CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 7 août 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }          In the case of Johansen v. Norway (1),           The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court B (2), as a Chamber composed of the following judges:           Mr R. Bernhardt, President,         Mr R. Ryssdal,         Mr R. Macdonald,         Mr I. Foighel,         Mr R. Pekkanen,         Mr A.N. Loizou,         Mr J.M. Morenilla,         Mr P. Kuris,         Mr U. Lohmus,   and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy Registrar,           Having deliberated in private on 26 January and 27 June 1996,           Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: _______________ Notes by the Registrar   1.   The case is numbered 24/1995/530/616.   The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number).   The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.   2.   Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, apply to all cases concerning the States bound by Protocol No. 9 (P9). ________________   PROCEDURE   1.       The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway ("the Government") on 1 March and 3 April 1995 respectively, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47).   It originated in an application (no. 17383/90) against Norway lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by a Norwegian citizen, Ms Adele Johansen, on 10 October 1990.           The Commission's request and the Government's application referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48); the request also referred to the declaration whereby Norway recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46).   The object of the request and of the application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention (art. 6, art. 8, art. 13).   2.       In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 35 para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court B, the applicant stated that she wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent her (Rule 31).   3.       The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr R. Ryssdal, the elected judge of Norwegian nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)).   On 5 May 1995, in the presence of the Registrar, Mr Bernhardt drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr R. Macdonald, Mr I. Foighel, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr P. Kuris and Mr U. Lohmus (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43).   4.       As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Bernhardt, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the applicant's lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 39 para. 1 and 40).   Pursuant to the orders made in consequence on 6 June and 13 November 1995, the Registrar received the applicant's and the Government's memorials on 13 and 20 November 1995.   On 20 December 1995 the Secretary to the Commission indicated that the Delegate did not wish to reply in writing.   5.       On various dates between 10 January and 19 June 1996 the Registrar received a number of documents from the Government and the applicant, including particulars on the latter's Article 50 (art. 50) claims.   6.       On 10 and 12 January 1996, the Registrar received from the Government a request that the memorials and appendices thereto not be made accessible to the public and that the hearing on 23 January be held in camera.   The applicant and the Delegate of the Commission submitted their comments on 16 and 17 January.   On 19 and 22 January the Government and the applicant accepted that the hearing be held in public subject, inter alia, to the non-disclosure of the identity of certain persons, including the applicant's daughter.   7.       In accordance with the President's decisions, the hearing took place in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 January 1996, in public, in accordance with the terms indicated above.   The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.           There appeared before the Court:   (a)   for the Government        Mr T. Stabell, Assistant Attorney-General         (Civil Matters),                                        Agent,      Mr F. Elgesem, Attorney, Attorney-General's Office         (Civil Matters),      Ms T. Smith, Assistant Director-General, The Royal         Ministry of Child and Family Affairs,      Ms K. Ofstad, Adviser, The Royal Ministry of         Child and Family Affairs,                            Advisers;   (b)   for the Commission        Mrs G.H. Thune,                                         Delegate;   (c)   for the applicant        Mrs S. Moland, advokat,                                  Counsel,      Mrs K. Næss, advokat,                                    Adviser,      Mr   A. Salomonsen,                                     Assistant.           The Court heard addresses by Mrs Thune, Mrs Moland, Mrs Næss and Mr Stabell.   8.       On 26 June 1996 the President decided that the Government's and the applicant's memorials, subject to changes to the former, be made accessible to the public but that those appendices thereto which related to the domestic proceedings not be made so accessible (see paragraph 6 above).           On the same date, he also decided to authorise the filing of the applicant's letters of 16 and 22 January 1996, with their enclosures, but to refuse that of the letter and enclosures received on 19 January (Rule 39 para. 1, third sub-paragraph, of Rules of Court B).   AS TO THE FACTS   I.       Particular circumstances of the case      A.    Background   9.       The applicant, who was born at Laksevåg near Bergen, left home when she was 16. In 1977, when she was 17 years old, she gave birth to her son C. and they became dependent on assistance from the social welfare authorities.   From 1980 onwards the applicant cohabited with a man who mistreated her and C.   