CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 22 février 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                                FIRST CHAMBER                          Application No. 22095/93                                    D.S.                                   against                             the United Kingdom                           REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                        (adopted on 22 February 1995)                              TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                    page   I.     INTRODUCTION       (paras. 1-16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         A.    The application            (paras. 2-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         B.    The proceedings            (paras. 5-11). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1         C.    The present Report            (paras. 12-16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS       (paras. 17-33). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         A.    Particular circumstances of the case            (paras. 17-22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3         B.    Relevant domestic law and practice            (paras. 23-33) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION       (paras. 34-56). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         A.    Complaint declared admissible            (para. 34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         B.    Point at issue            (para. 35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9         C.    Article 6 taken alone and in conjunction with            Article 14 of the Convention            (paras. 36-55) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9              CONCLUSION            (para. 56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13   APPENDIX I    : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . .14   APPENDIX II   : DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . .15   I.     INTRODUCTION     1.     The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.     The application   2.     The applicant, D.S., is a British citizen born in 1962 and resident in Taunton. She is represented before the Commission by Mr. Paul Sykes, a solicitor practising in Taunton.   3.     The application is directed against the United Kingdom.   The respondent Government are represented by Mr. Martin Eaton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as Agent.   4.     The case concerns the complaints of the applicant that she is denied access to court in respect of her claim for compensation for psychological injury caused by abuse suffered in her childhood as a result of the operation of the applicable rules of prescription and that the difference in the rules as applied to herself and other categories of claimants discloses discrimination. It raises issues under Articles 6 para. 1 and 14 of the Convention.   B.     The proceedings   5.     The application was introduced on 14 June 1993 and registered on 19 June 1993.   6.     On 1 December 1993, the Commission (First Chamber) decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government for their written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.   7.     The Government submitted their written observations on 21 March 1994.   The applicant submitted her written observations in reply on 10 June 1994.   8.     On 6 September 1994, the Commission (First Chamber) declared the application admissible.   9.     The parties were then invited to submit any additional observations on the merits of the application.   10.    On 23 November 1994, the Government submitted further observations.   11.    After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   In light of the parties' reactions, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which a friendly settlement can be effected.   C.     The present Report   12.    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission (First Chamber) in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS   13.    The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on 22 February 1995 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   14.    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is         1)   to establish the facts, and         2)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   15.    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   16.    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     Particular circumstances of the case   17.    The applicant was born in 1962.   18.    Between 1968 and 1977, the applicant was repeatedly indecently assaulted by her father, abuse which included acts of incest. She told her mother about the abuse while it was going on and in a statement to the police made later stated "having listened to my friends it made me realise that what my father was doing to me wasn't right."   19.    Her father was convicted on 15 March 1991 of indecent assault following his guilty plea. He received a sentence of one year probation.   20.    The applicant alleges that following the abuse, she suffered increasing feelings of fear, depression, despair and guilt. She had difficulty with relationships and her two marriages only lasted brief periods.   21.    The applicant instituted proceedings to claim damages from her father on 14 August 1992. A report by a psychologist stated that it would have been impossible for the applicant to have instituted proceedings earlier since she had largely blocked out the memories as a means of survival.     22.    Following the judgment of the House of Lords   in the Stubbings case on 16 December 1992 (see No. 22083/93), her action was discontinued on 24 May 1993, her claims having become statute-barred as being outside the six year time-limit imposed by section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980.   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice   23.    The Limitation Act 1939 imposed a six year time-limit from the date of the cause of action on claims founded on simple contract or tort. A two year time-limit was imposed on claims against local authorities.   Since the vast majority of actions against public authorities were for personal injuries arising out of accidents, the question as to the fairness of a short time-limit arose. A report presented to Parliament by the Tucker committee in 1949 recommended that the period of limitations   for actions in respect of personal injuries should be 2 years irrespective of the defendant but that courts should have discretion to grant leave for claims up to be brought six years later. The committee excluded trespass to the person from their definition of personal injury. In the ensuing Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) act 1954 a three year period with possible extension to six years was provided for actions for personal injuries which were formulated as actions for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty.   24.    In the case of Letang v. Cooper (1965 1 Q.B. 232), where the plaintiff had been injured as she sunbathed on the grass by a car which ran over her legs, the plaintiff sought to evade the three year time-limit imposed on personal injury by framing her action as a claim in trespass to the person. