CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 29 novembre 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 19496/92                       by G.B.                       against Italy         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 29 November 1995, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 21 September 1991 by G.B. against Italy and registered on 7 February 1992 under file No. 19496/92;         Having regard to:   -      the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 18 May       1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on       11 August 1995;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1916 and residing in Livorno.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.         On 7 November 1986 the applicant's wife applied to the presiding judge of the Livorno court in order to obtain an ex parte injunction freezing ("sequestro conservativo") her husband's bank account and portfolio (including stocks, shares and securities), in which she claimed to own a fifty per cent share.         By decree of 7 November 1986, the President of the court allowed the freezing of the applicant's bank account and portfolio, on the grounds that the applicant's wife's claim appeared prima facie to be well-founded (fumus boni iuris) and that there existed a periculum in mora.         The freezing of the bank account took effect in Livorno on 11 November 1986; that of the portfolio took effect in Pisa on 14 November 1986.         The substantive proceedings were instituted by the applicant's wife before the Livorno court by summons of 21 November 1986.         By judgment of 17 July 1990, the Livorno court held that the applicant's wife was the legitimate owner of fifty per cent of the money deposited in the frozen bank account and of the portfolio, and therefore ratified the injunction.         The judgment was filed with the registry on 7 November 1990 and was served on the applicant's wife on 7 January 1991.         By a writ served on 7 February 1991, the applicant lodged an appeal before the Florence court of appeal against this judgment, claiming that his wife did not have any property rights over either the sums of money deposited in his bank account or over his portfolio.         By a decision delivered on 5 March 1993, filed with the registry on 11 June 1993 and served on the applicant on 1 February 1994, the Florence court of appeal dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it had been lodged out of time, the relevant thirty days' time limit having expired on 6 February 1991.         On 14 April 1994, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against this judgment; the proceedings are currently pending before the Court of cassation.   COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention about the length of the civil proceedings concerning the freezing of his bank account and portfolio.         He further maintains that the financial prejudice resulting from the length of the said proceedings infringes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         He finally alleges that the injunction itself constitutes a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         The applicant claims to be the sole legitimate owner both of the sums of money deposited in his bank account and the portfolio and therefore complains about the domestic courts' decision.         He further asserts that since his wife's claim related only to fifty per cent of the money deposited in his bank account and of the portfolio, the injunction should have been authorised only in relation to half the money and the stocks, shares and securities.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 21 September 1991 and registered on 7 February 1992.         On 22 February 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, as to the complaints about the length of the proceedings and the financial prejudice resulting therefrom.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 18 May 1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicant replied on 11 August 1995.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains about the length of the proceedings concerning the freezing of his bank account and portfolio. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, according to which:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (...);       everyone is entitled to a (...) hearing within a reasonable time       by (...) a tribunal (...)."         The proceedings in question began on 7 November 1986, when the applicant's wife applied for an ex parte injunction against the applicant, and are currently pending before the Court of cassation; therefore their overall length covers over nine years.         The Government maintain that the overall duration of the proceedings cannot be regarded as being unreasonable, having regard in particular to the failure of the applicant to apply for a speedy trial before the Court of cassation.         The applicant contends that the duration of the proceedings is in any event excessive, in particular in view of his age.         The Commission considers, in the light of the criteria established by the case-law of the Convention on the question of "reasonable time" (the complexity of the case, the applicant's conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. This complaint cannot therefore be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring this complaint inadmissible has been established.   2.     The applicant further alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), as a result both of the length of the proceedings at issue and of the freezing of his bank account and portfolio.         Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), in so far as relevant, reads:         "Every (...) person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his       possessions."   a)     In so far as the part of the complaint concerning the financial burden resulting from the length of the proceedings is concerned, the Commission refers to the case-law of the Commission (No. 25237/94, Latella v. Italy, dec. 13.9.95, unpublished; No. 26432/95, Siface v. Italy, dec. 24.10.95, unpublished) and considers that it cannot be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention and therefore requires an examination on the merits.   b)     In so far as the remainder of the complaint is concerned, the Commission observes that it relates to two different aspects of the freezing of the assets.         On the one hand, the applicant challenges the domestic courts' decision that his wife is the legitimate owner of fifty per cent of the frozen money and portfolio.         On the other hand, the applicant maintains that, since his wife's claim related only to half of his money and portfolio, the freezing of the other half was unnecessary and unlawful.         However, the Commission observes that the applicant has appealed against the Livorno court judgment and that the relevant proceedings are currently pending before the Court of cassation; it therefore considers that the applicant cannot, at this stage, claim to be a victim of the alleged violation.         It follows that this part of the complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the       applicant's complaints about the length of the proceedings and       about the financial burden resulting from such length;         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.   Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber         (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)