CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 20 mai 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 20390/92                       by John TINNELLY & SONS LTD and                       Patrick and Gerard TINNELLY                                     and                         Application No. 21322/92                       by Kevin, Michael, Paddy and Barry McELDUFF                                    both                         against the United Kingdom        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 20 May 1996, the following members being present:              MM.    S. TRECHSEL, President                  H. DANELIUS                  E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    L. LOUCAIDES                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the applications introduced on 27 May 1992 and 26 August 1992 by John TINNELLY & SONS LTD and Patrick and Gerard TINNELLY and by Kevin, Michael, Paddy and Barry McELDUFF respectively against the United Kingdom and registered on 29 July 1992 and 3 February 1993 under file No. 20390/92 and file No. 21322/92 respectively;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      2 March 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicants on 7 July 1994;   -     the further observations submitted by the respondent Government      on 13 April 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicants on 17 May 1995;   -     the Commission's decision of 27 November 1995 to hold a hearing      on the admissibility and merits of the applications;   -     the parties' submissions at the hearing on 20 May 1996;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant in Application No. 20390/92 is a limited company carrying on business as a demolition contractor in Northern Ireland.   The second and third applicants are, respectively, the managing director and company secretary of the first applicant.        The applicants in Application No. 21322/92 are self-employed joiners from Omagh, County Tyrone, Northern Ireland.        The applicants in Application No. 20390/92 are represented by Ms. F. Cassidy, solicitor, and the applicants in Application No. 21322/92 are represented by Ms D. Hawthorne, of the Fair Employment Commission.   Observations have been submitted by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, Mr P. Goulding, Mr. B. Macdonald and Mr. J. O'Hara, of counsel.        The facts of the present case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   (a)   The particular circumstances of the case   Application No. 20390/92        In or about March 1985 the first applicant tendered for a contract with Northern Ireland Electricity Services ("NIE") including demolition work at a power station.   It was on a list of approved contractors for NIE.   Its tender was the lowest and, following an NIE engineer's recommendation that recorded the first applicant's experience of carrying out sub-contract demolition work on power stations in England, its tender was approved by the Executive of NIE at a meeting on 2 May 1985. In June 1985, however, NIE accepted a revised recommendation to award the contract to the second lowest tenderer, Mc W. NIE declined to inform the first applicant of the reasons for this decision.        Subsequently, the first applicant submitted the lowest tender for a sub-contract with Mc W. relating to part of the demolition project. However, the sub-contract was withheld from the first applicant after NIE informed Mc W. that the first applicant would not receive security clearance to enter the site.        The first applicant lodged complaints with the Fair Employment Agency for Northern Ireland ("FEA") contending that it had been the victim of unlawful discrimination on the ground of religious belief and political opinion in relation to the contract and the sub-contract. In the course of subsequent correspondence between the FEA and NIE, NIE stated that it had chosen the contractor with the proven record of safely dismantling power stations.   The FEA agreed to investigate the first applicant's complaint that there were suspicions that the NIE decision had been brought about by sectarian trade union pressure, under Section 23 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 ("the 1976 Act": see below, relevant domestic law and practice).        NIE sought to prevent this investigation by seeking a court order declaring that the protection afforded by Section 23 was not available to corporate bodies.   This argument was rejected by Mr. Justice Nicholson on 8 September 1987 and the investigation was allowed to proceed.        However, on 28 October 1987, at the request of NIE, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland issued a certificate pursuant to Section 42 (2) of the 1976 Act to the effect that the decision not to grant the first applicant the contract in question was "an act done for the purpose of safeguarding national security or the protection of public safety or order".        No other avenue of complaint in respect of the alleged unlawful discrimination was available to the first applicant.   However, the FEA itself commenced judicial review proceedings seeking, inter alia, to quash the Section 42 certificate.   It was contended that the certificate was issued in bad faith, unfairly, irrationally and on the basis of irrelevant considerations. In the course of those proceedings, the FEA requested discovery of a number of documents.   The Secretary of State declined to produce certain documents and was willing to produce others only on the basis that parts of them were removed or sealed up.        