CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 27 juin 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                          Application No. 20005/92                        by PROSA, Kirsten SJØGREN,                        Nils AUGSBURG and Morten LIEDECKE                        against Denmark         The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 27 June 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    H. DANELIUS, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 20 September 1991 by PROSA, Kirsten SJØGREN, Nils AUGSBURG and Morten LIEDECKE against Denmark and registered on 18 May 1992 under file No. 20005/92;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 2 December 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants on 27 February 1995;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.         The first applicant (hereinafter called Prosa) is a trade union domiciled in Copenhagen. Prosa is inter alia divided into a number of branches which represent their members vis-à-vis the different employers. In the following the term "Prosa" will cover the entire trade union. The three other applicants are members of Prosa and reside at Brønshøj, Copenhagen, and Vejle, respectively. They are computer programmers by profession. Before the Commission all four applicants are represented by Mr. Christian Harlang, a lawyer practising in Copenhagen.   A.     The particular circumstances   of the case         On 10 November 1988 the employer Sparekassernes Datacenter (hereinafter called SDC) and Prosa entered into a so-called general framework agreement (Hovedaftale) which gave Prosa the exclusive right to negotiate on behalf of its members salaries and other work conditions with SDC. According to its section 2 SDC was obliged in its letters of employment to refer to the fact that any employment should be in accordance with the terms which followed from the agreements between SDC and Prosa. According to section 10 the general framework agreement could be terminated with six months notice, although at the earliest as from 1 October 1991.         On 30 May 1989 SDC and Prosa signed an agreement (overenskomst) concerning salaries and other work conditions. According to its section 22 the agreement entered into force on 1 April 1989 and could be terminated with three months notice, although at the earliest as from 31 March 1991. This agreement applied to the second and third applicants who at that moment in time were employed by SDC.         On 1 April 1990 three Danish banks merged thereby forming a new bank, the Unibank A/S. A new data centre, called Unidata, was also created for the purpose of handling all computer linked activities of the Unibank A/S. In this connection 100-150 employees of SDC were, on 17 January 1990, offered employment in Unidata. By letter of 1 March 1990 the employees interested were informed that their existing terms of employment would continue and that no changes would occur to the agreements in force at the time.         As a result of this, 102 employees of SDC, including the second and third applicants, took up employment at Unidata as from 1 April 1990. The fourth applicant was employed by Unidata from a job in one of the banks which had merged. In their letters of employment it was pointed out that they were employed on the same conditions as those applicable to their previous jobs.         Subsequently, on 29 August 1990 Unidata informed the members of Prosa who previously had been employed in SDC as follows:   (Translation)         "As mentioned in your letter of employment your present       conditions of employment are valid until and including       31 March 1991.         As part of a co-ordination of salary and work conditions in       the Uni Danmark Group your salary and employment conditions       will as from 1 April 1991 follow the agreements made       between ... the Financial Sector's Employers' Association       (Finanssektorens Arbejdsgiverforening, hereinafter called       FA) and the National Association of Bank Employees (Danske       Bankfunktionærers Landsforening, hereinafter called DBL).       ..."         In the meantime a dispute had commenced between Prosa and Unidata as to whether the latter was bound by the general framework agreement and the collective agreement of 1988 and 1989 between Prosa and SDC in respect of those members of Prosa who had now transferred to Unidata. As no agreement could be reached Prosa instituted proceedings in the Labour Court (Arbejdsretten) in September 1990 against FA and Unidata/Unibank A/S. The case was registered as case No. 90.328.         On 30 October 1990 the Joint Council of Public Servants and Salaried Employees (Fællesrådet for Tjenestemænd og Funktionærer, hereinafter called FTF) requested permission to intervene in the proceedings on behalf of DBL in support of FA and Unidata. This request was made in particular due to the fact that FA had entered into a collective agreement with DBL covering the employment area concerned and that the outcome of the case would therefore be of importance to this collective agreement.         By letter of 8 November 1990 Prosa opposed the request and referred to section 19 of the Labour Court Act (arbejdsretsloven) and section 252 of the Administration of Justice Act (retsplejeloven). It considered that FTF had no legal interest (retlig interesse) in the case.         Following further written observations in which the parties maintained their above views the Labour Court held a meeting with the parties after which the Court stated as follows:   (Translation)         "The parties agree to leave it to the presiding judge to       decide whether the request submitted by FTF to intervene in       the proceedings shall be granted. The presiding judge       decided that the above request to intervene in the       proceedings shall be granted."         