CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 5 avril 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21009/92                       by Ove, Bengt, Bertil and Inkeri GUSTAVSSON                       against Sweden         The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 5 April 1995, the following members being present:              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE, Acting President            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  S. TRECHSEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                Mr.    K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 16 November 1992 by Ove, Bengt, Bertil and Inkeri GUSTAVSSON against Sweden and registered on 30 November 1992 under file No. 21009/92;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The first applicant, Mr. Ove Gustavsson, is a technician born in 1960 and resident at Partille. He is the father and sole guardian of the second applicant, Bengt Gustavsson, born in 1984 and also resident at Partille. The third and the fourth applicant, Mr. and Mrs. Bertil and Inkeri Gustavsson, are the first applicant's parents, born in 1933 and 1932, respectively. The third applicant is an industrial supervisor and the fourth applicant is a child nurse. They are both resident at Landvetter. All applicants are Swedish citizens, but the fourth applicant is of Finnish origin. They are all represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a lawyer in Gothenburg.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants or apparent from the documents, may be summarised as follows.   I.     Particular circumstances of the case         1.    Background         In September 1986 S., the wife of the first applicant and the mother of the second applicant, died of cancer. Prior to S.'s death and also subsequently the second applicant was to a significant extent cared for by the third and the fourth applicant.         In August 1989 the second applicant was enrolled at a day nursery. It appears that towards the end of 1990 he was observed playing sexually explicit games with other children in his day nursery. It further appears that he stated in an interview in private with the nursery manager that he had played similar "games" also with his father. On 20 December 1990 the nursery manager informed the Social Office (socialkontoret) of Partille of her suspicions that the second applicant had been sexually abused by the first applicant.         According to the applicants, the second applicant had been led by the nursery manager to state that "games" had taken place together with the first applicant. Allegedly, the second applicant subsequently asserted that he had only played the "games" with his friend at school and never with the first applicant. Certain allegations made by the nursery manager concerning the second applicant's behaviour in the nursery were said to be based on second-hand or third-hand information from other children in the nursery.         2.    The criminal proceedings against the first applicant         On 9 January 1991 the Social Office lodged a complaint with the police suspecting the first applicant of having sexually abused the second applicant. On 21 January 1991 the first applicant was interrogated by the police on this suspicion. He was arrested and on 22 January 1991 detained, but was released on 28 January 1991. He was further ordered to refrain from contacting his son during the pre-trial investigation.         On 21 January 1991 a police officer interviewed the second applicant on videotape. Meanwhile, during a search carried out in the first applicant's home some pornographic magazines and video cassettes were seized.      On 21 January 1991 the fourth applicant was informed by social welfare officials of the suspicions against the first applicant. She was prohibited from taking the second applicant to her home. Instead he was taken to the home of the nursery manager. On 28 January 1991 he was placed in public care in a so-called "family home" (familjehem). During this period he was not allowed to see any of the other applicants.         On 4 February 1991 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Mölndal ordered that the second applicant should undergo a psychiatric examination by Ms. Monica Ekberg, a psychologist and psychotherapist specialised in child and witness psychology and whom the Court itself had called as an expert. On 23 February and 2 March 1991 Ms. Ekberg interviewed him in the "family home". In her report of 4 April 1991 Ms. Ekberg considered the boy to be credible and his account of sexual acts together with his father to be trustworthy, although with a certain reservation.         In a report of 15 May 1991 Dr. Mats Pihlgren, a psychologist of the Child and Youth Psychiatric Centre (barn- och ungdomspsykiatriska mottagningen) of Partille recommended that the second applicant should undergo individual therapy. In a report of 19 June 1991 Mr. Robert S. Jerdén, a psychologist and psychotherapist, refuted the conclusions of Ms. Ekberg of 4 April 1991 on the ground that her investigation material had been insufficient. For instance, no interviews had been carried out with part of the nursery staff and the second applicant's day carer at the time of the suspected offences. Mr. Jerdén concluded that the first applicant could not have - and had not - committed the offences with which he had been charged.         On 19 July 1991 the District Court held an oral hearing. In the prosecution's written indictment the first applicant had been charged with having sexually abused the second applicant "on several occasions during 1990, [the second applicant] being 5-6 years old". At the main hearing before the District Court the indictment was amended, the first applicant now being charged with having sexually abused the second applicant "on several occasions during the years 1987-90, [the second applicant] being 3-6 years old".         