CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 15 mai 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 26299/95                       by Maurice KIRK                       against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 18 July 1994 by Maurice KIRK against the United Kingdom and registered on 28 January 1995 under file No. 26299/95;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a British citizen born in 1945 and resident in Guernsey. He is represented before the Commission by Bobbetts Mackan, solicitors practising in Bristol. This is the fifteenth application by the applicant to the Commission. The previous fourteen were declared inadmissible, the latest being No. 20890/92 declared inadmissible on 1 July 1993.        The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.        The applicant is a practising veterinary surgeon who moved to Guernsey from England with his family in 1979.   Since his arrival in Guernsey, the applicant has been involved in a large number of cases, criminal and civil. He speedily formed the view that the administration of justice on the island was conducted in an arbitrary and archaic manner by persons ill-begotten of their high office. The applicant did not hesitate to communicate his opinions to the relevant authorities and drew attention to what he and others considered to be a feudal system of political and judicial administration. As a result, the applicant states that he became "persona non grata" with the political and judicial administration on the island and a clear desire was evinced by those in authority to ensure that the applicant was forced to leave the island. This was demonstrated, inter alia, by the bringing of further criminal charges against him which would ensure that his name was removed from the register of persons permitted to practise as veterinary surgeons.        The applicant refers in particular to the following decisions and proceedings:   A.    On 17 July 1984, the applicant was convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment following an incident on 12 December 1983 in which the applicant had left the dock and advanced in a threatening manner towards the magistrate sitting to hear a charge of drunk driving against the applicant. The applicant appealed to the Guernsey Court of Appeal, explaining, inter alia, that the magistrate had not constituted a "competent court" and he had intended to carry out a citizen's arrest on the magistrate. The applicant's appeal was rejected on 5 October 1984.   B.    Between 4 June and 31 December 1984, the applicant states that the prison authorities prevented him from receiving (at least 16 were never received) or sending communications (exceeding 65 in number) which hampered him in contacting lawyers, witnesses and other helpers and in thus preparing for various court proceedings. The applicant complained to the Prison Board. By letter dated 27 July 1984, the Board stated that the applicant as a prisoner on remand or pending his appeal had been or was entitled to necessary facilities for the preparation of his defence or appeal. By further letter dated 26 September 1984, the Board rejected the applicant's claim that he had insufficient time to prepare his case, referring to the 600 letters already sent by him and to the fact that he was allowed to work on his case during the time that he should have been working and noting that in association time he was making use of the leisure facilities. A letter dated 11 December 1984 from the Home Officer in response to enquiry by the applicant's Member of Parliament stated that the applicant had been allowed to send more than 1000 letters while in prison   which was far in excess of the statutory entitlement: only one incoming letter had been stopped (from a mentally ill patient) and 32 outgoing letters   which were mostly of an excessive length and contained cartoons and press cuttings not relevant to his litigation or pending appeal. By petition dated 16 February 1991, the applicant complained about this and other matters to the Privy Council requesting special leave to appeal. By report dated 21 May 1991, the Privy Council refused special leave to appeal.   C.    On 4 June 1990, the applicant was fined £1000 (term of imprisonment in default) for contempt of court in respect of the publication of a leaflet "Guernsey's Corrupt Judicial System" which contained scandalous statements about a magistrate. The text of the court order indicates that the applicant elected to represent himself. The applicant considered that he required the transcript of the proceedings   in order to appeal but his application to be provided a transcript free of cost was rejected on 7 January 1991, since he had not provided sufficient details about his financial position which could satisfy the court that he would be eligible for legal aid. It seems that his appeal lapsed, no subsequent documents relating to it being provided.   D.    On 12 October 1990, the applicant was convicted for criminal damage and fined £100. On 24 October 1990, he was convicted for contempt and sentenced to one months'imprisonment. He was granted bail pending his appeal. He appears to have applied for a full copy of the transcript (extracts were before the courts) but was not eligible to obtain a free copy. The appeal against the contempt was adjourned at his request in April 1991 pending his appeals to the Privy Council. On rejection of the Privy Council petitions, the appeal was dismissed on 22 October 1991.   COMPLAINTS   A.    In respect of his conviction for contempt of 17 July 1984, the applicant invokes Articles 3, 5 paras. 