CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 25 octobre 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                       Application No. 32025/96                     by Falah Mahdi KAREEM                     against Sweden        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 25 October 1996, the following members being present:             Mr.   S. TRECHSEL, President           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                J.-C. SOYER                H. DANELIUS                F. MARTINEZ                L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                B. CONFORTI                N. BRATZA                I. BÉKÉS                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY                G. RESS                A. PERENIC                C. BÎRSAN                P. LORENZEN                K. HERNDL                E. BIELIUNAS                E.A. ALKEMA                M. VILA AMIGÓ             Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 18 June 1996 by Falah Mahdi KAREEM against Sweden and registered on 25 June 1996 under file No. 32025/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 19 July 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 30 August and 18 September 1996;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant, an Iraqi citizen, was born in 1963.   He is presently detained for deportation purposes in Härnösand, Sweden. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Anders Bengtsson, a lawyer practising in Sundsvall, Sweden.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.        Upon arrival at Arlanda airport, Stockholm on 7 December 1991, the applicant applied for political asylum.   Interrogated by the police the same day, he stated that, although he was not a political activist, he took part in the Intifada, the 1991 rebellion against Saddam Hussein.   Some friends, who were arrested and tortured following the Intifada, told the Iraqi authorities about the applicant's participation.   He therefore fled to the north of Iraq.   A week later, he passed the border to Turkey where he stayed for two or three days. On 6 December he took the plane from Istanbul to Vienna and the next day he flew to Stockholm.   He also mentioned that his elder brother had been living in Sweden for the past four years.        During a further police interview on 10 February 1992 the applicant stated that, after disregarding a call-up for active military service in the beginning of 1990, he had been in hiding in Iraq for almost two years.   As a consequence, he probably would be executed if returned to Iraq.   However, neither he nor his relatives had been subjected to any form of persecution or harassment by the Iraqi authorities.   Furthermore, he had not been arrested, convicted or imprisoned.   With regard to his flight from Iraq, the applicant gave the following details.   In November 1991 he went by bus from his hometown Babel to Erbil in the north of Iraq.   The trip took seven hours.   In Erbil, he stayed with a friend for three weeks before the two of them made a four hour bus journey to a Turkish border town. They passed the Turkish border by foot at a place where there was no control post.   After having spent three nights at an hotel, the applicant and his friend left the border town by bus in the morning of 6 December.   Later the same day, they arrived at the airport in Istanbul where they met an unknown smuggler who supplied the applicant with a false passport.   After the passport, plane ticket and luggage had been checked and the applicant had received a boarding card, the smuggler reclaimed the passport and left.   The applicant travelled alone to Vienna.   At Vienna airport, the applicant passed the passport control by showing his boarding card.   He stayed overnight at a transit hotel.   The next day, 7 December, he took the plane to Stockholm.   The applicant was unable to name the Turkish border town, any of the hotels and airlines and the airports in Istanbul and Vienna.   Furthermore, he did not know in which name his plane tickets had been issued.        When the recording of the interview was played back for him, the applicant added that he took part in the Intifada while he was in hiding.   He further handed over his international driving permit, issued by the Iraq Automobile & Touring Association in Bagdad on 10 October 1991.        In a memorandum to the National Immigration Board (Statens invandrarverk), dated 2 March 1992, the Swedish security police (Säkerhetspolisen; "SÄPO") stated that there were reasons to believe that the applicant and two other Iraqi citizens were acting on behalf of the Iraqi Government.   Referring to their conduct in Sweden, SÄPO considered that they had shown an unreasonable interest in other asylum seekers' situation.   SÄPO considered therefore that they did not meet the requirements for asylum status and that they could be expected to engage in criminal activities in Sweden.        In December 1994 and January 1995 the applicant's lawyer submitted additional observations to the National Immigration Board. He stated that the applicant was not called up for military service in the beginning of 1990, as erroneously indicated in the minutes of the police interview, but in August 1990.   While hiding from the police and the army, the applicant received help from friends and family.   He was, inter alia, able to obtain false leave passes and other military documents from a friend in the army.   When the Intifada reached his hometown, the applicant took a very active part and participated in large, sometimes violent, demonstrations.   After the Iraqi military had crushed the rebellion, the applicant fled by bus to Bagdad and then by taxi to Erbil.   After having stayed with his friend in Erbil, the two of them took a taxi to Zacho, a town on the border between Iraq and Turkey.   At the border, the applicant's friend talked to some guards and, in exchange for 500 Iraqi dinars, received instructions on where and how they should pass the border.   The applicant and his friend passed the border by foot close to the border station.   After half an hour's walk, they were given a lift by car to the nearest Turkish village.   After the Intifada, the applicant's father had allegedly been questioned about the applicant's whereabouts.        The lawyer further stated that the applicant feared harsh treatment in Iraq not only because he had disregarded the call-up and participated in the Intifada but also because he had left Iraq without permission.   The applicant claimed that he was entitled to a residence permit also on account of his family ties and on humanitarian grounds. He referred to his marriage, on 3 March 1994, with a Swedish woman. Allegedly, they had met on 20 March 1992 and had lived together for a year and a half before getting married.   Moreover, he had stayed in Sweden for three years waiting for his asylum application to be determined.   The applicant strongly repudiated SÄPO's allegation that he was active for the Iraqi Government.   Naturally, he had talked to Iraqis in Sweden.   However, except for some questions on how the asylum interviews were conducted, the talks had only concerned everyday matters and not political subjects.        On 13 January 1995 the Immigration Board referred the applicant's case to the Government with a recommendation that the application be rejected.   The Board stated that the applicant, on account of his marriage, had certain ties to Sweden.   However, these ties were of minor importance in view of the security reasons for refusing a residence permit.   The Board further noted that SÄPO, orally on 9 December 1994, had recommended the rejection of the application.        In letters to the Government of 8 and 13 February 1995, the applicant's lawyer stated that the delay in examining the application rather indicated that there were no security reasons for refusing the applicant a residence permit.   The lawyer further mentioned that the applicant had met M, one of the Iraqis mentioned in the SÄPO memorandum of 2 March 1992, upon arrival at Arlanda airport, that they had stayed for some time at the same centre for asylum seekers and that they had been in contact only once after M had received a residence permit and left the centre.   Allegedly, they only had normal social relations.        In a statement to the Government of 18 May 1995, SÄPO again recommended the rejection of the application.   For security reasons, the information in the statement was not communicated to the applicant.        By decision of 31 August 1995, the Government rejected the applicant's request for access to SÄPO's statement.        On 13 June 1996 the Government rejected the applicant's application for a residence permit.   It further ordered SÄPO to deport the applicant.   The Government gave the following reasons for its decision.   The fact that the applicant had disposed of his passport affected the credibility of his statements.   Moreover, the applicant had not been able to give a credible account of how he had left Iraq and travelled to Sweden.   His statements on the events in Iraq and the reasons for seeking asylum in Sweden were also remarkably vague and imprecise.   There were discrepancies between statements given on different occasions.   The Government noted, inter alia, that, at the first police interview in December 1991, the applicant had failed to mention that he had disregarded a call-up for military service.   This vital information was not given until the second interview in February 1992.   Moreover, on the latter occasion, the applicant had mentioned his participation in the Intifada only after having listened to the recording of the interview.   Concluding that the applicant's statements were not credible, the Government found that he did not have, on any ground, a right to asylum in Sweden.   The Government further accepted the findings of SÄPO.   There were thus reasons to expel the applicant under Chapter 4, Section 2, subsections 3 and 4 of the Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen, 1989:529), according to which a foreigner may be expelled if it can be assumed that he will engage in criminal activities, sabotage, espionage or other unlawful intelligence activities.   In these circumstances, the applicant could not be granted a residence permit on account of his family ties or his long stay in Sweden.        On 13 June 1996 SÄPO also decided to take the applicant into custody for deportation purposes, as there was a risk that he would otherwise go into hiding or commit crimes.   The decision was enforced the same day.   By judgment of 28 June, the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm rejected the applicant's appeal.   On 9 July and 20 August, respectively, the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm and the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) refused the applicant leave to appeal.        After the Commission had indicated to the respondent Government that it was desirable not to deport the applicant until the Commission had had an opportunity to examine the present application, the National Immigration Board, by decision of 16 July 1996, stayed the enforcement of the expulsion order pending the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application.        After having held an oral hearing on 9 August 1996, SÄPO decided on 12 August that the applicant should remain in custody.   SÄPO found that there were special reasons (synnerliga skäl) for the continued detention, as prescribed by Chapter 6, Section 4 of the Aliens Act. The decision was upheld by the County Administrative Court on 20 August.   Leave to appeal was refused by the Administrative Court of Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court on 3 and 25 September, respectively.        On 30 August 1996 the applicant's lawyer requested permission to study SÄPO's file on the applicant.   By decision of 9 September, SÄPO rejected   the request   except   for the minutes of SÄPO's interview with the applicant on 5 March 1993 which were handed over to the lawyer. The decision has been appealed against to the Administrative Court of Appeal.   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant claims that his expulsion would violate Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, as he risks the death penalty, torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Iraq.   2.    As it would also separate the applicant from his wife, the expulsion allegedly fails to respect his family life.   In this regard, he invokes Article 8 of the Convention.   3.    Under Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complains that he did not receive a fair hearing of his asylum application.   4.    The applicant further claims that he is being detained in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 18 June and registered on 25 June 1996.        On 25 June 1996 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure, to indicate to the respondent Government that it was desirable in the interest of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings not to deport the applicant to Iraq until the Commission had had an opportunity to examine the application.   The Commission further decided, in accordance with Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government were requested to submit observations on the applicant's complaints under Articles 2, 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention. The complaint under Article 5 of the Convention was not introduced until 18 September 1996 and has not been communicated to the Government.        