He was convicted of drug offences in 1983 and spent two years in prison.   On many occasions the social welfare authorities assisted the applicant in the upbringing of C., but considerable problems as well as friction arose between those authorities and the applicant.   In August 1988 C. began to receive treatment at the Child Psychiatric Department of Haukeland Hospital in Bergen.   In January 1989 he was admitted to a special school adapted to his needs.   10.      On 14 November 1989 C., who was then 12 years old, was provisionally taken into care under section 11 of the Child Welfare Act (Barnevernsloven) no. 14 of 17 July 1953 ("the 1953 Act"; see paragraph 33 below), as the circumstances of the case disclosed a danger to his health and development.   The police assisted the child welfare authorities in enforcing the decision.   After spending the period from November 1989 to early January 1990 at the Child Psychiatric Department of Haukeland Hospital, C. was placed in a children's home.           According to a statement of 10 January 1990 by the Chief Physician, Ms Guri Rogge, and the Deputy Chief Physician, Mr Arne Hæggernes, the applicant's and C.'s situation had been "rather chaotic" throughout the period during which they had been in contact with the hospital.   When faced with difficulties, the applicant had broken off her contact with the system which had been set up to assist her.   Her way of life had had a detrimental effect on C. and the fact that he had changed schools had created much insecurity.   11.      In mid-November 1989 the applicant, who was pregnant, left Bergen for Oslo.   On 23 November she was given accommodation at the Oslo Crisis Centre, an institution for women who had been victims of domestic ill-treatment.           On the following day she went for an antenatal check-up at Markveien Medical Centre in Oslo.   She stated to the doctor concerned that she had been taking valium, vival and paralgin during her pregnancy and that she had hardly eaten during the last fortnight. Because of her pregnancy and her state of health she was subsequently referred to Ullevål Hospital in Oslo.   The doctors there considered her physical and mental state of health to be very poor, but refrained from contacting the child welfare authorities, fearing that she might injure herself if they did so.      B.    Public-care measures in respect of the applicant's         second child   12.      On 7 December 1989 the applicant gave birth to her daughter S. In view of the applicant's difficult situation and the problems with regard to the upbringing of C., the child welfare authorities (barnevernet) at Røa in Oslo were contacted.   At a meeting on 8 December 1989 between the applicant and her lawyer and the child welfare authorities the applicant's and S.'s situation was discussed.           On 13 December 1989 the Chairperson of the Client and Patient Committee of Røa, district 24 (klient- og pasientutvalget i bydel 24, Røa - "the Committee"), decided to take S. provisionally into care under section 11 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 33 below) on the grounds that the applicant, because of her physical and mental state of health, was considered incapable of taking care of her daughter.   The Chairperson considered that the child would be put at risk if the decision were not implemented immediately.           In reaching the above decision, the Chairperson had regard to the decision by the social welfare authorities in Bergen to take the applicant's son provisionally into care and their intention of doing so on a permanent basis, as well as their concern for the situation of the baby whom they considered taking into care immediately after birth. The Chairperson also took into account information provided by Markveien Medical Centre, by Ullevål Hospital and by those who had attended the meeting on 8 December 1989.           The applicant did not lodge any appeal against this provisional care decision.   13.      On 19 December 1989, in accordance with the above decision, S. was placed in a short-term foster home linked to the Aline Child Care Centre.   The applicant was allowed to visit her twice a week at the Centre.   She did not challenge this access arrangement, which was not based on any formal decision.   14.      The question of public care was brought before the Committee on 29 December 1989.   The Committee obtained an expert opinion dated 13 February 1990 from Mr Knut Rønbeck, psychologist, which contained the following conclusion on the applicant's ability to take care of S.:           "... On the surface, she appears to be a well-organised,         friendly and charming young woman.   On meeting her, it may         therefore initially be difficult to understand that the child         welfare authorities and mental health authorities have had         such serious problems in achieving cooperation with her for         the benefit of her son.   If one approaches her more closely,         however, a clear picture emerges of a woman with major         unsolved mental problems which strongly affect her social         functioning and her ability to care [for a child].   The         problems are expressed in the form of anxiety and depression.         Since her early youth, she has functioned fairly marginally         from a social point of view.   For many years, she lived with         a man who she herself believes abused both her and her son,         but without being able to break out of this relationship.           ...           ... Having regard to [the applicant's] history in respect of         taking care of her child and due to her lack of knowledge         of/denial of her own faults vis-à-vis her own and [C.'s]         problems I regret that, as the expert in this case, I am not         hopeful about her future ability to take care of her children,         although she undoubtedly loves them and is attached to them.         