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning found that for injury inflicted unintentionally the only cause of action was in negligence not trespass but that if he was wrong he would hold that the phrase "breach of duty" covered a breach of any duty under the law of tort.   25.    With the discovery of injuries to health resulting from exposure to noxious substances many years previously (eg. Cartledge v. Jopling, 1963 AC 758), the law on limitation periods was reformed further to confer a judicial discretion to extend the three year time limit (Limitation Act 1963 later replaced by the Limitation Act 1975). The legislation currently in force is the Limitation Act 1980.   26.    The Limitation Act 1980 provides as relevant:         Actions founded on tort:         "2.   An action founded on tort shall not be brought after       the expiration of six years from the date on which the       cause of action accrued."         Actions in respect of wrongs causing personal injuries or death:         "11   (1) This section applies to any action for damages for       negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty       exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or       under a statute or independently of any contract or any       such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff       for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of       or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the       plaintiff or any other person.              (2) None of the time limits given in the preceding       provisions of this Act shall apply to an action to which       this section applies.              (3) An action to which this section applies shall not       be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in       accordance with subsection (4) or (5) below.              (4) Except where subsection (5) below applies, the       period applicable is three years from -              (a) the date on which the cause of action accrued;   or              (b) the date of knowledge (if later) of the person       injured.       ...         14.   (1) In sections 11 and 12 of this Act references to a       person's date of knowledge are references to the date on       which he first had knowledge of the following facts -              (a) that the injury in question was significant; and              (b) that the injury was attributable in whole or in       part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute       negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and              (c) the identity of the defendant; and              (d) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that       of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that       person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of       an action against the defendant;         and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as       a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of       duty is irrelevant.              (2) For the purposes of this section an injury is       significant if the person whose date of knowledge is in       question would reasonably have considered it sufficiently       serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages       against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was       able to satisfy a judgment.         (3)   For the purposes of this section a person's knowledge       includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been       expected to acquire -              (a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or              (b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of       medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is       reasonable for him to seek;         but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with       knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of       expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps       to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice."         Extension in the time-limit where a person is under a       disability:         "28. (1)   Subject to the following provisions of this       section, if on the date when any right of action accrued       for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act,       the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the       action may be brought at any time before the expiration of       six years from the date when he ceased to be under a       disability or died (whichever first occurred)       notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired.         38. ...              (2) For the purposes of this Act a person shall be       treated as under a disability while he is an infant, or of       unsound mind."         Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of       personal injuries or death:         33. (1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to       allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which-              (a) the provisions of section 11 or 12 of this Act            prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents;            and              (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would            prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents;         the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the       action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to       which the action relates.         ...         (3) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to       all the circumstances of the case and in particular to-              (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the            part of the plaintiff;              (b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the            evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff            or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if            the action had been brought within the time allowed by            section 11 or (as the case may be) by section 12;              (c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action            accrued...              (d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising            after the date of the accrual of the cause of action;              (e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and            reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission            of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable,            might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action            for damages;              (f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain            medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any            such advice which he may have received..."   The case of Stubbings v. Webb   27.    The issue arose in the case of Stubbings v. Webb as to the time- limit applicable under the 1980 Act to claims concerning sexual abuse which took place during childhood. In the case, the plaintiff alleged abuse which occurred up until 1971 when she was 14, but contended that it was not until September 1984 that she first became aware of the possibility of a connection between the serious psychological problems which she suffered and the alleged abuse.   28.    