CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 5 décembre 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }      EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS   FIRST CHAMBER   Application No. 22045/93   Kostas Beis   against   Greece   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 5 December 1995)                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The application           (paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The proceedings           (paras. 5-10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The present Report           (paras. 11-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 16-32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3        A.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 16-26). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3        B.    Relevant domestic law           (paras. 27-32). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 33-71) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 33). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7        B.    Points at issue           (para. 34). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7        C.    As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1           (paras. 35-54). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7        a.    Existence of a property right           (paras. 36-48). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7        b.    Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1           (paras. 49-54). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9             CONCLUSION           (para. 55). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10        D.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           (paras. 56-62). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10             CONCLUSION           (para. 63). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page        E.    As regards Article 13 of the Convention           (paras. 64-67). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12             CONCLUSION           (para. 68). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12        F.    Recapitulation           (paras. 69-71). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12   APPENDIX: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE           ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION. . . . . . . . . 13   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The application   2.    The applicants is a Greek citizen, born in Greece and resident in Athens. He was represented before the Commission by Mr. Ch. Chryssanthakis, a lawyer practising in Athens.   3.    The application is directed against Greece.   The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. L. Papidas, President of the Legal Advisory Council of the State and Mr. Ph. Georgakopoulos, Deputy Member of the Legal Advisory Council of the State.   4.    The case concerns the refusal of a public body to comply with a judge's final decision ordering it to pay the applicant a sum of money and the lack of any possibility under domestic law of compelling it to do so.   The applicant invokes Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   B.    The proceedings   5.    The application was introduced on 18 March 1993 and registered on 11 June 1993.   6.    On 2 March 1994 the Commission (First Chamber) decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.   7.    The Government's observations were submitted on 22 June 1994 after an   extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.   The applicant replied on 20 July 1994.   8.    On 11 January 1995 the Commission declared the application admissible.   9.    The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 26 January 1995 and they were invited to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished.   10.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   11.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission (First Chamber) in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             Mrs. J. LIDDY, Acting President           MM.   C.L. ROZAKIS                E. BUSUTTIL                A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                B. MARXER                B. CONFORTI                N. BRATZA                I. BÉKÉS                E. KONSTANTINOV                G. RESS                A. PERENIC                C. BÎRSAN                K. HERNDL   12.   The text of this Report was adopted on 5 December 1995 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        (i)   to establish the facts, and        (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   14.    The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto.   15.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   16.   In March 1992 the head of the legal service of the Technical Chamber of Greece (Tehniko Epimelitirio Ellados - hereafter TEE), a legal entity of public law (nomiko prosopo dimosiu dikeu) enjoying all the privileges and immunities of the State, entrusted the applicant with the drafting of two expert's opinions concerning proceedings brought against the TEE by Messrs. P and S. It was agreed that the applicant would receive a fee of 7,500,000 drachmas for the drafting of the two opinions. Mr. P, an engineer, had sued the TEE for having failed adequately to represent him in proceedings for the recovery of his fees. Mr. S., a lawyer who used to provide legal services to the TEE under a long-term agreement, had initiated proceedings against the TEE to challenge the termination of that agreement.   17.   The applicant submitted his opinions on 22 April 1992. However, the fee agreed was not paid. According to the applicant, the deputy (paredros) of the Court of Auditors (Elengtiko Sinedrio) did not approve the payment on the ground that the opinions could have been drafted by the legal staff of the TEE.   18.   