CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 28 juin 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 23546/94                       by M. L.                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 28 June 1995, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 14 September 1992 by M. L. against the United Kingdom and registered on 28 February 1994 under file No. 23546/94;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a British citizen residing in Lancashire and he was born in 1952. He is represented before the Commission by Felix Moss, a solicitor practising in Lancashire.        The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.        The applicant is the father of five children, M (a boy born 16 March 1987), J (a girl born 29 April 1988), R (a boy born 15 September 1989), B (a boy born 25 August 1992) and JL (a boy born 15 October 1994).        The applicant's wife first came to the attention of social services in 1985 when she was a patient in a hospital in Preston and there was concern about her erratic behaviour.        On 18 March 1987 (two days after M's birth) a case conference was held to discuss the applicant's wife's ability to care for M and concluded that there was no evidence of risk to the child. During subsequent contacts with a health visitor the applicant denied that he was M's father. The health visitor noticed developmental delays in M and referred the family to social services. Records indicate that the applicant repeatedly requested financial assistance from social services and complained about his wife's "bizarre" behaviour. The applicant and his wife separated for a while about this time.        Following a case meeting, held on 15 April 1988 at the request of a health visitor from a Lancashire hospital, the family was given financial assistance and M was given a place at a day nursery.        J was born on 29 April 1988. A case conference was held on 29 May 1988 where anxiety was expressed regarding J's care as she was losing weight and not thriving. The applicant and his wife both subsequently alleged that each other was at fault, the applicant claiming that his wife force fed J and could not cope, while the applicant's wife claimed that the applicant constantly criticised her. The applicant then went to court in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain custody of the children in case of a separation.        On 17 May 1988 J was admitted to hospital in light of her falling weight. Due to unfit living conditions in the family home M and J were received into voluntary care but were discharged from care on 8 July 1988. The applicant and his wife were married on 9 July 1988.        On 19 July 1988 J was re-admitted to hospital but was subsequently discharged by the applicant's wife against medical advice. On 18 August 1988 J was again admitted to hospital. She subsequently gained weight, was discharged, lost weight and was readmitted on 25 August 1988 where she remained for a thorough assessment. Though the applicant and his wife did not cooperate with social services to enable an assessment to be carried out, at the next case conference it was decided that J could go home. After further case conferences in December 1988 and February 1989 the children's names were removed from the risk register because of satisfactory progress.        By 1 March 1989 the applicant and his wife had again separated. On 10 March 1989 social services closed the family's file but input on the children's progress was to be received from the day nursery which both children were attending.        R was born on 15 September 1989. The applicant again claims that his wife could not cope and would not let him help. On 26 October 1989 the applicant's wife turned up at her solicitor's office at 3.00pm claiming that she had not fed R since the morning as she had no money. The applicant's wife then went to live in a homeless unit for a while and the applicant requested social services to take the children into care as his wife could not look after them.        M and J continued to attend the day nursery. The nursery staff noted that M's behaviour was disruptive and dangerous for the other children. It was also reported that he had begun to exhibit "precocious sexual awareness and overtly sexual behaviour and actions". J was reported as a happy child although concern was expressed when she sustained a suspected fractured collar bone and she was not taken for medical attention for several days. In March 1991 she too was also reported as exhibiting sexual behaviour and had alleged that she was sexually abused by her father.        Interviews by social services with M and J followed. During his interview M repeated the sexual behaviour demonstrated previously though J revealed little of note. Place of Safety Orders were subsequently obtained and in April 1991 M was placed in Easington Walk Children's Home (his behaviour and language being sufficiently anti- social as to prevent his placing in foster care) and J and R were placed with foster parents. Neither of these three children have since been returned to their parents.        On 29 April 1991 J made further allegations of sexual abuse to the day nursery staff and on 30 April 1991 the applicant made allegations in this respect against his wife. On 2 May 1991 M and J were again interviewed by social services and J gave a demonstration of moving in a sexual manner.        On 10 May 1991 wardship proceedings were commenced by Lancashire County Council ("the local authority") in the Family Division of the High Court (Preston District Registry), pursuant to that court's inherent jurisdiction to make a child a ward of court.        On 13 May 1991 M was reported as having referred to games he had played with his father of a sexual nature and on 16 May 1991 social services received information regarding a previous allegation of child abuse involving the applicant.        On 16 May 1991 Mr. Justice Hollings, having heard counsel for all parties involved, made the three children (M, J and R) wards of court. Interim care and control of the children was to remain vested in the local authority which was given leave to continue the existing placements of the children. The applicant and his wife were to have supervised access to the children twice a week for two hours. Any further reports or affidavits were to be served by the local authority within seven days and the matter was relisted for hearing on 23 May 1991.        