On 13 September 1988, the Secretary of State issued a public interest immunity ("PII") certificate under Section 52 of the 1976 Act in relation to several such documents, to the effect that discovery of the missing documents or parts of documents should not be given for national security reasons similar to those which were said to justify the issue of the Section 42 certificate.   In the PII certificate, the Secretary of State inter alia stated:        "NIE is responsible for the provision... of an uninterrupted      supply of electricity in Northern Ireland. To fulfil this      responsibility it must have available to it all relevant      information which may reduce or avoid the risk of disruption to      the supply... for any unlawful reason including acts of      terrorism, and in case of the [relevant] contract, I believe that      it did obtain such information. The disclosure of certain      information which was obtained by NIE would reveal to those who      are engaged in unlawful activities including acts of terrorism,      the nature of that information, the extent of the information      known about them and possibly the source from which it      originated. This could endanger life and would make it more      difficult to obtain such information in the future. ...disclosure      of the process by which this information is obtained could impair      the effectiveness of that process.        I am of the view that if the independent information which I      obtained in the present case were to be disclosed it could enable      terrorist organisations to know the nature and extent of the      information known about them and would aid them in their unlawful      acts..."        On 16 March 1989, Mr. Justice Nicholson considered an interlocutory application by the FEA challenging the Secretary of State's decision to withhold documents.   The judge found that the documents or some of the documents already disclosed on which NIE based their decision gave rise to a prima facie case of bad faith on the part of NIE and the advisers to the Secretary of State; those documents, in other words, cast doubt on the contention that the decision to issue the Section 42 certificate, and hence the claim to PII, were genuinely made on national security grounds.   He ordered that some 19 of the missing documents should be produced for inspection by the court.        On 19 April 1989, having read the documents (which were not disclosed to the FEA or the applicants), the judge held that none of the withheld documents assisted the application for judicial review. He accepted the claim for PII in respect of documents 1 - 14, which related to confidential record checks carried out by the Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") on the first applicant and on persons employed by it. He considered that documents 15 - 18, internal NIE documents, could be partly disclosed and that document 19 could be disclosed as a whole. He concluded:        "I am satisfied that the claim for immunity from production for      all these documents was made in good faith.   But in my opinion      no person could reasonably say that for the safeguarding of      national security or for the protection of public safety or      public order documents 15 - 19 should not be produced or, if      admissible, should not be admissible in evidence - so long as my      directions are carried out about covering over portions of some      of them."        At the substantive hearing on 3 December 1991, the judicial review application was dismissed.   Mr. Justice McCollum found, inter alia, as follows:        "The issue of course before me is not whether the Secretary of      State was right or wrong in signing the certificate, but whether      he had jurisdiction to do so, which is basically accepted by the      parties, and whether the events leading up to his decision are      such that his decision to certify can or cannot stand.        I must also remember that the process of judicial review is      ill-suited to the resolution of disputed issues of fact, and      particularly so when the primary issue is not the determination      of what occurred, but the motives of those engaged in the      relevant acts...        Even taking NIE's case at its highest, [one particular letter]      was misleading because it made no mention of the true reason,      according to them, i.e. the withdrawal of the contract from      Tinnelly on security considerations...        In spite however of all those matters I have referred to, I am      nonetheless not satisfied that the application for the Section      42 certificate by NIE was an abuse of the process as it is      understood by the parties, nor that it was an act of fraud in the      legal sense on the part of NIE...        One of the great problems which is quite beyond my power to      resolve is that Tinnelly insists that it previously had always      received security clearance for workers in highly sensitive      installations...        I have not been permitted to inspect the RUC response to the      individual requests for clearance.   I do not understand why      persons who may have got clearance earlier, may have been refused      in this case...      However, having regard to the evidence given and to the      unchallenged affidavit of the Secretary of State about the effect      of the RUC response, and indeed to those parts of the documents      which I have been permitted to see, I must accept that in      response to some individuals at least, the response was      unfavourable, and this may have been to such a degree as to      justify the view that a serious risk was involved if the contract      was granted to Tinnelly...        