CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 avril 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21342/93                       by E., I. and M.                       against Finland         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 12 April 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 6 September 1992 by E., I. and M. against Finland and registered on 5 February 1993 under file No. 21342/93;         Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 27 April 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants on 30 June and 18 October 1995;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicants, born in 1915, 1935 and 1944, respectively, are all Finnish citizens. The first and second applicant reside at Juuka and the third one at Kauniainen.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   Particular circumstances of the case         In 1988 the applicants were the owners of a real property, Toivola 25:4, at Juuka. A dwelling-house and outhouses were located on it. In the municipal building plan (rakennuskaava, byggnadsplan) the part of the property occupied by the dwelling-house was reserved for private construction, while the garden area of the property was designated for public construction purposes. A further part was reserved for road purposes.         On 30 June 1988 the Municipal Council (kunnanvaltuusto, kommun- fullmäktige) of Juuka decided to amend and enlarge the building plan so as to enable construction of further municipal buildings. The amendment and enlargement included designating, for public construction purposes, the part of the applicants' property which had been reserved for private construction. The first and the second applicant had objected to the proposed amendment, arguing that the municipality already owned enough land of comparable character in the centre of Juuka.         On 17 February 1989 the County Administrative Board (läänin- hallitus, länsstyrelsen) of Northern Karelia rejected the first and the second applicant's appeal and confirmed the Municipal Council's decision of 30 June 1988.         On 15 December 1989 the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) partly quashed the decisions of the County Administrative Board and the Municipal Council, considering that the designation for public construction purposes of the part of the applicants' property which had been reserved for private construction was not justified.         The applicants later refused an offer by the municipality to buy those parts of their property which had been designated for public construction and road purposes. The municipality had offered them about 15 FIM per square metre. In August 1990 it instituted proceedings with a view to expropriating the relevant parts of their property and, on 26 October 1990, it took possession thereof, following an authorisation by the Compulsory Acquisition Committee (lunastustoimikunta, inlösningskommissionen).         In the ensuing compensation proceedings before the Committee the applicants requested compensation in the amount of 70 FIM per square metre. They submitted that land situated in the centre of Juuka and reserved for business purposes had been sold for up to 130 FIM per square metre. Their land should have been designated at least as a densely populated dwelling area the   current price of which would be at least 70 FIM per square metre. In support of their submissions the applicants referred to certain sales of comparable land in the vicinity.         On 10 April 1991 the Compulsory Acquisition Committee fixed the compensation to be paid to the applicants at between 19 and 25 FIM per square metre, depending on the location of the property areas and the designation affecting them. The Committee based its examination on the development of, on the one hand, the prices of land as such in the centre of Juuka and, on the other hand, of the prices of land particularly reserved for dwelling purposes. It found that the prices of the last-mentioned character of land were ranging between 20 and 25 FIM per square metre, depending on whether it was located nearer or further away from the centre of Juuka.         The Committee also noted that the estimated current sales price of a piece of land sold in 1979 and reserved for public construction purposes would be 24 FIM per square metre. It did not regard the property sales referred to by the applicants as representative of the current price level. It noted, inter alia, that one of the sales referred to had concerned land which the municipality had previously designed as a plot intended for the construction of a block house. Another piece of land had previously been designed for parish buildings and the buyer had been a bank.         On 18 December 1991 the Land Court (maaoikeus, jorddomstolen) of Eastern Finland amended the Committee's decision and granted the applicants compensation in the amount of 216.400 FIM which corresponded to an average of 25 FIM per square metre. The Expert on the Compulsory Acquisition Committee, a land surveyor, was heard orally before the Land Court. Contrary to the Compulsory Acquisition Committee, the Land Court accepted that the totality of the compulsorily acquired land should be considered as having been designated as a densely populated dwelling area prior to the two most recent amendments to the building plan.         On 16 April 1992 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.   Relevant domestic law         Under the 1919 Constitution Act (Suomen Hallitusmuoto 94/19, Regeringsform för Finland 94/19), as in force at the relevant time, the right of Finnish citizens to their possessions was to be secured by law (section 6, subsection 1). Expropriation of property in the public interest against full compensation was to be governed by law (section 6, subsection 3). As of 1 August 1995, everyone's property rights are guaranteed by section 12 of the Constitution Act (as amended by Act no. 969/95).         