CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 juillet 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 24962/94                       by Nicolaos KOLTSIDAS and 1158 others                       against Greece                                     and                         Application No. 25370/94                       by Kiriakos FOUNTIS and 39 others                       against Greece                                     and                         Application No. 26303/95                       by Panagiotis ANDROUTSOS and 109 others                       against Greece         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 1 July 1996, the following members being present:              MM.    S. TRECHSEL, President                  H. DANELIUS                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  G.B. REFFI                  M.A. NOWICKI                  B. CONFORTI                  D. SVÁBY                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 10 April 1994 by Nicolaos KOLTSIDAS and 1158 others against Greece and registered on 22 August 1994 under file No. 24962/94;         Having regard to the application introduced on 19 May 1994 by Kiriakos FOUNTIS and 39 others against Greece and registered on 5 October 1994 under file No. 25370/94;         Having regard to the application introduced on 29 December 1994 by Panagiotis ANDROUTSOS and 109 others against Greece and registered on 25 January 1995 under file No. 26303/95;         Having regard to :   -      the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       4 July 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicants of the second application on 16 September 1995 and by       the applicants of the first and third applications on       29 September 1995;   -      the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 1 July 1996;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The first application has been introduced by 1159 Greek citizens. In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by Professor P. Dagtoglou of the University of Athens, who is also practising as an attorney in Athens and London.         The second application has been introduced by 40 Greek citizens. In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by Mr. Ch. Alvanos, a lawyer practising in Thessaloniki.         The third application has been introduced by 110 Greek citizens. In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by Professor P. Dagtoglou.         All the applicants were holders of licences to operate bus services in Athens, Piraeus and the suburbs (hereafter the metropolitan area), which licences were revoked by a law introduced in 1993.         The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:   A.     Particular circumstances of the case         Until 1977 the public transport services by buses in the metropolitan area were provided by private entrepreneurs under the control of a public body, the Organisation for the Control of Transport by Buses (Organismos Elenhou ton di Aftokiniton Singinonion, hereafter OEAS). In 1977 law 588 was enacted making the Undertaking for City Transport (Epihirisi Astikon Singinonion, hereafter EAS), a company wholly owned by the State, exclusively responsible for the provision of bus services. The EAS was placed under the control of a public body, the Organisation for City Transport (Organismos Astikon Singinonion, hereafter OAS). The OEAS was dissolved.         In 1992 the Government decided to devise a new scheme for the provision of public transport services by buses in the metropolitan area. This scheme would be based on licences to operate new privately owned environmentally friendly buses, which would be granted to certain categories of physical persons.         On 12 August 1992 law 2078 was promulgated by which the EAS was dissolved. Outstanding debts were assumed by the State and its property was transferred to the OAS, which remained the control body for public transport in the metropolitan area. The law further provided that the transport by buses would be provided until 31 December 2006 by Transport Undertakings (Singinoniakes Epihirisis, hereafter SEP) which were going to be set up by ministerial decision as private law bodies. Eight such SEP were established by decision No. 29077/1068/13.8.92 of the Minister of Transport and Communications, which specified that they should operate either as private law companies or as cooperatives and fixed their by-laws. Each physical person who had been granted a licence to operate a bus had to become a member-shareholder of a SEP.       In accordance with the provisions of law 2078/92, the following categories of physical persons, mentioned in order of priority, became entitled to a licence to operate a bus on their own or jointly with others: former drivers of the EAS and former employees of the EAS who held a professional driver's licence (under Article 3 para. 1 (a) of law 2078/92), owners of buses in the provinces who agreed to surrender their existing licences (under Article 3 para. 1 (b) of law 2078/92), taxi-owners who agreed to surrender their existing licences (under Article 3 para. 1 (c) of law 2078/92), heads of families with a certain number of children who held a professional driver's licence (under Article 3 para. 1 (d) of law 2078/92) and other physical persons who held a professional driver's licence (under Article 3 para. 1 (e) of law 2078/92). For each half licence granted a fee of 500,000 drachmas had to be paid to the SEP. Certain categories of potential licence holders had to pay an extra fee to the State, which was fixed at 500,000 drachmas per half licence for the former employees of the EAS and at 1,500,000 drachmas per half licence for the heads of families with a certain number of children and the other physical persons. Special reductions were fixed for the heads of families with more than five children. In accordance with law 2078/92, the licences could not be transferred inter vivos before the new buses were acquired.         The right to retain one's licence was made dependant on the acquisition or leasing of a new environmentally-friendly bus within three years. Under Article 14 para. 2 of law 2078/92, the State assumed the obligation to facilitate the acquisition of the new buses by providing guarantees for the loans which the licence holders would contract to this effect.         The use of the new buses would be attributed to the SEP. Pending the acquisition or leasing of the new buses, the law provided that the OAS would put at the disposal of the licence holders the buses it had acquired from the EAS. The licence holders would pay in return a fee to a special fund set up by each SEP for the renewal of the buses. In accordance with the ministerial decision No. 29077/1068/13.8.92, the licence holders were under the obligation to attribute the use of the OAS buses to the SEP of which they were members-shareholders.         Law 2078/92 also provided that the OAS could lease to the SEP assets it had acquired from the EAS.         The income of the SEP consisted of the proceeds from the sale of tickets and subsidies by the State. The law provided that 10% of the proceeds of each SEP would go to the buses renewal fund and 3% to the OAS. The balance would be divided among its members after deducting the cost of operation of the SEP. Ministerial decision 29077/1068/13.8.92 provided that this would happen four times a year in February, May, August and November. In accordance with the law 2078/92, the licence holders had to bear the costs of operating the bus, including maintenance, servicing, spare parts, petrol, insurance and the salaries of and social insurance contributions for the drivers.         The applicants took advantage of the possibility to acquire bus licences under law 2078/92 and paid the fees provided. A number of them ordered new buses contracting to this effect large loans, which were in part guaranteed by the State. In accordance with the relevant agreements, the ownership of the buses would not be transferred to the applicants until the full repayment of the loans. The applicants also concluded agreements with insurance companies and undertook expensive renovations of the old buses given to them by the OAS. They rented garages and administration offices, hired bus and administrative personnel and purchased bus and office equipment.       Article 40 of law 2168/93, which was subsequently adopted, gave the Minister of National Economy the possibility of granting subsidies to the licence-holders. Such subsidies were indeed granted.         On 22 December 1993, after a change in government, law 2175 was promulgated abolishing the OAS, dissolving the various SEP, which went into compulsory liquidation, and revoking the licences granted under law 2078/92. A new public enterprise, the Organisation of Public Transport in Athens (Organismos Astikon Singinonion Athinon, hereafter OASA), was established which was entrusted with the provision of the public transport services in the metropolitan area. The OASA acquired all the assets of the OAS and succeeded it in all its rights and obligations. It also succeeded the SEP and its shareholders in all the rights and obligations deriving from loan contracts, contracts for the acquisition of buses and insurance contracts. The State continued to guarantee the loans transferred to the OASA.         Law 2175/93 provided for the return of any fees paid to the State with a view to acquiring a bus licence. No interest would be paid thereon. Any sums of money paid for the acquisition of buses would also be returned to the former licence holders with interest from the date of payment.         Under Article 4 para. 3(a) of law 2175/93 the OASA would employ all the persons who were employed by the EAS when it was dissolved. Under Article 4 para. 3(b) of law 2175/93 members of the SEP who had acquired licences to operate buses under Article 3 para. 1(b)(c)(d) and (e) of law 2078/92 were also given the right to be employed as drivers by the OASA.         Law 2175/93 further provided for the adoption of a number of ministerial decisions which would establish the procedure for the compulsory liquidation of the SEP and for the setting off of the claims of the State against the claims of the former licence holders. Similar decisions would provide for the restitution to the former licence holders of the rights they had to surrender in order to acquire the licences under law 2078/92. Finally, a ministerial decision would provide for the procedure for the handing over of the assets which the OAS had put at the disposal of the SEP and their members.         On 23 December 1993 the Minister of Transport and Communications, acting alone or together with the Minister in charge of the Civil Service (Ipurgos Proedrias), adopted three decisions under law 2175/93. Under decision No. 22800 the former members of the SEP who had acquired a licence to operate a bus under law 2078/92 upon surrendering a licence to operate a bus in a province or a taxi could apply for the re-acquisition of the licences they had had to surrender. However, the restoration of the licences was made conditional on the making of a declaration waiving the right to pursue any claims the former members of the SEP had against the OAS or the OASA other than the claims allowed under law 2175/92. Decision No. 22804 set a similar condition for the re-instatement of former members of the SEP in civil service or public sector positions from which they had to resign in order to obtain a licence to operate a bus under law 2078/92. Decision No. 22802 laid out the procedure for the handing over of the assets which the OAS had put at the disposal of the SEP and their members. On 24 December 1993 the Minister of Transport and Communications adopted decision No. 22806 concerning the compulsory liquidation of the SEP.       On 17 February 1994 some applicants lodged before the Council of State an action for the annulment of decision No. 22802/23.12.93 of the Minister of Transport and Communications on the ground that it had been issued on the basis of a law which violated, inter alia, Articles 17 and 106 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.         Three more actions were lodged before the Council of State for the annulment of decision No. 22806/24.12.93. These actions are still pending.         Some applicants also instituted proceedings against the Greek State before the First Instance Administrative Court (Diikitiko Protodikio) of Athens claiming that their enterprises had been taken under Article 106 para. 3 of the Constitution and requesting the court to fix their compensation under Article 106 para. 4 thereof.         On 28 April 1994 the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens rejected one of the above-mentioned actions, which had been lodged on 6 April 1994, for lack of competence. It considered that the actions should have been introduced before the civil courts against the OASA.         