CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 15 mai 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF        1. Application No. 21363/93        2. Application No. 21364/93      by Hendrik VAN MECHELEN            by Willem VENERIUS      against the Netherlands            against the Netherlands        3. Application No. 21427/93        4. Application No. 22056/93      by Johan VENERIUS                  by Antonius Amandus PRUIJMBOOM      against the Netherlands            against the Netherlands          The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 15 May 1995, the following members being present:              MM.    C.A. NØRGAARD, President                  H. DANELIUS                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  S. TRECHSEL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            Mr.    F. MARTINEZ            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 27 November 1992 by Hendrik VAN MECHELEN against the Netherlands and registered on 10 February 1993 under file No. 21363/93;        Having regard to the application introduced on 27 November 1992 by Willem VENERIUS against the Netherlands and registered on 10 February 1993 under file No. 21364/93;        Having regard to the application introduced on 8 December 1992 by Johan VENERIUS against the Netherlands and registered on 25 February 1993 under file No. 21427/93;        Having regard to the application introduced on 24 November 1992 by Antonius Amandus PRUIJMBOOM against the Netherlands and registered on 14 June 1993 under file No. 22056/93;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      1 July 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the first,      the second and the third applicant on 26 September 1994 and by      the fourth applicant on 30 September 1994;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1960, and detained in 's-Hertogenbosch. The second applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1961, and detained in Grave. Before the Commission the first and second applicants are represented by T.N.B.M. Spronken, a lawyer practising in Maastricht.        The third applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1962, and detained in Rotterdam. Before the Commission he is represented by J.M. Sjöcrona, a lawyer practising in The Hague.        The fourth applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1964, and detained in Veenhuizen. Before the Commission he is represented by G.G.J. Knoops, a lawyer practising in 's-Hertogenbosch.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.        In the course of the investigation of a series of bank robberies in the province of Noord-Brabant, the police received information about a group of five persons, amongst whom the applicants, which seemed to be involved in the robberies and which operated from two mobile home sites, where three of the four applicants lived. The police decided, apparently in the beginning of November 1988, to place these two mobile home sites under observation by a special team.        On 27 January 1989, three or four men robbed the Post Office in Oirschot and stole an amount of some 87.000 Dutch guilders. While being pursued by the police, the perpetrators fired several times at policemen and passers-by, deploying inter alia an automatic gun. At one point they ambushed the police, wounded several policemen, and got away.        The applicants were arrested in January and February 1989. They were charged in March 1989 with the robbery of 27 January 1989 and a similar robbery in October 1988. They were also charged with multiple attempts of murder or manslaughter during the pursuit after the robbery in Oirschot. The applicants have always denied all charges.        The Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of 's-Hertogenbosch convicted the applicants of multiple attempts of manslaughter and aggravated theft by judgments of 12 May 1989, 3 August 1989 and 9 October 1989, while acquitting them of the 1988 bank robbery. Each of the applicants was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The Regional Court used a number of police reports about the events in evidence. The reports contained, inter alia, statements of six anonymous police officers, who were only referred to by a number. The Regional Court also relied on the statements of six passers-by who had witnessed the robbery or parts of the pursuit.        The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of 's-Hertogenbosch. At the hearing of 2 May 1990, the defence requested to have the anonymous police officers examined before the Court. The Procurator General (Procureur-generaal) objected to this request as he felt that the anonymity of the witnesses should be preserved. He submitted that the rights of the defence would not be prejudiced if these witnesses were examined by an investigating judge (rechter- commissaris) instead of appearing before the Court.        The Court of Appeal decided to refer the case to the investigating judge in order to hear all twenty-one witnesses and to examine the objections the anonymous policemen might have against revealing their identity. The Court also considered that, given the large number of witnesses, it did not appear to be efficient at that stage of the proceedings to hear them all before the Court. On the basis of the findings of the investigating judge, the Court would then decide whether or not the witnesses were to appear before it.        