However, the heart of the matter was whether security information      had in fact become available to NIE at the relevant time which      would have justified its decision to withdraw the contract...        Had it transpired that no such information existed, then the      application for the Section 42 certificate would have been      exposed as bogus...        As I have already indicated, I have not seen that information in      detail, but I am bound to accept the judgment of the Secretary      of State that the information was such as to justify the      decision.   And I may add that those parts of the documents that      I have seen confirm that view.   When it was confirmed that such      security information was made available, it was in my view      reasonable for the Department to accept that the NIE application      was made in good faith...        It seemed to me that the Department acted with the utmost      propriety in pursuing its own investigations into the central      issue of security, and that the application to the Secretary of      State was only processed further when the Department were      satisfied that there was a genuine security consideration      involved in the case...        The Secretary of State goes on to say `having seen this report      I was quite satisfied that there would have been a genuine risk      to national security, public safety or public order, if the      contract had been awarded to Tinnellys' and that notwithstanding      that a different reason had been given by NIE for not awarding      the contract to the Tinnellys, he felt satisfied that he could      accept the assurance by NIE that the security issue had been the      fundamental one from the outset...        It would be impossible for any court to hold that this was not      a tenable view reached after due consideration of the submissions      presented to him, and having regard to the fact that the      consideration of what constitutes a risk to national security,      public safety or public order, are matters very much within the      exclusive competence of the Secretary of State to determine...        However, once it is accepted that it was appropriate for NIE to      seek a Section 42 certificate to justify its withdrawal of the      contract from Tinnelly, and that the procedures followed were      lawful, and did not fall short of any legal requirement, and add      to that the finding that the procedures were followed in good      faith and with proper attention and consideration, then clearly      it is not open to the court to interfere by way of judicial      review.        It is not the function of judicial review to re-try issues."        Senior Counsel advised the FEA that an appeal against the decision of 3 December 1991 would not succeed.   Application No. 21322/93        In or about May 1990 the applicants were informed by a building contractor that he had a contract with the Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland (DOE) to build premises at Hospital Road, Omagh, Co Tyrone.   The contractor invited the applicants to tender for the joiner sub-contract.   Their tender was accepted and they were advised by the contractor that they could start the work, subject to security clearance from the DOE.        The applicants supplied their names, addresses and dates of birth to the contractor, who forwarded them to the Contracts Branch of the DOE.   Approximately 6 weeks later they were informed that they had not been granted security clearance and that they could not therefore be awarded the sub-contract. The recommendation that security clearance be refused emanated from the Security Branch of the Department of Finance and Personnel ("DFP"), a Government department in Northern Ireland, which based its recommendation on information supplied by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (including officers of its Special Branch).        The applicants have no criminal convictions of any kind, except minor motoring offences.   They state that they are not and never have been involved in any criminal or terrorist activity and know of no good reason why they should have been refused security clearance.   They believe that they were discriminated against by the DOE on the grounds of religious belief or political opinion.   In broad terms they would be perceived as having nationalist views, although they are not a member of any political party and are not engaged in any form of political activity.   They wrote to the DOE through their solicitors requesting an explanation as to why they had been refused clearance to be employed on this contract, but the DOE, following re-examination by the DFP Security Branch of the information originally supplied by the police, refused to provide an explanation.        The applicants sought the assistance of the Fair Employment Commission for Northern Ireland and in August 1990 they made a complaint to the Fair Employment Tribunal ("the Tribunal") alleging that the contractor and the DOE had discriminated against them contrary to the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 ("the 1976 Act": see below, relevant domestic law and practice).   They also served a Questionnaire in accordance with Section 28 of the Act.   The applicants had in the past been stopped and mistaken by members of the security forces for different persons of the same name, and they suspected that this was a case of mistaken identity.        