CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 17 janvier 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21062/92                       by Kristina KRAMELIUS                       against Sweden           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 17 January 1996, the following members being present:              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE, Acting President            MM.    H. DANELIUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 29 September 1992 by Kristina KRAMELIUS against Sweden and registered on 14 December 1992 under file No. 21062/92;         Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 10 March 1995, the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 3 May 1995 and the additional observations submitted by the Government on 16 June 1995;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a Swedish citizen of Polish origin, born in 1946 and resident at Huddinge near Stockholm. She is represented by Mr. Peter Klevius, an anthropologist at Borgå, Finland.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   I.     Particular circumstances of the case         1.    Background         The applicant moved from Poland to Sweden in 1976. A daughter, Anette, was born to her in February 1979. The applicant is a single mother and Anette's legal custodian. Anette's father is of Iranian origin.         In December 1988 the Pupil Welfare Committee (elevvårdsteamet) reported Anette's behaviour in school to the Sub-Municipal Administration (kommundelsnämnden) of Flemingsberg. The report concluded that Anette's mental condition had been poor since she had started school in 1986. Her behaviour had been "destructive" and the school had repeatedly discussed her problems with the applicant, who had considered, however, that they had been caused by the school and society. The report also questioned the applicant's mental condition. The report was lodged pursuant to section 71 of the 1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620). The Sub-Municipal Administration exercised the functions of a Social Council (socialnämnd) such as referred to in the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lag 1980:621 med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga) and subsequently in the 1990 Act with the same name (lag 1990:52; hereinafter "the 1990 Act"). According to the applicant, the report purported to have been lodged by the whole Pupil Welfare Committee was produced exclusively by the school's headmaster.         In September 1990 two teachers at Anette's school again reported her situation to the Sub-Municipal Administration (hereinafter referred to as "the Social Council"). They considered that Anette was expressing "morbid" ideas, e.g., in the form of essays, and that this was a call for help. The teachers were anxious about her mental health and suspected that Anette's problems were due to the applicant's behaviour. For instance, the applicant had untruthfully alleged that a teacher had called her to report that Anette had been hit by another pupil.         The applicant later lodged a criminal complaint, alleging that staff at Anette's school had failed to intervene in order to stop the bullying of Anette which had allegedly been caused by her parents' origin. The applicant invoked a medical report of 5 October 1990 supporting to some extent the claim that Anette had been subjected to physical assaults. The report concluded, for instance, that a scar in Anette's hand could well have been caused by a nail which a fellow pupil had allegedly tried to hammer into her hand. According to the applicant, she had attempted to discuss the bullying with Anette's principal teacher, who had threatened "to make things worse" for Anette unless the applicant stopped making untruthful allegations.         Meanwhile, a social welfare officer had begun to suspect that the applicant was mentally ill and that she might herself have inflicted the injuries on Anette. Having contacted staff of the school, the police decided not to pursue its investigation of the applicant's complaint and contacted the Social Council.         2.    The public care orders and their implementation         On 15 October 1990 Anette was provisionally placed in public care by decision of the Chairman of the Social Council pursuant to section 6 of the 1990 Act. The provisional care order was based on a finding that the applicant's behaviour was jeopardising Anette's mental health. The applicant had rejected every attempt by social welfare officials to meet Anette. She had not agreed to let Anette undergo a psychological assessment in a residential home for children. Neighbours of the applicant had also filed reports with the Social Council in which they had expressed their concern about Anette's well-being. According to the applicant, the provisional care order was not preceded by any inspection of the conditions in her and Anette's home. Nor had it been shown that the applicant was not in good mental health.         On 16 October 1990 Anette was fetched from the applicant's and her home and placed for observation in the Geneta residential home for children. The provisional care order was upheld by the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Stockholm on 25 November 1990.         On 27 November 1990 the Social Council requested that Anette be placed in public care pursuant to section 2 of the 1990 Act. The applicant received a copy of the Council's investigation. She objected to the Council's request, stating that Anette's need of care could be satisfied with voluntary means. Anette's official counsel supported the Council's request.         