CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 28 février 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 24483/94                       by Fred SÖDERSTRÖM                       against Sweden         The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 28 February 1996, the following members being present:              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE, Acting President            MM.    H. DANELIUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 7 March 1994 by Fred Söderström against Sweden and registered on 28 June 1994 under file No. 24483/94;         Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 24 March 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 24 April 1995;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant, a Swedish citizen born in 1929 and residing at Lindesberg, is a pensioner.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.         In letters to the National Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds (Kammarkollegiet) dated 18 April and 24 October 1982 and 17 March and 13 May 1984 the applicant claimed to be the rightful owner of a piece of property, Grimsö, in Lindesberg. He referred to his relationship with an earlier owner of the property and claimed that, when rights to the property later had been transferred to the State, the State had not acquired the right of ownership.         After an investigation of the matter, the National Judicial Board replied to the applicant on 6 September 1982 and 7 June 1984. The Board concluded that the applicant could not, with any prospect of success, claim ownership rights to the property in question.         After having received a further letter from the applicant on 6 August 1984, the National Judicial Board reiterated its position in a decision of 8 May 1985.         The applicant later contacted the Ministry of Finance concerning the applicability of certain laws and regulations on hereditary tenancy rights (åborätt). On 7 May 1986 he was informed by the Ministry that if he claimed such a right to a piece of property he should file an application with the County Administrative Board (Länsstyrelsen). If, on the other hand, he claimed ownership to the property, he should apply to the District Court.         In a letter dated 12 May 1986, which was received by the County Administrative Board of the County of Örebro on 14 May 1986, the applicant, claiming that his family had a hereditary tenancy right to the above property due to the relationship with the earlier owner, requested the Board to grant him possession of the property. The applicant maintained that, according to a Royal Prohibition (Kungligt förbud) of 11 December 1766 which was still in force, the property could not have been legally sold to anybody outside his family.         On 22 May 1986 the County Administrative Board referred the case for investigation to its Land Surveying Department (Lantmäterienheten).         On 23 March 1987 the Board reminded the Department that it should submit its opinion. The Department replied on 14 April, stating that the matter called for a thorough investigation and might take some time but that it would make an effort to submit the opinion during the spring of 1987.         On 24 August 1987 the applicant requested that the Government take over the case. By decision of 10 September 1987, the Government rejected the request, stating that it lacked competence to deal with the case.         On 25 April 1988 the applicant reminded the County Administrative Board of the case and on 14 June 1988 he again suggested that the Board should hand over the case to the Government.         On 6 October 1988 the Land Surveying Department drew up a draft opinion which was later submitted for comments to the County Administrative Board. On 13 December 1988 the Board presented its comments to the Department.         A further request by the applicant that the case be determined by the Government was forwarded by the County Administrative Board on 13 December 1988 and rejected by the Government on 10 February 1989.         In a memorandum dated 10 April 1989 the Land Surveying Department gave its opinion on the applicant's request. It reached the following conclusions. At the time of the enactment of the 1766 Royal Prohibition and for many years thereafter, property of the Crown could be bought by, inter alia, an ironworks owner for the purpose of being used in the running of the industrial activities. If the property had been bought for this purpose, the hereditary right of any tenant (åbo) remained unchanged. There were also other possibilities of buying Crown property, to which such hereditary rights did not apply. The Department found that the property to which the applicant claimed a hereditary right had been bought from the Crown at the end of the eighteenth or at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the applicant's relative had been the registered owner of the property in 1839 and that it had later been sold to another private person and, in 1912, to the State. After an examination of several different sources, the Department concluded that the property had not been bought from the Crown for the purpose of being used in the activities of the ironworks and that, for this reason, the applicant could not claim any hereditary right to it.         The Land Surveying Department further stated that the case was of a very complex nature, that some documents were missing and that reference was made to very old legislation. The Department noted that it could be regarded as being primarily responsible for the delay in the case and pointed out that the efforts it had made to provide a basis for a decision clearly exceeded what was normal in cases such as the present one. The Department had examined, inter alia, much unconfirmed information supplied by the applicant.         On 24 April 1989 the County Administrative Board gave the applicant an opportunity to submit comments on the memorandum, which he did on 12 May 1989.         