According to the 1977 Act on Compulsory Acquisition of Real Property and Particular Rights (laki 603/77 kiinteän omaisuuden ja erityisten oikeuksien lunastuksesta, lag 603/77 om inlösen av fast egendom och särskilda rättigheter), a property may be expropriated if there is a general need therefor. Expropriation shall, however, not be resorted to, if its aim may be achieved as well in another manner or if the inconvenience caused to a private interest is more significant than the benefit caused to the general interest (section 4, subsection 1).         According to the 1958 Building Act (rakennuslaki 370/58, byggnadslag 370/58), a municipality may expropriate real property, for instance, for the purpose of implementing a municipal building plan (sections 50 and 111). Proceedings to this effect shall be instituted before a Compulsory Acquisition Committee consisting of a presiding land surveyor as expert and two lay members. The Committee may hear experts (section 12 of the 1977 Act).         A property owner is entitled to full compensation for the economic losses caused by the expropriation (section 29). The sum shall be fixed on the basis of the current price of the property (section 30). When the expropriation forms part of the implementation of, for instance, a building plan or an amendment thereto, any rise in the value of the land occurring subsequent to the planning decision shall be ignored. Compensation shall thus be paid for the value increase corresponding to the rise in the general price level or otherwise resulting from other circumstances than the planning decision (section 31).   COMPLAINT         The applicants complain that their right peacefully to enjoy their property has been violated as a result of the expropriation of part of their property Toivola 25:4. They assert that the expropriation was not justified in the public interest, since, for the construction purposes announced by the municipality of Juuka, it already owned suitable and comparable land adjacent to their property. Moreover, the compensation afforded to the applicants only amounted to 25 FIM per square metre of expropriated land, while comparable land in the vicinity of their property and allegedly subjected to the same planning regulations had, in 1987-93, been sold at 100-167 FIM per square metre. The applicants invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 6 September 1992 and registered on 5 February 1993.         On 28 February 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 27 April 1995. The applicants replied on 30 June and 18 October 1995.   THE LAW         The applicants complain that the expropriation of part of their property Toivola 25:4 was not justified in the public interest and that the compensation paid to them did not correspond to the value of the land. They invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which reads as follows:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of       his possessions except in the public interest and subject       to the conditions provided for by law and by the general       principles of international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it       deems necessary to control the use of property in       accordance with the general interest or to secure the       payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."         The Government admit that the expropriation interfered with the applicants' property rights. It was nevertheless subject to conditions provided for by law both as regards its legal basis as such and as regards the compensation fixed. Under the 1977 Act the authorities were obliged to apply the rule of full compensation in accordance with the market value of the expropriated land. Although, admittedly, the estimation of that value is difficult, the estimation method used was neither incorrect nor inadequate and the price fixed lay within a certain margin of error.         The Government furthermore submit that the interference was justified in the public interest, since it was aimed at acquiring an area which had been designated by the municipality for the construction of public facilities. The means applied to this end were not disproportionate to that legitimate aim and a fair balance was struck between the interests of the community and those of the applicants.         The Government finally submit that under Finnish law a property owner is in principle entitled to full compensation for a deprivation of his property. The term "full" normally means that the current, probable purchase price of the property shall be reimbursed. In the estimation of the current value regard must be had to the purchase prices of similar properties. If, however, a property is compulsorily acquired for public construction purposes as a result of its inclusion in, for instance, a municipal building plan, any increase in the current value resulting from the adoption of, or an amendment to, the plan shall normally be ignored. The interpretation of the compensation rules in cases where a plan has been amended is not unambiguous. The Government stress, however, that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) cannot be interpreted as requiring a particular method for the fixing of compensation for a compulsory acquisition of property. In the applicants' case the method used and the compensation fixed were not manifestly unreasonable.         