Before the District Court the prosecution invoked the videotape of the interview with the second applicant on 21 January 1991 which was apparently shown to the Court. On the prosecution's request the nursery manager was heard as a witness. Ms. Ekberg was heard as an expert. The prosecution further invoked the report of 4 April 1991 by Ms. Ekberg, a report by Mr. Pihlgren as well as a report by Dr. Margit Möller, a physician specialised in child and youth psychiatry, of the Child and Youth Psychiatric Centre. Finally, the prosecution invoked photographs of the material seized in the first applicant's home.         On the first applicant's request Mr. Jerdén was heard as an expert. The first applicant also invoked a written report submitted by Mr. Jerdén. Three staff members of the nursery, a nurse at the Child and Youth Psychiatric Clinic as well as the fourth applicant were heard as witnesses. The first applicant's request that the second applicant's day carer be heard as a witness was apparently rejected.         The District Court, by a majority, convicted the first applicant of, inter alia, sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment. It noted that the indictment had been exclusively based on information given by the second applicant and considered, inter alia, that the evidential value of the police interview with the second applicant on 21 January 1991 was diminished by leading questions. The District Court had not listened to the tape from Ms. Ekberg's first interview with the second applicant. It found no reason, however, to question Ms. Ekberg's report and further noted that in a further interview on 29 April 1991 conducted by Mr. Pihlgren the second applicant had again referred to sexual contacts between him and the first applicant. For the Court, it was beyond reasonable doubt that the first applicant had "at least on some occasions" abused the second applicant sexually. One lay judge dissented.         In his appeal the applicant challenged the accuracy of Ms. Ekberg's report from which the District Court had allegedly drawn incorrect conclusions. He further complained that Ms. Ekberg had failed to record her interviews with the second applicant and repeated his request that the second applicant's day carer at the time of the suspected offences be heard as witness.         On 22 October 1991 a report on a psychiatric examination of the first applicant was received by the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) of Western Sweden. On 30 January 1992 the Court of Appeal heard experts Ekberg and Jerdén as well as all witnesses heard by the District Court except the nurse at the Child and Youth Psychiatric Centre. The Court of Appeal also viewed the videotape of the police interview with the applicant on 21 January 1991. As further evidence the prosecution invoked a report of 11 December 1991 by Mr. Pihlgren, whom the second applicant had visited once a week as from June 1991 for therapy. Mr. Pihlgren concluded that the second applicant was entirely fixated on sexual acts, in particular between a child and its father. On the first applicant's request the second applicant's day carer at the time of the suspected offences was heard as a new witness before the Court of Appeal. She had not noticed any disturbances in the second applicant's behaviour until the middle of 1991.         In its judgment of 30 January 1992 the Court of Appeal confirmed the first applicant's conviction. It found Mr. Pihlgren's report of December 1991 not decisive, since it was impossible to distinguish between acts experienced by the second applicant and imaginative acts provoked by his therapy.         In his request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) the applicant complained that his conviction was mainly based on Ms. Ekberg's expert report, although this report had been challenged by the other expert Mr. Jerdén. Moreover, as pressure had been put on the second applicant during the interviews conducted by the nursery manager and the police officer, these interviews could not be decisive either. The first applicant further referred to the testimony by the second applicant's day carer and finally recalled the Court of Appeal's disregard of Mr. Pihlgren's report of December 1991.         On 2 June 1992 the Supreme Court refused the first applicant leave to appeal.         On 15 September 1994 the first applicant requested a re-opening of the criminal proceedings, arguing that he had not been provided with an opportunity to challenge the videotaped police interview with the second applicant by questioning him at the hearings before the District Court and the Court of Appeal. On 14 November 1994 the Supreme Court refused to re-open the case.         Before the Commission the applicants invoke a report and appendix of 5 and 21 January 1993, respectively, by Dr. Rudolf Schlaug, a specialist in general psychiatry, finding it unlikely that the second applicant has been sexually abused.         3.    The second applicant's placement in public care and the            conditions in the "family homes"         On 21 January 1991 the Chairman of the Social Council (socialnämnden) of Partille decided in pursuance of Section 6 of the 1990 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lag 1990:52 med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga; hereinafter "the 1990 Act") to place the second applicant in provisional public care. This order was revoked on 25 January 1991, when the second applicant was placed in a "family home" at Hällingsjö with the first applicant's consent in pursuance of Section 6 and 22 of the 1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620). It appears that he subsequently withdrew his consent, objecting to the manner in which the public care was being implemented.         On 14 May 1991 Dr. Möller requested the Social Council to urgently investigate whether it would be preferable to implement the public care in the third and the fourth applicant's home rather than in a "family home".         On 16 May 1991 the Social Council decided in pursuance of Section 1, subsection 2, Section 2 and Section 11 of the 1990 Act to request the second applicant's placement in compulsory public care and to maintain his placement in the "family home" at Hällingsjö.         