CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 10 septembre 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          Application No. 24437/94                       by Hendrik MEIJER                       against the Netherlands        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 10 September 1996, the following members being present:              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE, President            MM.    J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 2 May 1994 by Hendrik MEIJER against the Netherlands and registered on 20 June 1994 under file No. 24437/94;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      10 August 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 13 November 1995;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1916, and resides in Sittard, the Netherlands. Before the Commission he is represented by Ms. Y.E.J. Geradts, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.        In 1982 the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Department (Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst) began an investigation into the fiscal situation of the applicant who was suspected of tax evasion in respect of having derived income from a cattle trading business. The investigation was conducted primarily in 1983.        On 8 March 1984 the Inspector of Direct Taxes (Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, hereafter: the Inspector) issued additional tax assessments concerning the years 1978 and 1979 to the applicant. The Inspector concluded that the applicant's taxable income in each of those years had been 100,000 Dutch guilders higher than the applicant had stated in his tax declarations. In addition, the Inspector also imposed fiscal surcharges which amounted to 100% of the additional tax imposed.        The applicant filed appeals against the additional assessments with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of 's-Hertogenbosch and submitted supplementary grounds for his appeals on 5 September 1984. He alleged that he did not run a cattle trading business but only occasionally assisted his son in his business.        The Inspector lodged an initial response to the appeals in writing on 15 February 1985 and a supplementary response on 27 March 1985.        On 6 January 1986 a hearing took place before the Court of Appeal after which, on 16 January 1986, the Court requested further information in writing from the Inspector. The Inspector supplied the requested information on 15 April 1986 and on 16 April 1986 the Court of Appeal invited the applicant to reply to the submissions of the Inspector. The applicant's submissions in reply were received by the Court of Appeal on 28 May 1986.        The Court of Appeal requested the parties on 3 June 1986 to inform the Court if they wished to have a second hearing. The Inspector requested a hearing on 4 July 1986.        On 19 November and 3 December 1986 hearings took place before the Court of Appeal, which decided in two judgments of 21 January 1987 to reduce by 3% the applicant's taxable income in accordance with the Inspector's statement at the second hearing. The Court upheld the 100% fiscal surcharges.        The applicant filed appeals in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) on 2 April 1987 against the Court of Appeal's judgments of 21 January 1987.        On 3 August 1987 the State Secretary for Finance (Staatssecretaris van Financiën) submitted his observations. The applicant put the grounds for his appeals forward in a hearing on 17 February 1988 and on 27 July 1988 the Advocate General (Advocaat- Generaal) submitted his conclusions to the Supreme Court.        On 29 November 1989 the Supreme Court in chambers (raadkamer) quashed the judgments of the Court of Appeal and referred the cases to the Court of Appeal of Arnhem. The part of the judgments which concerned the fiscal surcharges was pronounced in public on 13 December 1989.        Following the judgments of the Supreme Court, the applicant and the Inspector entered into ultimately unsuccessful consultations in an effort to reach a settlement.        The applicant filed a further explanation to the Arnhem Court of Appeal on 1 October 1990. After having been granted an extension, the Inspector expressed his views in writing on 28 February 1991 a copy of which was sent to the applicant on 8 March 1991.        In the course of 1991 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to adjourn the hearing until February 1992 due to his bad health. On 15 January 1992 the applicant requested a further adjournment until April 1992.        Following a hearing on 23 April 1992, the Court of Appeal on 30 June 1992 decided to reduce the applicant's taxable income as assessed by the Inspector by 25% and to uphold the 100% fiscal surcharges. The decisions concerning the fiscal surcharges were pronounced at a public hearing on 8 July 1992.        The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the length of the proceedings in respect of the imposed fiscal surcharges did not warrant a complete or partial remission of the fiscal surcharges.        On 28 August 1992 the applicant again filed appeals in cassation against the judgments of the Court of Appeal of 30 June 1992, alleging, inter alia, that the reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention had been exceeded. The State Secretary for Finance and the applicant submitted their observations on 5 February and 17 March 1993 respectively.        The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeals in cassation in chambers on 27 October 1993. It communicated these decisions to the applicant's representative on 2 November 1993. The part of the judgments pertaining to the fiscal surcharges was pronounced in public on 10 November 1993.     COMPLAINT        The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that the length of proceedings in respect of fiscal surcharges imposed on him was such that he has been denied the determination of these criminal charges against him within a reasonable time.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 2 May 1994 and registered on 20 June 1994.        On 18 May 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 10 August 1995, after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that purpose.   The applicant replied on 13 November 1995, also after an extension of the time-limit.        In a letter dated 2 July 1996 the applicant informed the Commission that he wished to withdraw the application since he had reached a settlement with the Inspector. Under the terms of this settlement, which also relates to disputes about tax assessments concerning the years 1980 until 1984, the applicant is released from the duty to pay the additional tax assessments imposed on him concerning the years 1978 and 1979, including the fiscal surcharges, costs and interests.   REASONS FOR THE DECISION        Having regard to Article 30 para. 1 (a) of the Convention, the Commission notes that, by letter of 2 July 1996, the applicant informed the Commission that he does not intend to pursue his application. The Commission finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention which require examination of the application to be continued, in accordance with Article 30 para. 1 in fine of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECIDES TO STRIKE THE APPLICATION OFF ITS LIST OF CASES.        M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               G.H. THUNE       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber