CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 27 juin 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 26335/95                       by     1. VERENIGING RADIO 100                             2. Herman A. DE RAAIJ                             3. Patrick J.A.M. FOLLON                             4. Robert N. STRAUS                             5. Christiaan SWART                       against the Netherlands        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 27 June 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    H. DANELIUS, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  J.-C. SOYER                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 28 August 1994 by VERENIGING RADIO 100, Herman A. DE RAAIJ, Patrick J.A.M. FOLLON, Robert N. STRAUS, and Christiaan SWART against the Netherlands and registered on 17 March 1995 under file No. 26335/95;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant is an association (vereniging), founded in 1986, and based in Amsterdam. The second, third, fourth and fifth applicants are all Dutch citizens, born in respectively 1950, 1966, 1957 and 1956. They are journalists and reside in Amsterdam. Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mrs. T. Prakken, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.   A.    The particular circumstances of the case        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.        The applicant association Radio 100 has been transmitting radio broadcasts in Amsterdam since 1986. Amateur radio operators may use the station to transmit programmes of an experimental nature. Radio 100 has never applied for the required licence under the Telecommunications Act (Wet op de Telecommunicatievoorzieningen), inter alia because the cost which this entails would require Radio 100 to sell broadcasting time to commercial sponsors to which it is opposed for reasons of principle.        Although it is submitted that Radio 100 takes care not to cause interference with other transmissions it appears that some interference with the reception of television programmes was experienced on old television sets or television sets of inferior quality which were positioned in close proximity to the transmitter.        At the end of 1988, the mayor of Amsterdam, the chief public prosecutor (hoofdofficier van justitie) and the chief superintendent (hoofdcommissaris) of the Amsterdam police decided that judicial proceedings should be initiated against Radio 100 in order to prevent it from broadcasting on the ground, inter alia, that the broadcasts transmitted by Radio 100 caused interference with the broadcasts of legal radio and television stations. It was further taken into consideration that many other illegal radio stations had been taken off the air and that a failure to undertake any steps against Radio 100 could be construed as unequal treatment. The fact that Radio 100 had in the past informed its listeners of the movements of the police during large-scale police operations was also noted.        On 3 May 1989, transmitting equipment belonging to Radio 100 was seized (in beslagname). However, two days later Radio 100 resumed its broadcasts.        In 1990, the prosecuting authorities concluded that the Telecommunications Act did not provide the authorities with sufficient powers to bring the broadcasts of Radio 100 to an end, since this Act only allowed for the seizure of transmitting equipment. A preliminary investigation revealed that Radio 100 could be considered as an organisation which intended to commit the offence of broadcasting without a licence. Section 140 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) makes it a criminal offence to participate in an organisation which intends to commit offences.        Within the framework of a preliminary judicial investigation (gerechtelijk vooronderzoek) searches were carried out at seven addresses in Amsterdam on 15 May 1991. The application concerns the searches carried out at five of these addresses (hereinafter called A, B, C, D and E) which include the premises from which the applicant association transmitted its broadcasts and the homes of the other applicants. During the searches many objects were seized, among which transmitting equipment but also other material indispensable for the broadcasting of radio programmes, such as compact discs and records. A number of suspects were arrested but released on the following day.        Also on the following day, Radio 100 resumed its broadcasts, although the transmissions were of a poorer quality.        In May and June 1991, the applicants filed objections in which they complained of the seizures with the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam. Apart from complaining of irregularities which had occurred during the searches and which, in their view, invalidated the lawfulness of these searches, the applicants alleged that the seizure of transmitting equipment and other property prevented them from broadcasting and therefore violated their rights under Article 10 of the Convention. The second to fifth applicants further complained that the searches of their homes in order to seize goods constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.        Following hearings on 21 June and 2 July 1991, the Regional Court rejected in an interlocutory decision (beschikking) of 15 July 1991 the applicants' argument that there had been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. In this respect it held that para. 2 of Article 10 allowed Contracting States to institute a licensing system for radio communications and that in the Netherlands this system had been laid down in the Telecommunications Act. Finding it established that none of the applicants was in possession of the required licence, the Regional Court concluded that the methods for investigation and prosecution provided for in the Telecommunications Act could be applied without infringing the applicants' rights under the Convention.        The Regional Court further considered that no Convention or other legal provision prevented the prosecution pursuant to Section 140 of the Criminal Code of persons who were suspected of participating in an organisation which transmitted broadcasts without a licence. The question whether the investigating and prosecuting authorities had thus been equipped with more wide-ranging powers than they would have been had the prosecution been conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Telecommunications Act was found by the Regional Court to be of no relevance in the proceedings at issue which only concerned complaints about the seizure of goods.        