CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 25 juin 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                  EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS             Applications Nos. 21319/93, 21449/93 & 21675/93     The National & Provincial Building Society, the Leeds Permanent Building Society and the Yorkshire Building Society                                   against                           the United Kingdom                        REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                      (adopted on 25 June 1996)                            TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                           Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1-18). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The applications           (paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The proceedings           (paras. 5-13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The present Report           (paras. 14-18). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2     II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 19-52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        A.    The background of the present case           (paras. 19-25)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        B.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 26-48). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5        C.    The relevant domestic law           (paras. 49-51). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10     III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 52-114). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 52). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        B.    Points at issue           (para. 53). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        C.    As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1           to the Convention           (paras. 54-81). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             CONCLUSION           (para. 81). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17        D.    As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken           together with Article 14 of the Convention           (paras. 82-94). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17             CONCLUSION           (para. 94). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19        E.    As regards Article 6 of the Convention           (paras. 95-107) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19             CONCLUSION           (para. 107) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22        F.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           taken together with Article 14 of the Convention           (paras. 108-110)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22             CONCLUSION           (para. 110) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22        G.    Recapitulation           (paras. 111-114). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22          PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. N. BRATZA, JOINED BY      Mr. A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK, Mrs. G.H. THUNE, MM. J.-C. GEUS,      M.P. PELLONPÄÄ, B. MARXER AND B. CONFORTI. . . . . . . 24        PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. E. BUSUTTIL   . . . 26        PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. L. LOUCAIDES . . . 28        PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr. G. RESS   . . . . . 30   APPENDIX :      DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATIONS. . . . . . 31   I.INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The applications   2.    The applicants are three building societies, the National & Provincial Building Society ("the National & Provincial"), the Leeds Permanent Building Society ("the Leeds"), and the Yorkshire Building Society ("the Yorkshire").   The National & Provincial is represented by Mr. C. Evans, of Messrs. Slaughter and May, London, the Leeds by Mr. R.V. Jordan, of Messrs. Clifford Chance, London, and the Yorkshire by Ms. S. Garrett, of Messrs. Booth & Co., Leeds.   3.    The applications are directed against the United Kingdom.   The respondent Government were represented by Mr. M. Eaton as Agent, from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.   4.    The case concerns legislation which retrospectively validated regulations and Treasury Orders which had been challenged in litigation. The applicant societies invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention, taken alone and together with Article 14 of the Convention, and Article 6 of the Convention, again taken alone and together with Article 14 of the Convention.   B.    The proceedings   5.    The National & Provincial's application was introduced on 15 January 1993 and registered on 3 February 1993.   The Leeds' application was introduced on 21 December 1992 and registered on 1 March 1993. The Yorkshire's application was introduced on 11 January 1993 and registered on 16 April 1993.   6.    On 28 June 1993 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.   7.    The Government's observations were submitted on 2 November 1993, and the applicant societies' observations in reply were submitted on 21 February 1994.   8.    On 30 August 1994 the Commission decided to join the National & Provincial's application and the Yorkshire's application.   On the same date, it decided to hold a hearing of the parties.   9.    On 10 January 1995 the Commission decided to join the Leeds' application with the other two applications.   10.   The hearing was held on 13 January 1995.   The Government were represented by Messrs. M. Eaton, Agent, A. Moses, QC, Counsel, and D. Anderson, Counsel.   The applicant societies were represented by Messrs. J. Gardiner, QC, Counsel, P. Duffy, Counsel, and J. Peacock, Counsel.   The names of the other participants at the hearing are set out in the Commission's decision on admissibility which is annexed to the present report.   11.   On 13 January 1995 the Commission declared the application admissible.   