During the meeting the case was furthermore scheduled for hearing on 29 and 30 January 1991.         The case was heard by the Labour Court on 30 January 1991. Prosa was represented by the applicants' present representative and four of its members, including the second and third applicants.         The Court was composed of nine members, i.e. the President (P) and two vice-presidents who were all Supreme Court judges, and six lay judges one of whom had been appointed to the Labour Court's pool of lay judges by the Ministry of Finance and two by the Danish Employers' Confederation. Of the remaining three lay judges one had been appointed to the pool of judges by the Federation of Danish Trade Unions and the other   two (MS and S) by a group of associations consisting of FTF, the Central Organisation of Academic Staff and the Joint Central Organisation of Supervisors' and Technical Officers' Societies. The question of the impartiality of the Labour Court as composed was not discussed before or during the hearing.         As regards the material question of law Prosa pointed out that as per 1 April 1990 Unidata had employed 22 Prosa members who previously had been employed by SDC. As they continued to carry out identical work in Unidata the parties had agreed that SDC had been partly incorporated into Unidata. Accordingly, pursuant to the applicable legislation it followed that Unidata was bound by the general framework agreement of 10 November 1988 and the agreement of 30 May 1989 between Prosa and SDC. Prosa furthermore maintained that this also applied to members of Prosa who, prior to 1 April 1990, had been employed from the banks which had merged or had been employed from elsewhere.         FA, Unidata and FTF did not dispute that SDC had been partly incorporated into Unidata and that therefore the employment of the 22 Prosa members as per 1 April 1990 should be considered under the legislation covering business mergers. However, this could only mean that they were guaranteed identical employment conditions until the previous agreement would expire which, in their opinion, was on 31 March 1991. Furthermore, FA, Unidata and FTF maintained that there was no basis upon which it could be concluded that Prosa members coming from the merging banks or other employment could be covered by the agreements in question. Finally, Unidata maintained that it had not in any way accepted to be bound by the agreements between SDC and Prosa.         Following the parties' oral submissions the case was accepted for adjudication. A copy of the court transcript concerning the hearing on 30 January 1991, including the names of everybody present, was sent to the parties soon after the hearing.         In its judgment of 21 March 1991 the Labour Court found against Prosa while sustaining the claim of FA, Unidata and FTF. The Court stated that only those members of Prosa who had previously been employed by SDC and who had now been employed by Unidata in connection with the bank merger of 1 April 1990 could rely on the previous collective agreement between Prosa and SDC and only until the expiry of this agreement on 31 March 1991. The merger, however, did not mean that Unidata was otherwise bound by the previous agreements.         No appeal lies against a judgment of the Labour Court.         On 28 May 1991 Prosa requested that the case be re-opened, the reason being that the presiding judge and two of the lay judges were considered to have been disqualified in a manner which in the request was described as follows:   (Translation)         "... In connection with the preparations of (another Labour       Court) case No. 91.109 professor K represented Prosa on       27 March (1991). The Court sat with Supreme Court judge       (P). The court transcript reads inter alia as follows:       'The presiding judge noted that in an article in (the       newspaper) Politiken of 6 February 1986 professor K had       expressed the view in connection with the mentioning of an       arbitration case in which he had represented Prosa, that       the presiding judge is a 'willing employers' tool'. As it       may be expected that the professor maintains his view and       that it is shared by the party which the professor       represents, the presiding judge decides as follows pursuant       to section 62 subsection 1 second sentence of the       Administration of Justice Act:                                    DECISION         As there is in the circumstances reason to fear that the       plaintiffs, represented by professor dr. jur. K, cannot       consider the presiding judge as being entirely impartial it       is decided: the presiding judge vacates his seat on the       bench.'       ...         Prosa considered - and considers - that the decision taken       by (P) in (the 1986 arbitration case) is wrong but Prosa       obviously does not consider a wrong decision of that kind       as a reason for being disqualified as far as future cases       are concerned. The fact that Prosa and Prosa's       representative publicly criticise (the 1986 decision)       obviously does not concern a matter which could reasonably       put (P's) impartiality in question.         In (Prosa's) opinion it is unacceptable that the presiding       judge's perception of being partial should refer back to       Prosa's criticism of (the 1986 decision), the more so since       Prosa, neither before the presiding judge's decision of       27 March (1991) nor on other occasions, has challenged the       impartiality of judge P. ...       ...         Since the above-mentioned decision of 27 March (1991) is       based on the assumption that the lack of confidence 'is       shared by the party which the professor represents' Prosa       considers that the disqualification which the presiding       judge finds on 27 March also - although not admitted - must       have been present six days earlier when judgment was       pronounced in case No. 90.328 (the present case). We are       unable to explain why the presiding judge considers himself       to be disqualified in the one case but not in the other       although he maintains in his decision that the lack of       confidence 'is shared by' Prosa. But we consider it to be       a serious legal flaw in the judgment pronounced that       Supreme Court judge P in the circumstances did not vacate       his seat from the bench in case No. 90.328 but remained       there, even as the presiding judge.       ...         This legal flaw is of particular importance having regard       to the fact that the Labour Court's judgment of       21 March 1991 has been pronounced with the participation of       two lay judges who are both affiliated to FTF-       organisations, i.e. judges MS and S.         Having regard to the fact that an important part of the       case concerns a dispute between two employee organisations,       i.e. Prosa ... and one of FTF's organisations, DBL ...,       Prosa has decided, after careful consideration, to       challenge the validity of the judgment pronounced. ...       ...         As a reason for the present request we refer separately to       the assumption that such a request is a precondition for an       examination on the merits pursuant to the rules of the       European Convention on Human Rights ... ."         Following further observations from the parties the Labour Court rejected the request for the re-opening of the proceedings on 27 November 1991 stating inter alia as follows:   (Translation)         "The lay judge S who participated in the case is not, and       has not been, affiliated to an FTF organisation, but is a       member of the Chief Engineers' Association which is       affiliated to the Joint Central Organisation of       Supervisors' and Technical Officers' Societies. Already for       this reason the objection to the impartiality of this judge       must be rejected.       ...         In the newspaper article which is referred to in the       decision of 27 March 1991 in case No. 91.109 professor K       has submitted that he considers the presiding judge to be       partial and to favour in a prejudiced manner employer       interests.         When submitted by a professor of law at the University of       Copenhagen it cannot be excluded that such a statement has       been considered to be of some importance at least by the       party the professor represented in the arbitration case.       Against this background it was natural for the presiding       judge to vacate his seat on the bench in the Labour Court       case No. 91.109 - in which the party was once more       represented by professor K - without this being a sign that       the presiding judge was, or considered himself to be,       disqualified. Accordingly, there was no reason for the       presiding judge to vacate his seat when examining case       No. 90.328 (the present case) in which the party was       represented by a lawyer who only subsequently has submitted       that he shares the professor's view.         In these circumstances, and since the objection to the lay       judge MS was not submitted until approximately four months       after the hearing of the case, the objections of lack of       impartiality now submitted by the complainant cannot       constitute a reason for a re-opening of the case,       cf. section 19 of the Labour Court Act and section 399 of       the Administration of Justice Act."         A second request by Prosa for a re-opening of the case was rejected by the Labour Court on 3 January 1992.   B.     Domestic law and practice         a.    The Danish labour market model         The Danish labour market is to a high extent governed by collective agreements concluded between the labour market parties. About 80 per cent of all employees are organised and nearly 90 per cent of all employees are covered by collective agreements.         In the so-called September Compromise of 1899 between the labour market parties the collective bargaining system was to a certain extent put into a legal framework through the establishment of the Permanent Arbitration Court. However, there were still unclear points about the legal nature of "the collective agreement". Doubt continued to exist as to how breaches of collective agreements should and could be sanctioned. Claims for damages could only be brought before the ordinary courts of law and the same applied to questions concerning the interpretation of a collective agreement.         In 1908, a committee was set up to submit proposals for a model to solve these problems.         In a report of 17 August 1908 the committee proposed three measures which were later introduced:   1.     A proposal for "Standard Rules for Handling Labour Disputes". The aim of these standard rules was that all disputes should be made the subject of negotiations and that disputes concerning the interpretation of collective agreements should, if necessary, be settled by an arbitration court. By virtue of section 22 of the Labour Court Act these standard rules now form part of all collective agreements, unless the parties themselves have agreed on other appropriate rules to settle labour disputes.   