CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 avril 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 26372/95                       by L.V.P.                       against the United Kingdom         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 12 April 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 5 October 1994 by L.V.P. against the United Kingdom and registered on 1 February 1995 under file No. 26372/95;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.         The applicant is a Spanish national born in 1962 and residing in Ibiza, Spain.         In October 1993 the applicant and her child M., a boy born in 1986, went to London.   Initially they stayed with a relative, but later lived in hotels and, for certain periods of time, had social welfare accommodation.   The applicant was working for an unspecified period of time in restaurants and discotheques in London.         On 24 December 1993 a police protection order was issued in respect of M., who was left in a London hotel by the applicant.   The applicant returned to the hotel several hours later and stated that she had informed the hotel staff of her intention to leave the boy alone for the evening only.   The order was discharged and M. returned to his mother's care.         Between October 1993 and the summer of 1994 the applicant moved M. three times from one school to another.         On 28 January 1994 the applicant requested the local social service authority to provide accommodation for M. as she had to undergo an operation.   M. was placed temporarily with foster carers.   The applicant left the hospital before the date of the operation and collected M., but was later persuaded by her doctor to return as the operation was necessary.   The hospital were concerned about the applicant's mental health and arranged for a psychiatric assessment. The psychiatrist concluded that she was suffering from acute stress and anxiety.   M. was brought again to his foster carers and stayed with them until 10 February 1994, when he was taken back by his mother. In the following months he was apparently again placed with them for limited periods of time.         In March 1994 the school which M. attended at that time reported to the local social service authority that he was displaying disruptive behaviour and that on 15 March 1994 he had come to school with a 5 centimetre long cut on his face.         On 31 May 1994 the applicant contacted the police and complained that two men in suits were asking questions about her at work and that she had been nearly run over by a car outside her apartment.         On 3 July 1994 the applicant brought M. to a hospital as he had a cut on his lip.   Upon the examination of the boy, a number of other bruises were discovered.   The hospital staff notified the police and a police protection order, authorising M.'s detention for a limited number of hours, was issued.   This was based, inter alia, on the opinion of the paediatrician that the applicant's explanation as regards the origin of the bruises had been unsatisfactory.   As the applicant was of the opinion that the acts of the authorities amounted to an unlawful abduction of her child, she protested energetically and had to be removed from the hospital forcefully by the police.         On 4 July 1994 the local social service authority sought, and was granted, an emergency protection order which authorised the continuation of the temporary arrangements in respect of M. for a certain additional period of time.   On 12 July 1994 a meeting was arranged between M. and the applicant.   The applicant's behaviour at this meeting was assessed as strange and violent by the social service officers, who had to ask for the help of the police to escort the applicant out of the building.         On an unspecified date in July 1994 M. was placed temporarily with the same foster carers as before.         On 14 July 1994, upon the application of the local social service authority for an interim care order, the Inner London Family Proceedings Court held a hearing.   The Court heard the applicant who explained that, inter alia, she had hit M. with a leather strap when he had attempted to climb on the balcony, thus frightening her.         On the same day, after examining a paediatrician's opinion, the submissions of the applicant and of the social service officers involved, the Court issued an interim care order for a period of eight weeks.   Such an order was necessary as there were substantial grounds to believe that M. had suffered harm from the applicant.   Furthermore, the applicant appeared mentally unstable, she and her son had been in the United Kingdom only for a very short period of time, had very few connections there, and little was known about their family history in Spain.   The order allowed for contacts between the applicant and her son two times per week on the condition that the applicant did not behave again as she did during the meeting of 12 July 1994.   A guardian ad litem of M. was appointed.         On 15 July 1994 the applicant wrote a letter to the Court protesting against its decision.   This was treated as an appeal against the interim care order.   The appeal was heard by the High Court on 10 August 1994 and was dismissed.         On 2 August 1994, at a meeting with her son, the applicant again behaved violently and was removed with the help of the police.   On 4 August 1994 the local social service authority informed the applicant that they were suspending temporarily her contacts with M.   On 10 August 1994 they again wrote to the applicant proposing to meet her to discuss the contact arrangements between her and her son.   In the meantime the applicant was able to speak to M. by telephone and to write letters to him.   M. was also allowed to send letters to the applicant.         On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant for common assault and bodily harm against two social service employees.   Hearings on this matter were held on or about 17 August 1994 and again on or about 20 September 1994.   The outcome of these proceedings has not been indicated by the applicant.         On 24 August 1994 the applicant submitted to the London Magistrates' Court an application for contact with her son.   On 31 August 1994 the Court heard the applicant, counsel for the child and representatives of the local social service authority.   The Court decided to examine the matter jointly with the application of the local authority for a further interim order and adjourned the matter until 8 September 1994.   On that date the interim care order was renewed and the contact between the applicant and M. was left at the discretion of the social service authority.         Throughout the proceedings in which she was involved, the applicant was repeatedly advised orally and in writing by the social service authority and by the courts to seek legal advice.   It appears that she did so at some point and received legal aid for an unspecified part of the proceedings.         In September 1994 the applicant was contacted by representatives of the local mental health service, who unsuccessfully attempted to arrange an interview with her.         The interim care order in respect of M. was repeatedly renewed at hearings held on 5 October, 1 November, 28 November, and 19 December 1994.   It was again renewed on 11 January, 8 February and 8 March 1995.         The renewal orders also dealt with additional matters such as the collection of evidence about the family circumstances of M. in Spain, the seeking of a legal opinion of an expert in Spanish law and the disclosure of certain documents to the social service authority.   Some of the orders also dealt with the applicant's petitions to be informed of the address of M.'s foster carers, which were dismissed.   On 8 March 1995 the Court directed that a report about the applicant's capacity to conduct the litigation be prepared by a psychiatrist.         At a final hearing on 20 March 1995, of which the applicant was informed but did not attend, the Court issued a full care order in respect of M.   The Court also gave leave to the local social service authority to refuse contact between the applicant and M.   On 21 March 1995 the authority informed the applicant that they were looking for a Spanish family to adopt M.         The applicant apparently has not appealed against the full care order of 20 March 1995.         On an unspecified date after March 1995 the applicant returned to Spain.   In October 1995 she went again to the United Kingdom for several weeks and returned to Spain in November 1995.   The applicant has not substantiated any subsequent developments.   She has not seen her son allegedly since August 1994.   COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains that her son was unlawfully abducted by the United Kingdom authorities.   As a result she was deprived of her right to live with her son and was even denied any contact with him.         The applicant invokes Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.   THE LAW         The applicant complains of the acts of the United Kingdom authorities in respect of the custody of her child.         However, insofar as the applicant may be understood as complaining on behalf of her minor son that his arrest and detention were unlawful and contrary to Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention, even assuming that the boy's situation can be regarded as a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of this provision, the Commission notes that the applicant has not challenged the police protection order and has not instituted proceedings against the police. In respect of this complaint the applicant has not, therefore, exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.         The applicant has also complained under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention that the acts of the local social service authority and the judicial decisions as regards the custody of her son amounted to a breach of her right to respect for her family life.   However, the Commission notes that the applicant has not pursued proceedings to obtain the custody of, or the right of contact with, her son M. since September 1994.   Moreover, she has not appealed against the full care order of 20 March 1995.   It follows that also in respect of this complaint the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.         Insofar as the applicant invokes Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in respect of the acts of the United Kingdom authorities in the events at issue, the Commission does not find any appearance of a violation of her rights under this provision.         The remainder of the application is, therefore, manifestly ill- founded.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber         (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)