On 18 August 1987, she commenced proceedings in trespass against her adoptive parents and their son, S., seeking damages for the alleged sexual and other abuse. The defendants sought to strike out the claim as being time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 which imposed a time-limit of three years from the date on which she had knowledge that she had grounds to bring a claim.   29.    The High Court Master held on 14 December 1989 that on the facts of the case the plaintiff's "date of knowledge" was more than three years prior to the date of commencement of proceedings and that there were no grounds for exercising the discretion in section 33 of the 1980 Act to waive the time-limit.   30.    On appeal, the High Court judge and the Court of Appeal both took a different view, holding first that the proceedings had been commenced within three years of the relevant "date of knowledge" and secondly that, even if they had not been, it would be appropriate to exercise the section 33 discretion to allow the claim to continue. In his judgment in the Court of Appeal dated 27 March 1991, Lord Justice Bingham, found that the plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to acquire knowledge at an earlier date of the causal link between her health problems and the childhood abuse from facts observable or ascertainable by her, since mental impairment, such as this allegedly was, almost necessarily produced a lack of insight. He agreed with the High Court judge that she was entitled to pursue her action as of right since it had been introduced with three years of the date of knowledge that she had suffered significant injury. On considering whether, if applicable, the discretion to allow the claim should be exercised under section 33, he found that notwithstanding the lapse of time (twenty years in respect of the latest of the acts complained of) the delay did not prejudice the defendants' ability to rebut the claims. In this context, he noted that the alleged acts took place in private without other witnesses and that, though the defendants' recollection of time and place might have deteriorated, as regarded the essential point in the case -whether the acts took place or not- there was no room for doubt or mistake and the case would turn, as it would at any point in time, on whether the judge could accept the plaintiff's evidence as honest and reliable.   31.    Before the Court of Appeal, the defendants also contested that the three year "date of knowledge" time-limit was applicable at all since the plaintiff's claim was not a claim based on "negligence, nuisance or breach of duty" but was rather one "founded on tort" within the meaning of section 2, subject to section 28 of the 1980 Act.   The defendants claimed that the date of the plaintiff's knowledge was accordingly irrelevant and that the Court had no discretion under section 33 to mitigate against the consequences of the applicable limitation period.   In its judgment of 27 March 1991, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Lord Justice Bingham held, inter alia:         "On behalf of the <W.s> a submission was made to us, not       made to the master and the judge, that sections 11, 14 and       33 of the Act do not apply to the plaintiff's claims, with       the result that they are subject to a non-extendable 6 year       limitation period which irretrievably expired in January       1981, 6 years after the plaintiff reached her majority.       The grounds of this submission were         (1) that the plaintiff's claims were of battery, i.e.       intentional trespass to the person;         (2) that such a cause of action does not fall within the       reference in section 11 (1) of the Act to "any action for       damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether       the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision       made by or under a statute or independently of any contract       or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the       plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty       consist of or include damages in respect of personal       injuries to the plaintiff or any other person";       and         (3) that the claims are therefore subject to the six year       time-limit prescribed by section 2 of the Act for claims in       tort not covered by section 11.         At the risk of apparent discourtesy, I shall deal with this       submission very briefly.   In Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB       232 the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts and       Diplock L.JJ) construed the language here in question as       embracing a claim based on unintentional and intentional       trespass to the person.   Cooke J so understood the       judgments in Long v Hepworth [1968] 1 WLR 1299, and I       consider the Court of Appeal's ruling to be binding upon us       as he held it binding upon him.   The Limitation Acts of       1975 and 1980 were enacted in the same terms against the       background of this authority, which they must be taken to       have endorsed.   Even in the absence of authority I would,       like Cooke J, reach that conclusion on construction of the       statutory language alone, unless I could see some reason       why Parliament should have intended to draw the suggested       distinction, and I can see none.   I am satisfied that this       is an action falling within section 11 (1) of the Act."     32.    The defendants successfully appealed on this point to the House of Lords and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed on 16 December 1992. The House of Lords based their decision on what they held to be Parliament's intended meaning for the words in section 11.   It was clear from the records of the parliamentary debate introducing the 1954 Limitation Act that the Government and consequently Parliament had not intended the words "negligence, nuisance or breach of duty" to extend to cases concerning intentional as opposed to accidental infliction of injury.   Given the identical language carried over into the subsequent legislation, the House of Lords felt bound to accept the defendants' submissions that the plaintiff's claim, framed as it was in terms of intentional infliction of injury, did not fall within the ambit of section 11 nor, consequently, of sections 14 and 33 of the 1980 Act.   33.    The result of this decision was that the standard and inflexible limitation period of six years provided by section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 applied to the plaintiff's claim, subject to the delayed starting point established by section 28 of the Act ie. the age of majority for injuries suffered in childhood.   The House of Lords accordingly concluded that the claim was time barred and should be dismissed.   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.     Complaint declared admissible   34.    The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints that she is denied access to court as a result of the limitation period applied in respect of her claims arising out of incidents of abuse which she suffered during childhood.   B.     Point at issue   35.    The issue to be determined is:   -      whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1       (Art. 6-1) alone or taken in conjunction with Article 14       (Art. 6-1+14) of the Convention in that the applicant is denied       access to court to obtain a determination of her civil rights as       a result of the applicable limitation period;   C.     Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention alone and taken       inconjunction with Article 14 (Art. 6-1+14)         Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention   36.    Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides in its first sentence:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of       any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair       and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and       impartial tribunal established by law."   37.    The applicant's claims relate to alleged psychological injury caused by sexual abuse during her childhood. The Commission finds, and the Government have not contested, that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable, the applicant's complaints relating to the determination of rights of a civil character.   38.    The applicant submits that the six year time-limit imposed on injuries resulting from intentional injury (trespass, assault etc) effectively bars her access to court in the determination of her claims of psychological injury resulting from childhood abuse. The applicant submits that the inflexible time-limit imposed on claims relating to intentional injury which applies regardless of the circumstances of an individual case is arbitrary and disproportionate. It may not be possible, as in the case of this applicant, for a victim of intentional injury to make a claim until after the expiration of the six year period and application of an inflexible rule in these circumstances causes obvious injustice.   39.    The respondent Government submit, inter alia, that the essence of the applicant's right of access to court is not extinguished as a result of the applicable limitation period since an individual has six years in which to bring a claim. This period has a legitimate aim in providing finality, protecting others from stale claims and preventing injustice which might result from litigating matters which are difficult to establish due to lapse of time. The Government argue that a period of six years for this purpose is reasonably proportionate, pointing out that less generous time-limits are common in international conventions eg. a one year limitation period for claims under the Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road and two years under the Warsaw Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Air.   The Government consider that it is extremely unlikely that the victim of an intentional injury will be unaware of the ingredients of his cause of action. In their submission, a line has to be drawn at some point, the right of access to court by its very nature calling for regulation, and Contracting States must enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in laying down such regulation.   40.    The Commission recalls that the case-law of the Convention organs establishes that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal (eg. Eur. Court H.R. Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18 p. 18, para. 36). The right of access to court guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is however not absolute, but may be regulated by States, which have a certain margin of appreciation, provided that any limitation applied does not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Eur. Court H.R,, Ashingdane judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 93, pp. 24-25 paras. 55-57).   41.    The Commission has in previous cases found that it must generally be accepted in the interests of good administration of justice that there are time-limits within which prospective proceedings must be introduced. It agrees with the Government that time-limits imposed on the introduction of claims pursue the legitimate aim of preventing stale claims and the possible injustice to defendants faced with evidential difficulties in contesting allegations relating to distant events and of promoting legal certainty.   42.    The Commission's case-law has further established that the need for legal certainty may justify the imposition of time-limits which cannot be waived. In a case dealing with a three year time-limit on the introduction of claims by a father to challenge the paternity of a putative child, the Commission considered that, in the interests of the good administration of justice, it had to be accepted that the time- limit was final and that there was no possibility to institute proceedings even when new facts had arisen after the expiry of the time-limit (No. 9707/82, Dec. 6.10.82, D.R. 33 p. 223).   43.    The Commission notes that the applicant claims that in the circumstances of her case an inflexible time-limit is disproportionate since it is not infrequent that knowledge of the factors necessary to bring a claim based on sexual abuse in childhood arises only after a considerable number of years. This is however a situation which may arise, for different reasons, in the context of other types of claims eg. the paternity case referred to above.   44.    The applicant's principal argument is that the application of a rigid time-limit to claims brought by victims of intentional injury is unreasonable and disproportionate when compared with the position of victims of unintentional injury: in the latter case, the law provides for flexibility by treating the date of the victim's knowledge of the facts necessary to found a claim as the starting date for the limitation period and by conferring a discretion on the courts to set aside the time-limit in a particular case if it would be equitable to allow the action to proceed. Consequently, the Commission considers that the essence of the applicant's complaints is that she is, without good reason, subject to a time-limit which is final, whereas victims of other injuries, unintentionally inflicted, benefit from different and more favourable regulations. This raises issues of discrimination which the Commission finds appropriate to examine in conjunction with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention which has also been raised by the applicants.         Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention in conjunction       with Article 14 (Art. 6-1+14)   45.    Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides:         "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this       Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground       such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other       opinion, national or social origin, association with a national       minority, property, birth or other status."   46.    The applicant contends that imposing a rigid six year time-limit on applicants who have suffered psychological damage, rather than the three year time-limit from the date of knowledge which applies to claims of unintentional injury combined with the power of the courts to extend the period beyond the three years, amounts to discrimination on the basis of her status which is not objectively or reasonably justified. There is, she submits, no rational or credible justification for distinguishing between cases of intentional or unintentional injury in regard to limitation periods. She disputes that it is correct to state that the victims of intentional injury are inherently more likely to be aware of the facts necessary to make a claim than a victim of unintentional injury. Victims of other particular types of injury may be very likely to know some or all of the ingredients of their cause of action.   