The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 25 January 1995 and they were invited to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished. The applicant societies submitted observations on 3 March 1995 to which the Government replied on 5 April 1995.   The applicant societies submitted a further memorandum on 31 May 1995.   12.   On 2 December 1995 the Commission asked the parties for comments in the light of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and others v. Belgium.   The Government and the applicant societies made such comments on 25 January 1996.   The applicant societies made further remarks on the Government's comments on 26 February 1996.   13.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   14.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President                C.L. ROZAKIS                E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                B. MARXER                I. CABRAL BARRETO                B. CONFORTI                N. BRATZA                D. SVÁBY                G. RESS   15.   The text of this Report was adopted on 25 June 1996 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   16.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        (i)   to establish the facts, and        (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   17.   The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto.   18.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The background to the present case   19.   Investors in a building society are liable to pay income tax in respect of interest paid to them.   In principle such tax would have to be collected from each investor individually.   However, because of the very large number of building society investors and the (usually) small amounts of income tax due from each investor, it had for many years up to and including the fiscal year 1985-1986 been the practice for the Inland Revenue to make voluntary arrangements with the building societies (under Section 343 (1) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 - "the 1970 Act") for a single annual composite payment to be made by each society to discharge its investors' liability for income tax.   That payment was calculated for each fiscal year by reference to the global amount of interest paid by the society to its investors: a reduced rate of tax was applied, to reflect the fact that some of the investors would not have been liable for tax at all.   The payments made under these arrangements were referred to as "reduced-rate tax" or "composite-rate tax", or "CRT".   20.   Each year, the Treasury sets, by statutory instrument, the rate for composite-rate tax; in doing so, it is required to aim at a result whereby the same amount of tax is collected as if collection had been made directly from the individual taxpayers.   This requires an estimate to be made of the amount of tax to be collected under the composite- rate tax system.   21.   Until 1985-86, a "prior-period" system applied in respect of CRT. The amount of CRT to be paid by each building society for each fiscal year (i.e. from 6 April in one year to 5 April in the next) was calculated by reference to the interest which it paid to its investors not during the actual year being taxed, but during the society's own 12 months accounting period ending within that fiscal year.   The tax was in every case paid on 1 January of the year of assessment.   The legal effect of this payment was to discharge the liability of investors to pay income tax upon the interest received by them from the building society in the year being taxed.   22.   The accounting period of the Leeds ran from 1 October to 30 September; the accounting period of the National & Provincial and the Yorkshire ran from 1 January to 31 December.   Thus, in January 1986, the three applicant societies paid to the Revenue, to discharge their investors' liability to tax for the fiscal year 1985-86, sums measured by reference to the interest paid to their investors in their accounting periods ended 30 September 1985 and 31 December 1985 respectively.   These payments completely discharged the income tax liability of their investors in respect of the interest paid to them by the societies for the fiscal year 1985-86 i.e. up to and including 5 April 1986.   23.   Section 40 of the Finance Act 1985 amended Section 343 of the 1970 Act (by inserting sub-section (1A)) so as to terminate the arrangements as from 6 April 1986 and to empower the Revenue to make regulations introducing a new system of accounting for the fiscal year 1986-87 and   for   subsequent   years.   Under   the   Income Tax   (Building Society) Regulations 1986 ("the 1986 Regulations"), which came into force on 6 April 1986, tax was to be calculated on a quarterly basis on the actual interest paid during the year of assessment.   24.   The ending of the voluntary arrangements exposed a gap ("the gap period") between the end of the applicant societies' accounting periods in 1985-86 and the start of the first quarter under the new regime. In the case of the Leeds the gap period was from 1 October 1985 to 5 April 1986, and in the case of the National & Provincial and the Yorkshire it was from 1 January 1986 to 5 April 1986.   Regulation 11 (read with Regulation 3) of the 1986 Regulations purported to require building societies to account for tax relating to payments of interest to their investors in the gap period.   25.   Regulation 11(4) provided for tax to be charged on interest paid in the gap period at 1985-86 rates i.e. 25.15 %.   B.    The particular circumstances of the present case   26.   Each of the three applicant societies paid the tax claimed to be due under the transitional provisions of the Regulations as follows:             National & Provincial     -     £15,873,945           Leeds                     -     £56,973,690           Yorkshire                 -     £ 8,902,620   The Government contend that the payments were made "without formal protest".   The applicants assert that they made clear from the outset that they disputed the lawfulness of the tax and that they associated themselves with the proceedings by Woolwich Equitable Building Society ("the Woolwich") challenging the lawfulness of the transitional provisions in Regulation 11.   27.   