For the same reasons the Regional Court rejected the applicants' argument of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.        The Regional Court then adjourned its examination of the case to enable the prosecuting authorities to complete the file. A further hearing was held on 15 November 1991.        In its decision of 6 December 1991, the Regional Court ruled that the searches relating to the addresses A and B had been wholly or partly unlawful as the premises where the searches had taken place did not correspond to the addresses indicated in the search warrants. The search which had taken place at the address C was also found to have been conducted unlawfully since the applicants' representative had not been allowed to be present on the premises during the search. The Dsitrict Court ordered the return of the goods which had been seized at these addresses. It declared the searches at the addresses D and E lawful.        The public prosecutor filed an appeal in cassation against the Regional Court's decision insofar as it had declared searches unlawful. On 19 December 1991, the applicants also filed an appeal in cassation.        By letter of 9 January 1992, the applicants' representative requested the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) to transmit copies of the case- file and of the submissions of the Procurator General (Procureur- Generaal) at the Supreme Court as soon as these became available. She further requested the Supreme Court to enable her to comment on the submissions of the Procurator General and to fix a time-limit for the submission of the grounds of cassation. The grounds of cassation were submitted by the applicants' representative on 19 June 1992. On 12 November 1992, she made inquiries by telephone about the state of the proceedings and by letter of 6 October 1993, she requested the Supreme Court to expedite matters. In reply, the Registrar of the Supreme Court informed the applicants' representative on 7 October 1993 that the case was still with the Office of the Procurator General but that he would urge the Procurator General to deal with the case expeditiously.        On 23 November 1993, the Advocate General made his submissions. These were, however, not transmitted to the applicants' representative.        In its decision on the appeals in cassation of 1 March 1994, the Supreme Court first dealt with the applicants' complaints under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention that the authorities had made use of the more-wide ranging powers conferred on them by the Code of Criminal Procedure rather than those provided for in the Telecommunications Act. The Supreme Court held that para. 2 of Article 10 did not prevent the seizure of goods resulting in the temporary discontinuation of radio broadcasts. According to the Supreme Court, the finding of the Regional Court that legal provisions had allowed for the seizure of goods in the circumstances of the case, should be understood to mean that the seizure had been "in accordance with the law" pursuant to Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention and "prescribed by law" pursuant to para. 2 of Article 10 of the Convention. This finding also included that the seizure had been "necessary in a democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime" and "for the protection of the ... rights of others" pursuant to these provisions. In view of the fact that none of the applicants had been in possession of the required licence and that it did not appear that this licence had been withheld from them in an arbitrary manner, the Supreme Court found that the Regional Court had been right in concluding that Articles 8 and 10 had not been violated.        The Supreme Court further did not agree with the applicants that where a person is suspected of participating in an organisation which intends to transmit broadcasts without a licence, only such property may be seized as is liable to seizure pursuant to the provisions of the Telecommunications Act.        The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Regional Court as regards the finding that the searches at the addresses A and B had been unlawful for technical reasons. It also upheld the Regional Court's finding that the searches at the addresses D and E had been lawful.        The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Regional Court only in respect of the search at the address C which the Regional Court had found to have been unlawful. This part of the case was referred to the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam.        At the hearing before this Court of Appeal on 29 July 1994, the Procurator General at the Court stated that in view of the time which had passed since the seizure, the criminal proceedings would not be continued. She argued, however, that the complaints concerning the seizure which had taken place at the address C should still be rejected since the prosecuting authorities intended to demand the withdrawal from circulation of the seized goods given that their uncontrolled possession was illegal.        On 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeal declared the search at the address C unlawful and ordered the return of the property which had been seized at that address. The prosecuting authorities filed an appeal in cassation against this decision.        On 14 February 1995, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal. It held that even if the search had been unlawful the Court of Appeal should have examined the question whether the possibility of withdrawal from circulation justified the continued seizure of the goods. The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeal of The Hague.        Following a hearing before the Court of Appeal of The Hague on 23 May 1995, this court pronounced its decision on 6 June 1995 in the absence of the applicants' representative. The registry informed the representative by telephone that a number of the seized objects would be returned. Despite several requests in writing, including one to the chairman of the criminal chamber of the Court of Appeal, the representative has still not been provided with a written copy of the decision and is unaware of its precise contents.        