On 11 December 1990 the County Administrative Court held a hearing and on 8 January 1991 it granted the Social Council's request. It noted, inter alia, that when Anette had started elementary school in 1986 her teacher and the school psychologist had found her to suffer from mental problems. The school had provided her with support activities such as picture therapy. The applicant had objected to the support activities which had then been discontinued against the school's wishes. The Social Council had twice been contacted by Anette's school on account of Anette's behaviour. The applicant had, however, not accepted the Council's offers to appoint a support family and to contact the local children's and young persons' psychiatric clinic. According to a report of 16 November 1990 submitted by Kristina Ånstrand, an authorised psychotherapist, Anette's concept of her own identity was "confused" and she had difficulties "perceiving reality". She was suffering from "a strong internal pressure of unsorted primitive aggression which was being projected on others", whom she considered as her persecutors. She was therefore in need of long-term care around the clock in combination with "intensive parenting" and individual psychotherapy. The Court furthermore had regard to a report of 16 November 1990 by Mr. Dan Fränkel, Superintendent at the children's home. Mr. Fränkel had noted, inter alia, that Anette had herself expressed a wish to receive help. He concluded that the applicant categorically denied that Anette was having problems.         The County Administrative Court finally reasoned as follows:         (Translation)         "... Consistent information from [Anette's] school,       neighbours and [the children's home] has shown that she has       been suffering from mental and physical disturbances since       she started school. Psychological expertise has interpreted       these disturbances as an indication that she is in need of       qualified help. ... [The applicant] has on several       occasions ... expressed herself in a manner which might       indicate that she is suffering from paranoia. [She] has       also made statements which could be interpreted as pointing       towards suspicions that [she] is in need of mental care.         Against the background of [Anette's] need of qualified care       the applicant cannot, in the light of her [own] personal       problems, be considered as being able to meet Anette's care       needs.       ...       It is true that the applicant has now consented to care       [services] such as support conversations and, moreover, to       the appointment of a contact person. There is no reason to       doubt that this consent is genuine. ... The evidence in the       case does not support the assumption that voluntary care       could be provided to the necessary extent as long as [the       applicant] has the care responsibility. Therefore, ... [the       Social Council's request] shall be granted. ..."         The applicant did not challenge the implementation of Anette's public care in the Geneta children's home. In March 1991 Anette was moved from the Geneta children's home to a so-called "family home" (familjehem; hereinafter "foster home") at Lindås some 400 kilometres away from Huddinge. The parents of that home had two children of their own and four other children, who were also placed in public care.         According to the Government, the Social Council had wished to avoid placing Anette in a so-called residential treatment centre. No suitable foster home had been found in the Stockholm area and it had been deemed therapeutically correct to implement the public care at some distance from the applicant. The applicant's travel to visit Anette in the "family home" was to be paid by the authorities. According to the Government, the applicant refused to participate in the planning of how the public care was to be implemented, e.g., as regards the applicant's visits to the foster home. According to the applicant, she was not informed in advance of the removal of Anette from the Geneta children's home, nor was she given any information about the foster home.         On the applicant's appeal the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm on 12 April 1991 upheld the care order, considering, in essence, that the applicant lacked the necessary understanding for Anette's care needs.         The applicant requested leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). Since her submissions had been lodged out of time the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on 17 May 1991. On 27 September 1991 the Supreme Administrative Court refused to restore the expired time-limit.         According to the Government, the applicant on several occasions declined to visit the applicant in the foster home together with social welfare officials or staff of the Geneta residential home. In August 1991, after Anette had expressed concern about the fact that the applicant had not visited her and while the applicant's request for a termination of Anette's public care was pending, the applicant agreed to one such meeting with Anette. During her visit the applicant mainly accused officials and authorities of Anette's placement in public care. She refused to plan any future visits to the foster home, since Anette "was to come home very soon". In September 1991 the applicant again visited the foster home and made Anette state that she was longing to return home. The applicant taped this statement and told Anette to keep quiet about it. After the applicant's visit Anette nevertheless told the parents of the foster home as well as a social welfare officer about the incident.         In a report of 21 October 1991 drawn up by the Social Council the applicant was recognised as wishing the very best for Anette. She was, however, incapable of observing Anette's needs. This was causing Anette a dilemma, since she wished to remain loyal to the applicant but found it difficult to tolerate her lies and accusations.         On 30 October 1991 the Social Council, noting the report of 21 October 1991, rejected the applicant's request that Anette's public care be terminated and ordered that her care should continue to be implemented in the foster home at Lindås.         The applicant was served with the expert report and the Council's decision on 18 November 1991. She appealed against the Council's decision in so far as it had refused to terminate the public care. She argued that Anette was not in need of public care and asserted, inter alia, that her mental state had deteriorated during her stay in a foster home at Lindås, where she had also lost weight.         