CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 16 octobre 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 16970/90                       by Allan JACOBSSON                       against Sweden         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 16 October 1995, the following members being present:              MM.    S. TRECHSEL, President                  H. DANELIUS                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            Mr.    F. MARTINEZ            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  G.B. REFFI                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 21 July 1990 by Allan JACOBSSON against Sweden and registered on 2 August 1990 under file No. 16970/90;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 30 August 1993 and 3 January 1995 the observations submitted in reply by the applicant on 15 November 1993 and 14 February 1995;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.         The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1927. He is retired and resides at Rönninge, Sweden.   A.     The particular circumstances of the case         In 1974 the applicant bought a property of 2,644 m2, Salem 23:1, in the centre of Rönninge in the municipality of Salem, a suburb about 20 kilometres south-west of Stockholm. On the property there is a one-family house in which the applicant lives.         When the applicant bought the property it was covered by a so-called subdivision plan (avstyckningsplan), adopted in 1938. According to this plan no building could be constructed on a plot of less than 1,500 m2 until sufficient water and sewage facilities had been provided for. Such facilities appear to have been built at the end of the 1960's. The property was also covered by an area plan (områdesplan), adopted in 1972, which described the property mainly as a public area containing open spaces, streets and car parking, and by a building prohibition pursuant to section 35 of the previous Building Act (byggnadslagen) of 1947, issued on 26 August 1974.         The first building prohibition under the Building Act of 1947 was issued by the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen, hereinafter "the Board") of the Stockholm County already in September 1965 and was valid for one year. This prohibition was subsequently prolonged by the Board for one or two years each time. The last decision was taken on 11 July 1985 and was valid until 11 July 1987. On 1 July 1987, with the entry into force of the Planning and Building Act of 1987 (Plan- och bygglagen, hereinafter "the 1987 Act"), the existing system for prohibition on construction was abolished and replaced by a possibility for the Building Committee (byggnadsnämnden) to defer its decision on an application for a building permit, or a preliminary opinion on that issue, for a maximum period of two years.         Ever since he bought the property in question the applicant has tried, in vain, to obtain from the competent authorities a permit to divide his plot and/or to build, in addition to the existing house, more houses on it. On 28 July 1975 the Building Committee of Botkyrka stated in a preliminary opinion, requested by the applicant, that it was not prepared to permit the division of his property into smaller plots, referring inter alia to the area plan adopted in 1972.         On 28 June 1979 the Municipal Assembly (kommunfullmäktige) adopted a master plan (generalplan) relating to part of the municipality of Botkyrka, according to which the applicant's property was supposed to be used for building blocks of flats of more than two storeys. On 15 January 1980 the Building Committee stated, in reply to a request from the applicant, that accordingly it was not prepared to grant him an exemption from the building prohibition or a permit to build a one-family house and a garage on the property. The applicant appealed to the Board claiming that the building prohibition was not valid. The Board rejected the appeal on 25 April 1980, stating inter alia that in its opinion the proposed buildings could be contrary to the aim of the prevailing prohibition and hinder future town planning as indicated in the master plan of 1979.         On 13 February 1984 the Municipal Council (kommunstyrelsen) adopted an area programme according to which the area in which the applicant's property is situated should be used for the construction of multi-family houses in 1988. It also stated that the planning procedure should be given priority. On 23 February 1984 the Municipal Assembly adopted a building programme to the same effect.         On 12 June 1984 the Building Committee stated in a new preliminary opinion requested by the applicant that it would not be prepared to grant any building permit in view of the existing building prohibition. The applicant's appeals against this were, as before, unsuccessful.         On 20 March 1986 the Municipal Assembly adopted a new area plan covering inter alia the applicant's property. This plan mentioned the possibility of using the area for single or multi-family house development.         On the basis of these facts the applicant lodged an application with the Commission (No. 10842/84) alleging violations of inter alia Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In its Report of 8 October 1987 the Commission expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention as a result of the lack of any court remedy to challenge the lawfulness and the compatibility with the Convention of the building prohibitions imposed on his property. It also reached the conclusion, by seven votes to four, that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Commission's view was subsequently upheld by the European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163).         