1, 2 and 3, 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) and 10 of the Convention.   B.    In respect of the stopping of his letters during his detention between June and December 1984, the applicant invokes Articles 3, 5, 6 paras. 1, 2 and 3 (c), 8 and 13 of the Convention.   C. In respect of his conviction for contempt on 4 June 1990, the applicant invokes Articles 5 paras 2 and 3 and 6 in that he was deprived of the opportunity to answer the allegations   or to represent himself.   D. In respect of his convictions in October 1990, the applicant invokes Articles 5 paras. 2 and 3, 6 and 8 in that he was deprived of the opportunity to appeal, answer the allegations   or to represent himself.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        On 29 October 1991, the applicant's counsel submitted a faxed outline application on his behalf. A letter containing complaints, with documents, had previously been submitted by the applicant personally on or about 24 October 1991. On 31 December 1991, solicitors contacted the Secretariat stating that they were now representing the applicant. The Commission's application form was sent to the solicitors on 21 January 1992. It was drawn to the attention of the applicant's representatives that many of the matters raised had also been considered in previous applications by the applicant and copies of the Commission's decisions were sent. They were also warned that failure to return the application form within a short period might affect the date of introduction of the application.        By letter dated 12 June 1992, the applicant's representatives referring to "two separate and distinct petitions" submitted in October 1991 stated that the first concerned new matters unrelated to previous applications and in respect of the second, made by the applicant personally, there was the new element of a Privy Council decision by way of exhaustion of domestic remedies. By letter dated 17 July 1992, the Secretariat reminded the applicant's representatives that they had not returned the Commission's application form sent to them in January 1992 but informing that there was no need to repeat information previously submitted.        On receipt of the Commission's application form on 9 November 1992, with enclosures repeating largely earlier submissions made by counsel on 29 October 1991, the Secretariat informed the applicant's representatives that the application had been registered under No. 20890/92 on 29 October 1992 and that it was considered as having been introduced in October 1991.        The Commission sitting by way a committee rejected the application as manifestly ill-founded on the basis of all the material in the file on 1 July 1993.        The decision was sent to the applicant's representatives on 13 July 1993. A further copy was sent on 11 August 1993 when it appeared the first was misdirected. By letter dated 21 September 1993, the applicant's representatives wrote requesting further details of the Commission's reasoning.   By letter dated 29 September 1993, the Secretariat informed them that no further reasons could be disclosed and explained the nature of the committee proceedings.        By letter dated 18 July 1994, the applicant's representatives referred to the application lodged on 24 October 1991 and enclosed their formal submissions. By letter dated 22 August 1994, the Secretariat informed them that the application No. 20890/92 introduced on that date had been declared inadmissible.        By letter dated 5 September 1994, the applicant's representatives contended that two sets of papers had been submitted on 24 October 1991, one from the applicant and the other from his counsel.   They accepted that one application had been determined and asked to proceed with the second one. By letter dated 24 November 1994, the Secretariat informed them that the two sets of papers had been registered as one application under No. 20890/92 and that the Commission's decision concerned both. By letter dated 30 November 1994, the applicant's representatives stated that they had never been informed that the two sets of papers had been linked under one application number and that detailed submissions had only been provided concerning one: the detailed submissions now provided related to the second.        By letter dated 26 January 1995, the Secretariat informed the applicant's representatives that their current complaints had been registered under No. 26299/95 with the introduction date of 30 November 1994 but that to the extent that the matters raised were substantially the same as those dealt with under the previous application they were likely to be rejected under Article 27 para. (1) b. They were also informed that the introduction date would be taken from the date of their recent submissions.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains principally of his conviction for contempt of 17 July 1984, the stopping of his letters between June- December 1984 and his convictions for contempt in June and October 1990.   The Commission notes that the first two complaints were examined and rejected in the Commission's decision in Application Nos. 13352/87 and 13496/88 of 8 March 1989 and were also contained in the materials submitted to the Commission and registered under Application No. 20890/92 rejected on 1 July 1993. The convictions of the applicant for contempt in June and October 1990 were also included in the complaints submitted in the application No. 20890/92 which was rejected on 1 July 1993.   2.    