In total, the investigating judge examined twenty witnesses under oath, eleven of whom remaining anonymous. The latter witnesses were examined before the investigating judge while both the defence and the Procurator General remained in different rooms, which were connected to each other and the investigating judge's cabinet through sound equipment. The anonymous witnesses were all police officers assigned to special police units, namely observation teams and arrest teams. Each of them stated before the investigating judge that, if their identity was disclosed, they could no longer function in their service. According to some statements the police authorities had actually ordered officers not to reveal their identity, although others denied this. Some of the officers added that they wanted to remain anonymous out of fear for reprisals against them or their families. They all confirmed the reports which they had previously made and which had been used in evidence by the Regional Court.        In the procès-verbal on his findings (proces verbaal van bevindingen) to the Court of Appeal of 19 November 1990, the investigating judge stated that he had endeavoured to observe the conditions for the statements of an anonymous witness to be used as evidence, as defined by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Kostovski case (judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 166). He recalled that in principle these conditions are: 1) that the statement must have been taken by a judge who knows the witness' identity; 2) that, in the procès-verbal of the hearing of the witness, this judge must have expressed his opinion as to the reliability of the witness and as to the reasons for the witness' wish to remain anonymous; and 3) that the judge must give the defence an opportunity to put questions or have questions put to the witness. The investigating judge stated in his report that, in the instant case, he was aware of the identity of each anonymous police officer acting as a witness. The minutes of the hearings contained their reasons for their anonymity, which he considered to be credible. The investigating judge felt that the anonymous witnesses were reliable, while at the same time acknowledging that the assessment of the probative value of all evidence fell within the competence of the Court of Appeal. The report indicated that both the applicants and their lawyers had been able to question the witnesses extensively, specifying that the interrogations had lasted between two and five hours per witness. Some questions remained unanswered as the witnesses feared that their answers to these questions would lead to the disclosure of either their identity or the research methods of the police. These questions were specifically mentioned in the procès-verbaux of the interrogations. The draft minutes of all hearings were circulated to the persons having attended the hearing and they had the possibility to comment on the contents.        At the hearings of 3 October and 28 November 1990 before the Court of Appeal the defence repeated its request to have the anonymous witnesses examined before the Court. The defence submitted that the questioning of the witnesses before the investigating judge had proved to be troublesome due to both technical problems and the impossibility to see how the witnesses reacted to questions posed to them. The Procurator General again objected arguing that the policemen had well- founded reasons for remaining anonymous. The Court of Appeal rejected the request by the defence, considering that this decision could not reasonably prejudice the interests of the defence, in particular as the investigating judge had interrogated the witnesses under oath, the defence had had ample opportunity to question them thoroughly, and the investigating judge had expressed a reasoned opinion as to the reliability of the witnesses examined. The Court decided that the anonymity of these witnesses was to be preserved during the trial, as the reasons for their anonymity as submitted before the investigating judge were relevant and sufficient.        On 16 and 18 January 1991 the Court of Appeal examined a number of identified persons as witnesses in respect of the facts of the case and a reconstruction of the events made on 14 November 1990 and 4 January 1991. On 21 January 1991 the Court of Appeal heard the final pleas in the case and closed its investigation.        In four separate judgments of 4 February 1991, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgments of the Regional Court in view of a different assessment of the evidence and convicted the applicants of several counts of attempted murder, and robbery, preceded and accompanied by violence against persons, committed with a view to preparing the robbery and facilitating it, and committed together with two or more others. Each of the applicants was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.        