Both the Social Welfare Committee and Anette's official counsel objected to the applicant's appeal. On 24 February 1992 it was rejected after an oral hearing. The County Administrative Court noted that Anette had developed favourably during her public care but found that sufficient time had not yet passed for a termination thereof. It also considered that the applicant did not understand and could not therefore satisfy Anette's need for qualified care.         The applicant lodged a further appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal, questioning, inter alia, the accuracy of Dr. Ånstrand's opinion of November 1990 which had been drawn up shortly after Anette's placement in public care, i.e. when she had been "in a state of shock".         The Social Council objected to the applicant's appeal, submitting inter alia, that she had not allowed Anette to "adapt" to staying in the foster home and that Anette's loss of weight was due to a healthier diet and her having reached her teens. Anette's official counsel also objected to a termination of the public care.         On 10 April 1992 the Administrative Court of Appeal held an oral hearing at which it heard a further witness on the applicant's request. This witness, a neighbour of the applicant, found no reason to question the conditions in the applicant's and Anette's home prior to the issuing of the care orders. The witness had met Anette once during her placement in public care and had concluded from that meeting that she had not been "well".         The applicant's appeal was rejected on 30 April 1992, the Administrative Court of Appeal having found no reason to question the expert opinion of November 1990 or the conditions in Anette's foster home. On 3 July 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.         On 26 August 1992 the Social Council rejected the applicant's further request for a termination of Anette's public care and ordered that the care should continue to be implemented in the foster home at Lindås. The Council based itself on a social welfare report of 14 August 1992. In her appeal to the County Administrative Court concerning the refusal to terminate the public care the applicant alleged, inter alia, that Anette was depressed and skinny and that she had been the victim of physical and mental abuse. Both the Social Council and Anette's official counsel objected to the applicant's appeal and on 12 January 1993 it was rejected.         In her further appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal the applicant argued, inter alia, that Anette's public care had created a split between them which had not existed earlier. At the applicant's request the Administrative Court of Appeal heard two of the applicant's neighbours as witnesses. They found no reason to question the conditions in the applicant's and Anette's home prior to her placement in public care.         Both the Social Council and Anette's official counsel objected to the applicant's further appeal and on 30 March 1993 it was rejected. The Administrative Court of Appeal considered the witnesses credible but found that they had not had a sufficiently close contact with the applicant and Anette. Therefore no decisive weight should be given to their testimony.         According to the Government, the contact between the applicant and the parents of the foster home improved in the spring and summer of 1993. The foster parents planned to take Anette along on a visit to a children's' home in Poland with children for whom the foster parents were considering acting as godparents. The applicant objected to the idea of Anette going on the trip and claimed that Anette did not wish to go. According to the Government, this allegation was untruthful.         On 6 October 1993 the Social Council reviewed Anette's care needs under section 13 of the 1990 Act and decided to maintain the public care.         The applicant did not request leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against the Administrative Court of Appeal's judgment of 30 March 1993 but requested a re-opening of the proceedings. This request was rejected on 1 November 1993.         According to the Government, the attempts of the social welfare officials to hear the applicant in regard to Anette's future and care failed, since the applicant did not show up at a meeting in January 1994 in spite of having been approached by a social welfare official both by telephone and mail. She had been informed by the social authorities that she could be assisted by counsel.         In February 1994 Anette briefly stayed at the Geneta residential home.          On 13 April 1994 the Social Council rejected the applicant's further request for a termination of Anette's public care. It also decided that Anette's further care needs should be examined at the children's and young persons' psychiatric clinic at Huddinge Hospital. She stayed there until 4 July 1994, when she was moved to Villa Rödkinda, a treatment home in Farsta near Stockholm. This move took place after a consultation with the applicant on 26 May 1994. According to the applicant, Villa Rödkinda is a home for teenage drug abusers.         According to the Government, Anette stated categorically during this investigation that she did not wish to live with the applicant. The applicant regularly attended meetings with staff in charge of Anette's examination during the first four weeks but later declined to come to any further meetings. She started accusing the hospital staff of acting partially, i.e. on behalf of the social welfare authority. Meanwhile, Anette visited the applicant in their home on several occasions.         The applicant appealed against the Social Council's decision of 13 April 1994 in so far as it concerned its refusal to terminate Anette's public care. The applicant stated that she would consent to Anette's treatment at Huddinge Hospital, if only the public care would be terminated. The Social Council opposed a termination of the care, inter alia since the applicant might later withdraw her consent to the care planned for Anette. Anette herself, now fifteen years of age, also opposed a termination of her public care.         