant has either failed to provide sufficient information on the state of the proceedings, or is himself responsible for the delays.         As a result, this part of the application, insofar as it does not relate to complaints which are substantially the same to those rejected by the Commission in Applications No. 12750/87 and 15068/89, is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.     The applicant complains of the fact that he has to pay in advance the court fees for the hearing of any action which could result in an enforceable judgment (katapsifistikes agoges) and of the fact that his failure to do so resulted in the dismissal of two actions he had instituted against the OEK on 29 May and 1 December 1989 and in the conversion of his other actions in declaratory actions.         The Commission notes that the applicant's appeals against the dismissal of his two actions are still pending. It also notes the applicant's submissions as to the futility of further challenging before the domestic courts the constitutionality of the relevant legislation in the light of the case-law of the Court of Cassation on this matter. However, the Commission does not consider that it has to pronounce on the issue of the exhaustion of domestic remedies for the following reasons.         The Commission may have accepted that, in certain circumstances, high costs of proceedings could raise an issue under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which secures to everyone the right of access to the courts and the right to a fair trial (No. 6202/73, Dec. 16.3.75, D.R. 1, p. 66; No. 6958/75, Dec. 10.12.75, D.R. 3, p. 155). However, the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not an absolute right and does not prevent the Contracting Parties from regulating the manner in which the public may have access to the courts in order to ensure the proper administration of justice (No. 17070/90, Dec. 1.10.90, D.R. 66, p. 268).         The Commission notes that under Greek law plaintiffs in certain kind of actions must pre-pay a court fee which corresponds to 0.9 % approximately of the sum they are suing for. If successful in their action, they can recover the court fee from the losing party. The Commission does not consider as a matter of principle this arrangement to be unreasonable. The applicant had or wished to have instituted a series of actions claiming substantial sums of money. The ostensibly high court fees he was or would have been required to pay were proportional to the sums he was claiming. In these circumstances the Commission does not consider that the applicant was arbitrarily denied access to a court.         This part of the application is, as a result, manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   6.     The applicant further complains that the OEK refused the enforcement of decisions No. 16527/78 and 1879/81 of the First Instance Civil Court of Athens which ordered OEK to produce by way of interim measures, certain evidence which the applicant intended to use in the context of court proceedings he had instituted against the OEK.         The Commission considers that the failure of the administration or a public body to comply with court decisions ordering it to take certain measures could raise an issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         The Commission notes, however, that the applicant's request for interim measures concerned the disclosure of certain documents which would have enabled him to obtain effective legal protection in the context of his principal action against the OEK. These proceedings, however, have been either terminated or discontinued between January 1984 and March 1986 or are actually pending before the courts. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the applicant's complaints have either not been introduced within the six months period provided for under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention or are premature, the fairness of the proceedings having to be assessed on the basis of the trial as a whole (No. 9938/82, 15.7.86, D.R. 48, p. 21).         As a result, insofar it has been introduced within the time-limit provided for under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   7.     The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) of the outcome of the proceedings he instituted against the PNP.         The Commission recalls that under Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention it shall not deal with an application which is substantially the same as a matter which has already been examined by the Commission and contains no relevant new information. It finds that the above complaints are substantially the same as the complaints examined by the Court in the Philis judgment of 27 August 1991.         It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (A. WEITZEL)