The contractor resisted the complaint on the grounds that he had been willing to offer employment to the applicants but that the DOE had not been prepared to give them security clearance.   The DOE stated by letter dated 3 December 1990 that it did not propose to respond to the Questionnaire.   By Notice of Appearance of the same date, the DOE resisted the complaint on the grounds that it had not done anything which would constitute an act of unlawful discrimination under the Act and, in the alternative, that "any act of the respondent in relation to the applicant was an act done for the purpose of safeguarding national security, and thus any such act is not an act to which the [1976 Act] or the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 apply".        In relation to the first ground relied upon by the DOE, the DOE applied for an interlocutory hearing on the questions whether it should be dismissed from the proceedings, whether the applicants sought employment from it within the meaning of the Act and whether in the circumstances it could have discriminated against the applicants contrary to Sections 23 and 57 of the Act.   On the morning of the interlocutory hearing, on 26 September 1991, the DOE withdrew its application.   On 22 October 1991 the Tribunal ordered the DOE to provide discovery of all relevant documents relating to the matter. It also ordered the DOE to provide further particulars of its case, inter alia requiring the DOE to specify the national security grounds relied upon in relation to the applicants.        On 6 February 1992, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland issued a certificate pursuant to Section 42 (2) of the 1976 Act to the effect that the decision to refuse the applicants' admission to the site of the contract was done for the purpose of safeguarding national security.   Counsel advised the applicants that the effect of issuing the certificate was to bar the Tribunal from determining the complaint in the applicants' favour.   In view of the fact that an award of costs could have been made against the applicants if they had unreasonably proceeded to a hearing in the face of the certificate, they withdrew their application, which was accordingly dismissed by an order of the Tribunal dated 27 March 1992.        Although the certificate related specifically to the refusal of security clearance for work on the particular site in question, the implication is that the applicants are regarded by the Government as a security risk and that they would therefore be refused clearance for any other publicly funded work.   In view of the fact that such work is the single most important category of construction work in Northern Ireland, the applicants claim, as a result of these matters, to have been put at a serious disadvantage in the conduct of their business.   (b)   Relevant domestic law and practice        Under Sections 17 and 18 of the 1976 Act, it is unlawful for an employer, or a person engaging contract work, to discriminate against a person on the grounds of religious belief or political opinion in cases like the present.   Section 23 of the 1976 Act also prohibits a party, including a public authority, from discriminating against a person on grounds of religious belief or political opinion by refusing or omitting to confer a "qualification" required for employment or engagement. Other provisions in the 1976 Act relate to the liability of principals (Section 35) and of those who aid, incite, direct, procure, or induce others to commit unlawful acts of discrimination (Section 34).        The FEA, known since 1989 as the Fair Employment Commission, is a statutory body established under the 1976 Act. It has the duty to promote equality of opportunity in Northern Ireland and the elimination of religious and political discrimination.   As constituted at the time of the facts of Application No. 20390/92, if the FEA, following an investigation, reached the conclusion that there had been unlawful discrimination, it had power to attempt a settlement of the matters in dispute or if necessary to commence proceedings in the County Court against the relevant party in order to recover damages or secure injunctive relief on behalf of the victim.        Investigation proceedings were conducted in private before a complaints sub-committee of the FEA.   Any proceedings before the County Court, including an appeal by either party from the conclusions reached by the FEA, would be heard in public, subject to the judge's discretion, under the County Court Rules (Northern Ireland) 1981, to sit in chambers, for example to prevent confidential information or the evidence of a vulnerable witness from becoming known to the public.        Following amendments made by the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act"), applicable to Application No. 21322/93, the only remedy available to a person who has been a victim of a discrimination contrary to the 1976 Act is to make a complaint to the Tribunal, which is empowered to make various orders and recommendations, including an order for financial compensation up to a maximum of £30,000.   The amended legislation enables an intending complainant to request a party who has allegedly discriminated to respond to a questionnaire as to the reasons for that party's conduct. The questionnaire and any reply are admissible in proceedings before the Tribunal, which may draw adverse inferences from a party's failure to reply.        