Following this decision, some of the actions were re-introduced before the civil courts and more specifically before the Court of Appeal (Efetio) of Athens.         On 17 June 1994 some applicants introduced actions before the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens claiming damages against the State under Articles 105 and 106 of the law introducing the Civil Code on the ground that the provisions of law 2175 violated, inter alia, Articles 17 and 106 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These actions are still pending.         On 28 July 1995 the Minister of Transport and Communications proposed to the former members of the SEP that they withdraw all court actions in exchange for a speedy settlement of the claims allowed under law 2175/93.           On 7 August 1995 the Fourth Division of the Council of State considered, inter alia, the following in respect of the action for the annulment of decision No. 22802/23.12.93 of the Minister of Transport and Communications. It was the Fourth Division's opinion that law 2175/93 did not violate any property rights under Article 17 of the Constitution, in that it did not affect any rights in rem. Law 2078/92 by setting up the SEP had created private enterprises within the meaning of Article 106 para. 3 of the Constitution, because the SEP had been set up as legal persons incorporated under private law and their members had contributed private funds and taken business risks. However, the dissolution of the SEP and the setting up of another body to which the privilege of rendering a public service had been conferred did not amount to a taking over of a private enterprise within the meaning of Article 106 paras. 3 and 4 of the Constitution. It simply reflected a change of attitude on the part of the legislator as to the most appropriate way in which this public service should be rendered and it did not involve the transfer of an organised business as such from one legal person to another. The economic interests associated with the licences granted under law 2078/92 amounted to "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the dissolution of the SEP amounted to a deprivation of property to be examined under the second sentence of Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, the compensation for which law 2175/93 made provision was adequate, insofar as it covered most of the actual losses incurred. Although the law did not provide for compensation in respect of loss of earnings, this could not constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given the short period of time for which the SEP had existed. Finally, the Fourth Division considered that the seriousness of the above- mentioned issues merited further examination and decided under Article 14 para. 2 (b) of the presidential decree 18/89 to refer the action for annulment to the Plenary.         At the time of the introduction of the application all the buses had already been removed from the applicants with the help of the police. It appears that the applicants have not yet received the compensation provided for under law 2175 and that the liquidation of the SEP has not yet been completed.   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice   1.     The Greek Constitution provides the following:         Article 17 para. 2         "No one shall be deprived of his property except for the       public benefit which must be duly proven, when and as       specified by the law and always following full compensation       corresponding to the value of the expropriated property."         Article 106 paras. 3 and 4         ".... the law may regulate the acquisition by purchase of       or the compulsory participation by the State or another       public body in an enterprise which has a monopoly or which       is of vital importance for the exploitation of a source of       national wealth or the purpose of which is to offer       services to the community as a whole.         The amount of money to be paid for the purchase or the       compulsory participation of the State or another public       body will be determined by a court; it will represent the       full value of the enterprise, when it is purchased, or the       full value of the participation therein."   2.     Article 105 of the law introducing the Civil Code provides for the award of compensation to persons who sustain losses as a result of something done or omitted by an organ of the State in the exercise   of the powers vested in it, except where the legal rule which has been breached serves to protect the general interest.         Article 106 of the same law provides for the award of compensation in cases where the losses are similarly caused by an organ of a municipality or of a legal person of public law.         In decision No. 2174/1991 the Administrative Court of Appeal (Diikitiko Efetio) of Athens held that a person could   under Article 105 of the law introducing the Civil Code sue the State   for damages caused by an unlawful act of the legislature, i.e. the adoption of a law which was not in conformity with a legal rule with superior force (for example, the Constitution or European Community   law), provided that the law adopted by the legislature affected rights of that person which were directly protected by the legal   rule   with superior force.   COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that they have been deprived of their possessions for reasons of political expediency without receiving adequate compensation in a manner which disregarded the Greek Constitution.   2.     The applicants further complain under Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 of the Convention of their inability to institute proceedings under national law with a view to obtaining compensation.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         Application No. 23372/94 was introduced on 10 April 1994 and registered on 22 August 1994.         Application No. 25370/94 was introduced on 19 May 1994 and registered on 5 October 1994.         Application No. 26303/95 was introduced on 29 December 1994 and registered on 25 January 1995.         On 3 April 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the applications to the respondent Government for observations on the admissibility and merits.         On 4 July 1995 the Government submitted their observations after an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.         