While his case was pending before the Commission and the Court, and following the entry into force of the 1987 Act, the applicant filed a request with the Building Committee on 9 July 1987 for a preliminary opinion regarding a building permit for his property in order to build a house thereon. On 13 October 1987 the Building Committee decided, however, pursuant to the rules laid down in the 1987 Act, to defer its decision on the request for a period of two years. It nevertheless informed the applicant that a building permit could not be expected for the time being. Before the end of the above two year period the Municipal Assembly of the Municipality of Salem decided, on 21 June 1989, to revoke the detailed development plan (previously called a subdivision plan) which had been in force since 1938. Following this the Building Committee decided, on 11 September 1990, to confirm its preliminary opinion of 13 October 1987 rejecting the applicant's request for a building permit. In its reasons the Committee referred to the need for a new detailed development plan and the Municipality's intention to plan the land for single or multi-family house development in accordance with the area plan adopted in 1986. The applicant did not appeal against this decision.         In the meantime the applicant had, however, lodged an appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) against the decision of the Municipal Assembly of 21 June 1989 to revoke the detailed development plan from 1938. On 6 July 1989 the Court decided not to entertain the appeal as it had no competence to do so since such an appeal, in accordance with the 1987 Act, was to be examined by the County Administrative Board. Leave to appeal against this decision was refused by the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) on 20 September 1989.         Following the above decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal the applicant lodged his appeal with the Board. He maintained in particular that the authorities were under an obligation, pursuant to Chapter 1, section 5, of the 1987 Act, to take into consideration both private and public interests and thus weigh the loss of the rights created by the old detailed development plan against the public interest in adopting a new detailed development plan.         On 7 September 1989 the Board rejected the appeal and upheld the decision of the Municipal Assembly to revoke the detailed development plan of 1938. In its decision the Board stated:   (translation)         "The area is covered by a detailed development plan,       approved by the County Administrative Board on 16 September       1938. Pursuant to Chapter 17, section 4, of the 1987 Act       the implementation period for the plan is to be considered       as having elapsed.         In such circumstances the municipality has a strong       position in respect of the right to revoke a detailed       development plan, something which has been exemplified by       the fact that the revocation may be decided without the       rights which derived from the plan being taken into       consideration (chapter 5, section 11, subsection 2, of the       1987 Act). This presupposes that the general interest       speaks in favour of a revocation. Such a general interest       has been expressed by the issuing of an area plan for Östra       Rönninge.         When examining questions under the 1987 Act both public and       individual interests must be taken into consideration       unless otherwise provided. The above provision is an       example thereof. The meaning of this provision is that the       person who has obtained a right according to the plan       cannot rely thereon during the examination of the question       whether the plan should be repealed. However, when it comes       to examining the contents of a new plan the main rule in       Chapter 1, section 5, concerning the individual's interests       must obviously be considered, but even in these       circumstances it is not required that the rights under the       old plan must be respected. When it comes to adopting a new       plan it would not be contrary to the 1987 Act to let the       adoption thereof be preceded by the revocation of a       detailed development plan. The possible result of an       examination of a request for a building permit in respect       of a new construction on Salem 2[3]:1 following the       revocation of the detailed development plan cannot be       examined in this case. The applicant's submissions in       support of his appeal do not provide a reason for refusing       the implementation of the decision appealed against."         The applicant appealed against this decision to the Government. On 14 June 1990 the Government rejected the appeal stating that they shared the assessment made by the County Administrative Board.         In accordance with the provisions of the 1988 Act on Judicial Review of Certain Administrative Decisions (Lag 1988:205 om rättsprövning av vissa förvaltningsbeslut, hereinafter "the 1988 Act") the applicant challenged the Government's decision in the Supreme Administrative Court. He also requested the Court to examine a request for a building permit and to hold an oral hearing.         On 11 November 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court, without holding an oral hearing, rejected the applicant's request for review of the Government's decision. In its decision the Court stated:   (translation)         "According to section 1 of the 1988 Act the Supreme       Administrative Court shall, at the request of a private       party in certain administrative matters dealt with by the       Government or an administrative authority, examine whether       the decision is contrary to any legal provision.         In the present case the examination concerns the       Government's decision of 14 June 1990. In this decision the       Government rejected an appeal lodged by (the applicant)       against a decision of the County Administrative Board of       Stockholm to uphold a decision to revoke (the 1938 detailed       development plan) concerning a land area within the       Municipality of Salem. This means that the Supreme       Administrative Court cannot in the present proceedings       examine (the applicant's) request to be granted a building       permit. The Supreme Administrative Court dismisses this       request and rejects the request for a public oral hearing.         