In addition to these points [I] must add that [the applicant]         now realises that what the future holds in store is the         prospect of being a mother on her own in Oslo where she lacks         support from a social environment.           ...           The child in this case [S.] is in a period of her life where         the attachment to preferably stable persons ought to develop.         It is of decisive importance for her personal development that         she now gets the opportunity to attach herself to persons whom         she may regard during her adolescence as stable and secure         parents."   15.      The applicant requested the appointment of a second expert. Since the child welfare authorities refused her request, the applicant herself engaged a psychologist, Mrs Lise Valla, who submitted her opinion on 17 April 1990.   This concluded:           "... I cannot find that there are sufficient reasons for         depriving [the applicant] of the care of her children [C.] and         [S.].           In my view [the applicant] shows responsibility when it comes         to considering the children's adolescence - and she is also a         person who may learn from the mistakes she has made.           It is clear, however, that [the applicant] will need some         practical assistance in the future.   It is desirable that both         she and [C.] receive therapy in order to manage the emotional         gaps from the bad years - and I would consider it reasonable         that the public authorities should provide this.   Furthermore,         [the applicant] ought to receive support so that she can         improve her level of education."           The above opinion was based on available documents and meetings with the applicant and her son.   16.      In the meantime the child welfare authorities at Røa continued their examination of the case.   Their report to the Committee of 30 March 1990, based on, among other material, talks with the applicant, Mr Rønbeck's opinion and the case files of the child welfare authorities in Bergen and Oslo, stated that if S. were to be reunited with her mother, the child's mental health would be subjected to harm or serious danger and she would live under such conditions as described in section 16 (a) of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 32 below). The report recommended that S. be taken into compulsory care pursuant to section 19 of the Act, such measures being necessary in view of the applicant's inability to provide satisfactory care for her daughter and of the fact that the preventive care measures taken under section 18 of the Act in respect of her son C. had not been effective (see paragraphs 33-34 below).   The report further recommended that S. be placed in a foster home with a view to adoption.   Scientific experience in recent years had shown that remaining a long-term foster child instead of being adopted was disadvantageous for the child: the foster parents could at any time cancel the agreement or the parents might institute proceedings in order to be reunited with the child. Adoption had the advantage of clarifying the situation and of creating security and stability for the child and the adoptive parents. Moreover, the report stated that, in order to secure the child's development and its relationship with the persons who would permanently assume the care, it would be appropriate for the authorities to deprive the applicant of all her parental responsibilities (foreldreansvaret) pursuant to section 20 of the Act (see paragraph 35 below).           As regards the question of access, the report added:           "While the girl has been at the Child Care Centre [the         applicant] has had access to her twice a week for one hour.         Following transfer of the girl to an approved foster home with         a view to adoption it is recommended that access be refused         and the address kept secret.           [The applicant] has previously tried to disappear with her son         in order to avoid the social welfare authorities and she did         not inform the social welfare office/authorities when her son         ran away from the children's home at Bergen in February 1990         in order to stay with her.   Therefore, it is considered not         unlikely that she would intervene in a disturbing manner in         the foster home, and perhaps also try to take the girl with         her.           It is considered important for this child to have quiet and         stability in the new environment where she is placed.   The         social welfare authorities will accordingly recommend that         [the applicant] be refused contact with the child and that the         child's new address be kept secret.           Today the girl has no relationship with her mother and,         therefore, it will not be necessary to phase out the access         arrangement before the girl is transferred to the foster         home."   17.      On 2 May 1990 the Committee, chaired by a Mrs Justice Inger Kristine Moksnes of the Oslo City Court (byrett), examined the case.   The applicant, assisted by a lawyer, called three witnesses and the child welfare authorities called one witness. Mr Rønbeck, the appointed expert, was heard, but not Mrs Valla, the expert engaged by the applicant herself.   As the costs in respect of Mrs Valla's appearance were not covered by the State, she was not able to attend the hearing.           A request by the applicant's counsel to be assisted by Mr Reidar Larssen, a psychiatrist, as a representative was rejected by the Committee on the ground that the applicant was already represented. He was, however, allowed to appear as a witness and to attend the hearing thereafter with no right to address the Committee.           The opinions of Mr Rønbeck and Mrs Valla and the child welfare authorities' report of 30 March 1990 were available to the Committee.           