The Court of Appeal based its conviction, apart from the physical and forensic evidence, on the statements of: (1) a number of identified policemen who had been involved in the investigation; (2) five identified civilians who had witnessed parts of the events; and (3) the eleven anonymous police officers who had been involved in the events following the robbery. A procès-verbal of a telephone conversation, shortly after the bank robbery, between the wife of one of the applicants and her mother was also included in the evidence. Only some of the anonymous witnesses stated that they had recognised one or more of the suspects during the events. In response to the final submissions of the defence, the Court held:   <Dutch>      "De bezwaren van de door de rechter-commissaris onder nummer      gehoorde getuigen om anoniem te blijven leveren voor het hof      voldoende argumenten op om die anonimiteit te handhaven. Het bij      pleidooi door de raadsman gedane verzoek om die getuigen alsnog      ter terechtzitting te horen wordt door het hof afgewezen, ook      voor het geval dat verzoek inhoudt dat zulks onder vermomming van      die getuigen zou kunnen plaatshebben, nu herkenning van die      getuigen op de openbare terechtzitting niet is uit te sluiten.      Met bedoelde argumenten om de anonimiteit van de getuigen te      handhaven heeft het hof met name het oog op de persoonlijke      veiligheid van de getuigen en hun gezinsleden, waaraan niet      afdoet dat die getuigen nog niet zijn bedreigd. Zoals reeds      verwoord in de interlocutoire beslissing van het hof d.d. 3      oktober 1990 gaat het in casu immers om buitengewoon ernstige      misdrijven, waarbij het sub 1 bewezenverklaarde is begaan om      herkenning en aanhouding door de politie te ontlopen en waarbij      de daders bereid zijn geweest een aantal mensenlevens op te      offeren. Onder die omstandigheden zijn de risico's die de onder      nummer gehoorde getuigen en hun familieleden lopen, indien die      getuigen uit de anonimiteit treden, c.q. hun anonimiteit niet      voldoende is gewaarborgd, van doorslaggevende aard.        Voorzover anonieme getuigen geweigerd hebben antwoord te geven      op bepaalde vragen is dit geschied om geen onderzoeksmethode      prijs te geven of om de persoonlijke anonimiteit of die van      andere bij de zaak betrokken opsporingsambtenaren te waarborgen.      Ook het hof zou deze gronden hebben gerespecteerd in het geval      de getuigen ter terechtzitting zouden zijn gehoord.      Bij zijn beslissing heeft het hof tevens in aanmerking genomen      dat door de raadsman niet, althans onvoldoende, is aangegeven      welke vragen - die nog niet aan de getuigen bij de rechter-      commissaris zijn gesteld - hij alsnog, naar aanleiding van het      verhoor van de getuigen ter terechtzitting in hoger beroep, aan      de anonieme getuigen zou willen stellen."   <Translation>      "The reasons for remaining anonymous advanced by those witnesses      heard under a number by the investigating judge, give the Court      of Appeal enough arguments to maintain their anonymity. The      request made by counsel in his final pleadings to have these      witnesses examined before the Court is rejected, also if the      request would aim at the hearing of these witnesses in disguise,      since recognition of the witnesses at the public hearing cannot      be excluded.      When referring to the arguments to maintain the anonymity of the      witnesses, the Court has paid special attention to the personal      security of the witnesses and their family members, a      consideration which is valid even though these witnesses have not      yet been threatened. As already stated in the Court's      interlocutory decision of 3 October 1990, the present case      involves exceptionally serious offences, of which the acts      established under (1) have been committed to avoid recognition      and arrest by the police while the offenders were prepared to      sacrifice a number of human lives. What is decisive under these      circumstances are the risks incumbent upon the witnesses heard      under a number and their family members if these witnesses give      up their anonymity or if their anonymity is insufficiently      guaranteed.        Insofar as the anonymous witnesses have refused to answer certain      questions, this has been done in order not to disclose an      investigation method or in order to safeguard the personal      anonymity or the personal anonymity of other investigation      officers involved in the case.      Also the Court of Appeal would have respected these grounds in      case the witnesses would have been examined before it.      In its decision the Court has also taken into account that      counsel has not, in any event insufficiently, indicated which      questions - which so far have not been put to the witnesses      before the investigating judge - he still wishes to put to the      anonymous witnesses following the examination of witnesses at the      hearing on appeal."        After having fully quoted the investigating judge's report on the hearings of the anonymous witnesses, the Court of Appeal found that it was not in conflict with Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the Convention to use their statements in evidence.         A complaint of the fourth applicant that in their investigation the police had used a book containing a photograph of him unlawfully obtained via the municipal or provincial driving licence or passport administration was also rejected by the Court of Appeal.        