It appears from the file that the property seized at the address A belonged to the second applicant. The property seized at the address B belonged to the applicant association and the third applicant. The property seized at the address C belonged to the applicant association and the fourth applicant. The property seized at the address D belonged to the applicant association. Finally, the property seized at the address E belonged to the fifth applicant.   B.    Domestic law and practice        Pursuant to Section 17 of the Telecommunications Act, a Ministerial authorisation is required for the instalment and use of broadcasting installations. When the instalment and use of a broadcasting installation is considered to be contrary to an efficient use of the air waves, an authorisation is withheld (Section 17 para. 7 (b) Telecommunication Facilities Act).        The Telecommunications Act provides for the seizure of only those objects which may be used in evidence in respect of the offence of broadcasting without the required licence. It does not provide for searches of premises from which no broadcasts are transmitted.        According to Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "CCP"), items which may serve to establish the truth or whose confiscation (verbeurdverklaring) or withdrawal from circulation (onttrekking aan het verkeer) may be ordered are liable to seizure (inbeslagneming).        Section 33a of the Criminal Code (hereinafter referred to as "CC") defines the property which is liable to confiscation. This property includes, inter alia, items and/or claims partially or wholly obtained by criminal offences or through the proceeds thereof and items with which such offences have been committed.        According to Section 33 CC, confiscation may be pronounced following a conviction for a criminal offence.        Withdrawal from circulation is provided for in Sections 36b, 36c and 36d CC. Withdrawal from circulation entails that the ownership of (already seized) items passes to the State, which may then dispose of them. Under Section 36b CC withdrawal from circulation may be pronounced either by a judgment, or, in the absence of criminal proceedings, by a separate judicial order upon the request of the public prosecutor when it is found that the items concerned are of such a nature that their uncontrolled possession is contrary to the law or the public interest. Consequently, a conviction is no prerequisite for an order for withdrawal from circulation.        Pursuant to Section 552a para. 1 CCP interested parties including the suspect may file an objection against, inter alia, a seizure, the use of seized objects and the failure to order their return. If the competent court finds the objection well-founded, it will issue a corresponding order.        It is for the prosecuting authorities to decide whether or not a person who is suspected of a criminal offence shall be prosecuted (Sections 167 and 242 CCP).        If the interests of criminal proceedings no longer require seizure, seized goods are, in principle, returned to the person from whom they have been seized (Section 118 CCP). Such a situation may arise when no criminal proceedings have been brought or when they have been discontinued and no final order for withdrawal from circulation has been issued.   COMPLAINTS        The applicants complain of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, in that in the cassation proceedings leading to the Supreme Court's decision of 1 March 1994 they were not informed of the submissions of the Advocate General at the Supreme Court and were therefore not able to reply to these submissions. They also complain of the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Court.        They further complain that their right to freedom of expression and their right to impart information within the meaning of Article 10 para. 1 of the Convention has been interfered with and that this interference was not justified under para. 2 of the provision. In this respect the applicants submit that by using the powers which have been provided for the investigation and prosecution of the offence of Section 140 CC instead of those provided for in the Telecommunications Act, the interference was not prescribed by law. The applicants argue that the interference was also not necessary in a democratic society for the protection of any of the legitimate aims enumerated in para. 2.        Finally, the applicants argue that the search of premises in order to seize goods belonging to them violated their right to respect for their home and they invoke Article 8 of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.    The applicants complain that the proceedings before the Supreme Court which led to the decision of 1 March 1994 were not in conformity with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. This provision reads, insofar as relevant:        "1.    In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or      of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a      fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an      independent and impartial tribunal established by law ..."        The Commission must in the first place determine whether the proceedings at issue fall within the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. In this respect the Commission is of the opinion that these proceedings cannot in any event be regarded as determining a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), as they did not concern the question whether or not the applicants were guilty of a criminal offence.        As regards the question whether the proceedings involved the determination of "civil rights and obligations" the Commission recalls that for Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention to be applicable under its "civil" head, there must be a dispute over civil rights and obligations and the outcome of the proceedings in question must be directly decisive for such a right or obligation, mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to bring Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) into operation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Fayed judgment of 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294-B, p. 46, para. 56).        