On 18 June 1986 the Woolwich commenced judicial review proceedings seeking a declaration that Regulation 11 was unlawful as being outside the scope of the enabling legislation:   it was further alleged that the transitional provisions transgressed the fundamental principles of constitutional and taxation law and that the machinery adopted by the 1986 Regulations in order to implement the change in the system resulted in a double charge to tax over the gap period ("Woolwich 1").   28.   On 25 July 1986 the Finance Act 1986 ("the 1986 Act") received the Royal Assent.   Section 47 of the Act retrospectively amended Section 343 (1A) of the 1970 Act with the purpose of authorising the Revenue to make Regulations requiring the taxation in the year 1986-87 and subsequent years of assessments of sums paid to investors in the gap period and not previously brought into account.   29.   On 15 July 1987 the Woolwich issued a writ against the Revenue claiming repayment of the sums paid by way of tax under the transitional provisions of the Regulations, as well as interest from the date of payment ("Woolwich 2").   30.   On 31 July 1987 Nolan J. granted the application in Woolwich 1 and made a declaration that Regulation 11 was void in its entirety and that the remaining Regulations were void so far as they purported to apply to payments made to investors prior to 6 April 1986.   He held:        (a)   there was nothing in the enabling legislation to indicate           that Parliament intended to authorise a departure from the           principle that income tax should only be levied on the           income of one year;        (b)   the power to make regulations conferred by Section 343 (1A)           was to be exercised solely with respect to 1986-87 and           later years and nothing in the Section authorised the           Revenue to go back on the arrangements with the building           societies and impose further tax on interest paid to their           members during the gap period;        (c)   the fact that Regulation 11 (4) provided for tax to be           charged at 1985-86 rates (which were higher than the 1986-           87 rates) was itself a clear indiction that the Regulations           went beyond the powers conferred by Section 343 (1A);        (d)   the position was not affected by the amendment in Section           47 (1) of the 1986 Act which, whatever its intention, still           left the power conferred by Section 343 (1A) as a power           exercisable only with respect to 1986-87 and subsequent           years.   31.   The Revenue appealed against the decision.   They conceded that Regulation 11 (4) was invalid but contended that this partial invalidity did not invalidate the rest of the Regulation.   32.   Towards the end of 1987, the Revenue repaid to Woolwich the sum of £57 m. with interest from 31 July 1987 (the date of the order of Nolan J.) but refused to pay interest from any earlier date.   Thus, the remaining issue in the Woolwich 2 proceedings came to be whether or not Woolwich had grounds for claiming interest on the payments made by them up to 31 July 1987.   33.   On 12 July 1988 Nolan J. dismissed the Woolwich 2 action, holding that the Woolwich was not entitled to recover the sums in issue under any general principle of restitution or as having been paid under duress.   He took the view that the sums had been paid under an implied agreement that they would be repaid if and when the dispute about the validity of the 1986 Regulations was resolved in favour of the Woolwich:   thus the Woolwich had no cause of action to recover the money until the date of his order of 31 July 1987.   The Woolwich appealed against the decision and order.   34.   On 12 April 1989 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the Revenue in Woolwich 1.   The Court held that:        (a)   as a matter of ordinary construction, the words of Section           47 of the 1986 Act were clear and enabled the Revenue to           take account of, and to charge to tax, interest paid by the           societies in the gap period; and        (b)   subject to the invalidity of Regulation 11 (4), which was           conceded by the Revenue, Regulation 11 was valid.   35.   On 25 October 1990 the House of Lords allowed the appeal of Woolwich in Woolwich 1 and declared Regulations 3 and 11 to be wholly void.   The House of Lords (Lord Lowry dissenting) held that:        (a)   read in its ordinary and natural meaning the amendment made           by Section 47 of the 1986 Act was intended by Parliament to           authorise the Revenue to make regulations requiring the           taxation, in the year 1986-87 and subsequent years of           assessment, of sums paid to investors by way of interest in           the gap period and not previously brought into account:           the well established presumption against double taxation,           and the presumption that income tax was an annual tax           payable only on the income of a particular year, were           rebuttable and were in the present case rebutted by           circumstances which showed that Parliament did not intend           them to apply;        (b)   however, it was conceded by the Revenue that Regulation 11           (4) was invalid.   Although severance of part of a provision           in a statutory instrument might be effected by a simple           deletion without affecting the grammatical sense of the           remainder, where such a deletion altered the substance of           the remainder and the provision became substantially           different from the original, the whole provision had to be           declared bad:   since the admitted invalidity of Regulation           11(4) infected the whole of that Regulation and since, to           reconcile Regulations 3 and 11 of the 1986 Regulations with           Section 343 (1A) of the 1970 Act, mere excision was           insufficient, they should be declared wholly invalid.   36.   Lord Oliver, delivering the judgment of the majority, concluded:        " ... I confess that I find the conclusion irresistible that      Parliament intended by these words [Section 47 of the 1986 Act]      to enable the Revenue to take account of and to charge to tax      sums which, rightly or wrongly, it regarded as otherwise      representing windfalls in the hands of building societies.   