The applicants appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court. They argued, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal, contrary to Article 6 paras. 1 and   3 (d) of the Convention, had used the statements of the anonymous witnesses in evidence to a decisive extent. They referred to the case-law of the European Court and Commission of Human Rights relating to anonymous witnesses and put particular emphasis on the Windisch judgment (27 August 1990, Series A vol. 186). The applicants argued that the criteria for the use of the statements of an anonymous witness in evidence, as defined by the Supreme Court following the Kostovski judgment of 20 November 1989 of the European Court, were not in conformity with the Convention. In support of this contention, they argued that the judges sitting in the trial court were prevented from forming themselves an opinion on the reliability of the witnesses and their statements; they were fully dependent on the assessment of the investigating judge. Furthermore, the defence was restricted as the witnesses remained anonymous and refused to answer certain questions. They further pointed in this respect to the fact that those witnesses, who had not remained anonymous, had not been threatened, which implied that the fear of reprisals among the anonymous witnesses had been exaggerated. The presumption that the police officers could no longer function in their service if their identity was disclosed was an insufficient reason to maintain their anonymity. The applicants finally argued that the fact that the anonymous witnesses were police officers did not in itself make their statements more reliable.        The fourth applicant repeated his complaint that in their investigation the police had used a book containing an unlawfully obtained photograph of him.        The Supreme Court rejected the appeal in four separate judgments on 9 June 1992. It found that the Court of Appeal had applied the correct criteria in its decision to maintain the anonymity of the eleven witnesses and in its subsequent decision to admit their statements in evidence. The Supreme Court found that the Convention provisions relied upon by the applicants had not been violated. It held, inter alia:   <Dutch>      "In aanmerking genomen      (1)    dat, zoals het Hof heeft vastgesteld, de anoniem gebleven      opsporingsambtenaren onder ede onderscheidenlijk belofte zijn      gehoord door de Rechter-Commissaris, die van hun onderscheiden-      lijke identiteit op de hoogte was, die gemotiveerd heeft doen      blijken van zijn oordeel omtrent hun betrouwbaarheid en omtrent      de redenen voor hun wens om anoniem te blijven, en die voorts de      verdachte en zijn raadsman in de gelegenheid heeft gesteld om aan      die opsporingsambtenaren vragen te stellen, van welke      gelegenheiduitvoerig gebruik is gemaakt zodat ook de verdediging      het waarheidsgehalte van de afgelegde verklaringen heeft kunnen      toetsen en bestrijden; en      (2)    het door het Hof kennelijk met het oog op de      betrouwbaarheid van de door de anonymi afgelegde verklaringen      vastgesteld verband tussen die verklaringen onderling en dat      tussen de verklaringen van de anonymi enerzijds en het niet      anonieme bewijsmateriaal anderzijds;      heeft het Hof zonder schending van het recht van de verdachte op      een eerlijk proces zoals bedoeld in de verdragsbepalingen die in      het middel als geschonden worden aangehaald de processen-verbaal      houdende de verklaringen van de anoniem gebleven opsporings-      ambtenaren voor het bewijs kunnen bezigen. Immers de hiervoren      onder (1) opgesomde, door het Hof vastgestelde, omstandigheden      vormen een voldoende tegenwicht tegen het nadeel dat de verdachte      zou hebben kunnen ondervinden als gevolg van de omstandigheid dat      de anoniem gebleven opsporingsambtenaren niet ter terechtzitting      zijn gehoord."   <Translation>      "Considering      (1)    that, as established by the Court of Appeal, the      investigating officers, who remained anonymous, were examined      under oath or affirmation by the investigating judge, who was      aware of their respective identities, who stated, giving reasons,      his opinion as regards their reliability and as regards the      reasons for their wish to remain anonymous, and who further gave      the accused and his counsel the opportunity to question those      investigating officers, of which opportunity extensive use has      been made so that also the defence was enabled to test and      challenge the veracity of the statements made; and      (2)    the connection established by the Court of Appeal -      apparently for the purpose of testing the reliability of the      statements made by the anonymous persons - between those      statements themselves and between those statements on the one      hand and the non-anonymous evidence on the other hand;      the Court of Appeal could use in evidence the procès-verbaux      containing the statements of the investigating officers, who      remained anonymous, without violating the suspect's right to a      fair trial within the meaning of the provisions of the Convention      which are mentioned in the means of cassation as being violated.      