CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 28 juin 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 23975/94                       by I. S.-B.                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 28 June 1995, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 20 October 1993 by I. S.-B. against the United Kingdom and registered on 26 April 1994 under file No. 23975/94;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen born in 1938.   Since 1966 he has been serving a life sentence.   At present he is detained at Ashworth Hospital in Liverpool.   Before the Commission the applicant is represented by Mr. Robin Makin, solicitor of E. Rex Makin & Co., Liverpool.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        Between 1986 and 1988 the applicant supplied the Manchester Police with information which led to the recovery of a murder victim. No further charges were brought against the applicant in this connection.        In 1989 the applicant learned that the police officer to whom he had furnished the information and who had led the investigation had opted for early retirement and intended to write a book on the applicant's case.        In July 1989 the applicant informed the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions that the publication of the book, envisaged for September 1989, and its serialisation in a newspaper would be tantamount to a public trial by media.   He considered that by writing the book the police officer had breached confidence and violated the Official Secrets Act 1911.   The applicant was informed that it was premature for the authorities concerned to decide whether any legal action in this respect was appropriate.        In September 1989, following a second intervention by the applicant after the publication of the book, the Greater Manchester Police Authority instituted proceedings for breach of confidence and copyright against the author of the book and the publishers.   The Attorney General considered that no investigation with a view to proceedings under the Official Secrets Act 1911 was necessary.        The applicant considered that he had a community of interest with the Greater Manchester Police Authority in restraining the author of the book and the publishers.   In 1990 and 1991 he proposed that an action contemplated by him should be consolidated with the proceedings commenced by the Police Authority.   He was informed that the proceedings in question were between the Police Authority on the one hand and its retired officer and others involved in the publication on the other hand.        The proceedings related to (i) the constitutional position of members of the Police Force and the conduct of former police officers after leaving the Force (ii) breach of copyright, and (iii) the proprietary interests in information supplied to the police.   They had, in the Police Authority's view, no bearing on any possible claim which the applicant might have.        As to the proceedings for breach of copyright and confidence, an out-of-court settlement was reached with the publishers and the author of the book in May and June 1993.   The settlement consisted in payment of a part of the profits from the publication to the Police Authority. The amount of the retired police officer's profits and the sum he actually paid to the Police Authority were not officially revealed to the public.        On 4 June 1993 the applicant complained to the Police Authority that no action had been taken in advance of publication of the book in question and of the absence of any action in respect of its subsequent serialisation and partial republication.   By letters of 10 and 22 June 1993 the applicant was informed that since he was not a party to the proceedings against the retired police officer and the publishers, he had no interest in those proceedings.   The Police Authority therefore decided to take no further action on the points raised by the applicant.   COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains that the competent authorities either took legal action belatedly (in respect of the publication of the book) or failed to do so at all (in respect of serialisation of the book and its partial republication).   He alleges that the out-of-court settlement resulting in financial gain of the Police Authority was unlawful.   The applicant considers that the police officer who wrote the book should have been subject to a punitive penalty.   He further alleges that financial details relating to the police officer's total profits resulting from disclosure of the confidential information and the amount of money the latter paid to the Police Authority should be revealed to the public.        The applicant also alleges that by the publication of the confidential information involving his person he was subjected to public trial by police and media without any official charges being brought.   He considers that, contrary to the opinion expressed by the competent authorities, he had an interest in relation to the information published in the book since it dealt with his case.   He draws the conclusion that the proceedings introduced against the police officer determined also his rights.        The applicant alleges a violation, on the above facts, of his rights guaranteed by Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 28, 30 and 45 of the Convention and by Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 7.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant alleges that he has been subjected, by publication of the book and its subsequent serialisation, to public trial by police and media.   He considers that since the book was about his case the proceedings introduced against persons responsible for its publication concerned also the determination of his rights.   He alleges a violation of Article 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (Art. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3) of the Convention.        Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention guarantees to everyone, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.   Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention guarantees the presumption of innocence and para. 3 (Art. 6-3) of the same Article provides for minimum rights in regard to persons charged with a criminal offence.        The Commission notes that no further criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and the disclosure of confidential information involving the applicant's person cannot be regarded as the determination of a criminal charge against the applicant or as a public trial of him within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.        As to the complaint that the proceedings against the police officer determined the civil rights of the applicant, the Commission notes that the proceedings were brought by the Greater Manchester Police Authority and concerned (i) the constitutional position of members of the Police Force and the conduct of former police officers after leaving the Force (ii) breach of copyright, and (iii) the proprietary interests in information supplied to the police.        The applicant was not a party to those proceedings which, as the Police Authority pointed out, did not relate to the rights, if any, of the applicant arising from the publication of the book.   The applicant at all times remained free to introduce civil proceedings of his own to assert any such rights but has not done so.        In these circumstances the Commission considers that, as regards the applicant, Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is inapplicable to the proceedings introduced by the Police Authority.        It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant further alleges that his rights guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention were violated by publication of the confidential information concerning his person which he had supplied to the police.        Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, as far as relevant, guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his private life.        In the present case the applicant voluntarily confided to the police, in the framework of a criminal investigation, information related to facts which were the object of that investigation.   Although he may have been entitled to expect that the information would be used only for purposes related to the investigation, it does not appear from the documents submitted that the authorities concerned undertook formally a duty of confidence vis-à-vis the applicant in this respect.        The Commission notes that the applicant has not, in any event, introduced an action for breach of confidence or defamation against the author of the book or its publishers.   In these circumstances the question is raised whether the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies available to him.        The Commission does not, however, find it necessary to determine this question since the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.        The applicant is serving a life sentence after having been convicted of murder and the information which the applicant supplied to the police and which forms the subject matter of the book is related to the location of the body of one of his victims.   Even if the information was not already in the public domain and may be regarded as having been supplied by the applicant in confidence, the Commission finds that the information did not relate to the sphere of private life within the meaning of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   Nor has the applicant shown in what other respect the contents of the book interfered with respect for his private life within the meaning of that Article (Art. 8).        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant further complains of violations of his rights under Articles 3, 5, 9, 28, 30 and 45 (Art. 3, 5, 9, 28, 30, 45) of the Convention and under Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-3, P7-4). The Commission has examined such complaints but finds that insofar as they have been substantiated and are within its competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or in its Protocols.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    Finally, the applicant complains of a violation of his rights under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention on the grounds that there existed no effective remedy in respect of his claims under the Convention.        The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention guarantees an effective remedy to everyone alleging a violation of the Convention, so long as there exists an arguable claim of such violation.   For the reasons given above, the Commission finds that the applicant has no arguable claim of a violation of his rights guaranteed by the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                         (C.L. ROZAKIS)