One      has only to look at the circumstances.   The Regulations of 1986      had been made and had been objected to.   They were made the      subject of a direct challenge in legal proceedings, the evidence      in support of which clearly adumbrated the arguments advanced      before the judge and the Court of Appeal.   The notion that      Parliament should go to the trouble of enacting an expressly      retrospective amendment in order to provide, unnecessarily, for      the use of these sums as a measurement of tax liability - a      matter never remotely in issue - is simply fanciful ...        ... I am bound to say that I think it unfortunate that the      Revenue, through Parliament, should have chosen by secondary      rather than primary legislation to take what was, on ordinary      principles, the very unusual course of seeking to tax more than      one year's income in a single year of assessment, but Section 47      of the Finance Act 1986 is, on any analysis, a very unusual      provision and I have, in the end, found myself irresistibly      driven to the conclusion that this was what Parliament intended      should occur.   It may be - I do not know - that the legislature      did not appreciate fully that the effect of the arrangements made      in 1985 was to discharge all liability for tax on interest paid      in the year of assessment 1985-86, including tax on interest paid      after the end of a society's accounting year, and that,      accordingly, to tax those sums again in a subsequent year was,      in a sense, to tax them twice.   But even making that assumption      it amounts to no more than saying that the legislature should not      have intended to do that which it plainly set out to do.   I      would, for my part, therefore, reject the Woolwich's principal      argument."   37.   On 15 March 1991 the Leeds commenced proceedings ("Leeds 1") against the Revenue for the restitution of the sum of £56,973,690 paid pursuant to the 1986 Regulations which had been found to be void.   38.   On 17 March 1991 the National & Provincial commenced proceedings against the Revenue for the restitution of the sum of £15,873,945 ("National & Provincial 1") paid pursuant to the void regulations.   39.   On 19 March 1991, in his budget statement, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the introduction of legislation to remedy "the technical defects in the Regulations".   This legislation became Section 53 of the Finance Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act").   40.   On 22 May 1991 the Court of Appeal, by a majority, allowed the appeal by the Woolwich in Woolwich 2 and awarded the interest claimed.   41.    The majority of the Court of Appeal accepted the Woolwich's primary submission that, where money was paid under an illegal demand for taxation by a Government body, the payer had an immediate prima facie right to recover the payment.   42.   On 10 July 1991 the Leeds applied for leave to commence judicial review proceedings for a declaration that the Treasury Orders establishing the composite rate tax for 1986-87 and for the following years were unlawful ("Leeds 2").   The Leeds claimed that        (a)   it was clear that in making the estimates for the years           following 1986/87, and setting the rates of composite-rate           tax on the basis of it, the Treasury had assumed the           correctness of the Government's position that the           Regulations collected no "extra" tax;        (b)   this position had been shown by the judgments in Woolwich           1 to be wrong, with the result that the Treasury had under-           estimated the amount of tax collection under the composite-           rate tax system and so set the rate of tax for those years           substantially too high;        (c)   this was of no significance so long as the Regulations were           held to be invalid, because the "extra" tax was in law           repayable to the building societies; however, by           retrospectively validating them the Government had           automatically invalidated the bases of the statutory           instruments setting the rates;        (d)   this, in principle, meant that all composite-rate tax paid           in those years had to be repaid, but in its proceedings the           Leeds made a binding commitment not to seek to recover more           than the £57 m. initially overpaid.   43.   On 25 July 1991, Section 53 of the 1991 Act became law.   It provided inter alia:        "Section 343(1A) of the [1970 Act] ... shall be deemed to have      conferred powers to make all the provisions in fact contained in      [the 1986 Regulations]."        The provision had retrospective effect, save that by sub- section (4) it had no effect "in relation to a building society which commenced proceedings to challenge the validity of the Regulations before 18 July 1986".   The Woolwich was the only building society which satisfied this condition.   The Leeds 1 and the National & Provincial 1 proceedings were effectively stifled.   44.   On 6 November 1991 the National & Provincial was granted leave to commence judicial review proceedings similar to those in Leeds 2 for a declaration that the Treasury Orders establishing the composite-rate tax for 1986-87 and subsequent years were unlawful because of the retrospective validation of the Regulations ("National & Provincial 2").   The application was joined with the Leeds 2 proceedings and with a similar application made by Bradford and Bingley Building Society.   45.   On 3 March 1992 the Yorkshire applied for leave to commence similar judicial review proceedings for a declaration that the Treasury Orders establishing the composite-rate tax for 1986-87 and subsequent years were unlawful ("Yorkshire 1").   46.   Further proceedings were commenced by the Yorkshire on 11 May 1992 ("Yorkshire 2"), by the Leeds on 1 June 1992 ("Leeds 3") and by the National & Provincial on 12 June 1992 ("National & Provincial 3").   In those proceedings the applicant societies claimed restitution of the money due to them if the judicial review proceedings (Leeds 2 and National & Provincial 2, and Yorkshire 1) were successful.   