CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 6 septembre 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 25461/94                       by Anna SEIDLOVÁ                       against the Slovak Republic          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 6 September 1995, the following members being present:                Mr.    H. DANELIUS, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 23 March 1994 by Mrs. Anna SEIDLOVÁ against the Slovak Republic and registered on 21 October 1994 under file No. 25461/94;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Slovak citizen born in 1914. She is retired and resides in Roznava.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        In 1961 the applicant's husband and several other persons were found guilty of larceny in that they had illegally dealt in meat which belonged to a State-owned company.   The courts found the husband responsible for damage amounting to 152,962 crowns and considered him as one of the principal organisers of the larceny.   He was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment and subsidiarily to confiscation of his property.   In addition, he and his co-defendants had to compensate the damage.   In 1963 the applicant's husband died in prison.        Pursuant to the Judicial Rehabilitation Act 1991 the Prosecutor General lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court (Najvyssí súd) in which he alleged that the 1961 decision to confiscate the property of the applicant's husband's three co-defendants was unlawful.   On 25 March 1992 the Supreme Court quashed the decision challenged by the Prosecutor General.   The co-defendants, one of whom had also been regarded as a principal organiser of the larceny, had been held responsible for damage amounting to 83,200, 43,711 and 39,470 crowns, respectively.   In 1961 they had been sentenced respectively to ten and six and a half years' imprisonment.         In the Supreme Court's view, the decision to confiscate the property of the three co-defendants was disproportionate to the gravity of the crime of which they had been found guilty and contradictory to the aim of the punishment, namely the individual and general deterrence.        The Supreme Court found that the confiscation bore no relation to the offence committed, and that in any event the courts had also ordered them to pay damages.   The decision to confiscate the property was not appropriate as the prison sentences imposed on the three offenders were sufficiently severe as such.   Finally, the Supreme Court considered that in 1961 the courts had overestimated the aggravating circumstances of the case without taking into due consideration the fact that the accused had voluntarily admitted their criminal activity and thereby facilitated the investigation.        On 8 December 1992 the Prosecutor General lodged a similar complaint against the 1961 sentence by which the property of the applicant's husband had been confiscated.   He considered that the penalty imposed on the husband was disproportionate and that it had been motivated by political reasons.   The Prosecutor General maintained that neither the character and gravity of the offence committed by the offender nor his personal situation had required the confiscation of his property.        The Prosecutor General considered that the justification, in 1961, of the confiscation of the husband's property by the necessity to deprive him of the material basis for committing further offences had been unlawful as he had been a State employee and his material situation had been in no relation to the offence of which he had been found guilty.   In addition to the confiscation of his property, the husband had also been sentenced to pay damages to his employer.        On 10 March 1993 the Supreme Court dismissed the Prosecutor General's complaint.   It noted that although the 1961 judgment concerning the applicant's husband had been politically motivated, the sentence was neither disproportionate nor contrary to the aim pursued. The husband had been regarded as one of the principal organisers of the larceny, and the damage for which he had been held responsible far exceeded that caused by the three other co-defendants.        The Supreme Court found that in 1961 the courts had taken into due account all particular circumstances of the case as regards the applicant's husband, namely that the criminal activity served as a source of income, that the damage caused by him exceeded eight years' income in a public company, and that it was therefore not probable that he would be able to pay the damages as ordered by the courts.   For these reasons, the Supreme Court had concluded that the decision to confiscate his property was not unlawful.        The applicant considered that the Supreme Court had treated her husband's case differently from those of his three co-defendants.   She introduced a petition before the Constitutional Court (Ústavny súd) alleging a violation of the constitutional right to equality in dignity and rights.   On 22 September 1993 the Constitutional Court rejected the petition as it found that the particular circumstances of the applicant's husband's case were not identical with those of his co- defendants.   COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains that the Supreme Court evaluated the facts on which the decision to confiscate her husband's property had been founded differently from those of the other co-defendants' cases. She alleges that she was thereby deprived of a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.        She further alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that the Supreme Court did not order the restitution of her husband's property, notwithstanding that it had been confiscated in violation of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the generally recognised principles of international law.        Finally, the applicant complains that her husband's case was treated differently from those of the other co-defendants despite the identity of their particular circumstances.   She alleges a violation of the principle of equality of all persons before the tribunals guaranteed by Article 14 para. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows:        "In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an ...      impartial tribunal established by law."          The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine whether Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention applies to the proceedings at issue since this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.        To the extent that the applicant complains of the Supreme Court's decision in her husband's case, the Commission recalls that it is not called upon to decide whether or not the domestic courts have correctly assessed the evidence before them (cf. No. 6172/73, Dec. 7.7.75, D.R. 3 p. 77, with further references) or to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (cf. No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, with further references).        In the present case the Supreme Court examined the particular circumstances of the case, evaluated the evidence which it had before it and for reasons expressly stated in its decision of 10 March 1993 found no violation of the law as regards the confiscation of the applicant's husband's property.   The Commission considers that this decision is neither grossly unfair nor arbitrary.        To the extent that the applicant alleges lack of impartiality of the Supreme Court, the Commission notes that the impartiality of a court cannot be put in doubt by the fact alone that it decided differently in similar cases, and the applicant does not invoke any other arguments in this respect.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant further alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in that the Supreme Court did not quash the decision by virtue of which her husband's property had been confiscated.        In the present case the property was confiscated in 1961, and according to the Commission's case-law deprivation of ownership or another right in rem is in principle an instantaneous act which does not produce a continuing situation of "deprivation of right" (cf. No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14 p. 146).        On 10 March 1993 the Supreme Court decided that the 1961 decision to confiscate her husband's property was not unlawful and thereby deprived the applicant of the possibility to acquire this property anew.   However, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) "applies only to existing possessions" and it does not guarantee, as such, any right to acquire property (cf. No. 11628/85, Dec. 9.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 271, with further references).        It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    Finally, the applicant complains, with reference to Article 14 para. 1 (Art. 14-1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the Supreme Court took a different decision in her husband's case although its particular circumstances were identical with those of his co-defendants' cases.        The Commission recalls that pursuant to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention it may only receive complaints of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.   However, the Commission considers that in substance the applicant complains of discrimination and considers it appropriate to examine this complaint under Article 14 of the Convention in connection with Article 6 (Art. 14+6) of the Convention.        In its decision of 10 March 1993 the Supreme Court noted, inter alia, that the damage for which the applicant's husband had been held responsible far exceeded that which the three other co-defendants had caused.   The Constitutional Court found that the particular circumstances of the husband's case had not been identical with those of his co-defendants, and the Commission does not find this decision arbitrary.        In these circumstances the Commission considers that the distinction objected to by the applicant is founded, inter alia, on dissimilar factual circumstances and is consistent with the requirements of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Second Chamber        President of the Second Chamber        (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                          (H. DANELIUS)