CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 16 octobre 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 24877/94                       by Alfredo CASOTTI, Adolfo FLORIO                       and the CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELL'ORDINE                       DEI CONSULENTI DEL LAVORO                       against Italy        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 16 October 1996, the following members being present:              Mrs.   J. LIDDY, President            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL                  M. VILA AMIGÓ              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 22 April 1994 by Alfredo CASOTTI, Adolfo FLORIO and the CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELL'ORDINE DEI CONSULENTI DEL LAVORO against Italy and registered on 10 August 1994 under file No. 24877/94 ;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The first applicant is an Italian national, born in 1948 and residing in Viareggio; he is a labour consultant ("consulente del lavoro") by profession.        The second applicant is an Italian national born in 1944 and residing in Potenza; he is also a labour consultant by profession.        The third applicant is the National Council of the Association of Labour Consultants, a professional association having its seat in Rome.        The three applicants are represented by Mr. Andrea Giardina, Giovanni Puoti and Cesare Glendi, lawyers in Rome.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.        The first and second applicant have been working as consultants in labour matters since 1978 and 1977 respectively.        The profession of labour consultant was regulated by Law no. 12 of 11 January 1979, according to which labour consultants deal, on behalf of any employer, with any question relating to the administration of personnel. They must enrol in a Register and their activity is submitted to the control of Provincial Councils, which act under the supervision of the National Council based in Rome.        According to Law no. 739/1981, which amended article 30 of Law no. 636/1972, labour consultants, as well as other categories such as lawyers and accountants, could represent their clients in all proceedings before tax courts.        Law no. 413 of 30 December 1991 and Law Decree no. 546 of 31 December 1992 reduced the scope of competence of labour consultants to the extent that the latter may represent their clients before tax courts only in matters concerning the taxation at source in subordinate and assimilated employment and the ensuing obligations for employers ("per le materie concernenti la ritenuta alla fonte sui redditi da lavoro e assimilati e gli obblighi del sostituto d'imposta relativi alle ritenute medesime"). Law no. 427 of 29 October 1993 extended the competence to represent taxpayers before tax courts to other categories of persons who did not possess the professional qualifications previously required. This new regulation of legal representation before tax courts entered into force on 1 October 1994.   COMPLAINTS        The applicants complain that, following the entry into force on 1 October 1994 of the new regulation of legal representation before tax courts, which involves on the one hand the limitation of cases in which labour consultants may represent their clients before tax courts and on the other hand the possibility also for other persons who do not meet the professional qualifications previously required, to represent taxpayers in certain matters, their income will fall as will their goodwill.        They allege a breach of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention.   THE LAW        The three applicants complain that the reform of tax litigation, involving on the one hand the limitation of cases in which labour consultants may represent their clients before tax courts and on the other hand the possibility for new categories of persons who do not possess the professional qualifications previously required, to represent taxpayers before tax courts in certain matters, has infringed their rights under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1), according to which:        "Every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties".   1.    Under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, "the Commission may receive petitions ... from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention".        The Commission recalls that in order for applicants to be able to avail themselves of this provision, they must fulfil two conditions: they must fall into one of the categories of applicants referred to in Article 25 (Art. 25) and they must have a claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention.   a)    As regards the first and the second applicant, who are natural "persons", the Commission notes that, although it has previously held that Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention entitles individuals to contend that a law violates their rights by itself, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if they run the risk of being directly affected by it (cf. Eur. Court HR, Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 13, para. 27 and Johnston and others v. Ireland judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 21, para. 42), in the present case the question whether these applicants can claim to be "victims" is closely connected with the substance of the complaint, so that the Commission will examine the two questions together.        The Commission recalls that the Convention organs have constantly held that Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) does no more than enshrine the right to the peaceful enjoyment of existing possessions (cf. Eur. Court HR, Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, p. 23, para. 50).        Therefore, the issue arises in the present case as to whether these two applicants have a vested right, a violation of which can be considered as an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions within the meaning of the above provision.        The applicants refer to the Van Marle judgment (cf. Eur. Court HR, Van Marle and others v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 June 1986, Series A no. 101), in which the Court held that the clientele built up by self-employed professionals constitutes an asset and hence a "possession", and argue that the law at issue will cause a fall in their income and in the goodwill, which constitutes an interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.        The Commission notes that the profession of labour consultant is a liberal one with no fixed income and no guaranteed turnover. It is naturally subject to the hazards of economic life. The Commission also recalls its previous case-law to the extent that future income constitutes a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) only if the income has been earned or where an enforceable claim to it exists (cf. Nos. 10438/83, Dec. 3.10.84, D.R. 41 p. 170; 24581/94, Dec. 6.4.95, D.R. 81 p. 123 and 29173/95, Dec. 15.5.96, unpublished).        However, the Commission considers that it is unnecessary to decide whether Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) is applicable in the present case, as, even assuming that it is so, this part of the application is inadmissible for the following reasons.        The Commission observes that the legislative provisions complained of were designed to promote "general interest", namely to structure the profession of labour consultant and the functioning of tax-courts and at the same time to ensure the professional competence of those who represent taxpayers before those courts.        Moreover, the Commission notes that the applicants have not submitted any evidence supporting their allegations that their income and the value of their clientèle have been so adversely affected by the legislative reforms at issue, as to result in an unfair balancing of interests.        The Commission considers therefore that, even assuming that there has been an interference with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, such interference was justified in terms of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1).        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded and must be rejected in pursuance of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   b)    As regards the National Council of the Association of Labour Consultants, the Commission observes in the present case that it is not the association as such which complains of its income diminishing as a result of that legislation, but rather each of its members taken individually (cf. Nos. 24581/94, Dec. 6.4.95, D.R. 81 p. 123 and 29173/95, Dec. 15.5.96, unpublished).        The Commission recalls its established case-law to the effect that a professional association, incapable of claiming to be a "victim" itself, cannot bring an application against a measure which affects its members (cf. No. 9939/82, Dec. 4.7.83, D.R. 34 p. 213; No. 24581/94, D.R. 81 p. 123).      It follows that the applicant association cannot claim that it is itself a victim of a violation of the Convention. The remainder of the application is thus incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.        M.F. BUQUICCHIO                          J. LIDDY Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber