CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 7 septembre 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 16817/90                       by Anne-Marie PAULSEN-MEDALEN and Others                       against Sweden         The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 7 September 1995, the following members being present:              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE, Acting President            MM.    H. DANELIUS            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 7 August 1989 by Anne-Marie Paulsen-Medalen and others against Sweden and registered on 3 July 1990 under file No. 16817/90;         Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 1 November 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 23 December 1993 and 11 January 1994;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.     The particular circumstances of the case         The first applicant is an unmarried mother, born in 1958. She resides at Västra Frölunda which is a suburb of Gothenburg. The second and third applicants are the first applicant's two sons, P and J, born in 1984 and 1986 respectively. At present the children live with foster parents, P at Stenkullen and J at Floda approximately 10 kilometres from each other and approximately 30 kilometres from Gothenburg. The fourth and fifth applicants are the first applicant's parents, and accordingly the second and third applicants' maternal grandparents, born in 1938 and 1926 respectively. They also reside at Västra Frölunda. The sixth applicant is J's father. He was born in 1957 and resides at Partille which is also situated near Gothenburg. Before the Commission all applicants are represented by Mrs. Siv Westerberg, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg. The application relates to the taking into care of the second and third applicants and their placement in the foster homes.   I.     The provisional care order         The first applicant came into contact with the social authorities in 1984 while expecting her first child, P. Following the birth of P, mother and child stayed first with the mother's parents, then with the sixth applicant and, as from May 1985 with P's father. Following the birth of J, in 1986, the first applicant and her sons returned to her parents before she moved to Högsbohöjd in the summer of 1986. In 1989 the first applicant moved to her present address at Västra Frölunda in order to be nearer her parents. During this period of time the social authorities constantly provided assistance to the family in the form of financial support and support from various persons in order to assist the first applicant in the upbringing of her children.         When P was a couple of years old it turned out that he was developing slowly and he was put on the list of children entitled to special assistance from the Board for Help and Assistance to the Mentally Retarded (Omsorgsstyrelsen).         In the light of the family's developments since 1984 the social authorities commenced an investigation in 1988 into the necessity of taking the children into care. On 8 February 1989 the chairman of the Social District Council (sociala distriktsnämnden) in Frölunda-Styrsö decided, on the basis of this investigation, to take the children immediately into care on a provisional basis. The children were placed at the Bö Children's Home in Gothenburg.         The first applicant appealed against this decision to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Gothenburg which, by judgment of 21 February 1989, upheld the provisional care. The Court stated as follows:         (translation)         "The documents submitted reveal inter alia the following.       (The first applicant) has received continuous support for       almost five years, first in the form of a home aid       (hemsyster) ... and thereafter in the form of special home       aid (hemma-hos). All efforts were aimed at giving (her) the       support necessary to enable her to take care of the       children and the home. It appears, however, that despite       the support given she does not have sufficient capacity to       protect the children from dangers or to set limits for       them. It also appears that (J) is responsible for his older       brother beyond what may be expected having regard to his       age. In view of this the Court finds it probable that P and       J need care in accordance with (the 1980 Act with Special       Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lag 1980:621 med       särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga) - hereinafter "the       1980 Act"). The Court further finds that a care decision       cannot be awaited considering the risks to the children's       health and development. Accordingly, the decision in       question is upheld."         By judgment of 7 March 1989 the Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten) of Gothenburg rejected the first applicant's further appeal against the provisional care order. Leave to appeal against this judgment was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) on 5 April 1989.   II.    The care order         Following the provisional care order the Social District Council lodged an application with the County Administrative Court on 27 February 1989 in order to have the children taken into care pursuant to the 1980 Act, considering that the first applicant was unable to provide the necessary care for the children's health and development. The application was lodged by the Council following a meeting with the first applicant and her counsel during which she challenged the Council's and the social authorities' findings.         By judgment of 17 March 1989 the County Administrative Court decided to take the children P and J into care pursuant to section 1 of the 1980 Act. The Court concluded that there were such deficiencies in the children's care as to endanger their health and development.         The first applicant appealed against the judgment, initially in respect of both P and J. She later withdrew the appeal in so far as it concerned P.         Following a supplementary child psychiatric examination and two oral hearings the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the care order of J by judgment of 13 February 1990. The Court stated inter alia as follows:         (translation)         "In the present case, there is no reason why an assessment       of J's status should not be confined primarily to what has       been stated by the psychologist KG and also what has been       reported by the senior physician, Dr. GH. Their evidence is       as follows. J is emotionally disturbed. This emotional       disturbance is expected to become more apparent as he grows       older and spends more time with other children. J is in       great need of support in the form of a secure relationship       with an adult who can help him face the outside world and       who sets limits for what is allowed and what is not. J has       been placed in a foster home for almost 11 months.       According to Dr. GH, J will need child psychiatric       treatment for a long time and there is no chance that this       treatment will prove successful unless J stays in his       foster home. (Psychologist) KG has also stated that J       should remain in the foster home.         (The first applicant) has had continuous support in her       parental role, in various forms and for a considerable       period of time. It is quite clear from the documentary and       other evidence that, despite these supportive measures, she       has not been able to take care of P and J simultaneously       without endangering their health and development. In       addition, there is every indication that (the first       applicant) who has explicitly stated that she wants to take       care of the children herself, is unaware in important       respects of what is demanded of her as a parent if she is       to safeguard - primarily - the development of the child,       and also to be responsible for the child's health.       Furthermore, no evidence has emerged in the case to       indicate that the measures taken by society to help (the       first applicant), P and J have resulted in any appreciable       improvement in (the first applicant's) capacity to take       care of the children or that such capacity is developing.       The Court is of the opinion that what has emerged in this       case confirms the view that - at least at present - (the       first applicant) cannot meet the demands which J makes in       regard to care in view of the degree of disturbance to       which he is subjected. The County Administrative Court's       decision to arrange for care for J under the 1980 Act is       therefore upheld."         The first applicant appealed against the judgment. Since her appeal was lodged out of time the Administrative Court of Appeal refused, on 22 March 1990, to accept the appeal. On 3 July 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal not to accept the appeal.   III.   The implementation of care         a)    The mother and her sons (the first, second and third            applicants)         As indicated (cf. I above) the second and third applicants (P and J) were taken into care on 8 February 1989 and placed at the Bö Children's Home. On 7 March 1989 and 18 April 1989 J and P, respectively, were placed with foster parents where they still live today. Initially no decisions regarding the first applicant's access to her children were made but it appears that the factual situation during this initial period, from March 1989 until March 1990, was that she could see her children once every two weeks for 21/2 hours in the foster homes. Furthermore, she could see them in her own home twice a year for 21/2 hours. The sixth applicant, J's father, normally accompanied the mother when she visited the foster homes in order to see the children. Their maternal grandparents (the fourth and fifth applicants) could see the children in connection with the children's visits to their mother's home.         In early 1990 the first applicant contacted her present representative, Siv Westerberg, following which she requested, on 19 March 1990, confirmation from the social authorities that no restrictions had been issued in respect of her right to see her children.         On 20 March 1990 the chairman of the Social District Council of Högsbo decided, pursuant to section 16 of the 1980 Act, to restrict the first applicant's access to her children to 21/2 hours in the foster homes every second week. On 27 March 1990, acting both in her own capacity and also on behalf of her children, the first applicant appealed against the decision to the County Administrative Court. She maintained primarily that the decision was unlawful in that the chairman of the Social District Council was not authorised to restrict access.         By judgment of 20 June 1990 the County Administrative Court quashed the chairman's decision, agreeing with the first applicant. However, on 6 July 1990 the Administrative Court of Appeal quashed that judgment upon appeal from the Social District Council considering that the chairman of the Social District Council did have the power to restrict access. The Administrative Court of Appeal furthermore referred the case back to the County Administrative Court for determination on its merits, i.e. whether the chairman's restrictions as to the first applicant's access to her children were acceptable.         The first applicant appealed against the Administrative Court of Appeal's judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court maintaining, inter alia, that she had not been informed of the Social District Council's appeal, nor had she been provided with an opportunity to submit her observations thereon.         On 5 November 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.         In the meantime the social authorities decided, on 19 June 1990, to restrict the mother's and the grandparents' right of telephone communications with J to twice per week as regards the mother and once per week as regards the grandparents. Furthermore, by decision of 3 July 1990 the restrictions on access to 21/2 hours every two weeks in the foster homes in respect of both children were maintained. The restriction on telephone communications between J and his grandparents was subsequently withdrawn.         