On 6 June 1994 Dr. Frank Ståhl, Chief Physician, Annika Elinder, a psychologist, and Dr. Clara Gumpert, Assistant Physician, submitted a report based on the examination of Anette's care needs as carried out at Huddinge Hospital. They concluded that the applicant had difficulties in perceiving Anette's emotional needs and mental problems which were of such a magnitude that she would remain dependent on the resources of a treatment home for a long time. The report was served on the applicant on 7 June 1994.         After an oral hearing the County Administrative Court on 16 June 1994 rejected the applicant's appeal against the Social Council's decision of 13 April 1994. The Court had regard, inter alia, to the expert report of 6 June 1994.         On 22 September 1994 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's further appeal which both the Social Council and Anette's official counsel had objected to. The Court considered, inter alia, that the necessary care could not be afforded to Anette with the applicant's consent. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was later refused.         In September 1994 Anette lodged a complaint with the police, accusing the foster father of having sexually harassed her in February 1994. The investigation was later closed.         In October 1994 Anette was moved to Magelungen treatment centre in Stockholm.         3.    Anette's schooling         According to the Government, a period of instability began in Anette's life in the autumn of 1993. She started testing the limits in the foster home. She also began to harass some of her teachers. In January 1994 the foster parents no longer felt capable of providing the necessary assistance and informed the Social Council accordingly. In February 1994 they reported that Anette's school had decided not to allow her to attend classes for the rest of a week. Anette had posted notes with pejorative statements regarding a particular teacher. She had repeatedly forced her way into the teachers' room. She would speak incoherently, scream and curse. A School Welfare Officer had been assigned to deal with Anette's problems, but this attempt had been in vain. A new special teacher had been giving Anette lessons so as to avoid contact between her and the teacher whom she had been harassing. According to the Government, the foster parents also reported that Anette had been aggressive and violent in the foster home, breaking a window. It was then decided that Anette should receive lessons in the foster home. Plans were also made to send Anette to Huddinge Hospital near Stockholm for a psychological examination.         According to the Government, Anette received one hour of individual schooling per day during her stay at Villa Rödkinda. After her move to Magelungen treatment centre it was intended to provide ordinary schooling in the ninth grade. Having attended school for one day, Anette refused to go back. According to the Government, the treatment centre was unable to provide schooling on its own premises. According to an opinion submitted by Dr. Ståhl on 28 November 1994 Anette's need of care had, for the time being, to be given priority over her need of education. It furthermore transpires from a report of Dr. Ståhl of 12 June 1995 that Anette has consistently and as recently as 6 June 1995 refused to receive education in whatever form offered to her.         4.    Other remedies resorted to by the applicant         In January 1990 the applicant complained to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Riksdagens justitieombudsmän) about alleged cooperation problems between her and the schools where Anette had been a pupil. In the course of the investigation these allegations were refuted by the teaching staff. On 22 March 1990 one of the Ombudsmen found, inter alia, that the officials who had, in 1988, reported Anette's behaviour to the Social Council had been acting in compliance with the law.         In response to the applicant's further petition one of the Ombudsmen, on 28 April 1992, found no reason to criticise the Social Council in regard to Anette's placement in public care. On 8 June 1994 a further petition by the applicant was considered as being partly time-barred. As to the rest no reason was found for criticising the Social Council's actions.         In response to the applicant's petitions the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) of Stockholm on 17 September 1991, 14 May and 24 July 1992 as well as on 24 March 1994 found no reason to criticise the manner in which Anette's case had been handled.   II.    Relevant domestic law         1.    Public care orders         According to the 1980 Act Social Services Act, any person who learns that a minor is being treated in a manner which could jeopardise his or her health or development should report this to the Social Council which shall immediately start an investigation (sections 50 and 71).         According to the 1990 Act, public care of a young person shall be provided if there is a particular reason to believe that his or her health or development may be jeopardised because of insufficient care or any other circumstance in his or her home and if it can be assumed that the necessary care cannot be provided with the consent of his or her custodian or custodians (sections 1 and 2).         The Social Council, its Chairman or another authorised member of the Council may decide provisionally to place a young person in public care if it is likely that he or she is in need of such care and if a court decision in the matter cannot be awaited (section 6, subsections 1 and 2).         2.    Implementation of public care         The Social Council is to decide how public care is to be provided and where the young person is to reside. It may consent to the young person residing in his or her own home, if this may be presumed to be the most appropriate means of implementing the care. The public care shall, however, always commence away from his or her home (sections 10 and 11 of the 1990 Act).         