2.     A proposal for a proper labour court instead of the Permanent Arbitration Court. This court was to deal with cases concerning alleged breaches of collective agreements. This proposal was adopted in the form of the Act on the new Permanent Arbitration Court which in 1973 was replaced by the Labour Court Act No. 317 of 13 June 1973.   3.     A proposal for an act on conciliation in labour disputes. This Act regulates the Danish system with publicly appointed conciliators who, if necessary, assist the parties in connection with the conclusion and renewal of collective agreements.         As a corollary of this historical development and as a consequence of the high rate of organisation, pay and working conditions in Denmark are mainly regulated by collective agreements between labour market partners.         Pay and working conditions may further be agreed individually between the individual employee and the employer.         There is an interaction among the three elements - collective agreements, individual agreements and legislation - when it comes to identifying the rights of an employee in relation to the employer.         A collective agreement has effect within the occupational field covered by the agreement. An employer who has concluded or adhered to a collective agreement has a duty in relation to the trade union to pay the employees the wage or salary fixed in the collective agreement whether the employee is or is not a member of the organisation concerned. However, a non-organised employee may not invoke rights under the collective agreement, but only under his or her individual agreement. On the other hand employees have no independent and direct rights which can be invoked under the collective agreement. Through the membership of a trade union, the union is considered empowered to act on behalf of its members.         The Danish trade union movement is organised as a network of trade unions, federations and central organisations.         The basic element in this structure is the trade union (branch of the federation) which is a local association of workers within the same occupational field. The trade unions may have local branches in the individual enterprises in the form of the so-called trade union clubs.         These local associations - which typically have their own economy - have joined together in national unions. They have wide powers in connection with the conclusion of collective agreements. Traditionally, the unions have been organised on the basis of professional skills - craft unions. However, in recent years this traditional structure has been disintegrating and several unions now form cartels within the various trades and they have taken over some of the powers of the unions, for instance negotiating rights.         The unions are again members of the central organisations which are the biggest organisations of employees. The biggest central organisation in Denmark is the Federation of Danish Trade Unions (LO).         b.    The jurisdiction and functioning of the Labour Court         As early as in 1910 when the Permanent Arbitration Court was set up, it was recognised that it was necessary to have a judicial authority - a court - to deal with breaches of collective agreements.         However, the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction as regards all matters concerning collective agreements. In Danish labour law a distinction is made between disputes of right and conflicts of interest. A dispute of right is a dispute concerning an existing agreement. It may be a matter of interpretation of the agreement or a dispute in which one of the parties commits a breach of the agreement. A conflict of interest arises where there is no agreement between the parties and where the dispute concerns the conclusion/renewal of such an agreement.         Under Danish labour law conflicts of interest may lawfully be supported by industrial action taken by the parties involved. In connection with such disputes the parties are fighting an economic struggle using the weapons of for instance strike and lockout.         When it comes to the solution of a dispute concerning an existing agreement (a dispute of right) the parties are not allowed to resort to industrial action in order to enforce their opinion. The parties may only resort to legal remedies in connection with the solution of such disputes.         In cases concerning the interpretation of an agreement the case is settled through a special negotiating procedure which may be decided by arbitration. The negotiating procedure is described in detail in the Standard Rules for Handling Labour Disputes.         In the case of an alleged breach of a collective agreement the alleged violation of the contractual rights must be determined and, where necessary, steps must be taken to bring the violation to an end and to impose a sanction.         The Labour Court has been given jurisdiction to hear such cases, cf. section 9, subsection 1, of the Labour Court Act. The Labour Court is further empowered to adjudicate cases concerning breach or interpretation of the basic agreements, questions as to whether there is or is not a valid agreement, and questions concerning the lawfulness of industrial action of which notice has been given. The Labour Court may sanction a breach of a collective agreement by imposing a penalty, cf. section 12, subsection 1, of the Labour Court Act. A penalty includes both an element of compensation and a penal element. The penalty is imposed on the party who has committed the breach of the agreement, i.e. typically the individual employer/employees/group of employees. The organisations may also be held liable to pay a penalty.         