The above decisions of 19 June and 3 July 1990 concerning restrictions on access between the first applicant and her sons were also brought before the County Administrative Court for determination.         On 28 September 1990 the County Administrative Court held a hearing in the case following which judgment was pronounced on 3 October 1990. The Court stated inter alia as follows:         (translation)         "P and J were taken into care on 8 February 1989. J was       placed in a foster home on 7 March 1989, and P on       18 April 1989.         When taken into care, J was emotionally disturbed and was       more seriously affected than his brother. The opinions of       the psychological and medical experts indicate that his       disturbance may prove to be more serious as he grows up and       spends more time with other children. He very much needs       support from adults who can help him deal with the       outside world and who can establish limits for what is       allowed and what is not. It is considered that J will need       child-psychiatric treatment for a very considerable period       of time and that such treatment has no chance of being       successful unless he stays in the foster home.         P is mentally handicapped and has had virtually no       stimulation to help his development when he was at home       with his mother. He has been overprotected and his mother       has treated him like a baby. For this reason, he has not       developed, has been unable to speak, has had difficulty in       coordinating his movements, has been unable to eat by       himself and has had to wear nappies. He is liable to suffer       from urinary tract infections since he suffers from a       kidney defect.         The children's mother may be considered to have a strong       desire to take care of her children herself, but in many       respects she is not aware of what is required of her as a       parent in providing for their safety and health. In       addition, the evidence produced in this case indicates that       the substantial and long-term efforts which have been made       by society have failed to achieve any significant       development of her ability to take care of children.         According to the investigation carried out in connection       with this case, J has made very considerable progress in       his development since he was placed in a foster home. In       less than one year, he has learnt to play with other       children without conflicts occurring. He has managed to       cope with participation in a children's group in a       part-time nursery school, and he has also been able to       accompany his (foster) family outside the home. He has       begun to show that he feels secure and his aggressiveness       has gradually diminished.         In P's case, he can now move without difficulty, his       ability to communicate has developed appreciably, he can       dress himself and he no longer requires nappies. The latter       factor has also meant a substantial improvement in his       tendency to suffer from urinary tract infections.         The mother and her children have had adequate contact every       two weeks in the foster home environment. They have met in       one of the foster homes in accordance with (the first       applicant's) wishes. This arrangement worked well until       March 1990. Subsequently, (the first applicant) considered       that she was entitled to meet her children whenever and as       often as she herself wanted to. There has also been an       increase in the number of telephone calls. These changes,       coupled with the application for the return of the       children, which they were probably aware of, appear to have       greatly disturbed the children. The evidence indicates that       J has had frequent outbursts of aggression, stomach pains       and been unable to sleep. He has also shown considerable       anxiety at his nursery school. Thus, he is no longer making       progress and some regression has occurred.         Every time (the first applicant) visits him, P shows signs       of regression back to the level he had when he was taken       into care. Even when contacts occurred in an acceptable       form, there was some regression, but he regained his normal       level of development more and more rapidly afterwards.         In the view of Dr. GH of the Västra Frölunda Children's and       Juveniles' Psychiatric Centre, the mother and her children       have nothing to gain from frequent contacts. The current       access arrangements are of a satisfactory maximum nature.       The mother would not feel more satisfied if she had more       frequent contact. In the children's case, there is no need       for increased contacts with their mother - on the contrary       it is a question of what they can `stand', since she is so       negative to their foster home placement and to the foster       parents.         Section 14 of the 1990 Act (with Special Provisions on the       Care of Young Persons which had replaced the 1980 Act on       1 July 1990) indicates inter alia that the Social District       Council is responsible for ensuring that the child's need       for contacts with its parents or with other persons who       have custody should be satisfied as far as possible. If       required in view of the purpose of care under the Act the       Council may decide, in accordance with sub-section 1, in       what form the child's contacts with its parents, or with       other persons who have custody of the child, may take       place.         