By decision of 12 September 1996, the Commission prolonged the indication under Rule 36 until 25 October 1996.        The Government's observations were submitted on 19 July 1996. The applicant replied on 30 August and 18 September 1996.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant claims that his expulsion would violate Articles 2 and 3 (Art. 2, 3) of the Convention.        Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention reads, in relevant parts, as follows:        "1.   Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.      No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in      the execution of a sentence of a court following his      conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by      law. ..."        Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention provides the following:        "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or      degrading treatment or punishment."        The respondent Government submit firstly that the alleged risk of the applicant being sentenced to death should be examined not under Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention but under Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (P6-1) to the Convention, as the latter but not the former provision prohibits the death penalty.   The Government further submit that Swedish authorities, for many years, have refrained from expelling people to Iraq as, due to the conditions prevailing in that country, it is normally not possible to assess with any degree of certainty the risks run by Iraqis who have spent time abroad for other purposes than business or the like.   Iraqi nationals are granted residence permits as refugees or so-called de facto refugees unless there are objections from the viewpoint of security.   Thus, had the applicant's case been a "normal asylum case", the applicant certainly would have been granted a permit to reside in Sweden.        The Government contend, however, that the applicant's complaints with respect to the risks facing him in Iraq are manifestly ill- founded, as he has not shown substantial grounds for believing that there exists a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (P6-1).   In this respect, the Government generally refer to their decision of 13 June 1996 in which they found that the applicant had not submitted a generally coherent and credible account of the events that had taken place in Iraq, his flight from the country and the reasons for his asylum request.   Furthermore, the applicant's claim that he was in hiding from the Iraqi authorities for a considerable time before he came to Sweden is contradicted by his alleged active participation in the rebellion against the country's regime and the fact that he applied for and obtained an international driving permit.   It is also unlikely that the applicant was able to pass the passport control at the airport in Vienna with only his boarding card.   The Government further submit that it is clear that the applicant arrived in Sweden under completely false pretences.   He was sent as an intelligence officer with an assignment to gather information about other Iraqi nationals.   Within months after the applicant's arrival in Sweden, Swedish authorities were contacted by a considerable number of both Iraqi and Swedish nationals who, independently of each other, stated that the applicant and two other Iraqis were collecting information on Iraqi asylum seekers to be forwarded to the authorities in Bagdad.   Allegedly, they had inquired in an unusually detailed manner into the reasons for other Iraqis' requests for asylum.   According to the Government, it is not uncommon for the Iraqi intelligence service to operate in this manner. One of the applicant's two compatriots, M, who had been identified as the applicant's superior, was expelled from Sweden in 1995.   The Government have further ordered the expulsion of the other colleague, reported by an Iraqi refugee as being the latter's torturer in Iraq.          The applicant submits that he might be killed or subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Iraq on account of having disregarded a call-up for military service, actively participated in the Intifada and left the country without permission.   The Government's reliance on the applicant's alleged lack of credibility is difficult to understand in view of the practice of granting residence permits to Iraqi asylum seekers, irrespective of their credibility, unless there are objections from the viewpoint of security.   With regard to his credibility, the applicant states the following.   He mentioned the military call-up at the first interview and his participation in the Intifada at the second interview before listening to the recording of it.   He does not know why these statements were not noted in the minutes or recorded on the tape, but states that the first interview was held in an accelerated tempo and was not conducted in a very careful way and that the chief interrogator at the second interview might have failed to repeat his answer on the tape.   Moreover, the interrogators' attitude towards the applicant was hostile, and so he found it easier to give a more correct and detailed account to his lawyer.   Furthermore, the applicant was not in hiding while he participated in the Intifada.   His international driving permit was obtained by his father in exchange for bribes.   As he had not travelled abroad before his flight to Sweden, does not understand any of the languages spoken in the countries he passed through and was constantly in fear of being sent back to Iraq, it is understandable that he forgot or did not note names and other details.   He was ordered by the smuggler to return the passport and maintains that he passed the passport control at the airport in Vienna without it.        The applicant denies that he has been sent to Sweden to carry on espionage or engage in other criminal activities.   He has not asked any Iraqi nationals about the reasons for their seeking asylum.   He has already, in his lawyer's letter to the Government of 13 February 1995, given an account of his contacts with M.   He does not know the identity of the third Iraqi mentioned in the Government's observations.   In general, he cannot comment on the credibility and reliability of the accusations against him, as he has had no access to the information held by SÄPO.   He suspects, however, that some accusations might be the result of jealousy and states, in this connection, that his brother and a friend of his brother accused the applicant of having affairs with their respective wives.   