Before ordering that public care is to be implemented in a foster home the Social Council must investigate the conditions therein (section 25). The Council must carefully monitor the young person's development in the foster home by regularly visiting it and by meeting with the person (section 39 of the 1981 Social Services Ordinance (socialtjänstförordning 1981:750)).         The Social Council shall carefully supervise the implementation of the public care. If the care order has been issued under section 2, the Social Council shall at least every six months review the legal conditions for maintaining it (section 13, subsections 1 and 2). If public care is no longer considered necessary, it shall be revoked. A public care order pursuant to section 2 shall be revoked when the young person reaches the age of eighteen (section 21, subsections 1 and 2).         The Social Council is responsible for accommodating as far as possible the young person's need of contact with his parents, custodian or custodians. If it is necessary in order to achieve the public care purposes, the Social Council may decide how the right of access to the young person shall be exercised by a parent or custodian and decide that the young person's whereabouts should not be revealed to a parent or custodian. The Social Council shall at least once every three months reconsider whether such a decision remains necessary (section 14).         3.    Appeals and supervision         The Social Council's decisions may be appealed to the County Administrative Court, if, inter alia, the Council has decided where the care of the young person is to begin; if it has decided on the removal of the young person from the home where he or she is living; if it has decided on the continuation of care in accordance with the Act; or if it has decided on access in accordance with section 14 (section 41(1-3) of the 1990 Act). According to the 1971 Administrative Procedure Act (förvaltningsprocesslag 1971:291), the decisions of the County Administrative Court may be appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. With leave to appeal, a judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal may be challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court (sections 33 and 35).         The County Administrative Boards (länsstyrelserna) and the Parliamentary Ombudsmen are responsible for the supervision of the social authorities.         4.    School legislation         The compulsory school attendance is governed by the 1985 Educational Act (skollag 1985:1100) and corresponds to a right to a nine-year long education provided by the public school system (chapter 3, section 1). The competent municipality is responsible for ensuring that children who do not attend public school receive education otherwise (section 13). Disciplinary action affecting the possibility for the pupil to attend school may only be used to a limited extent (section 11).         According to the 1988 Compulsory Education Ordinance (grundskole- förordning 1988:655), special education may be provided for children of school age with specific needs (chapter 5, section 17). Such education shall, as far as possible, correspond to the education in which the child is unable to participate. It must, however, be provided only if the child's doctor has consented thereto.         The National Agency for Education (statens skolverk) supervises the public school system and may examine complaints relating to its implementation (section 4 of the relevant 1991 Ordinance (1991: 1121).         The so-called pupil welfare committees are composed of the school's headmaster, teachers, the school's physician, its nurse as well as its welfare officer.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains that Anette's public care has not been sufficiently justified. The real reason for her placement in such care was allegedly the applicant's objections to the lax attitude of Anette's teachers in regard to the bullying which occurred in her school. The reports from Anette's school to the Social Council were "an act of revenge" on the part of some of her teachers. The applicant challenges the experts' findings that Anette was suffering from mental disturbances at the time of her placement in public care and that she is currently still in need of such care. Finally, certain investigations by the social authorities concerning Anette's care needs have allegedly not been communicated to the applicant. She invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.   2.     The applicant complains about the particular manner in which the provisional care order was enforced in October 1990. Allegedly, social officials broke into a toilet in the applicant's and Anette's home and did not inform the applicant of the reasons for the provisional care order. The applicant again invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.   3.     The applicant also complains about the implementation of Anette's public care. The Social Council refused to allow the implementation to take place in her and the applicant's home. The care was partly implemented at a considerable distance from her and the applicant's home. Anette's foster family at Lindås had already received several other children placed in public care and also had two children of their own. Anette had to stay in a very small room. The foster parents allegedly interfered with the applicant's and Anette's correspondence and telephone conversations. While Anette was placed in the foster home the applicant was allowed to see her only on rare occasions and always in the presence of a social welfare official or one of the foster parents. She was not always informed in advance of the duration of the meetings. During certain meetings she was not allowed to speak to Anette or show her physical affection. The applicant again invokes Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.   4.     