The observations in reply of the applicants of the second application were submitted on 16 September 1995.         The observations in reply of the applicants of the first and third applications were submitted on 29 September 1995.         On 15 January 1996 the Commission, having regard to the connection between the three cases and the similar nature of the issues raised, considered it appropriate to order the joinder of the three applications under Rule 35 of its Rules of Procedure. It also decided to invite the parties to submit oral observations on the admissibility and merits of the applications at a hearing.         The hearing took place on 1 July 1996.         At the hearing the parties were represented as follows:   The Government:   Mr. Vassilios Kontolaimos, Acting Agent, Senior Adviser, Legal Advisory Council of the State   Mrs. Vassilia Pelekou, Legal Assistant, Legal Advisory Council of the State   Mr. Ioannis Tsoufis, Adviser   Mr. Andreas Kitsos, Adviser   The Applicants:   Applications Nos. 24962/94 and 26303/95   Professor Prodromos D. Dagtoglou, Representative, lawyer   Mr. Anastasios Kefalas, Adviser, legal adviser and member of the board of EAS   Mr. Andreas Vardoulakis, Adviser, former Chairman of EAS   Two of the applicants, Messrs. Kalogeris and Labiris, were also present   Application No. 25370/94   Mr. Christos Alvanos, Representative, lawyer   THE LAW   1.     The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) that they have been deprived of their possessions for reasons of political expediency without receiving adequate compensation in a manner which disregarded the Greek Constitution.         Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:         "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his       possessions except in the public interest and subject to the       conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of       international law.         The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair       the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary       to control the use of property in accordance with the general       interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions       or penalties."         The Government submit that the applicants had various possibilities under national law for obtaining redress in respect of their complaints, which they did not use in full. Article 106 para. 4 of the Constitution provides that, when the State takes over an enterprise, it must pay full compensation, the amount of which must be fixed by the courts. Some of the applicants instituted proceedings under that constitutional provision which are still pending.         Articles 105 and 106 of the law introducing the Civil Code provide for an action for compensation in respect of unlawful acts by any State organ including the legislature. Article 914 of the Civil Code provides for an action for compensation in respect of unlawful acts in general. Some of the applicants have instituted proceedings invoking these provisions. These proceedings are still pending.         Moreover, the courts have the power to review the correct application of the provisions of law 2175/93 concerning the reimbursement of money paid for the acquisition of the licences or buses and the restitution of rights lost upon the acquisition of the licences.         Finally, the courts have the power to review the constitutionality of the provisions of law 2175/93. The Government attach particular importance in this connection to the actions currently pending before the Council of State by which the annulment of decision No. 22806/93 of the Minister of Transport and Communications is sought on the ground that law 2175/93 is unconstitutional. They submit that, if the Council of State declares law 2175/93 unconstitutional, the applicants' actions for damages are bound to be successful. Even if, however, the Council of State were to find that law 2175/93 is constitutional, the applicants would still have the possibility of obtaining compensation by the domestic courts.         The applicants argue that they have no effective remedies under domestic law. The rights of the applicants vis-à-vis the State are defined by law 2175/93. However, this law cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. The domestic courts have, on the one hand, always considered that the protection of property under Article 17 of the Constitution is limited to rights in rem. On the other hand, they have also always refrained from applying Article 106 para. 4 of the Constitution. Moreover, the Government have argued before the domestic courts that, in the absence of implementing legislation, Article 106 of the Constitution cannot be applied in a particular case.         The applicants also claim that the inordinate length of the proceedings before the Greek courts renders their protection ineffective. In any event, they argue that it is unlikely that the actions pending before the courts will ever reach their final stage. In cases involving large sums of money against the State, special laws have been repeatedly issued statute-barring claims before their period of limitation had run, discontinuing pending proceedings and excluding further actions against the State. Alternatively, the applicants submit that, even if the courts were to grant them compensation, they would not be able to enforce the judgment against the State, which enjoys immunity from execution under Greek law.         The applicants further refer to the letter of the Minister of Transport and Communications of 28 July 1995 whereby the settlement of their claims under law 2175/93 was made dependent on the waiver of their right to appeal to the courts. They also refer to the ministerial decisions Nos. 22800 and 22804 of 23 December 1993 where a similar condition was attached to the recovery of rights some of the applicants had had to surrender in order to obtain licences under law 2078/92.         The applicants in application No. 25370/94 further submit that the courts cannot award compensation in respect of a law which violates the Constitution in the absence of a criminal conviction of the Minister who was responsible for the law.   These applicants stress that they never attempted to institute proceedings before the domestic courts.         The Commission recalls that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it "may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law".         