Thus, the social authorities must consider what is most       important: contacts between parents and the child or the       principles for care under the 1990 Act. According to the       travaux préparatoires to the 1990 Act, the main principle       is that where there is a conflict of interest, the child's       needs always have priority. The investigation carried out       in connection with the case may be regarded as indicating       clearly that both P and J need to stay in good foster homes       for a considerable period if the harm they have suffered is       to be remedied. The investigation has also shown that both       children have made major progress in a foster home       environment but that this has ceased and that regression       has occurred since the conflict concerning the application       for the return of the children and increased access       started. In view of these circumstances, the Court finds       that the Social District Council's decision regarding       restrictions on access between (the first applicant) and       her children, P and J, shall be upheld. This also applies       to restrictions on telephone contact with J since, in       accordance with established practice, such contacts are       treated on the same basis as access in accordance with       section 14, para. 2, sub-section 1 of the 1990 Act."         On 8 October 1990 the first applicant appealed on her own behalf as well as on behalf of her sons against the above judgment to the Administrative Court of Appeal which, following an oral hearing, pronounced judgment on 11 January 1991 in which the access arrangements were upheld.         On 22 January 1991 the first applicant and the children, represented by their mother, applied to the Supreme Administrative Court for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal was granted on 23 July 1991.         By judgment of 28 June 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower courts' judgments as regards access. In its judgment the Supreme Administrative Court stated inter alia as follows:         "Section 14 of the 1990 Act prescribes inter alia that the       social welfare committee (socialnämnden) is responsible for       ensuring that a child's need for contact with its parents       or other persons having custody of the child is satisfied       as far as possible. If required in the light of the       objectives for care under the Act, a social welfare       committee may determine the manner in which the child's       contacts with its parents or other persons having custody       of the child shall be implemented. Social welfare       committees shall consider at least once every three months       whether a decision of this kind is still required.         Under this provision, a social welfare committee has the       power to restrict or totally terminate the possibility of       parents to meet their child while the child is subject to       public care. In the travaux préparatoires to Section 16 of       the 1980 Act, the wording of which was identical with the       first two paragraphs of section 14 of the 1990 Act, it is       stated (cf. Government Bill 1979/80:1, Section A, page 601       et seq.) that the circumstances may be such that the       parents should not meet the child in the period during       which care is provided. There may be a risk that the       parents will interfere with care arrangements in an       unwarranted manner. However, it is stressed (page 602) that       this provision should be applied restrictively. In       connection with the addition of the third paragraph of       section 14 in the 1990 Act, it was stated that it followed       from the responsibility of the social welfare committee to       monitor care that it should ensure that decisions regarding       restrictions on access are not upheld longer than necessary       (cf. Bill 1989/90:28 page 72 et seq.).         Thus, although section 14 in the 1990 Act should be applied       restrictively, the Supreme Administrative Court finds that       a limitation of the parents' right of access, if considered       to be required, may also take the form of restrictions on       the parents' right to contact the child by telephone. This       assessment is in compliance with the Supreme Administrative       Court's assessment in case No. RÅ 1971 S 283.         In view of the above and since it appears from the       circumstances that the Social District Council had good       reason for its decision to restrict the right of access as       it did, the appeal shall be rejected."         b)    The children and their maternal grandparents (the second,            third, fourth and fifth applicants)         On 12 November 1990 the applicants' representative, Mrs. Westerberg, submitted a request to the Högsbo Social District Council for access between the children P and J and their maternal grandparents to the extent that the children should stay with their grandparents every weekend all year round.         On 14 November 1990 the Council informed Mrs. Westerberg that the question regarding the grandparents' access to their grandchildren was not regulated in the law. The request could, nevertheless, be examined in the context of the social authorities' general powers to decide on the personal conditions of the children. Decisions made under these general powers were not subject to any review. The grandparents were advised to contact the social authority responsible for the foster home to discuss the possibilities of access but it was indicated that the access requested would not appear to be acceptable in view of the children's needs. By letter of 22 November 1992 the grandparents insisted on having a formal decision on the subject. On 4 December 1992 the Social District Council decided that the request did not call for any further action. It does not appear that the grandparents ever contacted the responsible social authority to discuss any other access arrangements.         c)    J and his father (the third and sixth applicants)         On 5 February 1991 J's father applied, through Mrs. Westerberg, for access to J to the extent that J should stay with him every weekend from Friday 17:00 hours until Sunday 17:00 hours.         