As regards the question whether the revocation of (the old       1938 plan) is contrary to any legal provision, it can be       established that the plan, according to Chapter 17,       section 4, of the 1987 Act, was to be regarded as a       detailed development plan with regard to which the       implementation period had elapsed. According to Chapter 5,       section 11, of the 1987 Act such a plan may be amended or       annulled without regard to the rights which may have       accrued during the plan's existence. The latter provision       constitutes an exception to the principal rule in       Chapter 1, section 5, of the 1987 Act that consideration       shall be given to both public and private interests when       examining issues under the 1987 Act (cf. Government Bill       1985/86:1 pp. 175 and 464). The facts of the case do not       indicate that the revocation of the plan is contrary to       Chapter 5, section 11, or Chapter 1, section 5, of the 1987       Act or to any other provision in the law. The decision is       upheld."   B.     Relevant domestic law   a.     The Planning and Building Act which entered into force on 1 July 1987 contains regulations about the planning of land and water areas as well as building. According to Chapter 1, section 1, "... the purpose of these regulations is, with due regard to the freedom of the individual, to promote a development of the society characterised by equal and good living conditions for people today and for future generations ...".         The provisions of the 1987 Act which have been invoked in the present case read as follows:   (translation)         Chapter 1         Section 5. When issues are examined in accordance with this       Act, consideration shall be given to both public and       private interests unless otherwise prescribed.         Chapter 5         Section 11. Before the expiry of the implementation period       a detailed development plan may only be amended or annulled       contrary to the wishes of the property owners concerned       when this is required as a result of new conditions of       great public importance and which could not be foreseen       when the plan was drawn up.         When the implementation period has elapsed, the plan may be       amended or annulled without regard to the rights which may       have accrued during the plan's existence ...         Chapter 17         Section 4. Town development plans and rural development       plans adopted under the Building Act (1947:385) or the Town       Planning Act (1931:142), older types of plans and       regulations referred to in sections 79 and 83 of the latter       act as well as subdivision plans, which are not covered by       a directive issued in accordance with section 168 of the       Building Act, shall be regarded as a detailed development       plan in accordance with this Act. Subdivision plans, to the       extent they are covered by the above-mentioned directives,       will cease to be valid with the coming into force of this       Act.         With regard to town development plans and rural development       plans which have been adopted before the end of 1978, the       implementation period will be considered, in accordance       with section 5, subsection 5, to be five years from the       date of their gaining legal force. For other plans and       regulations, referred to in the first subsection, the       implementation period will be regarded as having elapsed.         Unless otherwise prescribed in a plan or regulation, which       according to the first subsection is to be regarded as a       detailed development plan in accordance with this Act,       section 39 in the Building Ordinance (1959:612) shall apply       as a regulation in the plan.         Section 8. If damage occurs as a result of a plan or       regulation whose implementation period in accordance with       section 4 has elapsed, being amended or annulled, the owner       and holder of special rights to a property is entitled       to compensation from the municipality on condition that              1. the property is located in an area which is       developed predominantly in accordance with the plan or area       regulations,              2. notice about the decision regarding the amendment       or annulment of the plan or regulations is given before the       end of June 1992, and              3. the property after such amendment or annulment may       either not be built upon or only be used for development to       an extent which is obviously unreasonable.         If the plan or regulation is amended or annulled before the       end of June 1992, then the first subsection will apply if       an application has been made for a building permit but the       application has not been dealt with before the       above-mentioned date.         Compensation shall be calculated as the difference between       the property's market value before and after the decision       to amend or annul the plan. The property's market value       before the decision shall be calculated with regard to       planning conditions as well as the current compensation       principles at the time of the coming into force of this       Act. If the municipality so demands, however, the value may       not be set at a higher amount than included in the       regulations of section 36 of the Municipal Taxation Act       (1928:370) in their formulation in June 1990, and this       value may be deducted when calculating the capital gain       from the sale of a property by 31 December 1990, adjusted       with the percentage by which the basic value according to       the General Insurance Act (1962:381) has been changed by       the date of the sale.         Claims for compensation in accordance with the first       subsection shall be submitted within two years from the       date of the decision, which is being appealed against,       gaining legal force. If the property owner or the holder of       special rights to a property has submitted a claim and is       entitled to compensation, the municipality may instead       acquire the property or the right."   