He also refers to the fact that his brother fled to Sweden in November 1986 for political reasons and became a Swedish citizen in November 1991.   It is not likely that he would engage in activities against, inter alia, his brother.        The Commission recalls that Contracting States have the right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 102).   However, an expulsion decision may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, and hence engage the responsibility of the State, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he or she is to be expelled (ibid., p. 34, para. 103).   A mere possibility of ill-treatment is not in itself sufficient (ibid., p. 37, para. 111).   Moreover, the Commission does not exclude the possibility that a Contracting State's responsibility might be engaged under Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (P6-1) where a fugitive is extradited to a country where he is seriously at risk of being executed, as a result of the imposition of the death penalty or otherwise (cf. No. 22742/93, Aylor-Davis v. France, Dec. 20.1.94, D.R. 76 p. 164).        Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Commission notes that, with respect to the applicant's statements regarding the journey from Iraq, there are major discrepancies between the information given to the police in February 1992 and the observations submitted to the National Immigration Board in December 1994 and January 1995.   In 1992 the applicant stated that he had travelled all the way from Babel to Erbil by bus; in 1994/95 he claimed that he had changed to a taxi in Bagdad.   In 1992 he asserted that he had travelled by bus to the Turkish border; in 1994/95 he maintained that he had taken a taxi.   In 1992 he alleged that there was no control post at the Turkish border; in 1994/95 he stated that his friend had bribed some Turkish border guards.   In 1994/95, but not in 1992, he mentioned that he and his friend had been given a lift on the Turkish side.   Moreover, the applicant has not been able to name the Turkish town where he stayed for three days, any of the hotels he stayed at or any of the airlines he travelled with.   The Commission also notes that the applicant, according to the minutes of the first police interview in December 1991, on this occasion failed to mention that he had disregarded a call-up for military service, although this, as stated by the applicant at the second interview, was the initial reason why he went into hiding.        In view of the above, the Commission considers, notwithstanding the submissions made by the applicant to the Commission, that there are strong reasons to call into question the veracity of the applicant's statements.   The Commission further notes that the applicant has offered no evidence in support of his claims.   For these reasons, the Commission finds that it has not been established that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in Iraq.   It follows that there is no possibility of a violation of Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (P6-1).        Moreover, the Commission recalls from its previous case-law that Chapter 8, Section 1 of the Aliens Act imposes an absolute obligation on the enforcement authority in Sweden to refrain from expelling an alien should the human rights situation in the receiving country constitute a firm reason to believe that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to capital or corporal punishment, or torture, in that country (cf., e.g., No. 27776/95, A.G. and Others v. Sweden, Dec. 26.10.95, D.R. 83 p. 101).   In this connection, the Commission further notes the Swedish authorities' present practice of expelling asylum seekers to Iraq only in exceptional circumstances.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant further complains that the decision to expel him fails to respect his family life.   He invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which provides the following:        "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and      family life, his home and his correspondence.        2. There shall be no interference by a public authority      with the exercise of this right except such as is in      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic      society in the interests of national security, public      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of      health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and      freedoms of others."        The Government submit that the applicant's expulsion will entail no interference with his right to respect for his family life as, at the time of his marriage, he was well aware that his continued stay in Sweden was uncertain.   He had not been granted a residence permit and had prior to the marriage been questioned by SÄPO.   He could thus not reasonably expect to be able to choose Sweden as his and his wife's country of matrimonial residence.   Furthermore, the applicant has not even argued that his wife would not be allowed to live together with him in his own country or in another country of their mutual choice.        Should the Commission, however, find that the expulsion entails an interference under para. 1 of Article 8 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, the Government contend that it is justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).   The Government maintain their conclusion, referred to under 1 above, that the applicant is an intelligence officer sent to Sweden to gather information about other Iraqi nationals.   Thus, his expulsion would serve the purpose of preventing crime, as unlawful intelligence activities is a criminal offence under the Swedish Penal Code.   It would further protect the rights and freedoms of others, including other Iraqi nationals, and be in the obvious interest of national security.   The State's margin of appreciation in striking a fair balance between the general interests of the community and the individual interest of the applicant would not be exceeded by the enforcement of the expulsion decision.   Being proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, the enforcement of the decision is necessary in a democratic society.        The applicant submits, in addition to what has been referred to under 1 above, that, as a consequence of his expulsion, he will be separated from his wife.   They have been together since March 1992. They both wish to live in Sweden.   He believes that his wife would not be allowed to settle in Iraq.        The Commission recalls that the expulsion of a person from a country in which close members of his family live may amount to an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his family life as guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Moustaquim v. Belgium judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193, pp. 19-20, paras. 