On 20 June 1991 the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Gothenburg and Bohus held an oral hearing and granted the request with immediate effect. The Court took account of, inter alia, the indictment against the first applicant. The first applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Gothenburg.         On 25 July 1991 the Social Council decided to transfer the second applicant to another "family home" at Partille.         On 20 September 1991 the Administrative Court of Appeal struck the first applicant's appeal off its list of cases after he had withdrawn it. According to the applicants, the appeal was withdrawn after counsel had stated that it lacked any prospect of success.         On 17 October 1991 the Care Subcommittee (vårdutskottet) of the Social Council rejected the third and the fourth applicant's request under Section 25 of the Social Services Act that they be allowed to permanently care for the second applicant in their home. One member dissented, noting that the third and the fourth applicant had cared for the second applicant to up to 70 per cent of his time after he had reached the age of eight months. The investigating official of the Committee had not visited the third and the fourth applicant in their home. The third and the fourth applicant did not appeal against this decision.         On 30 December 1991 the Social Council considered that the second applicant was still in need of public care and approved a care plan for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1992. On 21 May 1992 the Social Council maintained his public care and approved a care plan for the period 1 July to 31 December 1992.         On 5 October 1992 the first applicant requested that the second applicant's care be terminated and that he be cared for by the third and the fourth applicant in their home, alternatively that the public care be implemented in the third and the fourth applicant's home. On 7 October 1992 the Social Council adjourned its decision until it had reviewed the second applicant's care need ex officio in pursuance of Section 13 of the 1990 Act.         On 17 December 1992 the Social Council maintained the second applicant's public care. The first applicant's appeal to the County Administrative Court was rejected on 13 May 1993 following an oral hearing at which the third and the fourth applicant as well as the first applicant's two sisters were heard as witnesses. The witnesses stated that following his taking into public care the second applicant's development had slowed down and he had become introvert. Furthermore he had not been properly washed and dressed by his substitute parents. On one occasion his substitute father had lost him in a crowd.         In its judgment the County Administrative Court noted a report by Mr. Pihlgren of 26 November 1992, according to which the second applicant was still in need of therapy. The other applicants opposed the therapy provided by Mr. Pihlgren. The Court considered that, while the third and the fourth applicant were generally suitable as carers, the implementation of the second applicant's public care in their home could lead to a conflict of interests, given their objections to the therapy provided as well as their belief that the first applicant had not committed the offences of which he had been convicted. The Court further found that the criticism of the conditions in the second applicant's "family home" was not corroborated by the witness statements nor by the investigation by the Social Council.         In his appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammar- rätten) of Gothenburg the first applicant criticised, inter alia, the second applicant's hygiene and clothing in the "family home".         The appeal was rejected on 15 September 1993. The Administrative Court of Appeal noted a report by Mr. Pihlgren of 23 August 1993, according to which the second applicant was still in need of therapy. The criticism of the conditions in the "family home" had been refuted by the Social Council and the second applicant's official counsel.         Leave to appeal was refused to the first applicant on 26 May 1994 by the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten).         Throughout the care proceedings the second applicant was represented by his official counsel, who supported the Social Council's view that public care away from the second applicant's biological family was still needed. According to the applicants, however, it has been the second applicant's consistent wish to live either with the first applicant or with the third and the fourth applicant.         4.    Access to the second applicant         Having been released from detention on 28 January 1991, the first applicant was prohibited by a social welfare official from taking the second applicant home. His request that the second applicant be allowed to stay with the third and the fourth applicant was also refused.         It appears from a report by officials of the Social Council of 11 April 1991 that during the first two months following the second applicant's placement in public care in the first "family home" the third and the fourth applicant visited him there at least every weekend. As from 18 March 1991 they were allowed to bring him to their home to spend the weekends there. On 18 March 1991 the first applicant visited the second applicant in the "family home" for the first time after his release. Subsequently the two met in the third and the fourth applicant's home. They were not allowed, however, to meet in private either there or elsewhere.         