b.     The 1988 Act on Judicial Review of Certain Administrative Decisions was introduced as a result of the European Court of Human Rights' findings in several cases, notably against Sweden, that lack of judicial review of certain administrative decisions infringed Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. It was enacted as a temporary law to remain in force until 1991; its validity has subsequently been extended.         Pursuant to section 1 of this Act, a person who has been a party to administrative proceedings before the Government or another public authority may, in the absence of any other remedy, apply to the Supreme Administrative Court, as the first and only court, for review of any decisions in the case which involve the exercise of public authority vis-à-vis a private individual. The kinds of administrative decisions covered by the Act are further defined in Chapter 8, sections 2 and 3 of the Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen), to which section 1 of the 1988 Act refers. Section 2 of the Act specifies several types of decisions which fall outside its scope, none of which is relevant in the instant case.         In proceedings brought under the 1988 Act, the Supreme Administrative Court examines whether the contested decision "conflicts with any legal rule" (section 1 of the 1988 Act). According to the preparatory work to the Act, as reproduced in Government Bill 1987/88:69 (pp. 23-24), its review of the merits of cases concerns essentially questions of law but may, in so far as relevant for the application of the law, extend also to factual issues; it must also consider whether there are any procedural errors which may have affected the outcome of the case.         If the Supreme Administrative Court finds that the impugned decision is unlawful, it must quash it and, where necessary, refer the case back to the relevant administrative authority.   c.     The procedure before the Supreme Administrative Court is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1971 (förvaltningsprocesslagen). It is in principle a written procedure, but the Supreme Administrative Court may decide to hold an oral hearing on specific matters if this is likely to assist it in its examination of the case or to expedite the proceedings (section 9).   COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains that the decision to revoke the detailed development plan of 1938 could not be brought before a court as required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention. He furthermore maintains that the review offered by the Supreme Administrative Court under the 1988 Act did not meet the requirements of this provision.         The applicant also complains that the revocation of the detailed development plan of 1938 amounts to a violation of the rights secured to him under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 21 July 1990 and registered on 2 August 1990.         On 29 March 1993 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.         After an extension of the time-limit the Government's observations were submitted on 30 August 1993. The applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 15 November 1993, also following an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.         On 28 November 1994 the Commission decided to obtain from the parties further observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.         The Government's further observations were submitted on 3 January 1995 and the applicant's further observations in reply were submitted on 14 February 1995.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains of matters which relate to questions of access to court and peaceful enjoyment of his possessions which were also at issue in his previous application. However, the Commission notes that his present application concerns a period of time which differs from the one covered by the European Court of Human Rights' judgment of 25 October 1989. It follows that no issue arises under Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant complains that, under Swedish law, he did not have access to a tribunal before which he could challenge the revocation of the detailed development plan of 1938. He furthermore complains that the review of this decision which he could obtain pursuant to the 1988 Act did not fulfil the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention according to which:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations       ... everyone is entitled to a ... public hearing by [a] ...       tribunal ...".         The Commission recalls that in the present case Article 6 (Art. 6) only applies in so far as the proceedings in question determine a civil right or obligation. The applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) depends on whether there was a dispute over a "right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law, and, if so, whether this "right" was of a "civil" character within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). In particular, the dispute must be genuine and serious, it may relate not only to the actual existence of a right, but also to its scope and the manner of its exercise and, finally, the results of the proceedings concerning the dispute at issue must be directly decisive for such a right (see Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 19, paras. 66-67).         The Commission recalls that a dispute concerning the lawfulness of building plan amendments which would in effect revoke a land owner's conditional right under the old plan to build a second house on his property involves a determination of the owner's civil rights (see Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 180-A, pp. 12-14, paras. 