Section 42 of the 1976 Act provides as follows:        "(1)   This Act shall not apply to an act done for the purpose of      safeguarding national security or of protecting public safety or      public order.        (2)    A certificate signed by or on behalf of the Secretary of      State and certifying that an act specified in the certificate was      done for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1) shall be      conclusive evidence that it was done for that purpose."        Section 52 provides that any restriction on the disclosure of information obtained by or furnished to persons in the service of the Crown shall not apply to proceedings under the Act, save that a minister of the Crown may "certify that in his opinion the disclosure of that document or information ... would be prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom or any part of it or otherwise contrary to the public interest, and where such a certificate is given", the restriction on disclosure applies again.        By virtue of Section 19 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 ("the 1973 Act"), persons in Northern Ireland have the right not to be discriminated against by public authorities, including Ministers of the Crown.   Breach of this right is actionable, so that the victim can apply to the civil courts for damages and an injunction against the person responsible.   However, Schedule 6 of the 1976 Act amended section 19 of the 1973 Act so that proceedings against a public body in respect of discrimination in employment may be brought only under the 1976 Act and are thus subject to Section 42.        Discrimination on the grounds of sex and race are prohibited, respectively, by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976.   Both contain provisions analogous to Section 42 of the 1976 Act, supplemented in the case of sex discrimination by the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976, Article 53 (1).      In Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, [1986] ECR 1663, a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in a sex discrimination case, the Court of Justice had regard to Article 6 of the Convention and held the certification provisions to infringe Community law insofar as they permitted a certificate issued by the Secretary of State to be treated as conclusive evidence and hence prevent an industrial tribunal from considering the merits of the complainant's case.        Domestic law was consequently amended by the Sex Discrimination (Amendment) Order 1988 (SI 1988 No. 249) so as to disapply the certification provisions in relation to complaints of sex discrimination in employment-related matters.   In the course of the Parliamentary debate which preceded enactment of the amending legislation, the Minister of State for Northern Ireland distinguished the factors considered relevant to the issue of Section 42 certificates from those taken into account in the issue of similar certificates under sex discrimination legislation:        "[In sex discrimination cases] a person's gender cannot be taken      into account when a Minister certifies that something is      necessary on the grounds of national security...   However, ...it      would not be appropriate or necessary to follow a similar      approach in relation to religion and political opinion...        First, unlike gender, issues of religion and political opinion      can have a particularly intimate bearing on matters of national      security in Northern Ireland.   Accordingly, there are issues that      it might be appropriate and necessary to take into account when      certain matters of national security arise.   This is both      unfortunate and regrettable, but it is the hard reality in      Northern Ireland...        Secondly, [European Community law] does not cover the issues of      religion and political opinion.   The Government took steps to      amend the sex discrimination legislation when it became clear      that it was in conflict with our European obligations.   There is      no such conflict in the case of Section 42, so it is a perfectly      permissible and appropriate provision."        The Minister continued:        "... I reiterate that we have made it clear that we are looking      at possible ways of introducing an independent element into the      Section 42 procedure..."   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicants claim that they have been denied a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, in violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.        The applicants submit that they have a civil right under the 1976 Act not to be discriminated against on grounds of religious belief or political opinion in employment and employment-related matters in Northern Ireland.   They claim that by issuing a certificate under Section 42 of the 1976 Act, the Government have denied them access to an independent and impartial tribunal. Notwithstanding the attempt in Application No. 20390/92 to challenge the certificate in domestic proceedings, none of the applicants has any way of assessing the accuracy, completeness or reliability of the information on which the Government based its decision to issue the certificate.   Thus they have been denied a fair and public hearing into the issue whether their civil rights have been infringed.        The applicants further argue in their Observations in Reply that the issue of a certificate injured their reputations and at the same time deprived them of a forum in which to vindicate those reputations.   2.    The applicants invoke the right to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention. They also invoke Article 13 of the Convention.   