The circumstances referred to under (1), as established by the      Court of Appeal, form a sufficient counterbalance against the      disadvantage the suspect may have suffered as a result of the      fact that the investigating officers, who remained anonymous,      were not examined at a hearing before the trial court."        The fourth applicant's separate complaint under Article 8 of the Convention was also rejected.        On 1 February 1994 the Act on the Protection of Witnesses (Wet Getuigenbescherming) entered into force, leading to an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the amended Code of Criminal Procedure, the judicial authorities may allow a witness to remain anonymous in criminal proceedings concerning offences which seriously rock the legal order. In cases where a witness or another person feels threatened if a statement would be made, and where there are reasonable grounds for the assumption that a statement by such a witness could give rise to fear for the life, the health or safety or the disruption of the family life or the social-economic existence of that witness or of another person, and where this witness has stated not to be willing to make a statement in view of such fears, the witness may be allowed to remain anonymous. The procedure to be respected as regards the statements by anonymous persons is, inter alia, based on the criteria established in the Supreme Court's case-law following the European Court's judgment of 20 November 1989 in the case of Kostovski against the Netherlands (cf. Hoge Raad, judgment of 2 July 1990, N.J. 1990, no. 692). A judge may not convict a person on the sole basis of statements from anonymous persons.   COMPLAINTS   1.    Before the Commission, the applicants repeat their submissions to the Supreme Court. They claim that the domestic courts violated Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention by using the statements of the anonymous witnesses as conclusive evidence and that the defence rights in respect of these witnesses were unacceptably restricted.   2.    The fourth applicant also complains that the police used in their investigations a book containing a photograph of him, unlawfully obtained from the municipal or provincial driving licence or passport administration. He claims that this interferes with his right to respect for his private life as protected by Article 8 para. 1 of the Convention and that the interference does not satisfy the requirements of Article 8 para. 2.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The first and second applications were introduced on 27 November 1992 and registered on 10 February 1993. The third application was introduced on 8 December 1992 and registered on 25 February 1993. The fourth application was introduced on 24 November 1992 and registered on 14 June 1993.        On 11 April 1994 the Commission decided to join the four applications and to communicate them to the respondent Government and invite the Government to submit their observations on the admissibility and merits of the applications.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 1 July 1994.   The first, second and third applicants replied on 26 September 1994. The fourth applicant replied on 30 September 1994.        On 21 October 1994 the Commission granted the first, second and third applicants legal aid.   THE LAW   1.    The applicants claim that the domestic courts violated Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-d) of the Convention by using the statements of the anonymous witnesses as conclusive evidence, since the defence rights in respect of these witnesses were unacceptably restricted.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:        "1.    In the determination of (...) any criminal charge against      him, everyone is entitled to a fair (...) hearing (...) by a      (...) tribunal established by law. (...).        (...)        3.     Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following      minimum rights:      (...)            d.     to examine or have examined witnesses against him and      to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his      behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;      (...)."        The Government submit, referring to the European Court's findings in the cases of Kostovski (judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 166) and Lüdi (judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238) as regards the use in evidence of statements made by anonymous persons, that the proceedings at issue were in conformity with the principles formulated by the European Court in those two judgments. They are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings in the present case complied with the requirements of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-d) of the Convention.        In the Government's opinion, the use made of the statements by the anonymous witnesses in the present case fully complied with the conditions laid down in the Supreme Court's case-law following the European Court's judgment in the Kostovski case (loc. cit.). The statements were taken down by a judge, i.e. the investigating judge, who knew the identity of the witnesses, who expressed in the procès- verbal on his findings his opinion, furnished with reasons, in respect of the witnesses' justification for wishing to remain anonymous and these witnesses' reliability, and who provided the defence with ample opportunity to question each of the witnesses, who were examined under oath or affirmation.        