32-34). Also a dispute concerning the lawfulness of a decision rejecting a request for a building permit as an exemption from a building plan involves a determination of civil rights, if the applicable national law provides for such an exemption (see Eur. Court H.R., Skärby judgment of 8 June 1990, Series A no. 180-B, pp. 36-38, paras. 28-29).         The Commission further recalls that it has previously held that a decision rejecting a request for amendment of an existing building plan does not involve a determination of civil rights (see No. 11844/85, Dec. 29.2.88, D.R. 55 p. 205). The Commission has also held that a dispute about an owner's use of land for purposes other than those listed in the relevant rules does not determine the owner's civil rights, but concerns the application of public law regulations to the permitted use of the land (see No. 10471/83, Dec. 9.12.85, D.R. 45 p. 113). Finally, in its Report in the Skärby case, the Commission considered the decision to refuse an exemption from the building plan not to be of the same kind as a decision not to amend the building plan (Skärby v. Sweden, Comm. Report 16.3.89, para. 82, Eur. Court H.R., Series A no. 180-B, p. 47).         From the above case-law it follows that civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are involved where the applicant has, or could arguably be said to have, rights recognised under domestic law which are revoked or denied by the decisions of the authorities. In the present case the Commission recalls that the detailed development plan of 1938 allowed for construction on a plot of land less than 1,500 m2, if sufficient water and sewage facilities had been provided for. Such facilities were apparently provided for in the 1960's and it has never been argued that the applicant's plot does not fulfil these requirements. The applicant's attempts to construct on his land were, however, thwarted by continuing building prohibitions against which he unsuccessfully appealed on several occasions. From his previous application it is clear that in so far as the applicant complained about the effects of these building prohibitions this dispute concerned a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention as this was a genuine dispute over a right to build on his property which he could arguably claim to have, provided he fulfilled certain other requirements. Accordingly, Article 6 (Art. 6) was applicable to those proceedings (cf. Allan Jacobsson judgment, mentioned above, pp. 20-21, paras. 66-74).         In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant, on 9 July 1987, filed a new request with the Building Committee for a preliminary opinion regarding a building permit and that the Committee, on 11 September 1990, finally decided to reject the request. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. Instead he pursued an appeal against the revocation of the detailed development plan by the Municipal Assembly of 21 June 1989, a revocation which was upheld by the County Administrative Board on 7 September 1989, confirmed by the Government on 14 June 1990 and eventually by the Supreme Administrative Court on 11 November 1990.         The Commission considers that the dispute concerning the revocation of the detailed development plan in effect also had repercussions on the applicant's conditional right under this plan to build on his property. Thus the Commission finds that it involved a determination of his civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (mutatis mutandis the Mats Jacobsson judgment mentioned above). The Commission must accordingly consider whether the proceedings fulfilled the requirements of this provision.   a.     The applicant first complains that he could not bring the question of the revocation of the detailed development plan before a court. The Commission recalls, however, that the issue was eventually examined by the Supreme Administrative Court which pronounced judgment on 11 November 1990. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   b.     The applicant also complains that in any event the scope of review afforded by the Supreme Administrative Court under the 1988 Act was insufficient for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. In this respect the Commission recalls that the 1988 Act provides for an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against administrative decisions involving exercise of public authority regarding a private individual or legal person in cases where no other judicial remedy is available. The scope of the Act is defined by reference to certain provisions in the Instrument of Government, and some enumerated categories of decisions are excluded from the application of the Act.         The examination by the Supreme Administrative Court under the 1988 Act is in principle limited to the question whether the challenged decision is in conflict with any legal rule and according to the travaux préparatoires the examination shall concentrate on the lawfulness of the challenged decision. However, the Commission recalls that the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court is not limited to an examination of how the law has been applied but may include a re-examination of the facts upon which the application of the law was based. The Supreme Administrative Court shall also examine whether fundamental legal principles such as objectivity, impartiality and equality before the law have been respected. Moreover, the Supreme Administrative Court shall examine whether there have been any procedural errors which may have affected the outcome of the case.         Furthermore, confining itself as far as possible to examining the question raised by the case before it the Commission has found no evidence which could lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Administrative Court in examining the complaints, as submitted by the applicant, had to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or in ascertaining the various facts.         In these circumstances the Commission finds that the review available to the applicant in the instant case fulfilled, as to its scope, the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. also No. 18660/91, Dec. 7.12.94, D.R. 79-A p. 11).         