On the basis of the information and evidence submitted to it the Committee decided on 3 May 1990, by four votes to two, to take S. into care; to deprive the applicant of her parental responsibilities (which as a result were transferred to the child welfare authorities); to place S. in a foster home with a view to adoption; to refuse the mother access as from the moment of the child's placement in the foster home and to keep the latter's address secret.   In its decision the Committee stated:           "With reference to the reports which have been submitted and         the submissions made during this meeting, the Committee's         majority, Mrs Ryberg, Mr Clausen, Mr Aasland and Mrs Moksnes,         finds that [the applicant] has very little chance of acting         satisfactorily in taking care of her daughter.   The majority         stresses that [the applicant] has had sole responsibility for         the maintenance and care of her son, born in 1977.   This task         she has not managed and the social welfare authorities have         taken this child into care.   The [applicant] has received         special assistance since 1977 and has lived off social         security benefits since her son was 10 years old.   She has         only worked for short periods.   She has not lived with the         fathers of her two children but had for several years a         cohabitant who ill-treated her and her son, both physically         and mentally.   He was part of the drugs scene in Bergen, as         she was at one time. He is now in prison, serving a sentence         for drug dealing.   She has herself used drugs and alcohol and         has had intoxication problems.   It is unclear how big a         problem this has been, but the Committee assumes that she has         no intoxication problems at present.   It is not quite clear,         however, whether the problem has been solved also for the         future.           [The applicant] now maintains that she has broken with her         former friend and her previous life.   She has moved to Oslo         and now appears to have a different lifestyle than the one in         Bergen.   She has made a few social contacts but these are         dependent on circumstances and cannot be of decisive         importance.   She has vague plans for the future, although she         expresses a wish to train as a nursing auxiliary.           However, the majority is of the opinion that the decisive         factor in this case must be that, according to the appointed         expert, [the applicant] has serious unsolved mental problems         which impair her social skills and her ability to take care         [of children]. Although her son has had considerable mental         problems she has not been able to cooperate with the         authorities and has not understood the necessity of giving his         needs priority over her own.   She has not been able to         understand that the boy needed help and has not been willing         to accept assistance either.   The majority fears that this         attitude may lead to her daughter's needs not being met either         if she remains with [the applicant]. The majority finds that         the daughter will live in such conditions that the         requirements of section 16 (a) of the Child Welfare Act are         fulfilled.           In connection with taking her son into care a number of         measures have been tried, and the majority therefore finds         that measures under section 18 would be ineffective.   The         requirements for care under section 19 are accordingly         fulfilled.   The majority also finds that the requirements         pursuant to section 20 of the Child Welfare Act are fulfilled.         [The applicant] is not particularly motivated to accept         treatment and there is little prospect of change in this         respect.   The majority accordingly finds that it would be in         the interest of the child to be placed in a foster home with         a view to adoption.   The next few years will be crucial for         the child and it is preferable that she should feel certain         that she will not be moved.   It is of decisive importance for         the girl that she can now be attached to stable persons whom         she may regard as stable and secure parents in her         adolescence.           This is of decisive importance for the development of her         personality.   Therefore she ought not to be exposed to a         foster-home agreement which may be revoked.   She also ought to         form close relationships with a small number of people and           therefore ought to remain at a secret address pursuant to         section 19 of the Child Welfare Act, so that [the applicant]         no longer has access to her daughter when she is placed with         foster parents."   18.      The minority of the Committee found that the applicant's situation in life had improved since her removal from Bergen to Oslo and that she should thus be given the opportunity to take charge of the care of her daughter while staying at a special institution for that purpose.   19.      After her daughter's birth the applicant moved to a flat in Oslo.   During the spring of 1990, her son C. twice ran away from the children's home in Bergen to join her in Oslo and, on the second occasion, she indicated that she would not comply with the care decision.   As C. did not want to return to Bergen and as the applicant considered that the social welfare authorities there did not do enough to help him, she decided to let C. stay in Oslo.   She managed to get him admitted to a school there and she contacted a psychiatrist for support.   20.      On 24 April 1990 it was decided to take C. permanently into care but on 19 June that care decision was lifted, notwithstanding the fact that his care situation was still considered to be detrimental to his physical and psychological development, a matter which continued to be of great concern to the authorities.   