At a directions hearing in or around this time, a social worker apologised to the court as it had recently come to the attention of the local authority that the same solicitors had been instructed by the applicant's wife and the local authority for a couple of months. The applicant claims that the local authority had been previously aware of this and it appears that the applicant's wife then changed solicitors.        On 23 May 1991 Mr Justice Hollings, having heard Counsel for all parties, continued the wardship, care and access orders. The parties were ordered to instruct Clinical Psychologists. The local authority was given leave to have the wards examined by a Child Psychologist and to carry out a family assessment. Time limits were set for the filing of further affidavits by the parties.        During June and July 1991 M and J were assessed by a Clinical Psychologist and the subsequent report (dated 24 January 1992) was inconclusive as to the allegations of sexual abuse.        During September and October 1991 the applicant and his wife underwent a family assessment by personnel from social services and from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. The assessors' conclusions, reported in a Family Assessment Report dated 14 February 1992, stated that working with the couple proved extremely difficult because of their difficulties in remembering and understanding issues. The information gained from them did not make sense to the assessors and appeared untrue. It was unclear to the assessors whether the applicant and his wife lived in fantasy worlds or were simply trying to impress them. In conclusion, the assessors were unable to comment firmly on the parenting abilities of the applicant and his wife due to the difficulties encountered during the sessions with them.        On 29 October 1991, the local authority applied, on an ex-parte basis, for leave to place M with the foster parents who at the time also cared for R and J, basing the application on the affidavit evidence of the key social worker in the case which, inter alia, noted M's dramatic improvement in care and recommended such placement. On 30 October 1991 District Judge Walker of the Family Division of the High Court (Preston District Registry), granted the local authority's application on an interim basis. This order was confirmed on 6 November 1991 by District Judge Walker having heard the solicitors for the parties. The existing access arrangements (twice weekly at the day nursery) were to continue until further order.        On 15 January 1992 Judge Walker, having heard the parties solicitors, ordered the filing of further affidavits by the parties and the setting down of the case for hearing before a judge of the Family Division of the High Court. The applicant filed an affidavit in January 1992. Further directions were given by Judge Walker on 20 May 1992 for the filing of affidavits by 22 May 1992.        On 22 May 1992 numerous reports and assessments of the parents and the children were filed in court. These included the Psychologist's report dated 24 January 1992, the Family Assessment Report dated 14 February 1992 together with affidavits of two social workers (involved, inter alia, in supervising the access visits) and of the key social worker. The latter affidavits were negative as regards the parenting abilities of the applicant and his wife.        As a result of the concerns expressed in the above-mentioned affidavits, a planning meeting was held on 17 June 1992 between the key and assistant social workers of the local authority and the authors of the Family Assessment Report to discuss the future plans for the children. It was agreed at this meeting that a permanent home for the children away from their parents was to be recommended. It was noted that the services of a Court Welfare Officer or a Guardian ad litem would be required by the court to assist it in its decision in this respect. Further affidavits were filed by the key social worker and three health visitors (on 18 September 1992) requesting the appointment of a Guardian ad litem and recommending a permanent home for the children away from their parents.        On 2 July 1992 a further case conference was held because the applicant's wife was now expecting a fourth child. It was decided that a placement of the applicant, his wife and the new baby in a supervised residential setting would provide an additional opportunity to fully assess the parenting skills of the applicant and his wife. B was born on 25 August 1992. Having unsuccessfully attempted supervision at home, on 24 September 1992 the local authority admitted the applicant, his wife and B to Cheshire House for a 12 week assessment.        However, in view of the applicant's and his wife's threats to leave Cheshire House, the local authority made an application for a care order for B. On 20 October 1992 the Hyndburn Magistrates Court made an interim care order under the Children Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act") in relation to B. The following day the applicant left Cheshire House.        The applicant subsequently attempted to reconcile with his wife but on 10 November 1992 the applicant's wife filed for divorce claiming that the applicant kept the family unnecessarily and continuously short of money, that he failed to show her emotional support and was absent from the family home for periods of time without explanation.        On 10 November 1992 Mr Justice Ewbank in the Family Division of the High Court (Preston District Registry), having heard Counsel for all parties, declared the wardship discharged by operation of law (due to the coming into force of the 1989 Act). As regards the three older children, he declared a deemed care order to be in operation since 13 October 1992 pursuant to the 1989 Act. In order to speedily and definitively deal with the question of those three children's future care under the 1989 Act, the applicant's wife was requested to undertake to the court to issue proceedings for residence orders under that Act. All documentation filed with the court to date was to be used in the subsequent proceedings. An order was made for the appointment of a Guardian ad litem.        The applicant's wife lodged the applications for residence orders in relation to the three older children on 10 November 1992 (her detailed supporting affidavit was filed later).        On 25 and 27 November 1992 the applicant's wife threatened suicide and on 27 November 1992 she requested foster care for B as she could no longer cope. The applicant's wife also requested psychological and psychiatric assessments.        On 9 December 1992 the applicant applied for the family and divorce proceedings to be transferred outside of Lancashire as he claimed he could not get a fair hearing in Lancashire due, inter alia, to the alleged prejudice of social services.        On 11 December 1992 a report, detailing recent developments mainly in relation to B, was filed in court by Ms. Wright of social services. That report noted that on the evidence to date, the applicant had little commitment to B and that it would be of no benefit to continue his access visits with B. This report also referenced the applicant's wife's disorganisation, emotional instability, her wavering commitment to B, her lack of attention to safety, her tendency towards aggression and her mood swings and concluded that the risks of leaving B in the sole care of the applicant's wife would be too great. The report recommended a care order and placement of B with foster parents.        On 15 December 1992 the Accrington Magistrates Court extended the interim care order in favour of the local authority in relation to B until 12 January 1993 and B was placed with foster parents.        On 23 December 1992 a District Judge of Blackburn County Court consolidated all outstanding applications concerning the family, ordered the applicant and his wife to file further affidavits within fourteen days and adjourned the matter to January 1993 for further directions. The applicant's wife's affidavit (dated December 1992, signed by her and submitted by the applicant to the Commission) repeated detailed allegations of sexual abuse of the children by the applicant (made previously to the local authority and social services).        On 12 January 1993 a District Justice at Blackburn County Court, inter alia, continued the interim care order in relation to B, ordered that the consolidated proceedings be transferred to the High Court (insofar as they were not already in that court), and declared, on an interim basis, that parental access continue on a once a week basis. The matter was adjourned until February 1993 for further directions.        The applicant completed his own detailed statement on 9 February 1993 and in February 1993 the District Judge at Blackburn County Court made further interim orders and directions.        Subsequently, further detailed reports dated 17 and 22 February 1993 from the Practice Manager (Child Care) of social services and from social workers were filed in court. As regards the three oldest children, the reports recommended, inter alia, long term placement together without parental access. As regards B the reports recommended adoption on his own, without parental access, with indirect and infrequent access to his siblings and with one relinquishment access session for each parent.        On 19 March 1993 the Guardian ad litem finalised her detailed report on the family. She had conducted personal interviews with, inter alia, the applicant, his wife, the three oldest children, numerous social workers, day nursery nurses, health visitors and teachers. She read family case files from 1988 and the numerous statements made in the course of the proceedings by the family and others. As regards the applicant the Guardian reported that the applicant wanted to be totally reconciled with his wife and to have his four children live with them. As regards the applicant's wife the Guardian reported her thoughts disordered, her short-term memory weak and that she did not appear to be willing to talk about her children. The applicant's wife had moved back in with the applicant but only, according to his wife, as a temporary measure. The applicant's wife wanted the children back but to stay with her only.        According to the Guardian, R expressed reluctance to attend access visits with his parents. M and J indicated their wish to continue living with their foster parents. As regards the effects of any future change, it was noted that B was still very young. A change from foster parents was not to be recommended in relation to R. J had more of a bond with her parents as she was older and thus a permanent move to foster parents would have to be handled carefully. M was a more difficult case though he appeared to have developed a strong sense of trust in his foster parents.        The report went on to assess in great detail the relevant characteristics of the children and any harm suffered to date (including summarising the children's references to inappropriate sexual behaviour of the applicant and the applicant's wife's specific charges against the applicant in this respect). The report also dealt with the parents capabilities, the possible orders available to the court, the probable impact of such orders on the children and the care plan recommended by social services. The Guardian recommended that the care orders remain in relation to each child and that the local authority should be given the power to immediately refuse access to B, and to refuse access to the three older children after six months during which period the access visits should gradually diminish.        The consolidated proceedings were heard by Judge Brown of the High Court at Preston on 12-15 July 1993. Two preliminary matters arose at the hearing. In the first place, it emerged that the local authority was represented at the hearing by a barrister who had represented the applicant's wife at a previous directions hearing. Having heard the submissions of the parties in this respect the judge found that the matter was not serious enough to warrant adjourning the hearing. The second matter related to the content of the report of Ms. Wright which was filed on 11 December 1992. The judge found that her statement consisted of the evidence of three other social workers involved in the case and, while it was confirmed by Ms. Wright that she had verified the information contained therein with those three social workers, that this manner of presenting evidence was misleading and that in future individual affidavits should be filed.        On 15 July 1993 judgment was delivered.        