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   c.     Finally, as regards the review offered by the Supreme Administrative Court the applicant complains of the fact that the Court refused his request for an oral hearing.         The Commission has taken cognizance of both parties' submissions on this point. After a preliminary examination thereof the Commission has reached the conclusion that it raises a serious issue as to the interpretation and application of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and that this issue can only be determined after a full examination of its merits. It follows that this part of the application cannot be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.   3.     The applicant also complains that the revocation of the plan amounts to a violation of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. He invokes in this respect Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of       his possessions except in the public interest and subject       to the conditions provided for by law and by the general       principles of international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it       deems necessary to control the use of property in       accordance with the general interest or to secure the       payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."         The Government contend, which is contested by the applicant, that in so far as his reference to the above provision relates to the fact that he has not been granted a building permit, he has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him since he did not lodge an appeal against the Building Committee's decision of 11 September 1990 with the County Administrative Board and, if necessary, with the Government. Furthermore, they maintain that the complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded.         The Commission recalls that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law. It is true that in the present case the applicant applied for a preliminary opinion regarding a building permit on 9 July 1987, that the Building Committee eventually on 11 September 1990 refused to grant such a permit and that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. In these circumstances the Commission agrees with the Government that the applicant cannot be considered as having complied with the condition as to exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of his possibilities of obtaining a building permit and such a complaint would have to be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.         However, the Commission considers that the applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) also relates to the fact that the Swedish authorities decided to revoke the detailed development plan of 1938. In respect of this the applicant did comply with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies as he not only obtained a decision from the Government but also had the matter examined by the Supreme Administrative Court pursuant to the 1988 Act. The Commission cannot, therefore, reject this part of the application for non-compliance with the exhaustion rule.         The Commission recalls that when the applicant bought his property it was subject to a building prohibition which was prolonged on several occasions. Under Swedish law he had a right to build on his property provided the intended construction would not run counter to any confirmed plan, regulation, or building prohibition. Thus, the effect of the building prohibition was the suspension of the conditional right to build which the applicant otherwise had. From the applicant's previous case the Commission recalls that the building prohibition, which had been in force for more than twenty years, did not violate his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention as this was not considered to be disproportionate to the requirements of the authorities' legitimate aim of planning for the area (cf. the Allan Jacobsson judgment mentioned above, pp. 17-19, paras. 56-64).         The Commission finds that the revocation of the 1938 detailed development plan did not change or alter this situation in any particular way. Neither before nor after the revocation did the applicant have an unconditional right to build on his property and, as before, the possibility exists for the applicant to apply for a building permit should he so wish. As mentioned above he in fact commenced proceedings to this effect, but decided not to pursue the matter.         The Commission further recalls that there has been a house on the applicant's property since he bought it. He has not been under any constraint to sell his property. It is true that the on-going planning procedure has left the applicant in uncertainty as to the further development of the area in which his property is situated. However, in part this uncertainty already existed when the applicant bought the property. Moreover, any possible expropriation of the property in the future would be subject to provisions of law and guarantees of compensation. In these circumstances the Commission considers that the applicant has been able to use his property in the way which he could reasonably expect when he bought it. It considers, in view of the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contacting States in the area of regulation of detailed town planning, that the revocation of a plan to this effect cannot be considered to be disproportionate to the authorities' legitimate aims.         The Commission therefore finds that the interference with the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions was justified under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the       complaint, under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, of the       lack of an oral hearing in the Supreme Administrative Court, and         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.   Secretary to the Commission             President of the Commission         (H.C. KRÜGER)                           (S. TRECHSEL)