The applicants maintain that their property rights were violated both as a result of the expropriation in itself and on account of the low compensation amount. As for the expropriation itself, they underline that no regard was had to the fact that similar land designated for public construction was already in the municipality's possession and located next to their property.         As regards the compensation amount, the applicants stress that the authorities only had regard to the prices of land designated as densely populated dwelling areas and failed to take into account the prices concerning land designated for public construction. As is evident also from the now completed construction on the expropriated land, much more construction volume is allowed on such land than on plots designated as densely populated dwelling areas. The compensation amount should therefore have been higher.         The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Fredin judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 14, para. 41).         The Commission finds that the expropriation of part of the applicants' real property constituted a deprivation of their possessions which is to be examined under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B, pp. 69-70, paras. 41-46). Such a deprivation must pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest and conform to the conditions provided for by law.         In the present case it is not in dispute that the deprivation was "subject to the conditions provided for by law". As to the requirement of a legitimate aim in the public interest, the Commission recalls that because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs the national authorities are in principle better placed that the international judge to appreciate what is "in the public interest". In performing their assessment the national authorities therefore enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (e.g., Eur. Court H.R. James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 32, paras. 46).         The Commission considers that the deprivation of part of the applicants' property had the legitimate aim of implementing the municipal building plan in which the land at issue had been reserved for public construction purposes in accordance with the 1988 amendment to the building plan. The Commission finds no substantiation of the applicants' allegation that the deprivation was unnecessary, considering the land which the municipality allegedly already owned in the vicinity. In any case, the proper proceedings in which to put such an argument were the planning proceedings ending with the Supreme Administrative Court's judgment of 15 December 1989. The Commission notes that this argument was indeed put in the first and the second applicant's appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against the 1988 amendment to the building plan. As a result of their appeal the designation of part of their property as an area to be used for private construction was retained. In these circumstances and having regard to State's margin of appreciation the Commission accepts that the deprivation of the remaining part of the applicants' property for the purpose of implementing the building plan took place in the public interest.         There must, however, also exist a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by virtue of a deprivation of property (ibid., p. 34, para. 50). Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) does not guarantee a particular amount of compensation for a deprivation of property, deprivation without a compensation "reasonably related" to the value of a property would normally constitute a disproportionate interference with the owner's property rights (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 50- 51, para. 121). The Convention organs' power of review is limited, however, to ascertaining whether the choice of compensation terms falls outside the State's margin of appreciation (e.g., the above-mentioned James and others judgment, p. 36, para. 54).         The Commission observes that under domestic law the applicants were to receive full compensation for the deprivation of their property. It goes without saying that the value to be compensated is not easily defined. The Commission cannot find any indication that the relevant authorities arbitrarily failed to consider the arguments put forward by the applicants as regards the criteria to be used for estimating that value. Nor can it find that the compensation fixed for the deprivation of their property was not in reasonable relation to its value.         The Commission finally recalls that, although Article 1 (Art. 1) contains no explicit procedural requirements, the proceedings at issue must afford the individual a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). In ascertaining whether this condition has been satisfied a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (cf., e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Agosi judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 19, para. 55; Eur. Court H.R., Hentrich v. France judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A no. 296-A, p. 21, para. 49).         In the present case the Commission finds that the proceedings viewed as a whole afforded the applicants a reasonable opportunity of putting their case to the responsible authorities with a view to establishing a fair balance between the conflicting interests at stake. Having regard to its considerations above, the Commission can accept that such a balance was struck in their case. Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in the particular circumstances of this case.         It follows that the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber         (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)