On 4 May 1992 the Committee of Management of the TEE set up a seven-member expert committee which would have advised the TEE on a number of issues against a fee of 10,500,000 drachmas. The applicant was one of the members of this committee and one of the issues the committee would have provided advice on was the actions brought against the TEE by P and S.   19.   On 8 May 1992 five of the members of the committee notified the legal service of the TEE that the committee had agreed to delegate to the applicant the task of advising the TEE on the proceedings brought against it by P and S. The applicant would receive 7,500,000 drachmas out of the total sum offered by the TEE to the committee. The remaining issues in the committee's mandate would be dealt with by the other members of the committee, who would receive the remaining 3,000,000 drachmas.   20.   On 12 June 1992 the TEE acknowledged receipt of two expert opinions drafted by the applicant concerning the proceedings brought by P and S against the TEE.   21.   On 9 July 1992 the Committee of Management of the TEE decided to pay the applicant 7,500,000 drachmas. On 29 July 1992, however, the Audit Court commissioner (epitropos) refused to authorise the payment, on the ground that the establishment of the expert committee had been unnecessary and therefore illegal. The TEE disagreed with the commissioner's opinion and on 16 September 1992 the case was referred to one of the Chambers of the Audit Court.   22.   On 5 October 1992 the applicant lodged with the judge of the Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikio) of Athens an application for an order for payment (diatagi pliromis) against the TEE, by which he sought recovery of the agreed remuneration for the two expert opinions he had submitted. His application was granted on 12 October 1992 (order for payment No. 12207/92). Taking into consideration the decision of 4 May 1992 of the Committee of Management of the TEE, the certificate of the TEE of 12 June 1992 and the decision of 9 July 1992 of the Committee of Management of the TEE, the judge ordered the TEE to pay the applicant 7,500,000 drachmas.   23.   On 21 October 1992 the applicant served the order on the TEE together with formal notice to pay. However, no payment was made. The order was served again on 11 November 1992, after the expiration of the time limit in which the TEE could have filed an opposition (anakopi).   24.   On 24 November 1992 the First Chamber of the Audit Court confirmed that no payment should be made. The Court considered that, although the setting up of the committee was legal, the relevant rules did not provide for the delegation of part of the committee's responsibilities to one of its members.   25.   On 3 December 1992, after the payment order had acquired force of res judicata, the applicant submitted to the Bank of Greece a formal request for compulsory seizure of the deposited TEE's assets.   26.   In the meantime the TEE indicated once more its wish to satisfy the applicant on the basis of the order for payment. On 12 February 1993, however, the competent Commissioner of the Court of Auditors refused to authorise the payment relying on a decision of the Plenary of the Court of 6 March 1985 to the effect that the res judicata force of the orders for payment being limited, they cannot be assimilated to a final court decision and, as a result, they do not bind the Court of Auditors.   B.    Relevant domestic law   27.   The procedure for issuing an order for payment is set forth in Articles 623 to 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure.        Article 623        "A person may apply for an order for payment, under the      special procedure of Articles 624 to 634, in respect of      claims to specific sums of money ..... the existence of      which is proven by deed done by a public authority or      privately".        Article 625        "The justice of the peace (irinodikis) is competent to      issue orders for payment in respect of claims otherwise      coming within his jurisdiction. The judge of the court of      first instance is competent to issue orders for payment in      all other cases. No hearing is held on the application for      an order for payment".        Article 627        "The judge decides on the application as soon as possible,      without notifying the debtor ...."        Article 629 provides:        "The judge grants the application if it is well founded in      law and in fact, orders the debtor to pay the sum due as      well as the court costs ......"        Article 631        "An order for payment is a title which can be executed".        Article 632 para. 1        "The debtor against whom an order has been issued has the      right to lodge an opposition within fifteen days from its      notification. The opposition is lodged with the court which      is competent ratione materiae to hear the case ....."        Article 633 para. 2        "If no opposition is lodged within the time-limit provided      by law, the person in favour of whom the order has been      issued may notify the debtor once again. The latter has the      right to lodge an opposition within a period of fifteen      from notification ....... If no opposition is lodged, the      order for payment acquires force of res judicata ......   28.   The presidential decree of 27.11/14.12.1926 provides the following in respect of the TEE:        Article 4        "1.   The aim of the TEE is the promotion of knowledge in      the scientific fields which are related to the      specialisation of its members .....        2.    The TEE acts as the advisor of the Government in      technical matters related to its aim .....        3.    