The main condition for liability to pay a penalty is that there has been a breach of the collective agreement. The agreement can only be breached by somebody who is bound by it. Thus, liability may only be imposed on those who are the actual parties to the agreement and members of organisations which are parties to the agreement.         The Labour Court is established by statute. As regards the procedure before the Labour Court the rules on civil procedure laid down in title 2 of the Administration of Justice Act and in chapter 23 and chapters 28-30 of the Act apply mutatis mutandis, cf. section 19 of the Labour Court Act.         A case is brought before the Labour Court by submitting a written complaint in two copies and the other party shall without further request draw up a defence. This normally concludes the pleadings, but the President of the Court may at his or her own initiative, or after having consulted the parties, provide for further pleadings to be exchanged.         According to the established practice of the Labour Court a preliminary court meeting is then held at which the Court is composed of the member of the presidency on service and the secretary of the Court functioning as clerk of the Court. The aim of this Court meeting is to establish the facts of the case without actually hearing witnesses or experts and the president of the Court tries to settle the case. There may be several preliminary court meetings.         During the main hearing the Court is presided over by the member of the presidency who participated in the preliminary court meeting(s). The Court is formed by a panel of one member of the presidency and three ordinary judges or deputies representing the employer side and the employee side, respectively. The presidency may be extended to three members.         A case before the Labour Court shall be brought by and against the appropriate employer or employee organisation, cf. section 14 of the Labour Court Act. If an organisation is a member of a bigger organisation the case must be brought by and against the biggest organisation. However, a case may be brought against an individual employer who is a party to a collective agreement if the individual employer is not a member of an employer organisation.         The Labour Court consists of twelve ordinary judges and twenty- eight deputy judges, one president, three vice-presidents and two deputy presidents. Furthermore, there is a secretary to the Court. The judges are partly professional, legally qualified, judges and partly judges appointed by the labour market organisations. The members of the presidency of the Court shall according to section 7 of the Labour Court Act satisfy the general conditions for being appointed to the office of a judge. At present the entire presidency, including the deputies, are judges of the Supreme Court (Højesteret).         The ordinary judges of the Labour Court are appointed to the post of judge by the labour market organisations. Under section 2 of the Labour Court Act the ordinary judges are appointed as follows:   By the employers' organisations:   The Danish Employers' Confederation     SALA (the Associations of Employers in Agriculture) and the Association of Employers in the Finance Sector   The Ministry of Finance The Association of Municipal Authorities The Association of County Authorities, and The Association of the municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg   By the employees' organisations:   The Federation of Danish Trade Unions     The Joint Council of Public Servants and Salaried Employees (FTF) The Central Organisation of Academic Staff (AC) and FR - the Joint Central Organisation of Supervisors' and Technical Officers' Societies     three ordinary judges and six deputies   one ordinary judge and four deputies     two ordinary judges and four deputies             four ordinary judges and seven deputies   two ordinary judges and seven deputies       The judges are elected for a period of three years.         As mentioned above members of the presidency of the Labour Court must satisfy the same requirements as to their legal qualifications as those applying to ordinary judges under the provisions laid down in the Administration of Justice Act. As regards the judges appointed by the organisations it follows from the nature of the case that the qualification requirements are different. The qualification requirements applying to ordinary judges (and deputy judges) follow from the rules laid down by agreement of 15 March 1948 between the Danish Employers' Confederation and the Federation of Danish Trade Unions.         c.    Individual right of action         As regards cases settled within the machinery set up for settlement of labour disputes, i.e. by arbitration or by the Labour Court, the right to take legal action is vested in the organisation which is a party to the agreement. It is also the organisation which decides about the subject-matter of the case. Before the ordinary courts of law it is the individual employee who has a right to sue.         As regards rights based on legislation the rule is that such rights may always be enforced by the ordinary courts of law. The courts will hear the case whether or not the employee is a member of a trade union or other organisation. In such cases it is always the individual employee who is entitled to bring the action and who may dispose of the subject-matter of the case.         