The Commission notes that the applicant and his representatives consider that there has been a confusion as to the complaints which were to be examined by it under Application No. 20890/92 and that they were under the impression that only one of the "sets of papers" submitted was registered under that application number. The Commission is prepared to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt as the genuineness of his misunderstanding. It has therefore not applied Article 27 para. 1 (b) (Art. 27-1-b) in respect of complaints which were referred to in outline in the materials before the Commission and registered under Application No. 20890/92.   3.    The Commission recalls however that the applicant's solicitors wrote to Secretariat by letter dated 18 July 1994 stating that with reference to the application lodged on 24 October 1991 they enclosed the formal submissions. These submissions provided a more detailed expansion of some matters referred to in the applicant's letter and annexes of 24 October 1991. The Commission would note that its task in examining the applicant's complaints which refer to a large number of different proceedings has not been assisted by the manner of its presentation. While difficulties may inevitably arise from the intricacy of events, the Commission has found inconsistencies and contradictions in submissions of facts and in allegations of complaint.        According, however, to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, applications to the Commission must be introduced within six months of the final decision taken in respect of their subject-matter.   The Commission's established practice is to consider as the date of introduction the date of the applicant's first letter indicating his intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the complaints which he wishes to raise.   However, where a substantial interval follows before the applicant submits further information regarding his proposed application, the Commission must examine the particular circumstances of the case in order to decide what date should be regarded as the date of introduction of the application, interrupting the running of time for the purpose of the six month time-limit (see eg. No. 15213/89 dec. 1.7.91 D.R. 71 p. 230).        The Commission considers that the purpose of the six month rule is to maintain reasonable legal certainty and ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time. This also facilitates the establishment of facts in a case, the passage of time rendering problematic any fair examination of the issues raised. It would therefore be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the six month rule laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention to accept that by means of an initial letter an applicant could set in motion the procedure provided for in Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention only to remain inactive thereafter for an unlimited and unexplained period of time (see eg. No. 10626/83, Dec. 7.5.85 D.R.42 p. 205).        In the present case, there has been a lapse of two years and nine months between the applicant's letter introducing his complaints and the provision of "formal submissions" concerning these matters on his behalf by his solicitors. While there was correspondence between the solicitors and the Commission's Secretariat during 1992 and 1993 concerning the applicant's Application No. 20890/92, the applicant's solicitors maintain that this application dealt with separate and distinct matters. In any event, there was a gap of more than a year between the decision rejecting that application   on 3 July 1993 and the submission of "formal submissions" in relation to this application   on 18 July 1994, a delay for which no explanation has been given. The Commission notes that the applicant's solicitors were warned of the possible effect of delay on the calculation of the introduction date in the first letter sent to them on 21 January 1992. The Commission finds therefore that the date of introduction for the purposes of this application must be taken as 18 July 1994.        The Commission recalls that the applicant claims that the final decision relating to his complaints about the contempt conviction of 17 July 1984 and the stopping of his correspondence while he was in prison between June and December 1984 was the decision of the Privy Council rejecting his request for special leave to appeal on 21 May 1991. Even assuming therefore that the applicant's petition to the Privy Council more than five years after the events in question could be regarded as an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26), the refusal of special leave was given more than six months before the introduction of this application.        As regards the complaints concerning convictions in June and October 1990, the Commission notes that the final decisions regarding these matters were given on 7 January 1991 and 21 October 1992 respectively though it also appears that some reference to these matters was also included in the applicant's petition to the Privy Council which was rejected on 21 May 1991. These decisions were also issued more than six months before the introduction of this application.        The Commission finds no special circumstances arising on the facts of this case which could be considered as interrupting the running of the six month period.        Consequently, the applicant's complaints must be rejected as out of time pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                         (C.L. ROZAKIS)