The TEE conducts the relevant examinations and grants      the licences required for the exercise of the profession of      an engineer, in accordance with the relevant provisions,      keeps a registry with the names of professional engineers,      technical offices and firms, seeks the recovery of fees      payable to engineers in accordance with the relevant      provisions ......        ........"        Article 41        "The TEE enjoys all the privileges of the State ....."   29.   Furthermore, the presidential decree 766/74 provides the following:        "The Court of Auditors exercises an a priori control over      the expenditure of ........ the TEE ......."   30.   Article 8 para. 1 of law 2097/52 provides:        "Court decisions ordering the payment of sums of money or      court costs cannot be enforced against the State ....."   31.   Article 98 para. 1 of the Constitution provides the following in respect of the Court of Auditors:        "The Court of Auditors is in particular competent for the      following matters:        a)    Controlling the expenditures of the State, the local      authorities and any other public law body which has been      subjected to its control in accordance with a special law.        ........."   32.   Furthermore, Article 17 of the presidential decree 774/80, which has codified all the legal provisions concerning the Court of Auditors, provides the following:        "1.   The Court of Auditors .....        b)    exercises the control under Article 98 of the      Constitution ...... in order to verify that there exist      lawfully allocated funds for each expenditure and that the      expenditure has been effected in accordance with the      provisions on public accounts and any other relevant legal      provision.        ......        3.    When exercising its control powers the Court of      Auditors may examine any preliminary issue which may arise;      however, it is bound by the legal provisions regarding res      judicata ....."   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   33.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints concerning the refusal of the TEE to comply with a judge's final decision ordering it to pay the applicant a sum of money and the lack of any possibility under domestic law of compelling the TEE to do so.   B.    Points at issue   34.   The issues to be determined are whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and of Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 (art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention.   C.    As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)   35.   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties."   a.    Existence of a property right   36.   The Commission must first establish whether a property right was involved.   37.   The applicant submits that the judge who issues an order for payment determines an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) right. Before issuing the order, the judge has to be satisfied that the application is well founded in law and in fact. The applicant admits that the order for payment in itself cannot be assimilated to a court judgment. However, the law grants the person against whom the order is made the right to lodge an opposition. Thereupon a court judgment is issued which has res judicata force.   38.   The applicant further argues that the exercise by the Court of Auditors of its control powers cannot cancel property rights deriving from a contractual relationship between an individual acting in good faith and a public authority, especially when these rights have been recognised by a judge whose assessment has acquired res judicata force.   39.   The applicant finally claims that, if he had tried to lodge civil proceedings, his action would have been rejected given the res judicata force of the order for payment. Alternatively, it would have been rejected for lack of legal interest, as he had already obtained a payment order. In any event, several years would have elapsed before he could obtain a final decision in proceedings for breach of contract.   40.   The Greek Government contend that the judge who issues an order for payment does not determine an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) right, since he does not deliver justice. The order is not a court judgment and is not pronounced pursuant to a judicial procedure with all the appropriate procedural guarantees. It has very limited consequences and does not create an irrebutable presumption that the claim exists and that the assessment of the judge is correct. The Court of Auditors, which must authorise all public expenditure, cannot in such circumstances consider itself bound by an order for payment.   41.   The Government further argue that the existence of a claim depends on the legality of the underlying contractual relationship. As a result, it cannot be concluded, on the basis of an order for payment, that a claim exists, when the competent organs of control, in casu the Court of Auditors, have not accepted the legality of this claim.   42.   The Government finally claim that, if the applicant had instituted proceedings before the civil courts for breach of contract, he would have obtained satisfaction from the TEE. The latter was willing to pay but was prevented by the Court of Auditors which considered the relevant expenditure illegal. However, a final court judgment in an ordinary civil action (agogi) for recovery would have bound the Court of Auditors, which would have then authorised the payment.   43.   The Commission recalls that, in accordance with its case-law, a claim can constitute a "possession", within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), provided that it is sufficiently established (Stran Refineries S.A. and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, Comm. Report 12.5.93, unpublished, para. 78, No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14 p. 146; No. 7775/77, Dec. 5.10.78, D.R. 15 p. 143).   44.   