According to the care plan approved by the Social Council on 21 May 1992, the first applicant was to spend one weekend a month with the third and the fourth applicant and another weekend with his maternal grandparents. The first applicant and other relatives of the second applicant were allowed to visit the second applicant during those weekends. The first applicant was not allowed to see the second applicant in private on those occasions. He was, however, allowed to visit the second applicant in the "family home" for two hours every second week or a maximum of two to three visits a month. The third and the fourth applicant could further see the second applicant outside the "family home" one afternoon a month. If the second applicant's other relatives would be unable to see him during the above weekends, they could arrange other meetings either in or outside the "family home" in agreement with the substitute parents. On special holidays the second applicant was allowed to see the first applicant and other relatives subject to consultation with the social welfare officer in charge. The second applicant was to continue his weekly therapy for another year. The care plan was to be revised in six months. The first applicant was notified of his right of appeal to the County Administrative Court against the restrictions on his access to the second applicant as indicated in the care plan. He did not avail himself of this possibility. Nor has he challenged the subsequent care plans, allegedly fearing retaliation measures by the Social Council such as further access restrictions. The third and the fourth applicant have no legal standing for the purpose of requesting access.         It appears that presently the second applicant is allowed to see the first applicant for two hours every second week in the "family home". The second applicant is allowed to spend one weekend a month in the third and the fourth applicant's home and another weekend in the home of his maternal grandparents.         5.    The first and the second applicant's obligation to            participate in the costs incurred by the public care of the            second applicant         On 23 August 1991 the Guardianship Board (överförmyndarnämnden) of Partille requested that the first applicant generally authorise, in his capacity as the second applicant's guardian, the substitute parents to withdraw money from an account opened by the Board for the purpose of collecting the second applicant's national supplementary insurance (allmän tilläggspension). Subject to the Board's approval, such withdrawals could be made for purchases for the second applicant. The first applicant signed such an authority, allegedly fearing further access restrictions.         According to the applicants, the furniture in the second applicant's room in the present "family home" has de facto been paid for by the second applicant himself by virtue of the collection of his various pension benefits. The same is allegedly true for clothing and other necessities, although such expenses are to be covered by a monthly compensatory lump sum paid by the Social Council to the substitute parents.         6.    The education provided to the second applicant         At the time of his placement in public care the second applicant was entitled to attend so-called preschool (förskola) for three hours a day. After the placement the first applicant requested that the second applicant be allowed to attend such classes, but this was allegedly refused by the social authorities and the substitute parents. As from the autumn of 1991 the second applicant is attending elementary school.         7.    The courts' refusals to communicate documents to the first            applicant         On 24 September 1992 the first applicant requested access to the District Court's confidential documents in the criminal proceedings against him, including the videotape and the audiotape from the hearing. The request was granted on 16 October 1992 on condition that the material only be used in domestic proceedings. The first applicant appealed, invoking his intention to use the requested documents and material before the Convention organs. The District Court's decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 11 December 1992. On 29 October 1993, however, the Supreme Court granted the first applicant's further appeal.         8.    The courts' refusals to accept the applicants' present            counsel as the first applicant's official counsel         On 20 October 1992 the County Administrative Court refused the first applicant's request that his counsel before the Commission be appointed official counsel in proceedings with a view to having the second applicant's public care terminated. The Court considered that she did not fulfil the requirements of suitability in Section 44 of the 1972 Legal Aid Act (rättshjälpslag 1972:429). The first applicant appealed, invoking, inter alia, Article 25 para. 1 of the Convention and stated his unwillingness to be represented by any other counsel. The appeal was rejected on 2 December 1992. Leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court on 26 May 1994.   II.    Relevant domestic law         A young person may be placed in public care inter alia if, due to physical abuse, exploitation, deficiencies of care or some other circumstances in his or her home, there is a clear risk of the young person's health and development being impaired (Section 1, subsection 2 as well as Section 2 of the 1990 Act). In certain situations a provisional care order may be issued (Section 6). The care order does not imply a transfer of custody or guardianship to the Social Council, such a transfer requiring specific court decisions (see Chapters 6 and 10 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken)).         The Social Council decides how the public care of the young person is to be implemented and where he or she is to reside during the care period. The Council may consent to the young person residing in his or her own home, if this may be presumed to be the most appropriate way of arranging public care, but such care is always to commence away from home (Section 11). An appeal may be lodged against a decision of the Social Council if it has, inter alia, decided where the care of the young person is to commence, if it has transferred him or her to another home or if it has decided a question relating to continued care (Section 41). A decision not to transfer a child from a "family home" is also appealable (Government Bill 1989/90:28, p. 125).         Under the 1980 Social Services Act the Social Council may also consent to a child's placement in a private home other than that of one or both of its parents or another custodian. A refusal of such consent may be appealed to the administrative courts (Sections 25 and 73).         