If the rights of the employee are based on a collective agreement, the legal situation may be summarised as follows:         If the employee is not organised and thus not attached to any organisation, but his or her rights are, nevertheless, based on a collective agreement, the practice is that the ordinary courts of law will hear the case. Reference is made to U85/800 V and U 1983/730H.         If the employee is organised, the starting point is that the matter should be settled by the special machinery for settlement of labour disputes, i.e. by arbitration or by the Labour Court. In such cases the general rule is that the organisations have the full disposal of the subject-matter and the right to take legal action. An exception from this general rule follows from section 11, subsection 2, of the Labour Court Act which reads as follows:   (Translation)         "An employee shall, however, be entitled to bring an action       for award of outstanding wages in the ordinary courts of       law unless the organisation, in proceedings before the       Labour Court, has waived this right on behalf of the       employee or when the failure to pay wages is related to a       labour market dispute."         The ordinary courts of law have, inter alia on the basis of this provision, heard cases involving collective agreements, even if the organisation has failed to proceed with the case within the framework of the machinery set up for the settlement of labour disputes, cf. U85/997Ø, U54/935H and most recently in U94/953H in which express reference was made to the right of access to court under Article 6 of the Convention.         Any decision (judgment) of the Labour Court is final. The Labour Court is the first and only level of jurisdiction, since no appeal lies against its decisions. Consequently, the judgments of the Labour Court are directly enforceable in accordance with the rules of the Administration of Justice Act relating to enforcement of judicial awards, cf. Section 20 of the Act. This means that a judgment from the Labour Court serves as the necessary and sufficient basis for court orders issued by the ordinary courts when enforcing court decisions. Thus, the legal effect of the judgments of the Labour Court is identical to that of judgments from other courts.   COMPLAINTS         The applicants have submitted five complaints under Article 6 of the Convention which they have summarised as follows:         "Article 6, para. 1, is violated as a result of Act no. 317       of 13 June 1973 because the provisions in the Act on the       composition of the Labour Court, by granting a legal       monopoly to certain designated organisations, eo ipso       constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial in public       before an independent and impartial tribunal; and       furthermore         in Article 6 it is stated that the court in question must       be established by law. It is submitted that Section 19 of       the Labour Court Act is not in conformity with the       requirements established by law (especially the       foreseeability requirements) in as much as it leaves it to       the discretion of the Labour Court to decide what parts of       the Administration of Justice Act apply to the proceedings       of the Labour Court;         Article 6, para. 1 guarantees access to court review of an       individual's civil rights and obligations. According to       Danish domestic law no such possibility exists. An       individual worker has no locus standi with the Labour Court       or any other court in the Danish legal system as concerns       questions of the impact of collective agreements or       individual labour contracts. Thus it is submitted that       Article 6, para. 1, is violated in the present case;         Article 6, para. 1, is violated in the instant case because       (the applicants) did not benefit from a public hearing as       a consequence of the non-disclosure of the identity of the       judges until after the hearing;         Article 6, para. 1, is violated in the instant case because       (the applicants) did not benefit from a fair trial before       an independent and impartial tribunal, in as much as the       composition of the Court on 30 January 1991 neither secured       personal impartiality nor created the appearance of       impartiality and independence."         On 22 November 1991 and 10 February 1992 the applicants submitted four complaints under Articles 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which they have summarised as follows:         "Article 11 is violated as a result of Act no. 317 of       13 June 1973 because the right to represent members of       certain trade unions de jure or de facto is curtailed;         Article 13 of the Convention guarantees to everyone an       effective remedy to rectify and compensate violations of       the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Convention. As       individual workers have no locus standi before Danish       courts and because no other effective remedy is available,       it is submitted that Article 13 of the Convention is       violated in the present case;         Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11 is violated as a       result of Act no. 317 of 13 June 1973 because the Act de       jure or de facto condones discrimination between trade       unions of different political opinions; and lastly that         Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention is       violated as a result of the Labour Court's condoning of a       procedure whereby Prosa workers were deprived of their       right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions in as much       as they had to accept a significant decline in their salary       or other changes in their terms of employment."   