CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 octobre 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21294/93                       by VOGGENBERGER TRANSPORT GmbH                       against Austria         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 12 October 1994, the following members being present:              MM.    A. WEITZEL, President                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 25 November 1992 by VOGGENBERGER TRANSPORT GmbH against Austria and registered on 28 January 1994 under file No. 21294/93;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.         The applicant is a limited company, which is involved in the transport business and has its seat in Uttendorf, Upper Austria. In the proceedings before the Commission the applicant company is represented by Mr. H. Rainer, a lawyer practising in Innsbruck.   A.     The particular circumstances of the case         On 7 July 1989 the Braunau Tax Office (Finanzamt) ordered the applicant company to pay a total of about AS 1.4 million as road taxes (Straßenverkehrsbeiträge) for 1986, 1987 and 1988, respectively. The Office found that the applicant company, when assessing in advance the taxes due, had relied on the tax exemption under S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act for transports carried out by its semi-trailers, insofar as their number exceeded the number of its motor vehicles. However, these semi-trailers had been towed by vehicles belonging to other companies. As regards these transports, the tax exemption of S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act (Straßenverkehrsbeitragsgesetz) did not apply.         On 19 June 1991 the Upper Austrian Tax Authority (Finanzlandes- direktion) dismissed the applicant company's appeal. The Authority found that the exemption under S. 2 (9) was not applicable to transports with semi-trailers towed by motor vehicles of another contributor. The Authority further considered that this interpretation, taking into account the aim pursued by the provision at issue, did not go beyond the wording which it had before the amendment of 1 August 1988, containing simply a clarification.         On 9 August 1991 the applicant company brought a complaint before the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). It alleged inter alia that its right to property had been violated, as there had been no legal basis for the tax authorities' decisions. It submitted in particular that the wording of S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act in the version, which was in force before the amendment of 1 August 1988, unconditionally exempted transports with semi-trailers, the number of which exceeded the number of motor vehicles of the same contributor. Moreover, the applicant company claimed that it had, when calculating its prices, taken the lower amount of taxes into account, and therefore, the tax authorities' decision had aggravated its financial difficulties.         On 20 February 1992 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant company's complaint for lack of sufficient prospects of success and referred the case to the Administrative Court.         On 14 May 1992 the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant's complaint as being ill-founded. The Administrative Court found that the question had already been decided upon in its judgments of 22 October 1990 and 22 April 1991, regarding similar cases. The decision was served on the applicant company on 11 June 1992.   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice         According to Section 1 para. 1 of the Road Taxes Act (Straßenver- kehrsbeitragsgesetz), all domestic transports of goods carried out by vehicles with Austrian or foreign number plates are taxable. Paragraph 2 states that motor vehicles (Kraftfahrzeuge) and semi-trailers (von Kraftfahrzeugen gezogene Anhänger) are vehicles within the meaning of the Act.         Section 2 (9) provides that transports carried out with semi- trailers, insofar as their number exceeds the number of motor vehicles belonging to the same contributor, are exempt from the road tax.         An amendment, which entered into force on 1 August 1988, added a sentence to Section 2 (9) according to which semi-trailers driven by motor vehicles of another contributor are not to be included in the above calculation.         The Administrative Court's judgement of 22 April 1991 concerned a complaint by the applicant company's predecessor, R. V., who owned the transport business before it was transformed into a limited company in May 1986. The Administrative Court had confirmed the view of the tax authorities, applying the same interpretation of S. 2 (9) Road Taxes Act for 1984 until May 1986 as in the decisions against the applicant company. As regards R.V.'s argument that the proceedings were unfair because the tax exemption of S. 2 (9) Road Taxes Act had been applied in earlier years, the Administrative Court had found that only in exceptional cases, e.g. where the tax authority had explicitly advised the contributor in line with the legal view from which it wanted to deviate, a change in the interpretation of the law would seem unfair.   COMPLAINTS         The applicant company complains under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the decisions by the tax authorities relating to its obligation to pay road taxes for 1986, 1987 and 1988 respectively, were unlawful and that the proceedings were unfair.         The applicant company submits in particular that the Tax Authorities' decisions, were unlawful, as they could not possibly be based on the version of S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act which was in force before the amendment of 1 August 1988 and also deviated from the previous interpretation of this provision. Moreover, the order to pay an additional AS 1.4 million as road taxes, added to the financial difficulties of the company.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant company complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) that the decisions by the tax authorities relating to its obligation to pay road taxes for 1986, 1987 and 1988 respectively, were unlawful.         Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:              "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the       peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be       deprived of his possessions except in the public interest       and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by       the general principles of international law.              The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any       way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it       deems necessary to control the use of property in       accordance with the general interest or to secure the       payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."         The Commission finds that the present case, relating to the applicant company's obligation to pay road taxes, does not concern a deprivation of property within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 1 (Art. 1-1), but has to be considered as an interference with the applicant company's right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, falling within the scope of the second paragraph of this Article.         The Commission recalls that this paragraph requires that the interference is lawful and serves a legitimate aim (see Eur. Court H.R., Fredin judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, pp. 16-17, paras. 48-50). Moreover the interference must be proportional, achieving a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (Fredin judgment, loc. cit., p. 17, para. 51).         The applicant company complains that the interference was unlawful, as the decisions in question could not reasonably be based on S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act in the version which was in force before the 1988 amendment and also deviated from the previous interpretation of the relevant provisions.         As regards the lawfulness of the interference the Commission recalls that the power of the Strasbourg organs to review compliance with domestic law is limited (Eur. Court H.R., Fredin judgment loc. cit., p. 16, para. 50). The applicant's submissions do not suffice to conclude that the decisions of the Austrian authorities were contrary to domestic law. Moreover, the Commission notes that S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act, with the contested interpretation, had already been applied to the applicant company's predecessor for the years 1984 to 1986. In that case, the Administrative Court, in its decision of 22 April 1991, had found that, only in exceptional circumstances, e.g. if the tax authorities had explicitly advised a contributor in line with the legal view from which they wanted to deviate, a change in the interpretation of a legal provision would seem unfair. The applicant company could thus foresee the interference complained of.         The Commission further considers that the interference at issue pursued a legitimate aim, namely the levying of taxes relating to the transport of goods.         The applicant company submits that the order to pay an amount of AS 1,4 million in road taxes placed a heavy burden on the company, adding to its financial difficulties.         As regards the proportionality of the interference, the Commission recalls that there must be a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aim pursued, whereby the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question (Eur. Court H. R., Fredin judgment, loc. cit., p. 17, para. 51).         The Commission notes that the applicant company had in 1986 to 1988 assessed in advance the amount of taxes due, in accordance with its legal view on S. 2 (9) of the Road Taxes Act. The Commission considers that the applicant company was aware that it had to pay the road taxes in advance on the basis of its own assessment while being subject to later review. In such a situation the applicant company had to take into account that the final amount might be higher and make provisions accordingly. In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the tax authorities' decisions ordering the applicant company to pay additional road taxes for 1986 to 1988 were not disproportionate.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant company also complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, that the proceedings leading to the tax authorities decisions which ordered it to pay road taxes were unfair.         The Commission recalls that proceedings relating to tax assessment do not fall within the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (No 8903/80, Dec. 8.7.1980, D.R. 21, 246; No 13013/87, Dec. 14.12.1988, D.R. 58, 163).         It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission unanimously         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (A. WEITZEL)