In the circumstances of the case, the Commission observes that the applicant's claim to his fee was not tested before the courts in civil proceedings for breach of contract but in the context of the special procedure for the issuing of a payment order.   45.   The parties agree that the purpose of the special procedure leading to the issuing of a payment order is to enable creditors to obtain speedy relief in respect of claims to specific sums of money the existence of which is proven by deed. The payment order is issued on the application of the creditor by a single judge on the basis of the deed. The procedure is in writing. Although the judge must be satisfied that the application is well founded in law and in fact, the person against whom the order is made is not heard. The order for payment can form the basis for the seizure of the debtor's assets. Before obtaining execution, however, the creditor must serve the order on the debtor and the latter may lodge an opposition. Thereupon a hearing is held with the participation of both parties. If no opposition is lodged the order for payment acquires force of res judicata.   46.   The Commission observes that the applicant obtained a payment order, which he served on the TEE. The latter did not lodge an opposition and, as a result, the order for payment acquired force of res judicata. The Government submit that a general distinction must be made between the underlying right, which is not the subject matter of the procedure for a payment order, and the claim to be paid a particular sum of money, which forms its subject matter. However, the Government have never argued that in the particular case the TEE could not raise in the context of the procedure for the payment order their arguments regarding the alleged illegality of the underlying contractual relationship. Moreover, it is not disputed that the applicant acted in good faith and that he completed the work for which the TEE had agreed to pay him a fee of a certain amount.   47.   In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the distinction between underlying right and claim is largely theoretical. Noting that the TEE could lodge an opposition but apparently decided not to, the Commission concludes that the applicant's claim to be paid a fee of 7,500,000 drachmas is sufficiently established and constitutes a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   48.   The fact that the applicant did not lodge an ordinary civil action for breach of contract does not undermine this conclusion. The Commission notes in this connection that the Government have not contested the applicant's submission that several years would have elapsed before he could obtain a final decision in proceedings for breach of contract. The proceedings for the payment order, on the contrary, lasted just over a month and the applicant's claim was sufficiently tested in the context of these proceedings to become a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   b.     Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)   49.   The Commission must then decide whether the refusal of the TEE to comply with the payment order violated the applicant's right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   50.   The applicant submits that there has been an interference with his property rights which is not justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   51.   The Government argue that the TEE was prevented from complying by the Court of Auditors which would not authorise the relevant expenditure on the ground that it was illegal. As for the rest, the Government submit that it is in the public interest not to allow enforcement against public bodies. Any interference with the applicant's possessions would have been, therefore, justified under Article 1 para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2).   52.   The Commission recalls, that in accordance with its case-law, the refusal of a State, which enjoys immunity from execution, to comply with a court decision ordering it to pay a sum of money, which constitutes a possession for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), amounts to a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision. Moreover, it constitutes a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) if it cannot be justified by any of the restrictions provided for in that Article (The Heirs of Dierckx, Comm. Report 6.3.90, paras. 35-36, unpublished).   53.   In the circumstances of the case, it was not the Greek State stricto sensu (Dimosio) which did not comply with a decision ordering payment of a sum of money but a public law body (nomiko prosopo dimosiu dikeu), the TEE. Under domestic law, public law bodies, although legally separate from the State, are assimilated in many respects with it. As a result, the TEE enjoys all the legal privileges of the State. However, the TEE is in essence a professional association. Although it has been also entrusted with the discharge of certain public functions, the agreement which it concluded with the applicant did not directly involve the exercise of these public functions. Yet the TEE enjoyed immunity from execution in connection with this agreement as well.   54.   The Commission notes that, although the TEE enjoyed immunity from execution, it was willing to comply with the payment order. It was prevented from doing so, because the Court of Auditors was of the opinion that the relevant expenditure was illegal. However, the Court of Auditors expressed this opinion when exercising an a priori control of the legality of the relevant expenditure and the Commission considers that the opinion of another branch of the administration cannot be invoked to thwart the protection afforded to property rights by the courts. It follows that, in the circumstances of the case, there can be no justification for the deprivation of the applicant's property rights which resulted from the combination of the privileges of the TEE and the view taken by the Court of Auditors.   