On 11 February 1991 the Social District Council replied that the provisions of the 1990 Act concerning access did not apply as J's father did not have custody. It was pointed out, however, that access between father and son was important and that J's father should have access to J in so far as this would be in the interest of J. The father was requested to contact the responsible social authorities in order to discuss the access arrangement which could be made. It was indicated, however, that the access arrangement requested, which went far beyond what the courts had decided in respect of J's mother, would not appear to be acceptable. It does not appear that the father took any further initiative in order to establish access to his son.   IV.    First request for the termination of care         By letters of 8 and 27 March 1990, i.e. while the initial question of care was still pending before the courts (cf. II above), the first applicant as well as her children, represented by her, requested the Social District Council to terminate the children's care immediately.         On 28 August 1990, the Social District Council decided, in accordance with the provisions of the 1990 Act, not to terminate care.         The first applicant appealed against this decision, also on behalf of her children, to the County Administrative Court. Following an oral hearing on 28 September 1990 the Court pronounced judgment on 3 October 1990. The Court decided to maintain the care stating inter alia as follows:         (translation)         "Ever since (the first applicant) was expecting P in the       early months of 1984, she has received various forms of       assistance, principally to support her in her parental       role. This has obviously meant that it has been possible to       follow up developments which have occurred in the family       and the way in which (she) has coped with her role as a       mother. These observations have provided a basis for the       official opinion expressed in the light of the request for       the termination of the care. The opinions indicate that       mother and children have had satisfactory contacts every       two weeks. In accordance with (the first applicant's)       wishes, they have met in one or the other of the foster       homes, since this made it easier to meet both children at       the same time. This worked well until March 1990, that is       to say the period when an application was made for the       return of the children. (The first applicant) considered       that she was entitled to meet the children whenever and       wherever she found it appropriate. Previous informal       arrangements were not acceptable. In view of this and of       the fact that telephone contacts became more intensive, it       was formally decided to restrict access. (The first       applicant's) course of action has had highly negative       effects, particularly on J. He became very uneasy and was       subject to frequent outbursts of aggression. He had stomach       pains in the evenings and had trouble in sleeping. J has       also demonstrated considerable anxiety at his nursery       school in the last few months. On the whole, according to       the investigation it may be concluded that J has developed       in a very positive manner in the foster home, but that he       experienced a relapse in the spring due to the anxiety       which he was subjected to.         Of the children, J is the one who has suffered most. As       already stated, he has a serious emotional disturbance. P       is mentally retarded and (the first applicant) has treated       him like a baby on whom no demands can be made. According       to the investigation, P has made considerable progress       since he came to his foster home. In less than a year, he       has learnt to speak in a manner which can be understood,       dress himself, move about in a more natural way, eat       without assistance and indicate when he needs to go to the       toilet. As already mentioned (the first applicant) has       always had difficulty in stimulating P's development and       she has treated him like a small baby. When she visits the       foster home, P regresses to the stage he was at before he       was taken into care. He still does this, but now he       recovers more quickly than in the past.         In the report of the Social Welfare Committee (SOU 1986:20)       entitled `Barns behov och föräldrars rätt - socialtjänstens       arbete med utsatta familjer' (Children's Needs and Parental       Rights - social services and disadvantaged families), on       which the new Act (SFS 1990:52) is based, it is stated       inter alia that the main principle is the child's need for       care and protection and that this is the primary objective       of the legislation. This means that where the child's needs       conflict with those of adults, it is quite clear that the       child's needs have priority. The Court considers that no       new circumstances have occurred since the ruling made by       the Administrative Court of Appeal at the beginning of this       year which might give rise to a reassessment of (the first       applicant's) ability to meet the children's physical and       mental needs. The children have developed very favourably       while they have been in a foster home, apart from the       setback resulting from the action to have them returned,       but they are considered to need a long period in a calm,       harmonious but also stimulating environment if they are to       develop in an optimal manner. It has not been shown that       there is cause for the termination of care under the       1990 Act."         The appeal against this judgment was rejected, following an oral hearing, by the Administrative Court of Appeal by judgment of 11 January 1991 in which the Court stated inter alia as follows: (translation)         "In its judgment of 13 February 1990, the Administrative       Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the County       Administrative Court concerning care of J in accordance       with the 1980 Act following an extensive investigation. The       request for the termination of the care for both P and J       was made shortly thereafter or in March 1990. In its       judgment, against which an appeal has been lodged, the       County Administrative Court rejected the request, giving       detailed reasons for its decision. The Court does not       consider that any evidence has emerged, either in the oral       hearing or in any other context, which gives cause for       amendment of this judgment."         Leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court on 23 July 1991.   V.     Second request for the termination of care, and request for       extended access         On 11 May 1992 the first applicant requested the Högsbo Social District Council to terminate the care of her sons. In the alternative she requested that her right of access should be extended to every weekend from Friday 18:00 hours to Sunday 18:00 hours. She maintained that there was no longer a need for public care or restrictions on access.         The Council rejected the request and the mother, acting both in her own capacity and as representative of her children, appealed to the County Administrative Court, which held a hearing on 1 October 1992. At the hearing the mother reiterated her request from the earlier proceedings for concrete evidence as to her unsuitability as a parent. She submitted that if the children were still presenting problems, this was due to the bad conditions in the foster homes and to the fact that the eldest son was mentally retarded. In the course of the hearing the parties agreed to allow the children and the mother to undergo a child psychiatric examination.         After this psychiatric examination had been completed the Court held another hearing following which judgment was pronounced on 27 April 1993. The Court rejected the appeal and stated inter alia as follows:         (translation)         "The question in the case is whether there has been a       change in (the first applicant's) situation and abilities       which now make it possible for her to give the children the       security and care they need. The Children's and Juveniles'       Psychiatric Clinic's report provides the best analysis of       (her) ability to meet the children's needs in these       respects. This report indicates that she clearly wishes to       take care of her children and has the best intentions.       However, she has shown an inability to establish a       structure and to set limits in everyday, normally       structured situations. This has led to frustrations which       the children cannot handle and with increasing chaos as a       result. Under pressure (the first applicant) has shown       directly inappropriate and degrading behaviour towards the       children, primarily in verbal form but sometimes also in a       physical manner.         (The first applicant) and Siv Westerberg have not stated       the reason for the termination of the care, apart from       sweeping and unconfirmed claims that (the first       applicant's) apartment is now clean and nicely arranged and       that she is able to take care of her children.         The witness statements only serve to confirm what already       appears from the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric       Clinic's report, namely that J has satisfactory       intelligence and that (the first applicant) functions best       with the children in play and games. What the witnesses,       who have met (her) and the children for an hour or two,       have said about the relationship between the mother and her       children cannot constitute grounds for the termination of       the care.         In the Court's opinion nothing has emerged during the       examination which supports the view that (the first       applicant) could now provide P and J with the care and       security to which they are entitled. On the contrary the       Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic's report       indicates unambiguously that there are no prerequisites for       the termination of the care, that such prerequisites cannot       be anticipated in the foreseeable future and that there is       no evidence that an increased access would be beneficial to       the children. The Social District Council's decision that       the care should not be terminated and that the right of       access should not be extended is therefore upheld.         The fact that conditions in P's foster home might be such       as to make it inappropriate as a foster home cannot       constitute grounds for the termination of the care for P.       Unsatisfactory conditions might justify a change of foster       home, but this question cannot be considered in the present       context."         The first applicant lodged an appeal against the County Administrative Court's judgment maintaining that the care should be terminated and that, in any event, she should be granted an extended right of access. On 8 October 1993 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal following an oral hearing. It adhered to the assessment made by the County Administrative Court as regards the continuation of care. As regards the question of access the Administrative Court of Appeal stated as follows:         (translation)         "Section 14 of the 1990 Act indicates that a local social       welfare committee is responsible for ensuring that the       child's need for contacts with its parents or with other       persons who have custody should be satisfied as far as       possible and that - if required in view of the purpose of       care - the committee may decide in what form such contacts       shall take place. Under this provision, the social welfare       committee has the power to restrict or totally prohibit the       possibilities of parents to meet their child while it is       subject to care in accordance with the 1990 Act. The       travaux préparatoires to the 1990 Act state, inter alia,       that there may be a situation in which the parents should       not meet the child while care is provided. There may be a       risk that the parents will intervene in the care process in       an un