On 28 May 1989 the Board submitted the applicant's comments to the Land Surveying Department.         On 11 August 1989 the Department presented a second memorandum, in which it answered the applicant's comments but did not change the conclusions drawn in the first memorandum.         After the applicant, on 24 October 1989, had been given an opportunity to express his opinion also on the second memorandum, he informed the County Administrative Board on 6 February 1990 that he preferred to await the Board's decision before making any further comments.         On 19 March 1990 the County Administrative Board, relying on the Land Surveying Department's memoranda, rejected the applicant's request, as he had not shown that he had any hereditary tenancy right to the property in question.         On 9 April 1990 the applicant appealed to the National Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds. The appeal was, in accordance with the applicable rules, submitted to the County Administrative Board, which forwarded it to the National Judicial Board three weeks later.         By decision of 19 December 1991 the National Judicial Board upheld the County Administrative Board's decision without further reasoning.         On 2 January 1992 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten).         By judgment of 1 June 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court, without stating any reasons of its own, upheld the National Judicial Board's decision.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant alleges, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the case was not heard by an impartial tribunal, as the Swedish State, the present owner of the property in question, was both a party to the dispute and the deciding authority.   2.     The applicant further complains that the case was not heard within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 7 March 1994 and registered on 28 June 1994.         On 11 January 1995 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure. The Government were asked to deal with the question whether the applicant's case was determined within a reasonable time.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 24 March 1995. The applicant replied on 24 April 1995.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant alleges that the case was not heard by an impartial tribunal. He invokes Article 6 of the Convention whose first paragraph (Art. 6-1), in relevant parts, reads as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is       entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by       an independent and impartial tribunal ..."         The Commission recalls that the applicant's case was determined in the final resort by the Supreme Administrative Court. There is nothing to suggest that that Court was not an impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant further complains that the case was not heard within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         The Government submit that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded. The Government maintain that the right claimed by the applicant is of very ancient origin, governed by ancient legislation and utterly seldom claimed today. The County Administrative Board had to carry out a thorough investigation which involved examinations of the files of the real estate archives and of ancient documents held by the authority administering State-owned land. It also had to make inquiries with other authorities. Furthermore, the applicant's case was particularly difficult and complex. The applicant referred to facts and events dating back to the sixteenth century and based his claims on extensive oral submissions without being able to present any written evidence to support his statements. He continued to submit additional information during the Land Surveying Department's investigation. It was very difficult to make an assessment and separate substantial facts from all the information submitted by the applicant. The Department made considerable efforts to investigate the applicant's statements which clearly exceeded what can be considered as normal in a case of this character. The Government argue that the thorough investigation carried out by the Department to a great extent was made in the applicant's own interest, as he could not himself substantiate his statements. The Government therefore claim that the delay in the proceedings before the County Administrative Board to a considerable extent must be attributed to the applicant's own conduct.         With respect to the proceedings before the National Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds and the Supreme Administrative Court, the Government reiterate that the case involved the application of very ancient and rarely applied legislation and that the facts and circumstances were of an extremely complex nature. As concerns the Supreme Administrative Court, the Government further refer to the considerable workload of the Court during the relevant years.         The applicant submits that the case could have been determined within a year. He claims that all the necessary documents are held in the archives of the National Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds.         The Commission considers, after a preliminary examination of the present complaint in the light of the parties' submissions, that it raises questions of fact and law which require an examination of the merits. This part of the application cannot, therefore, be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for inadmissibility have been established.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case,       the applicant's complaint that his case was not heard within a       reasonable time;         DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.               Secretary                        Acting President       to the Second Chamber               of the Second Chamber           (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                      (G.H. THUNE)