In her submissions of 17 October and 18 November 1994 the applicant also complains that Anette is not being provided with any effective possibility of completing her compulsory education. In this respect the applicant invokes no particular provision of the Convention or its Protocols.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 29 September 1992 and registered on 14 December 1992.         On 30 November 1994 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to communicate part of the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure. The Government were requested to submit written observations in regard to the complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention as well as Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 with the exception of the complaint concerning the manner in which the provisional care order was enforced.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 10 March 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose. The applicant replied on 3 May 1995. Additional observations were submitted by the Government on 16 June 1995.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains that neither the provisional care order of 15 October 1990 nor the care order of 8 January 1991 was based on sufficient reasons. In any event, there are no longer any reasons for maintaining her daughter Anette's public care.         The Government submit that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, since the applicant did not appeal against the provisional care order. Nor did she properly seek leave to appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal on 12 April 1991 upholding the care order of 8 January 1991. Alternatively, in so far as the definitive care order is concerned, the complaint has been lodged belatedly, even if the six months' time-limit prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention were to be calculated from the Supreme Administrative Court's decision of 27 September 1991 not to restore the time-limit for the applicant's request for leave to appeal. Finally, the applicant did not challenge the decisions of 26 August 1992 and 6 October 1993 not to terminate Anette's care.         The Government concede, however, that many circumstances of relevance to the initial care order have later been examined by the administrative courts dealing with the applicant's requests for a termination of Anette's public care. The Commission should therefore consider the complaint in the light of the entire proceedings up to and including the Supreme Administrative Court's refusal of leave to appeal on 3 July 1992. Should the Commission take this approach, the Government argue that the complaint is nevertheless manifestly ill-founded. Anette's placement in public care and the maintaining of that care has been based on the 1990 Act and has served the legitimate aim of protecting the interests and welfare of herself.         As to the necessity of the public care order, the Government recall that the Parliamentary Ombudsman found no reason to criticise the report of the Pupil Welfare Committee of 1988. The Government further refer to the findings of the Social Council and the expert reports of 16 November 1990 from which it became clear that Anette was in need of long-term treatment for her problems. Since the applicant failed to comprehend those problems and considering the risk that Anette's mental health and development would otherwise suffer, voluntary care was out of the question. These reasons were relevant and sufficient and responded to a pressing social need. Moreover, hearings were held before administrative courts on two levels.         As to the necessity of maintaining Anette's public care, the Government refer to the findings of the Social Council and the administrative courts as well as the expert report of 6 June 1994 indicating that Anette remained in need of treatment. Furthermore, the applicant has persistently denied Anette's problems. Finally, Anette's official counsel has consistently opposed a termination of the public care.         The Government admit that the applicant's general attitude in the matter has made her participation in the decision-making process difficult. She has nevertheless been duly informed of every measure taken in regard to Anette's public care and her views have been taken into account to the extent possible, also bearing in mind Anette's welfare. Throughout the proceedings the applicant has been represented by official counsel. Both the applicant's requests that an "impartial person" should be present during meetings and her requests that witnesses should be heard before the courts have been granted. Case notes show, however, that on several occasions, when the social authorities have attempted to meet her and her representative, neither of them attended the proposed meetings.         The applicant contends that the care needs of Anette which she has been considered incapable of comprehending have never been specified by the authorities. She questions the quality of the initial examination of Anette's care needs in November 1990 and asserts that the real reason for the initial care order was that she was seen as a "troublemaker" after having reported the bullying in Anette's school. Although the Government claim that the reports by the Pupil Welfare Committee of Anette's school to the Social Council were initiated by her teachers, the applicant contends that the reports are unknown to them and that they were produced by the headmaster wishing to protect the school's reputation. Moreover, the applicant's problems with the Swedish language has led the social welfare authorities to include in their reports absurd statements which she is said to have made and which she has not been allowed to correct.         