The Commission observes that the proceedings at issue did not deprive the applicants of the ownership of the seized property. The seizure merely prevented the applicants from freely using this property pending the possible subsequent criminal proceedings before the trial courts or, in the absence of such criminal proceedings, pending an order for the property to be returned or an order for the withdrawal of the objects from circulation.        The Commission, noting that at the time of the impugned decision, i.e. 1 March 1994, it was not yet known that the criminal proceedings would be discontinued, concludes that these proceedings were merely of a conservatory and provisional character and concerned an interim measure taken in the interest of the criminal proceedings concerning an offence against the Criminal Code.        Consequently, the Commission finds that the proceedings of which the applicants complain did not involve a determination of civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. No. 23908, Dec. 7.3.96, unpublished).        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.    The applicants also invoke Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention. They allege that the seizure of their property prevented them from transmitting radio broadcasts. Article 10 (Art. 10) provides:        "1.    Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This      right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and      impart information and ideas without interference by public      authority and regardless of frontiers.   This Article shall not      prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,      television or cinema enterprises.        2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it      duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,      conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law      and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of      national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for      the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health      or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of      others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in      confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of      the judiciary."        The first question which the Commission must examine is whether there has been an interference with the applicants' rights under Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention.        The present case concerns the seizure of goods indispensable for the transmission of radio broadcasts. It thus relates principally to the freedom enshrined in Article 10 para. 1   (Art. 10-1) "to ... impart information and ideas without interference by a public authority". The Commission   finds that the seizure of the property at issue constituted an interference with the applicants' right to impart information and ideas.        However, according to the third sentence of Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention, Article 10 (Art. 10) does "not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting ... enterprises". By applying a licensing system, the Contracting States are allowed under this provision of the Convention to regulate broadcasting activities in their territories for the purpose of controlling, inter alia, the technical aspects of broadcasting (Eur. Court H.R., Informationsverein Lentia and Others judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 14, para. 32). Given that in the present case the aim of the licensing system, as expressed in Section 17 para. 7 (c) of the Telecommunications Facilities Act, was to obtain an efficient use of the air waves, the Commission cannot find this system to be at variance with the third sentence of Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention.        However, although the aim of the interference at issue was legitimate under the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention, the interference must also be assessed in the light of the requirements of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention (Informationsverein Lentia and Others judgment, loc. cit., p. 14, para. 32).        As regards the question whether the interference was prescribed by law, the Commission recalls that the phrase "prescribed by law" in Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) must be given the same interpretation as the phrase "in accordance with the law" in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Silver judgment of 25 march 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 33, para. 85). Where the Convention refers to domestic law, it is primarily the task of the national authorities to apply and interpret domestic law. The Convention organs have a limited jurisdiction in controlling the manner in which this is done (cf. No. 10689/83, Dec. 14.5.84, D.R. 37 p. 225 and Eur. Court H.R., Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A, p. 17, para. 45).        The phrase "prescribed by law", or the equivalent phrase "in accordance with the law" does not, however, merely refer back to domestic law, but also relates to the quality of the law. A norm must be formulated with sufficient precision, but a law conferring a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity (Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 30, para. 61; Kruslin and Huvig judgments of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176 A and B respectively, pp. 22-25, para. 30-36, and pp. 54-57, paras. 29-35).        The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants had never applied for the licence required pursuant to Section 17 of the Telecommunications Act. The Commission finds it established that the applicants were sufficiently aware of the relevant statutory rules.        The Commission further notes that in the present case the seizure of the property took place within the framework of a preliminary judicial investigation into an offence against the Criminal Code, rather than an offence against the Telecommunications Act. The powers of seizure under the former Code are more extensive than under the latter Act. However, the Commission does not consider that measures taken in order to terminate a situation which contravenes a licensing system must themselves be contained in the legislation by which the licensing system is enacted.        