Furthermore, the Government point out that, like the investigating judge, the Court of Appeal accepted the reasons for the anonymous witnesses' wish to remain anonymous and the fact that certain questions put to these persons remained unanswered, whereas in its decision on the request of the defence to have these witnesses examined before the Court of Appeal, it noted that the defence had amply availed itself of the opportunity to question the anonymous witnesses during their examination before the investigating judge, and considered that the defence had failed to indicate with sufficient clarity, which questions - which had not yet been put to these witnesses in the course of their examination before the investigating judge - it would wish to put to the anonymous witnesses before the Court of Appeal.        Finally, the Government submit that neither Dutch law nor the Convention acknowledges an unrestricted right to question witnesses, and that the applicants were not convicted on the sole basis of statements by anonymous witnesses, but also on the basis of statements made by identified witnesses and physical evidence.        The applicants submit that the judicial authorities dealing with the applicants' cases unjustly held that preservation of the witnesses' anonymity was justified. They submit that the fear of reprisals was not plausible in the absence of any concrete evidence of actual threats or anything which would justify fear of reprisals.        The applicants maintain that they did not receive a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as they were denied an essential element of a fair trial, namely the cross- examination before the trial court of witnesses who give incriminating evidence. The applicants submit that they were not given an adequate opportunity by the investigating judge to test the reliability of the anonymous witnesses. The mere existence of an opportunity in some way to question witnesses does not necessarily mean that the opportunity is adequate. It was not adequate in their respective cases in view of the way the examination before the investigating judge took place, the fact that important questions remained unanswered and that the witnesses could not be observed during their examination.        The applicants consider that the principle of "immediacy" (onmiddellijkheidsbeginsel), i.e. the principle according to which the evidence should be produced and taken before the trial court itself, has been violated in respect of the anonymous witnesses' statements. The applicants submit that they were denied the opportunity to have the trial court form its own opinion of the reliability of the evidence given, which is a crucial flaw given that their convictions were mainly based on anonymous evidence. They argue that, even if it would have been necessary to hear witnesses anonymously, certain alternative measures could have been taken, such as hearing witnesses in camera, or in the absence of the accused.        After a preliminary examination in the light of all the parties' submissions, the Commission considers that this part of the application raises serious questions of fact and of law which require an examination of the merits. This part of the application cannot, therefore, be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for inadmissibility have been established.   2.    The fourth applicant complains that the police used in their investigations a book containing an unlawfully obtained photograph of him. He claims that this interfered with his right to respect for his private life as protected by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention and that the interference did not satisfy the requirements of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."        The Commission notes that the photograph at issue was not taken in a way which constitutes an intrusion upon the applicant's privacy, that the photograph was kept in official archives since it had been provided voluntarily by the applicant in connection with an application for a passport or a driving licence, and that the police had obtained and used the photograph solely for the identification of one of the authors of the robbery in the context of a judicial investigation. There is no indication that the photograph at issue has been made available to the general public or used for any other purpose.        In view of these elements the Commission finds that the use of the fourth applicant's photograph does not amount to an interference with his private life within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (cf. No. 20524/92, Dec. 29.11.93, Doorson v. the Netherlands, Comm. Report 11.10.94, Appendix II).        It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,      the applicants' complaint under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d)      (Art. 6-1, 6-3-d) of the Convention on the use in evidence of      statements of anonymous persons;        and, unanimously,        DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.   Secretary to the Commission        President of the Commission          (H.C. KRÜGER)                     (C.A. NØRGAARD)