According to the 1981 Social Services Ordinance (social- tjänstförordning 1981:750), the Social Council shall carefully monitor the young person's development in the "family home" where it has been placed (Section 39). This monitoring shall be carried out through regular visits in the "family home" and by hearing the child. Telephone calls to the substitute parents are deemed unsatisfactory in order to comply with this responsibility (Government Bill 1989/90:28, p. 113). If care has been provided under Section 2, the Council must at least every six months review whether care is still necessary (Section 13 of the 1990 Act).          It is primarily for the parents to ensure that their child's need of access to a person who is particularly close to it is satisfied to the utmost possible extent (Chapter 6, Section 15, subsection 1 of the Parental Code). If a young person is placed in public care the Social Council shall ensure, as far as possible, his or her access to parents or other custodians. If necessary in view of the purpose of the public care the Council may decide, inter alia, how access may be exercised (Section 14 of the 1990 Act). The contacts between the child and its parents should not be completely cut off and the public care should not continue for any longer than necessary. The Council shall promote contacts between the child and others who are close to it. The Council may not restrict access between the child and its parents without there being strong reasons therefor, e.g., when the parents interfere with the care or when their personal conditions are such that they should not have access. Restrictions on access shall be lifted immediately when they are no longer needed and shall be re-examined by the Council every three months (cf. Government Bill 1989/90:28, pp. 72 et seq.).   Under Swedish law grandparents have no right of access to a grandchild.         The individual concerned shall be informed of the notes concerning him or her kept by the Social Council (Section 52 of the Social Services Act). In proceedings before the administrative courts the parties shall normally be heard in regard to submissions by another party (Section 18 of the 1971 Code of Administrative Procedure (förvaltningsprocesslag 1971:291)).   COMPLAINTS   1.     The first applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings leading to his conviction were not conducted before an impartial District Court and Court of Appeal and that the proceedings were unfair and contrary to the presumption of innocence. The following is alleged:         (a) the nursery manager's interview with the second applicant was not conducted by professionals especially trained to handle incest suspicions;         (b) the interview was carried out in the absence of the first applicant;         (c) the second applicant should have been assisted by a legal representative during the interview;         (d) the police interview with the second applicant was not attended by the first applicant himself or his lawyer;         (e) at this interview the police officer used terms which the second applicant was unfamiliar with and, moreover, asked him leading questions;         (f) following the interview the second applicant was kept by the nursery manager for seven days during which period he was not allowed to see any of the other applicants, this being likely to influence his account of the suspected sexual abuse;         (g) the audio tape from Ms. Ekberg's interview with the second applicant on 23 February 1991 was destroyed before the first applicant found out about its existence, thus preventing him from challenging its contents;         (h) Ms. Ekberg's interviews were conducted long after the second applicant had been separated from the other applicants and thus had been subjected to influence by the nursery manager;         (i) the District Court's acceptance of the amendment of the indictment at the main hearing did not afford the first applicant adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;         (j) the first applicant remained unaware of a significant number of relevant documents submitted to the District Court by the prosecution (i.e. records from interrogations with nursery staff refuting the incest suspicions, interrogation records showing discrepancies in some of the witness statements, a medical report finding no physical injuries on the second applicant, etc.);         (k) the District Court did not ex officio communicate the above documents to the first applicant for comments;         (l) the videotape from the police interview with the second applicant was viewed at the District Court's and the Court of Appeal's hearings, but the first applicant had not been provided with a copy in advance and was thus denied adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;         (m) the second applicant was not heard by the District Court;         (n) Mr. Pihlgren was partial in the criminal proceedings, since it was in his pecuniary interests to secure the first applicant's conviction in order to be able to pursue his therapy sessions with the second applicant;         (o) the first applicant's conviction was not based on any forensic or "impartial" evidence; and         (p) the first applicant was not informed about the report on his psychiatric examination until the Court of Appeal's hearing.   2.     The first applicant further complains that his conviction also violated Article 3 of the Convention in that it led to the maintaining of the second applicant's placement in public care.   3.     The first and the second applicant complain that the first applicant was prohibited from taking the second applicant home on his release from his pre-trial detention, this prohibition violating the first applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention as well both applicants' rights under Article 8.   4.     The third and the fourth applicant complain under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention about lack of a court remedy enabling them to challenge the refusal to allow them to care for the second applicant during the pre-trial investigation. The second applicant also complains that the refusal violated his rights under Article 10 of the Convention to receive information, while the third and the fourth applicant complain that the refusal violated their rights under Article 10 of the Convention to freedom of expression.   