47.   On 16 July 1992 Section 64 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1992 ("the 1992 Act") entered into force.   It retrospectively validated the Treasury Orders by providing that the Orders "shall be taken to be and always to have been effective".   All outstanding proceedings were thereby stifled.   48.   On 20 July 1992 the House of Lords, by a majority, dismissed the Revenue's appeal in the Woolwich 2 proceedings.   The House of Lords did not accept that, on the facts of the Woolwich case, there was any implied agreement for the repayment of the money paid under the invalid Regulations if and when the dispute was resolved in the taxpayer's favour.   Nevertheless, by a majority, the House of Lords held:        (a)   that money paid by a citizen to a public authority in the           form of taxes or other levies pursuant to an ultra vires           demand by the authority is prima facie recoverable by the           citizen as of right;        (b)   that, accordingly, since the building society claims fell           outside the statutory framework governing repayment of           overpaid tax, it was entitled at common law to repayment of           the sums and to interest in respect thereof from the date           of payment.     C.    The relevant domestic law   49.   Section 343 (1A) of the 1970 Act (introduced by Section 40 of the Finance Act 1985, and as amended by Section 47 of the Finance Act 1986) provides as follows:        "The Board may by regulations made by statutory instrument make      provision with respect to the year 1986-87 and any subsequent      year of assessment requiring building societies, on such sums as      may be determined in accordance with the regulations (including      sums paid or credited before the beginning of the year but not      previously brought into account under subsection (1) above or      this subsection), to account for and pay an amount representing      income tax ... and any such regulations may contain such      incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the Board      to be appropriate, including provisions requiring the making of      returns."        The words in bold print were added by the 1986 Act.   50.   Section 53 of the Finance Act 1991 provides, so far as relevant, as follows:        "(1) Section 343 (1A) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act      1970 ... shall be deemed to have conferred power to make all the      provisions in fact contained in the Income Tax (Building      Societies) Regulations 1986 ...        (4) In relation to a building society which commenced proceedings      to challenge the validity of the Regulations before 18th July      1986, this Section shall not have effect to the extent that the      Regulations apply (or purport to apply) to payments or credits      made before 6th April 1986."   51.   Section 64 of the Finance Act 1992 provides as follows:        "(1) For the purposes of this Section each of the following is      a relevant order-        (a) the Income Tax (Reduced and Composite Rate) Order 1985 ...        (b) the Income Tax (Reduced and Composite Rate) Order 1986 ...        (c) the Income Tax (Reduced and Composite Rate) Order 1987 ...        (d) the Income Tax (Reduced and Composite Rate) Order 1988 ...        (2) If apart from this Section a relevant order would not be so      taken, it shall be taken to be and always to have been effective      to determine the rate set out in the order as the reduced rate      and the composite rate for the year of assessment for which the      order was made."     III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   52.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicant societies' complaints that the effect of the legislative provisions in the present case was to deprive them of their possessions and to deny them a fair hearing before a court in connection with their dispute with the Revenue, and that they were subjected to discriminatory treatment.   B.    Points at issue   53.   The points at issue in the present case are as follows:   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1      (P1-1) to the Convention, taken alone;   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1      (P1-1) taken together with Article 14 (Art. 14) of the      Convention;   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1      (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, taken alone, and   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1      (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, taken together with Article 14      (Art. 14) of the Convention.   C.    As regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention   54.   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention provides as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties."   55.   The applicant societies argue that, consistently with the judgment of the Court in the Pressos case (Eur. Court H.R., Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and others, judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332), their rights to restitution of the quantified sums paid under the invalid Regulations were sufficiently established to constitute an "asset" and thus amounted to a "possession" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   56.   The applicant societies consider that they were originally deprived of their possessions when they paid money under the transitional regulations.   It was then that they acquired rights to claim the restitution of the money, and the cumulative effect of Section 53 of the 1991 Act 1991 and Section 64 of the 1992 Act was to deprive them of those rights.   For them, it is not a question of the levying of taxation, but rather opportunistic legislation by the Government to avoid having to repay money paid in good faith under unlawful regulations.   The societies see the judicial review proceedings in which they challenged the relevant Treasury Orders, and the writ proceedings begun in May and June 1992, as the logical next step in their attempt to recover their money once Section 53 of the 1991 Act had prevented the restitution actions from proceeding, but had failed to destroy the underlying claims.   