CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 15 mai 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 26367/95                       by Pentti LOIKKANEN, Markku LOIKKANEN and                       the Estate of late Ms. Mirja Liisa ATTILA                       against Finland         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 2 November 1994 by Pentti LOIKKANEN, Markku LOIKKANEN and the Estate of late Ms. Mirja Liisa ATTILA against Finland and registered on 31 January 1995 under file No. 26367/95;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The first and second applicants are Finnish citizens, born in 1935 and 1948 respectively. The first applicant is a professor residing in Espoo and the second applicant is an airline pilot residing in Helsinki. The third applicant is the undistributed estate of the late Mirja Liisa Attila. The estate, which has legal personality, is represented by one of the heirs, Mr. Mikko Attila. Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. Markku Fredman, a lawyer practising in Helsinki.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.         The applicants are joint owners of a piece of real property known as Salmi 9:32 in Savonlinna, which has an area of 55.8 hectares. The neighbouring piece of property, known as Salmenranta 9:39, was owned by a person named T. The latter property had a right of way (tieoikeus, vägrätt) over a six-metre-wide road encumbering the applicants' property.         On 20 April 1990 a person named G bought a parcel (määräala, område) of T's original estate (kantatila, stamlägenhet), i.e. of Salmenranta. On 7 September 1990 G's spouse became a joint owner of the parcel.         At the end of August 1990 G, with the help of a person named P, felled about 200 trees situated on the applicants' property within the six-metre-wide area covered by the right of way. Furthermore, in the middle of September 1990, when the road was used for bringing building materials to G's parcel, a bridge belonging to the applicants' property collapsed. G and his wife subsequently replaced the bridge with another construction.         In September 1990 administrative proceedings began before an Expert (toimitusinsinööri, syssloman) with a view to separating (lohkominen, styckning) G's parcel from the original estate. On 19 November 1990 the separation was terminated and G's parcel was transformed into an independent piece of real property. It was also decided that the already-existing right of way over a six-metre-wide road, encumbering the applicants' property, would benefit G's land.         Later, in administrative proceedings on 17 May 1991, the location of the road was transferred to another place in accordance with the applicants' request and the existing right of way encumbering the applicants' property was accordingly transferred to that area.         Due to the fact that the applicants had reported the felling of timber to the police, the police conducted a preliminary investigation. As a result of the preliminary investigation G and P were charged with reckless felling of timber (haaskaaminen, åverkansbrott) as well as unauthorised building on another person's property (luvaton rakentaminen toisen maalla, olovlig byggande på mark som är i en annans besittning) contrary to chapter 33 sections 1 and 5 of the Criminal Code as it stood. Furthermore, the applicants sued G and P for damages.         The case was heard by the City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Savonlinna. The applicants were assisted or represented by counsel. The City Court heard evidence from the parties and from one witness called by the applicants and from one witness called by the accused. The parties did not call any further witnesses.         On 6 August 1992 the City Court found G and P guilty on the charges against them and sentenced both of them to 55 day-fines, totalling FIM 1,815 and FIM 4,785 respectively. Furthermore, the City Court obliged them to pay compensation of FIM 7,004 as regards the trees and of FIM 1,000 as regards the bridge. The City Court found that, under the Act on Private Roads, G, as the owner of the parcel, had had the right temporarily to use the six-metre-wide road over which T's original property had a right of way. It found, however, that this right of use did not include the right to fell the trees growing on the road area. It found that G and P had felled the trees without being authorised to do so.         The applicants as well as the accused appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of East Finland.         On 21 January 1994 the Court of Appeal acquitted G and P on the charges brought against them. It found that there was no reason to link a parcel-owner's right to make use of his possessions to the separation process. As G's property had had the right to be served by the relevant road in its entirety, i.e. in a width of six metres, he and P had not committed a crime by felling the trees growing on the road area. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found that the applicants had no right to grow trees on the relevant road area and, therefore, the felling of the trees had not caused them damage for which compensation should be paid. The Court of Appeal quashed the City Court's judgment as regards the compensation for the trees. As regards the compensation for the bridge, the Court of Appeal upheld the City Court's judgment.         On 2 May 1994 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complain that the Court of Appeal, by its judgment, failed to protect their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They maintain that the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding the legal status of an owner of a parcel of land to be equal to that of an owner of an already-separated piece of real property. They complain that their possession rights as regards the trees growing on their property were violated. They maintain, furthermore, that the alleged deprivation of their possessions was not in the public interest or lawful, since the relevant legislation was so unclear that the two courts came to different conclusions. They maintain that the State was obliged to enact laws clearly defining this type of action as punishable.   2.     The applicants maintain that the Court of Appeal tolerated their neighbours' allegedly unauthorised actions although their neighbours' right of way ought to have been confirmed only in the separation proceedings. Therefore, the applicants complain that their civil rights and obligations were not determined in a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.     The applicants complain that the Finnish courts, by their decisions in the present case, disregarded their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention reads:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of       his possessions except in the public interest and subject       to the conditions provided for by law and by the general       principles of international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it       deems necessary to control the use of property in       accordance with the general interest or to secure the       payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."         The Commission notes that the dispute concerned the interpretation of the right of way. In this respect the Commission recalls that the dispute was examined by the Court of Appeal, which, acting within its competence and applying what it considered to be the relevant rules of the applicable law, found it established that G and P had not committed a crime nor caused such damage to the applicants' timber as should be compensated for, since the applicants had not had the right to grow the relevant trees. The fact that the courts acquitted the accused and that the applicants were only partly successful in bringing compensation proceedings does not mean that the respondent State has disregarded the applicants' rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.          In these circumstances there is no basis upon which it could be held that the applicants' rights secured to them by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) have been violated.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicants complain, further, that their civil rights and obligations were not determined in a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention since the courts tolerated their neighbours' actions although their neighbours' rights ought to have been confirmed only in the separation proceedings.         Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:         "1.   In the determination of his civil rights and       obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a fair ...       hearing ...   by (a) ... tribunal ...       ... "         The Commission notes that in the court proceedings complained of the applicants were able to call all the witnesses whose evidence they considered relevant. As regards the evaluation of the evidence the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, the Commission's only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention whereas it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (cf., for example, No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77-A p. 81).         In the instant case the Commission has not found any appearance of a violation of the right to a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (C.L. ROZAKIS)