5.     The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 6 of the Convention that they were unable to refute the suspicions expressed by an official of the Social Council that they might sexually abuse the second applicant.   6.     The second applicant complains under Article 7 of the Convention that his placement in public care amounts to a punishment without any legal basis.   7.     All applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that the second applicant's public care, in particular in a "family home", has not been and is not justified, given the ability of the third and the fourth applicant to care for the second applicant, should his public care be terminated or implemented in their home. They invoke Article 8 of the Convention. In their submission of 15 March 1994 the third and the fourth applicant also complain under Article 9 of the Convention that the decisions complained of were taken in view of their opinion that the first applicant is innocent.8.    The second applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention of the conditions in the first "family home". Moreover, contrary to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, he had no court remedy whereby he could have challenged these conditions.   9.     The second applicant further complains under Article 5 of the Convention of his placement in public care in the second "family home", given the restrictions on his right to see the other applicants.   10.    The first applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that his request of 5 October 1992 for a termination of the second applicant's public care, alternatively that the care be implemented in the third and the fourth applicant's home, was not examined by a court within a reasonable time because the Social Council adjourned its examination of this request.   11.    The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 13 of the Convention about lack of a court remedy against the refusal to allow them to become the second applicant's foster parents pursuant to the Social Services Act.   12.    In the submissions of 15 March 1994 the first applicant complains under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that he has no court remedy at his disposal against the implementation of the second applicant's public care.   13.    The first and the second applicant complain under Article 8 of the Convention that the access restrictions concerning them have no basis in domestic law and are not necessary.   14.    The second, the third and the fourth applicant complain that their rights under Article 8 of the Convention have been violated in that the access restrictions concerning them have no basis in domestic law and are not necessary.   15.    The second, the third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.that they had no court remedy against the access restrictions concerning them.   16.    The second applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the restrictions on his other relatives' access to him have no basis in domestic law and are not necessary. He claims unrestricted contact with his maternal grandparents.   17.    The second applicant complains that the withdrawals from his national supplementary insurance account with a view to covering running expenses incurred on account of his placement in the "family home" violate his property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. He submits that the withdrawals constituted a de facto deprivation of his possessions to which the first applicant has been forced to consent under threat of having his access rights further restricted.   18.    The first and the second applicant complain under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that they had no court remedy at their disposal against the above-mentioned withdrawals.   19.    The second applicant complains that he was denied his right to attend preschool. He invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.   20.    The first applicant complains under Article 25 of the Convention about the refusal to accept his counsel before the Commission as his official counsel in the proceedings under the 1990 Act which he initiated in October 1992. He considers that the refusal limits his possibilities effectively to pursue his complaint with the Commission in respect of the second applicant's placement in public care.   21.    The first and the fourth applicant complain that they have been discriminated against, the first one on account of being a single parent and the fourth one on account of her Finnish origin.   22.    In the submission of 22 December 1994 the first applicant complains that except on one occasion he has not been informed by the Social Council of its notes concerning the second applicant's "family home", although this is required by Section 52 of the Social Services Act. No express Convention provision is invoked.   THE LAW   1.     The first applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that the criminal proceedings leading to his conviction were not conducted before an impartial District Court and Court of Appeal. They were, moreover, unfair and contrary to the presumption of innocence.         Article 6 (Art. 6) reads, as far as it is relevant to the present case, as follows:         "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and       obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone       is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time       by an independent and impartial tribunal established by       law. ...         2.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be       presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.         3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the       following minimum rights:       ...       