47.    The Government submit that there is no discrimination since the applicant was treated the same as any other person claiming to be the victim of intentional injury. While victims of negligently inflicted harm are subject to different rules, they fall into a separate category. Even assuming there was a difference in treatment, it is not on a ground relating to the applicant's status. Further, even it did so relate to status, there is in the Government's view an objective and reasonable justification for any difference in treatment based on the consideration that a victim of an intentional injury is very likely to be aware of the facts founding a claim, whereas the victim of negligently inflicted injury is often in a different position, being unaware that injury is attributable to an actionable lack of care.   48.    The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention safeguards individuals placed in analogous situations from any discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and Protocols (see eg. Eur. Court H.R. Van der Mussele judgment of 21 November 1982, Series A no. 70). The Government contend that the applicants, victims of intentionally inflicted harm, cannot seek to compare themselves to victims of unintentionally inflicted harm, who are in a separate and distinct category. The Commission does not accept this submission.   It notes that there may be cases where it is unclear whether harm was inflicted deliberately or negligently and that the two categories cannot be said to be exclusive. Where a person suffers an injury in respect of which a civil claim for compensation may lie, the Commission finds no basis for drawing a distinction based on the intention or culpability of the wrongdoer which would exclude comparison under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.   49.    The Commission finds therefore that the applicant may claim to be in an analogous position to victims of negligently inflicted injury for the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.   50.    As regards the alleged discriminatory treatment, the Commission recalls that victims of trespass to the person, such as the present applicant, are subject to a six year time-limit with no discretion in the courts to allow the action to proceed in particular cases, while victims of negligently inflicted injury are subject to a three year time-limit which runs from the date of knowledge of the facts necessary to found the cause of action and may be held by the courts not to apply where it is equitable to do so in the circumstances of a particular case. The applicant may therefore, in the Commission's view, claim to be victim of a difference of treatment as regards the regulation of her access to court in the determination of her claims. The difference in treatment is based on the fact that the injuries of which she claims to be a victim were intentionally inflicted and the Commission considers that this is a factor relating to personal status which falls within the scope of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.   51.    However, the Commission recalls that whether a difference in treatment constitutes discrimination in the sense of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention depends on whether or not there exists an objective and reasonable justification. This requires that the difference pursues a legitimate aim and that there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In this assessment of whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment, Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation which will vary according to the circumstances, subject-matter and background (see eg. Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, para. 177).   52.    Having regard to the above, the Commission recalls that the Government state that the justification for the difference in treatment is that victims of intentional injury are generally in the position that they are aware of the facts necessary to found a claim for compensation, whereas victims of negligently inflicted injury such as, for example, a patient who has been subject to an actionable lack of care in surgery may not be aware of either the injury or its cause for years afterwards.   53.    The Commission finds that the Government's argument is convincing but only up to a certain point. As the applicant states, victims of unintentional injury are also generally in a position where they are aware of the grounds for bringing a claim in the courts. The Commission is not satisfied that it is reasonable or proportionate to allow flexibility in the application of the time-limits in cases where a victim of unintentional injury lacks the knowledge required to bring an action but to exclude it entirely where a victim of intentional injury lacks the requisite knowledge. The arguments as to legal certainty, prevention of stale claims and injustice to defendants applies equally to both categories of victim. There is no apparent obstacle to allowing the courts to examine whether it is equitable to proceed in cases other than those of negligent injury.   54.    The Commission notes also the case of Letang v. Cooper referred to in the judgments of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in the Stubbings case where the plaintiff had been run over by a car while sunbathing on the grass and an issue arose as to whether the time-limit for unintentional or intentional injury should apply to the victim's claim. It seems to the Commission anomalous that a victim's access to court could turn on whether the alleged wrongdoer inflicted an injury accidentally or deliberately.   55.    Consequently, the Commission finds that the application of the six year time-limit to the applicant's claims is not objectively or reasonably justified and discloses discriminatory treatment in the regulation of her access to court for the determination of her civil rights.         CONCLUSION   56.    The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 14+6-1)) of the Convention.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber         (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)                                   APPENDIX I                         HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS   Date                   Item ________________________________________________________________   14.06.93               Introduction of the application   19.06.93               Registration of the application   Examination of admissibility   01.12.93               Commission's decision to invite the parties to                       submit observations on the admissibility and                       merits   21.03.94               Government's observations   13.04.94               Commission's grant of legal aid   10.6.94                Applicant's reply   06.09.94               Commission's decision to declare the application                       admissible   Examination of the merits   06.09.94               Commission's deliberations   23.11.94               Government's observations   17.01.95               Examination of the state of proceedings   22.02.95