As regards the applications for residence orders and the care order in relation to B, Judge Brown noted that the history of the family was one of extreme dysfunction, which situation was not likely to change in the future. The court noted that there was still some doubt as to the relationship between the applicant and his wife, that when the applicant and his wife were together it was harmful for the children but when they were apart the applicant's wife could not cope with the children. It was noted that the applicant had been of little assistance to his wife in this respect. The applicant's presence in the home was expressed by the court as being "in doubt" in light of the allegations as to his sexual behaviour and, though not making any particular findings in this respect, it was noted that the parents had failed to protect the children from such matters. The judge noted specifically that if B were to be returned to his parents, he would risk emotional harm.        Therefore, the applications for residence orders in relation to the three older children were dismissed (so that they were to remain in the care of the local authority) and it was ordered that B was also to remain in the care of the local authority.        As regards future access, the judge gave the local authority permission to refuse to allow the applicant and his wife continued access to B because, in the judge's view, there was no benefit in access with the parents and to continue access would prejudice the chance of B's future adoption. The local authority was also given permission to refuse to allow the applicant and his wife access in the future to the three older children. The judge noted in this respect that to continue access with those children was not desirable as it would disrupt the placement process and the quality of access in the past had not been good. However, the judge ordered that one more access visit be allowed with B and that the parents were to wind down access with the three older children over the space of three months at which stage all access would cease. In reaching his conclusions on the access issues the judge relied on the report of the Guardian ad litem.        The applicant and his wife were legally aided and represented throughout all of the proceedings concerning the care of the children.        On 15 October 1994 the applicant's wife gave birth to JL and JL was immediately taken into care pursuant to an Emergency Protection Order (under the 1989 Act). The applicant is to file a separate application before the Commission in relation to this child.        The applicant and his wife continue to share a home though it is not clear whether the divorce proceedings have been withdrawn.   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains that the proceedings in relation to his children were unfair. In this respect he alleges a material conflict of interest in that between April and June 1991 the same solicitor or firm of solicitors acted for the local authority and his wife and that a barrister, who had acted for his wife at a directions hearing, represented the local authority at the hearing in July 1993. The applicant also complains about a statement by Ms. Wright, social worker, which was presented to the court as her own when in fact it consisted of the evidence of three other social workers.   2.    The applicant also complains of an interference with his family life under Article 8 of the Convention in relation to the taking into care of his children, the lack of parental access and the length of the proceedings by which the question of the children's care was resolved.        He further complains under Article 8 of the Convention about, inter alia, the use of baby monitors in the living area in Cheshire house to monitor the applicant and his wife, the inappropriate handling of the case by social services and the local authority (in that they allegedly failed to adhere to "Government Guidelines", changed the dates and times of the access visits and treated M negligently while in care), a conspiracy between social services and the local authority to ensure his children remained in care, social services and the local authority taking advantage of his wife due to her "personality flaw" and the authorities pressurising his wife to issue divorce proceedings.        In addition, he complains that the Area Team Manager (who chaired all the case conferences) was not independent and that there was no independent complaints body or person within social services, that the children were denied the right to their own religion because social workers did not endeavour to bring up the children in the applicant's chosen religion, that a student attended a case conference against his wishes and that he was never informed, while in Cheshire House, that his wife was to have a hysterectomy.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant argues that the proceedings were unfair because of two alleged material irregularities namely, an alleged conflict of interest on the part of a barrister and a solicitor (or a firm of solicitors) together with the use by the court of Ms. Wright's statement.        The Commission has examined these complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which, insofar as is relevant, reads as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is      entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time      by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."        The Commission considers, in light of previous case-law (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, pp. 32-35, paras. 72-79, and H. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120, p. 58, paras. 68- 69), that these proceedings involved the determination of the applicant's "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        Insofar as the applicant complains about the decisions of the courts specifically on the submissions made in relation to these two allegations or about the decision of Judge Brown of 15 July 1993 in view of those alleged irregularities, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Schenk judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, para. 45).        The Commission notes that the local authority raised in court the matter of the alleged conflict of interest (on the part of the solicitor or firm of solicitors in question) some time after 25 April 1991, indicating that the matter had just come to its attention and apologising for the oversight. At the directions hearing in question the court accepted the local authority's apology. It is also noted that these allegations as to a conflict of interest related to April to June 1991 which was at the beginning of the proceedings. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the applicant was legally represented at the numerous hearings after this conflict issue was first raised in court and thus he had every opportunity to make representations, to provide evidence and to make submissions as to the impact of this alleged conflict of interest to the court.        As regards the conflict of interest allegation in relation to the barrister, the Commission recalls that the barrister in question represented the applicant's wife at one directions hearing only and further that the applicant was represented at the hearing in July 1993 when Judge Brown found that this matter was not sufficiently serious to warrant adjourning the hearing.        As regards the use by the court of the evidence of Ms. Wright, it is noted that Ms. Wright verified the information in the statement with the other social workers involved prior to signing the statement and that it is not alleged by the applicant that the information contained in the report was untrue or inaccurate. In these respects, it is further recalled that it is not for the Commission to re-assess the factual or legal elements of the case before the domestic courts, given that the decisions taken had a basis in law and were based (as noted above in respect of the specific court rulings on these allegations and below as regards the judgment of Judge Brown on 15 July 1993 on relevant and sufficient reasons (cf., for example, Eur. Court H.R., Barbera, Messegué and Jabardo judgment of 6 December 1988, Series A no. 146, p. 31, para. 68).        In light of these considerations, the Commission finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the requirement of a fair hearing. This complaint of the applicant is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant complains under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention about:   (a) the taking into care of his children without, in the end, any parental access; and   (b) the length of the proceedings.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, insofar as is relevant, reads as follows:        "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family      life....        2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with the      exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the      law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."   (a)   The Commission considers that the taking into care of the applicant's children, initially with and subsequently without parental access, constituted an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family life as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention and notes that these matters were finally decided by the High Court on 15 July 1993. In this respect, the Commission recalls that the applicant's three older children have been in care since April 1991 and that B. has been with foster parents since December 1992. The applicant has not had access to the three older children since October 1993 or to B. since the final access visit following the final decision of the High Court.        The Commission has consequently examined whether this interference was justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention namely, whether the interference is "in accordance with the law",   pursues one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 and whether it is "necessary in a democratic society" for one or more of those aims.        As regards the first two conditions, the Commission notes that the courts' interim decisions on care and parental access (initially made pursuant to the Family Division of the High Court's inherent wardship jurisdiction and subsequently pursuant to the 1989 Act) were conclusively dealt with and confirmed by the High Court (under the 1989 Act) on 15 July 1993. The Commission also notes that the courts' decisions on wardship, care and access were made on the basis of the evidence produced on an ongoing basis as to the parents' inability to care for their children and in the best interests of the children. The Commission therefore finds that the decisions of the courts on wardship, care and access were in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the children's health and rights. The applicant submits, in this respect, that the local authority and social services did not comply with "appropriate Government guidelines". However, the Commission considers this submission unsubstantiated in that the applicant does not specify the guidelines to which he refers or in what respect any such breach took place.        It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the children.        According to the established case-law of the Convention organs, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Furthermore, in determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society" the Commission and the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States, which are in principle in a better position to make an initial assessment of the necessity of a given interference. It is not the Commission's task to take the place of the competent national courts and make a fresh examination of all the facts and evidence in the case. The Commission's task is to examine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).        The Commission recalls that the judgment of the High Court of 15 July 1993 confirmed the interim care orders and allowed the local authority to refuse the parents any further access to the children (after some final access visits).        The Commission notes the extent and nature of the evidence before the High Court and, in particular, the recommendations contained in the social work report filed in September 1992 and those dated February 1993 together with the report of the Guardian ad litem.        The Commission also notes that Judge Brown refused the applications by the applicant and his wife for residence orders and ordered that B. remain in care on the basis of his findings as to the family history (of extreme dysfunction), as to the parents inability to care for the children whether together or separated and as to the best interests of the children. As regards access, the judge concluded that continued access was not desirable in the interests of the children. However, the judge allowed final access visits in order that the parents could wind down access to the older children gradually and could have a final access visit with B (who was, at that stage, less than one year old).        