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 20 September 1991 and registered on 18 May 1992. On 2 September 1994 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided that notice of the application should be given to the respondent Government and invited them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits thereof.         Following one extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose the Government submitted their observations on 2 December 1994.         Following one extension of the time-limit the applicants submitted their observations in reply to those of the Government on 27 February 1995.   THE LAW   1.     The applicants have submitted a number of complaints which relate to the Labour Court Act of 1973. They maintain first that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is violated as a result of the fact that the Labour Court Act, by granting a legal monopoly to certain designated organisations, constitutes a denial of the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, the more so as certain provisions of the Act are, allegedly, such that the Labour Court cannot be considered as being "established by law".         In this respect the Commission recalls that in accordance with Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention it can receive an application from a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals only if such person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals can claim to be a victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention. Moreover, the Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention only with respect to its application in a concrete case, while it is not competent to examine in abstracto its compatibility with the Convention (cf. for example No. 11045/84, Dec. 8.3.85, D.R. 42 p. 247).         Accordingly, the Commission will only examine the applicants' complaints in so far as the legislation in question affects the applicants themselves.   2.     The applicants complain, under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, that they did not have access to a court review of their civil rights and obligations.         Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads as far as relevant as follows:         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations       ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...       by an independent and impartial tribunal established by       law...".         The Commission recalls that the dispute was brought before the Labour Court by Prosa, the first applicant, and concerned the question whether or not Unidata was bound, in the particular circumstances, by the collective agreements made between Prosa and SDC and, accordingly, to what extent the individual members' terms of employment were covered thereby. It is not in dispute between the parties that the issues which the Labour Court was called upon to determine concerned a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention and it follows that "everyone" should have the right to have any such claim brought before a court or tribunal (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, para. 36, p. 18).         The applicants maintain, and this is disputed by the Government, that the Labour Court is not a court established by law within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. In addition the second, third and fourth applicants maintain that under Danish law the individual employee has no locus standi with the Labour Court, or any other court in the Danish legal system, in respect of the questions of the impact of collective agreements or individual labour contracts.         In respect of the applicants' additional arguments the Government maintain that it follows from established case-law that individual employees always have the right to take legal action to defend their rights. Such cases are dealt with either by the machinery set up for settlement of labour disputes or by the ordinary courts of law. In the present case the second, third and fourth applicants' rights were taken care of by Prosa, to whom they had delegated the powers to bring cases concerning rights in the employment relationship based on the collective agreement before the Labour Court.         The Commission recalls that the Danish Labour Court has been set up in accordance with the provisions of the Labour Court Act of 1973. Irrespective of this Act's general reference as to the applicability of the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act, the Commission has no doubt that the Danish Labour Court is as such a "tribunal established by law" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It is clear, however, that the guarantees of Article 6 (Art. 6) extend to both the organisation and composition of the tribunal, and the conduct of the proceedings in the concrete case. Whereas the latter points will be subject to a separate evaluation by the Commission it finds that Prosa, the first applicant, had access to a tribunal in respect of its dispute with Unidata.         As regards the second, third and fourth applicants the Commission recalls that the right to access to a tribunal secured by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention may be subject to limitations in the form of regulation by the State. The State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation but in addition to pursuing a legitimate aim the limitations applied shall not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such