43-46).        Noting that the applicant and his wife have been living together for several years and that they got married in March 1994, the Commission finds that the applicant's expulsion could be considered as an interference with his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1).   It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the expulsion would satisfy the conditions of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), that is to say whether it is "in accordance with the law", pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph, and is "necessary in a democratic society" for the achievement of that or those aims (cf., e.g., Eur. Court HR, Boughanemi v. France judgment of 24 April 1996, para. 36, to be published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions for 1996).        It has not been contested that the expulsion order was issued "in accordance with the law".   The Commission considers that the enforcement of the order pursued legitimate aims under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), namely the interests of national security, the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.        The necessity criterion implies the existence of a pressing social need and, in particular, requires that the measure must be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.   It has to be determined whether with regard to the intended expulsion a fair balance is being struck between the relevant interests, in the present case the applicant's right to respect for his family life, on the one hand, and the interest of national security, the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, on the other.   Regard should further be had to the margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States (ibid., p. 18, paras. 41-42).        The Commission recalls the Government's conclusion, based on information supplied by SÄPO, that the applicant is an Iraqi intelligence officer.   It is true that the facts on which this information is based have only partly been communicated to the applicant and the Commission.   The Commission observes, however, the need of preserving some degree of confidentiality of this kind of information in deportation matters.   Having regard to the available information and the margin of appreciation left to the Swedish Government, the Commission is satisfied that the decision to expel the applicant is supported by relevant and sufficient reasons.   The Commission further notes that there is no evidence that the applicant's wife would not be able to follow the applicant to Iraq.        In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the Swedish authorities have not failed to fulfil their obligation to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests.   Thus, the interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family life is justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant further complains that he did not receive a fair hearing of his asylum application.   He invokes Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:        "1.   In the determination of his civil rights ... or of any      criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair      ... hearing within a reasonable time ...        2.   Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be      presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."        The Government submit that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not applicable and that this complaint is thus incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.        The applicant contends that his rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) were violated as he was not presumed innocent and as the asylum application was not determined within a reasonable time.        The Commission recalls its established case-law according to which procedures followed by public authorities to determine whether an alien should be allowed to stay in a country or should be expelled do not involve the determination of civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf., e.g., No. 13162/87, P. v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 9.11.87, D.R. 54 p. 211).        Noting furthermore that the procedures followed in the applicant's case did not determine any criminal charge against him, the Commission finds that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not apply to the present complaint.        It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    The applicant finally complains that his detention since 13 June 1996 is not justified by special reasons, as required under the relevant provision of the Aliens Act for a detention exceeding two months.   Moreover, the courts examining this matter have accepted SÄPO's decisions without making any independent assessments.   He invokes Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention which, in relevant parts, provides the following:        "1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of      person.   No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in      the following cases and in accordance with a procedure      prescribed by law:      ...      f.   the lawful arrest or detention ... of a person against      whom action is being taken with a view to deportation ..."        The Commission considers that the applicant has been lawfully detained under Article 5 para. 1 (f) (Art. 5-1-f) of the Convention as a "person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation".   As to the length of his detention, the issue which arises is whether it has ceased to be justified because the proceedings have not been pursued with the requisite speed (cf. Eur. Court HR, Kolompar v. Belgium judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A no. 235-C, p. 55, para. 36).   In this connection, the Commission notes that SÄPO and, on appeal, the County Administrative Court decided that the applicant should remain in detention after the National Immigration Board had decided to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order pending the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the present application.   In view of this and having regard to the time the applicant so far has been detained, i.e. almost four and a half months, the Commission finds that the applicant's detention has not ceased to be justified.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.           H.C. KRÜGER                           S. TRECHSEL          Secretary                             President      to the Commission                     of the Commission