The conflict between the authorities, on the one hand, and the applicant and her son, on the other, had made it impossible to implement the care decision without it being even more detrimental to the boy.   The decision of 19 June was subsequently confirmed by the Hordaland County Governor (Fylkesmannen) on 13 March 1991.   C. has lived with the applicant since May 1990.      C.    Applicant's appeals against the care measures in respect of S.   21.      On 25 May 1990 the applicant's lawyer received the minutes of the Committee's meeting of 2 May 1990 leading to its decision of 3 May 1990.   As regards the taking into public care and the deprivation of her parental responsibilities, the applicant lodged an appeal on 28 May 1990 against the decision of 3 May with the County Governor for Oslo and Akershus.   As far as the restrictions on access were concerned, she requested the County Governor to give the appeal suspensive effect (oppsettende virkning).   She submitted that continuing access was decisive for maintaining contact between her and the child pending the appeal.   The applicant also sent a copy of her appeal to the Committee, which on 28 June 1990 decided to uphold the decision of 3 May 1990 and to refer the case to the County Governor.   22.      On 31 July 1990 the County Governor, referring to section 42 of the Public Administration Act (Forvaltningsloven) of 10 February 1967 decided not to give the appeal suspensive effect on the grounds that it would be in the girl's best interests if the decision of 3 May 1990 to terminate access were implemented as from the moment the child was placed in the foster home.           S. was placed with foster parents on 30 May 1990.   The applicant has not had access to or seen her daughter since.   23.      The applicant pursued her appeal against the care decision and the deprivation of parental responsibilities.   As she was informed that her appeal to the County Governor of 28 May 1990 would remain pending for four to five months, she instituted proceedings in the Oslo City Court.   She asked the court to set aside the Committee's decision of 3 May 1990, maintaining inter alia that it was crucial that her case be examined speedily, given that she had been refused access to her daughter.   On 24 October 1990 the City Court dismissed (avviste) the application as such actions could only be instituted subsequent to a decision in the matter by the County Governor.   On 17 January 1991 the High Court (Lagmannsretten) rejected an appeal by the applicant on the ground that the County Governor had in the meantime decided the case (see paragraph 24 below) and there was therefore no reason to deal with the appeal.   A further appeal to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) was rejected on 7 March 1991.   24.      On 9 November 1990, after a meeting with the applicant and her lawyer, the County Governor for Oslo and Akershus upheld the Committee's decision concerning care and parental responsibilities.   25.      On 13 November 1990 the applicant instituted proceedings against the Ministry of Child and Family Affairs (Barne- og familiedepartementet) in the Oslo City Court under Chapter 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (tvistemålsloven, Law no. 6 of 13 August 1915 -see paragraph 38 below), asking for the care decision to be lifted and to be reunited with her daughter.   In the alternative she requested that her parental responsibilities be restored.           On 20 December 1990 the defendant Ministry submitted observations in reply.   26.      After consulting the parties, the City Court appointed two experts on 1 February 1991 to evaluate the applicant's ability to take care of her daughter and the consequences of revoking the care decision and/or restoring the applicant's parental responsibilities.   The experts were requested to submit their opinions by 15 March 1991, which they did.           On 8 February 1991 the parties were informed that the case had been set down for 2 April 1991.   27.      The City Court, sitting with one specially appointed judge, Mr Idar E. Pettersen, heard the case between 2 and 5 April 1991. Having heard the applicant, represented by counsel, a representative of the defendant Ministry, eleven witnesses and the two appointed experts, the City Court, in a judgment of 16 April 1991, upheld the taking into care and the deprivation of parental responsibilities.   It gave the following reasons:           "According to the Child Welfare Act the starting-point is that         a child should grow up with his or her natural parents.   The         interests of the child may, however, warrant exceptions being         made to this general rule as it cannot be interpreted so as to         allow the child to be subjected to considerable harm.           In reviewing a compulsory measure imposed under the         Child Welfare Act the courts must as a starting-point rely on         the circumstances obtaining at the time of passing judgment.         The possible negative effects on the child of being returned         from the foster parents to the natural parents must be taken         into consideration.   Regard must also be had to the fact that         the Child Welfare Committee [barnevernsnemnda] and the         County Governor may lawfully maintain a decision to take the         child into care even if the circumstances on which the         decision was based have later changed to such an extent that         the conditions for intervention pursuant to the         Child Welfare Act are no longer fulfilled.           After hearing the evidence the Court finds that such material         conditions [ytre betingelser] obtain as would allow the         applicant today to give her daughter, born on 7 December 1989,         an acceptable upbringing.   In this respect there has been an         improvement in the situation since the child welfare         authorities took over the care of the daughter.   [The         applicant] now appears to be permanently settled in Oslo         together with the father of her oldest child who also lives         with her.   It appears quite clear that the applicant has great         concern for the child who has been taken from her.   There can         hardly be any doubt that it is her intention to arrange things         as far as possible in order to assume the care of the child,         if she were to be returned to the mother, to the best of her         abilities.   These being the facts in the present case, the         Court must examine whether returning the child from the foster         parents to her natural mother would entail a real danger of         harm to the child.           We have before us a case where the mother had the care taken         away from her shortly after birth.   The mother has since had         very little contact with the child and is now a stranger to         her.           The experts appointed by the City Court are both in agreement         that the child would be in a critical situation if returned.         On this point, Mrs Seltzer, psychologist, states in her expert         opinion:               'She is today in the middle of a phase of development of             her personal autonomy which, in order for her to develop             without complications, depends on secure conditions and             stable emotional continuity.   In the short term there can             be no doubt that the child would react with sorrow and             emotion if she were now to be removed from her foster             home.   In the long run it is likely that if she were             removed at this stage of her development she would carry             with her into her future life an experience of insecurity             vis-à-vis other people, including those who represent             close and dear relations.'           The experts stress that a return in these circumstances would         entail a particular risk. This is so because [the child] has         twice already in her short life experienced a removal from her         natural mother, first shortly after birth and then at the age         of seven months when she was moved from the         [Child Care Centre] to her present foster parents.   She would         therefore be particularly sensitive to further changes.           The child now lives under secure and stimulating conditions         with her foster family and, as the situation appears to the         Court, it is considered that the foster parents can give her         a safer upbringing than she would receive from her natural         mother.   Furthermore, in the Court's view there is a real         danger that the mother will not be able to deal adequately ...         with the return of her child in a crisis.   The mother's         history and previous contact with the public-support system         indicate that when, in such a pressing and threatening         situation, she needs help from that system, she will defend         herself with fear and aggression.   It was in particular         Mr Reigstad, psychologist, who emphasised this.   During his         oral explanations to the Court he has maintained the views         which he expressed in his written opinion but has also in his         oral explanations submitted further details concerning the         mother's personality.   He is of the opinion that the mother         makes a projective identification.   This means that she has         divided her world into two parts, one with friends and another         with enemies.   Towards those whom she recognises as friends         she shows a secure and nice side of herself, whilst to those         whom she considers to be against her she reacts with deep         suspicion, fear and aggression.   In Mr Reigstad's opinion, in         such a situation the mother will consider the public-support         system to be against her and will meet it with a         correspondingly negative attitude.   This will place an         additional burden on the child and harm her permanently in the         form of a split character.           The expert witnesses called by the mother have all had a very         good impression of her.   This goes for Mr Terje Torgersen,         doctor, Mrs Lise Valla, psychologist, and Mr Reidar Larsen,         psychiatrist.   A common element for these persons is, however,         that none of them have had a patient-doctor relationship with         [the applicant].   Those who have been appointed by the child         welfare authorities and the Court, Mr Knut Rønbeck,         psychologist, Mrs Wenche Seltzer, psychologist and         Mr Ståle Reigstad, psychologist, have all found the mother to         be more complex.   The Court considers that the appointed         experts, on the basis of their terms of reference and their         contacts with [the applicant] and others, have had the best         opportunity to evaluate her as a person.   The Court has         therefore considerable hesitations about departing from [their         assessment].   The Court has examined the [assessment] in the         light of the other submissions in the case and, not least, the         basic principles of the Act on the lifting of a care decision.           In the Court's view the experts have done a very thorough job.         The conclusions are clear and appear well-founded.   Their         statements confirm and elaborate the overall impression         which the Court has formed of the case.   The Court, therefore,         considering the case as a whole, will base its decision on the         experts' assessment.   In the Court's opinion, there is nothing         in the case to suggest that it should depart from their         assessment.           In the light of the above the Court finds that, because of the         likely reactions of the child to changes to her environment,         it would be a particularly demanding task for the mother to         assume the care of her.   In view of what is known about the    &