It further recalls that, in accordance with its case-law, in expropriation cases an action for reparation is an effective remedy, unless it manifestly affords no prospects of success (No. 14276/89, Dec. 20.5.92, unpublished). Moreover, if there exists mere doubt as to the chances of success of a domestic remedy, it must be tried (No. 9559/81, Dec. 9.5.83, D.R. 33 p. 158).         The Commission notes that some of the applicants have lodged actions for reparation of damages, which are currently pending before the domestic courts. It also notes that some of the applicants have lodged actions before the civil courts   claiming that their enterprises had been taken under Article 106 para. 3 of the Constitution and requesting the court to fix their compensation under Article 106 para. 4 thereof. Since, in accordance with its case-law, these actions would in principle constitute effective remedies, the Commission must examine whether, as the applicants maintain, these actions are devoid of prospects of success.         The Commission considers that the applicants of application No. 25370/94 have not substantiated their allegation that the courts could not award them compensation in the absence of a criminal conviction of the Minister who was responsible for the adoption of the law at issue.         It further notes that, despite their arguments that a constitutional challenge of law 2175/93 was bound to fail because of the restrictive interpretation attached by the Greek courts to the concept of property rights under the Constitution and the traditional reluctance of the Greek courts to apply Article 106 para. 4 of the Constitution concerning the taking over of private enterprises, some of the applicants have attempted to challenge the constitutionality of that law by bringing actions for the annulment of decision No. 22802/93 of the Minister of Transport and Communications on the procedure for the handing over of the assets which the OAS had put at the disposal of the SEP and their members. These actions has been referred by the Fourth Division of the Council of State to the Plenary on the ground that serious issues as to the compatibility of law 2175/93 with the Greek Constitution and the Convention arise.         In these circumstances, the Commission considers that, whatever the attitude of the domestic courts in previous cases of nationalisation may have been, it cannot be affirmed at this stage that the particular constitutional challenge is bound to fail. Moreover, although the annulment of the above-mentioned ministerial decision is unlikely to remedy directly the situation complained of, the Commission cannot ignore the repercussions which a possible finding by the Council of State that law 2175/93 is unconstitutional is bound to have for the applicants' actions for damages which are pending before the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens and their actions under Article 106 para. 4 of the Constitution which are pending before the Athens Court of Appeal.         The Commission considers that, pending a final determination by the Council of State of the compatibility of law 2175/93 with the Constitution and the Convention, it cannot be held that the applicants' actions for damages and their actions under Article 106 para. 4 of the Constitution are devoid of any prospects of success. As a result, these are remedies which the applicants are required to exhaust. This also holds true for the applicants who have so far refrained from instituting proceedings for compensation.         The Commission has further examined the applicants' remaining submissions concerning the length of the proceedings, the possibility of an ad hoc legislative interference with the determination of the dispute by the courts, the immunity of the State from execution and the pressure allegedly applied on them to waive their claims. However, it finds nothing in these submissions which could have released, in the particular circumstances of the case, the applicants from their obligation under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention to exhaust the particular remedies.         It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected, pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   3.     The applicants complain under Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention of their inability to institute proceedings under national law with a view to obtaining compensation.         Insofar as relevant, the provisions invoked by the applicants read as follows:   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention         "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations .....,       everyone is entitled to a ...... hearing ...... by a .....       tribunal established by law. ...."   Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention         "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this       Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a       national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been       committed by persons acting in an official capacity."         The Government submit that no property rights were involved; it follows that no civil rights were involved either. In any event, the applicants had the possibility of having their rights determined by the courts.         The applicants submit that a dispute about the nationalisation of private assets is a dispute involving the determination of civil rights and obligations. However, for the reasons already stated, they cannot obtain redress from the national courts.         The Commission, recalling its above observations regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), considers that it cannot be concluded at the present stage that an action for reparation of damages or an action under Article 104 para. 6 of the Constitution are devoid of any prospects of success, thus depriving the applicants of access to any effective court remedy for the determination of their property rights within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   It follows that the   applicants' complaints under Articles 6 para. 1 and 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention are premature and must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   For these reasons, the Commission unanimously   DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS INADMISSIBLE.           H.C. KRÜGER                          S. TRECHSEL          Secretary                            President      to the Commission                     of the Commission