b.    to have adequate time and facilities for the       preparation of his defence;         c.    to defend himself in person or through legal       assistance of his own choosing ...;         d.    to examine or have examined witnesses against him and       to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on       his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against       him; ..."         The Commission first recalls that the guarantees in paras. 2 and 3 (Art. 6-2, 6-3)are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial set forth in para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (cf. e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Unterpertinger judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 110, p. 14, para. 29). Accordingly, the Commission will have regard to them when examining the facts under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). The Commission's task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety were fair (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Stanford judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 280-A, para. 24). As a general rule, however, it is for the domestic courts to assess the evidence before them, in particular since they have the benefit of hearing witnesses and assessing their credibility (Eur. Court H.R., Klaas judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269-A, pp. 17-18, paras. 29-30). The Commission is normally not competent to deal with a complaint alleging that errors of law and fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or one of its Protocols, for instance in that a judgment has no legal justification and thereby violates a party's right to receive a fair trial (cf. No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45). It follows that it cannot examine whether or not the first applicant was guilty or innocent.         The Commission also recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it may only deal with a complaint after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules under international law. A complaint to the Commission must therefore have been made at least in substance in the proceedings before the competent domestic organs (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Cardot judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, p. 18, para. 34).         In the present case that the Commission finds that the first applicant has not shown that complaints 1(a) to (g), (i) to (n) and (p) were raised at least in substance before the domestic courts. He has not therefore exhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law in respect of these complaints. Moreover, the Commission finds no special circumstance which might have absolved this applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal. It follows that these complaints must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.         Limiting its examination of the fairness of the proceedings to the first applicant's complaints 1 (h) and (o), the Commission observes that he availed himself of his right to challenge Ms. Ekberg's report by making a request to hear another expert. There is thus no indication that there was in this respect a lack of "equality of arms" between the first applicant and the prosecution. The material submitted to the Commission does not call the findings of the domestic courts into question. In conclusion, there is no indication that the first applicant was denied a fair trial in this respect. Accordingly, as there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), these complaints must be rejected as being manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The first applicant complains that his conviction violated Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in that, as a result, the second applicant was kept in public care. The Commission finds no appearance of such a violation. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     The first and the second applicant complain that the first applicant was prohibited from taking the second applicant home on his release from his pre-trial detention, this prohibition violating the first applicant's rights under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention as well as both applicants' rights under Article 8 (Art. 8).         The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it may only deal with a complaint within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken. It observes that the prohibition complained of was issued on 28 January 1991 and became obsolete at the latest on 20 June 1991, when the County Administrative Court ordered the second applicant's placement in public care. The present application, however, was lodged on 16 November 1992, that is more than six months later. Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period. It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   4.     The third and the fourth applicant complain under Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the Convention about lack of a court remedy against the refusal to allow them to care for the second applicant during the investigation of the suspicions against the first applicant. The second applicant also complains that the refusal violated his rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention to receive information, while the third and the fourth applicant complain that the refusal violated their rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention to freedom of expression.         The Commission observes that the refusal at issue dates back to 28 January 1991. Reiterating its conclusion with regard to complaint no. 3, the Commission considers that these complaints have also been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3)of the Convention.   5.     The third and the fourth applicant complain under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that they have been unable to refute the suspicions expressed by a social welfare official that they might sexually abuse the second applicant.         Examining the complaint under Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of these applicants' rights. It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   6.     The second applicant complains under Art