The Commission is satisfied that the decision of the High Court of 15 July 1993 was based on a thorough and careful investigation of the case, was not unreasonable or arbitrary and was supported by "relevant and sufficient" reasons.        As regards the procedural requirements implied in Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (excluding the length of proceedings complaint which is dealt which below) to ensure effective respect for family life, the Commission notes that the applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings and is satisfied that the applicant had the possibility of putting forward any views which he may have felt would be decisive to the outcome of the case. While the applicant complains about a conflict of interest in respect of a solicitor (or a firm of solicitors) and a barrister and about the use of Ms. Wright's statement, the Commission has found above that these matters did not affect the fairness of the overall proceedings as regards the applicant. The Commission considers that the procedural requirements, implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, were complied with and that the applicant was involved in the decision- making process to a degree sufficient to provide him with the requisite protection of his interests (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., H. v. the United Kingdom, loc. cit., pp.27-28, paras. 87-90 and W. v. the United Kingdom, loc. cit., pp. 28-29, paras. 63-65).        The Commission therefore finds that, bearing in mind the margin of appreciation accorded to the domestic authorities in this respect, the interference in the present case was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention as being "necessary in a democratic society" for the protection of the health and rights of others.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   (b)   As to the applicant's complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention about the length of the proceedings, the Commission has considered whether the length of proceedings (being approximately two years and three months) has failed to show respect for the applicant's family life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. The Commission recalls that delays by the authorities resulting in proceedings taking 31 months, leading to a de facto determination of the issues by the effluxion of time, has been found to constitute a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., H. v. the United Kingdom, loc. cit., pp. 27-28, paras. 87-90).        In the present case, the Commission notes the consistent views expressed in the various affidavits and reports filed by the social workers, health visitors, psychologists and by the Guardian ad litem. The Commission also notes the opinion of Judge Brown, given in his judgment of 15 July 1993, as to the applicant's and his wife's parental abilities and as to the best interests of the children. It is therefore not established that, in the circumstances of the present case, the length of the proceedings led to a de facto determination of the issues. In addition, the Commission notes that the matter was relatively complex due to the number of children involved and the birth during the proceedings of B. The Commission further notes the importance of what was at stake for the applicant, the need to carefully collect information and to put that information before the courts and the contradictory statements of the applicant and his wife made in the course of the proceedings.        It therefore finds that this complaint of the applicant is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant also raises a number of additional complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.        He complains, inter alia, that the Cheshire House authorities used baby alarms in the living area in Cheshire house in order to monitor the applicant and his wife. He also complains about the handling of the matter by social services and the local authority and, in particular, about the changing of the times of the access visits by social services and about the negligent treatment of M. while in care. He also alleges that there was a conspiracy between the local authority and social services to ensure that the children remain in care. He further submits that his wife was taken advantage of by the local authority and social services due to her personality flaw and was pressurised by the authorities to institute divorce proceedings. The Commission has examined the allegations made and the documents submitted by the applicant. It considers that these complaints have not been substantiated.         The applicant also complains, inter alia, that the Area Team Manager (who chaired all the case conferences) was not independent and that there was no independent complaints body or person within social services. In this respect the Commission notes that the applicant had access to the courts in relation to the case on an ongoing basis, was legally represented and any complaint as to the Area Team Manager's independence, and consequently the evidentiary value of his or other's statements, could have been made by the applicant in court. As regards the claim that the children have been denied the right to their own religion because social workers did not endeavour to bring up the children in the applicant's chosen religion, there is no indication given by the applicant as to what religion he refers and no evidence has been submitted by the applicant indicating that this matter was ever raised with social services, the local authority or the courts.        As to his complaint in relation to the attendance of a student at one of the case conferences, there is no evidence that the student was doing anything other than observing the meeting. As regards the applicant's complaint that he was never informed while in Cheshire House that his wife was to have a hysterectomy, it is noted that the applicant's wife subsequently gave birth in October 1994.        The Commission has examined these complaints, the arguments of the applicant and the material submitted to the Commission by him and, insofar as these complaints have been substantiated, the Commission concludes that they do not disclose a violation of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber    President of the First Chamber        (M. F. BUQUICCHIO)                      (C. L. ROZAKIS)