The applicant societies argue, relying on the Court's Pressos judgment, that there has been a complete failure to respect the fair balance required under Article 1 (Art. 1).   As in the Pressos case itself, the financial consequences for the Revenue of allowing the applicants' claims to proceed could not amount to an exceptional circumstance justifying the denial of compensation and there existed no other and more general consideration affecting the Government's decision to deprive the applicants of their possessions than the simple desire to deprive the applicants of the monies they were entitled to.   57.   The Government do not accept that there has been a deprivation of possessions in the present case, submitting that the legislation in the present case was "to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions" within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1).   They regard any deprivation of property as in the public interest as its aim was to remedy the technical defects in the transitional regulations.   Moreover, this aim was not "manifestly without reasonable foundation" as that term is used by the Convention organs.   58.   In connection with the question of whether the applicant societies were deprived of their possessions by Section 53 of the 1991 Act and Section 64 of the 1992 Act, the Government consider that the applicant societies at no stage had a binding and enforceable award in their favour, as defined by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Stran Greek Refineries (Eur. Court H.R., Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreatis judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-B). They consider that this position has not been changed by the judgment of the Court in the Pressos case (Eur. Court H.R., Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and others judgment of 20 November 1995, to be published in Series A no. 332).   In particular, they underline that the purpose of the 1991 legislation was to correct technical defects in the 1986 Regulations and to give effect to the original intention of Parliament, and that the purpose of the 1992 legislation was, again, to give effect to that original parliamentary intention.   59.   In connection with Section 64 of the 1992 Act, the Government agree that the provision removed the possibility of any further challenge to the initial legislation, but add that the fresh argument in the further challenge was dependent on the argument as to double taxation which the House of Lords had failed to accept in the first Woolwich case.   They also point out that the effect of the attack on the rate of composite rate tax in the tax years 1986/87 to 1989/90 was to throw into doubt the lawfulness of the collection of all sums from building societies, banks and other deposit-takers in the periods in question.        Whether there was an interference with the applicant societies'      peaceful enjoyment of their "possessions"   60.   The Commission must first consider whether the legislative provisions in the present case affected the applicant societies' "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, (P1-1) as, if no possessions are involved, the provision cannot apply.   61.   The Commission recalls that in the Stran Greek Refineries case the Court held that, in order to determine whether the applicants had a "possession" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, (P1-1) it had to ascertain whether the judgment of the Athens Court of First Instance and the arbitration award of 27 February 1984 "had given rise to a debt in their favour that was sufficiently established to be enforceable."   The Court held that the judgment of the Athens Court, while appearing to accept in principle that the State owed a debt to the applicants, had not done so:   the effect of the decision of the Athens Court "was merely to furnish the applicants with the hope that they would secure recognition of the claim put forward.   Whether the resulting debt was enforceable would depend on any review by two superior courts" (Eur. Court H.R., Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreatis judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-B, p. 84, paras. 59-60).   On the other hand, the arbitration award was found by the Court to be "final and binding:   it did not require any further enforcement measure and no ordinary or special appeal lay against it." Accordingly, the Court held that at the time of the passing of the impugned law in question the arbitration award conferred on the applicants a right to the sums awarded and this right constituted a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Protocol (P1-1) (ibid,. p. 85, paras. 61-62).   62.   The Commission further recalls that in its judgment in the Pressos case the Court held that the applicants' claims for damages in tort, which under Belgian law came into existence when the damage occurred, "constituted an asset" and therefore "amounted to a possession within the first sentence of Article 1 (Art. 1)", even though none of the claims had been recognised and determined by a judicial decision having final effect.   The Court further observed that on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Cassation "the applicants could argue that they had a 'legitimate expectation' that their claims deriving from the accidents in question would be determined in accordance with the general law of tort".   (Eur. Court H.R., Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and others judgment of 20 November 1995, to be published in Series A no. 332, para. 31 with further references).   63.   The Government consider that the present case is similar to the Stran Greek Refineries case and that the applicants' claims to recover the monies were not "sufficiently established" to amount to possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   The applicant societies on the other hand contend that the Pressos case confirms that their claims for restitution constituted assets and therefore amounted to possessions for the purposes of the Article.   64.   The Commission notes that when Section 53 of the 1991 Act enter