The Commission observes that the offence at issue was the participation in an organisation which intended to transmit broadcasts without a licence. In the circumstances of the present case, where the applicants must have been aware of the fact that they were committing an offence in an organised manner, the Commission cannot find that the way in which the interference took place was not foreseeable.        Accordingly, the Commission finds that the interference was "prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention. The Commission also finds that it was intended to prevent disorder and crime and to protect the rights of others, these being legitimate purposes under that provision.        As regards the notion of necessity, the Commission recalls that the phrase "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention implies that the interference must correspond to a "pressing social need" and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society" the Convention organs must also take into account that the Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation, but this goes hand in hand with European supervision. In cases where there has been an interference with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention, this supervision must be strict because of the importance of these rights and freedoms. The necessity for any restriction must be convincingly established (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Autronic AG judgment of 22 may 1990, Series A no. 178, p. 26, para. 61; and Otto-Preminger- Institut judgment, loc. cit., p. 19, para. 50).        The Commission further recalls that the freedom of expression, subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (Art. 10-2), is also applicable to "information" or "ideas" which shock, offend or disturb the State (cf. Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment, loc. cit., p. 19, para. 49). In this respect the Commission notes that when the authorities decided that judicial proceedings should be instigated against Radio 100, they took into account the fact that Radio 100 had in the past through its broadcasts informed its listeners of the movements of the police during large-scale police operations. While accepting that this was an element which is likely to have disturbed the authorities, the Commission cannot find it established that this was the only or the overriding reason for the decision to instigate judicial proceedings against Radio 100. In fact, it appears that other reasons were that the broadcasts transmitted by Radio 100 had disturbed the broadcasts of legal radio and television stations and that other illegal radio stations had previously been taken off the air.        Furthermore, the Commission notes that on an earlier occasion, namely on 3 May 1989, the authorities had also attempted to bring the broadcasts of Radio 100 to an end by seizing their transmission equipment. However, two days later Radio 100 resumed its broadcasts.        In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the seizure of the property at issue was not disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and that the Dutch authorities cannot be regarded as having overstepped their margin of appreciation in this respect.        It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    Finally, the applicants argue that the search of premises in order to seize property belonging to them was contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for ... his home ...        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."        a.     As regards the searches which took place at the addresses A and B, the Commission notes that although the national courts did not accept that the applicants' rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention had been violated, they did find that these searches had been conducted unlawfully and consequently ordered the goods seized there to be returned. Given that the applicants' objection to the seizure of the property at these addresses pursuant to Section 552a CCP was successful in that it resulted in a finding of unlawfulness, the Commission considers that the applicant association and the second and third applicants, whose property was seized at these addresses, cannot be considered victims in regard to these searches within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.        The Commission notes that it is not clear what the outcome has been of the proceedings in respect of the search at the address C. However, if this search was found by the Court of Appeal of The Hague to have been conducted unlawfully, the above finding would apply also to the applicant association and the fifth applicant insofar as the seizure at that address was concerned.        b.     Insofar as the applicants complain that the searches conducted at the addresses D and E was an interference with their right to respect for their homes which was not in conformity with the provisions of the Telecommunications Act on which they should have been based, the Commission refers to its findings in this respect on the applicants' complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.        The Commission notes furthermore that the searches at these addresses were found by the national courts to have been conducted lawfully. The Commission cannot find any circumstances in the present case which suggest any illegality and therefore accepts that the requirement of lawfulness was satisfied.        The Commission further considers that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder and crime and the protection of the rights of others.        As regards the question whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the Commission similarly refers to its findings on the complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.        This finding would also apply to the search conducted at the address C if it should appear that the Court of Appeal of The Hague had found this search to have been conducted lawfully.        It follows that this part of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Second Chamber      President of the Second Chamber         (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                        (H. DANELIUS)