The applicant furthermore recalls that Anette's placement in public care was considered necessary because it was presumed that continued care in the applicant's home could jeopardise Anette's development. However, the qualified care and support which the authorities considered Anette to be in need of has never been provided. On the contrary, her violent behaviour started only as a result of her placement in public care, as did her problems in school. Her foster father has sexually abused her and threatened her at gunpoint, she has been prevented from attending school and she has been placed in a treatment centre where drugs are common and which does not provide the peaceful environment which the authorities have considered her to be in need of. The applicant also refutes the Government's statement that Anette's development was continuously being monitored by a psychologist at the Huddinge Hospital. Her only therapy has been provided by a non-authorised psychologist accused of violence against another young person placed in a treatment centre.         The applicant finally refutes the Government's statement that Anette has not wished to see her. On the contrary, she wants to spend as much as time as possible with the applicant and has continuously been corresponding with her. Occasionally, she has been spending up to eight hours a day with the applicant and this situation is continuing. Anette has furthermore stated to her that she has been dissuaded by social welfare officials from expressing her wish to move back home and return to school; otherwise they would see to it that she would be placed in psychiatric care.         The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken. It considers, however, that the public care of Anette can arguably be considered as a situation which started on 15 October 1990 and is still continuing. In this case it can be left open whether the applicant has complied with the six months' time-limit prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26) in respect of the various aspects of the present complaint. Nor does the Commission need to determine whether the applicant has complied with the exhaustion requirement prescribed by Article 26 (Art. 26), since, even if this were the case, the complaint is inadmissible for the following reasons.         The Commission considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which reads, in so far as it is relevant, as follows:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family       life, ...         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority       with the exercise of this right except such as is in       accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic       society in the interests of national security, public       safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the       prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of       health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and       freedoms of others."         The Commission finds that the placement of Anette in public care constituted an interference with the applicant's right to respect for her family life. In order to be justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) such an interference must satisfy three conditions: it must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those legitimate aims. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, requires that it be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Commission will also take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States, but its review is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith. Furthermore, in exercising its supervisory function, the Commission cannot confine itself to considering the impugned decisions in isolation, but must look at them in the light of the case as a whole. It must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interferences at issue were "relevant and sufficient" (see Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68). Finally, certain procedural requirements are also implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8) to the extent that in child care matters the parents must have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests. This requirement implies that the parents should be sufficiently informed of the outcome of investigations carried out by the authorities (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, pp. 28-29, paras. 63-65; cf. also the above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p. 33, para. 71).         In the Commission's view the 1990 Act which was applied in this case was clearly designed to protect young persons and there is nothing to suggest that it was applied for any other purpose. The interference in question was intended to safeguard the development of the applicant's daughter Anette and therefore served the legitimate aim of protecting her health and rights.         As regards the necessity of the various care orders, the Commission observes that Anette's need of public care has been carefully and repeatedly examined by Swedish administrative courts. The purpose of placing Anette in such care has essentially been to provide her with long-term treatment outside her home, which the applicant has not been willing to accept. The Commission considers that this reason is clearly relevant and sufficient to justify Anette's placement in public care and the decisions to maintain that care.         The Commission finally finds no indication that the applicant has not been sufficiently informed of the investigations concluding that Anette is still in need of public care. Nor can it find that she has at any stage of the domestic proceedings been prevented from presenting the views which would in her opinion be of importance for the examination of the care order and the subsequent maintaining of that order. In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicant was sufficiently involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, so as to provide her with the requisite protection of her interests.         Taking all the circumstances of the case into account and having regard to the State's margin of appreciation, the Commission is satisfied that the Swedish authorities have reasonably been entitled to consider Anette's placement in public care as necessary so as to achieve the above-mentioned legitimate aims. The Commission therefore finds no appearance of any violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) in this respect.         It follows that this complaint mus