Although the Section 42 certificates related specifically to the complaints regarding the contracts which had been refused, the applicants claim to have been "officially tainted" by the public authorities as a security risk, not least because the underlying complaints involved refusal of security clearance.        The applicants claim to have no effective remedy at their disposal for resolving these matters.   3.    The applicants complain of discrimination on grounds of religious or political opinion or association with a national minority, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, in the enjoyment of their rights under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.   They elaborate in their Observations in Reply that as victims of discrimination prohibited by national law, they are treated less favourably than victims of sex discrimination in Northern Ireland.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        Application No. 20390/92 was introduced on 27 May 1992 and registered on 29 July 1992.        Application No. 21322/92 was introduced on 26 August 1992 and registered on 3 February 1993.        On 1 September 1993 and 31 August 1993 respectively the Commission (First Chamber) decided to communicate the applications to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on admissibility and merits.        The Government submitted their observations in both applications on 2 March 1994, after 3 extensions of the time-limit.   The applicants submitted joint observations in reply on 7 July 1994, after an extension of the time-limit.        On 21 February 1995 the Commission decided to transfer further consideration of the case to the Plenary Commission, and on 27 February 1995 it decided to put further questions to the parties and to join the applications.   The Government submitted their further observations on 13 April 1995, and the applicants submitted their reply on 17 May 1995.        On 27 November 1995 the Commission decided to hold a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the applications.        At the hearing, which was held on 20 May 1996, the parties were represented as follows:   The Government:        Mr. D. BENTLEY, Agent of the Government      Mr. R. WEATHERUP, Counsel      Mr. B. McCLOSKEY, Counsel      Mr. H. CARTER, Home Office, Adviser      Mr. D. McCARTNEY, Department of Finance and Personnel,            Northern Ireland, Adviser      Mr. O. PAULIN, Assistant Crown Solicitor, Northern Ireland,            Adviser   The applicants:        Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Counsel      Mr. P. GOULDING, Counsel      Mr. B. MACDONALD, Counsel      Mr. J. O'HARA, Counsel      Ms. F. CASSIDY, Solicitor (Application No. 20390/92)      Ms. D. HAWTHORNE, Senior Complaints Officer, Fair Employment            Commission (Application No. 21322/92)   THE LAW        The applicants allege violations of Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 (Art. 6, 8, 13, 14) of the Convention by reason of the issue of certificates under Section 42 of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976.   Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention provides, so far as relevant, as follows:        "1.    In the determination of his civil rights and obligations      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an      independent and impartial tribunal established by law."        The Government submit that the procedural guarantees of Article 6 (Art. 6) do not attach to the proceedings brought by the applicants, and that in any event the courts are able, in an application for judicial review of a decision to issue a Section 42 Certificate, to look at sufficient aspects of the case to comply with the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6).   They consider that the complaints under Articles 8 and 13 (Art. 8, 13) are inadmissible for analogous reasons, and consider that the difference in treatment between sex discrimination cases and religious discrimination cases is justified because the security element in religious discrimination cases is fundamental to the issues, whereas it was not in the case of Johnston v. Chief Constable of the RUC.        The applicants disagree with the Government.   They see Article 6 (Art. 6) as applying to the proceedings on several grounds, and consider that the limitation on access to court was not proportionate to the legitimate aim of the protection of national security.   Under Article 8 (Art. 8) they expressly limit their complaint to the allegation of an interference with their right to honour and a good reputation, and to the absence of adequate and effective safeguards for that right. In connection with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, the applicants can see no difference in principle between their cases and the position under the Sex   Discrimination   Order, and   consider that if the rules can be changed for the latter, there is no valid reason for not changing the rules for the former.   The applicants also refer to the ILO (Discrimination and Occupation) Convention 1958.        In the light of the parties' observations, the Commission finds that the applications raise serious questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits.   The case cannot, therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority        DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the      merits.     Secretary to the Commission             President of the Commission           (H.C. KRÜGER)                             (S. TRECHSEL)