CONCLUSION   55.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   D.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention   56.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations      or of a criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled      to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an      independent and impartial tribunal established by law.      ......"   57.   The applicant argues that the proceedings for a payment order involved a determination of his civil rights with the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. The requirements of that provision were violated as a result of the immunity from execution enjoyed by the TEE and the fact that he was not allowed under Greek law to seize assets of his debtor, the TEE, which are deposited with banks. In the circumstances of the case, the applicant's rights were de facto determined by a member of the Court of Auditors, who refused to authorise the payment of the sum. Although an appeal lay with the Court of Auditors, the latter is not an Article 6 court, as it is called upon to review the actions of its own members.   58.   The Government consider it doubtful whether the applicant can invoke Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, since the dispute which led to the issuing of the order for payment is neither real nor serious. The real basis of the applicant's contractual relationship with the TEE is the agreement of March 1992, which, however, did not form the subject matter of the dispute of which he complains. In any event, the proceedings for an order for payment do not involve the determination of civil rights and the applicant never instituted ordinary civil proceedings.   59.   The Commission considers that the proceedings for the payment order involved a determination of the applicant's civil rights. This follows from the Commission's earlier finding that the applicant's claim was sufficiently tested in the context of these proceedings to become a "possession" within the meaning of Protocol No. 1 (Eur. Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 29, para. 79). Moreover, the Commission finds no ground for concluding, as the Government suggest, that the dispute which led to the issuing of the order for payment was neither real nor serious. As a result, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention was applicable in the proceedings in question.   60.   The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention guarantees the right to a court in the determination of one's civil rights and obligations (Eur. Court H.R., Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 18, para. 36). It further considers that the right to a court would be rendered entirely illusory and theoretical if State authorities could refuse, without acting in breach of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, to comply with court decisions issued against them in disputes involving the determination of civil rights and obligations (H. v. Greece, Comm. Report 23.10.95, para. 55, unpublished). The same holds true in respect of public law bodies which are largely assimilated under domestic law to the State.   61.   In the circumstances of the case, the Government admit that the applicant had no means under domestic law of having the payment order enforced against the TEE, which enjoyed immunity from execution. The Commission notes that a decision issued in the context of proceedings for breach of contract could not have been enforced against the TEE either. It follows that the applicant's right to an effective determination of his rights by a court has been violated.   62.   In the light of this finding, the Commission does not consider it necessary to examine whether, if the TEE had not enjoyed immunity from execution, Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention would have been violated because the applicant would not have been allowed to seize the TEE's assets which were deposited with the Bank of Greece. In any event, the applicant has not shown that this would have been the only means of obtaining redress.        CONCLUSION   63.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   E.    As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention   64.   Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention reads as follows:        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."   65.   The applicant submits that he has no effective remedy under Greek law for the violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), given the immunity from execution enjoyed by the TEE and the case-law of the Greek courts to the effect that creditors are not allowed to seize assets of their debtors which are deposited with banks.   66.   The Government contend in essence that the applicant would have recovered his fees if he had instituted ordinary civil proceedings for breach of contract.   67.   The Commission, having noted that in this case there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), considers that no separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.        CONCLUSION   68.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case no separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.   F.    Recapitulation   69.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (para. 55).   70.    The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (para. 63).   71.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case no separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention (para. 68).             Secretary                         Acting President      to the First Chamber                of the First Chamber          (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                          (J. LIDDY)