CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 27 novembre 1996

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 25944/94                       by PETERSON SARPSBORG AS and Others                       against Norway           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 27 November 1996, the following members being present:              Mr.    J.-C. GEUS, Acting President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 4 November 1994 by Peterson Sarpsborg AS and Others against Norway and registered on 14 December 1994 under file No. 25944/94;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicants nos. 1-3 are Norwegian companies and the applicants nos. 4-6 are Norwegian citizens who at the relevant time were the respective managing directors of the companies (see annex). Before the Commission all applicants are represented by Mr. Anders Chr. Stray Ryssdal, a lawyer practising in Oslo.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.         The applicant companies are undertakings engaged in the manufacturing and sale of corrugated cardboard, mostly for the Norwegian market. Occasioned by tip-offs about unlawful collaboration over prices, inspections were made in the period from May to December 1990 by the Price Directorate (Prisdirektoratet) and the National Price Inspectorate (Statens pristilsyn). Pursuant to section 15 of the Prices Act of 26 June 1953 (prisloven), and section 7 of the Regulations Enforcement Act of 9 July 1948 (lov om oppehalding av pris- og rasjoneringsføresegnene o.a.) statements were taken from the managing directors of the companies and from other employees. The inspectors from the price authorities prepared summaries of the statements made, a total of 34 individual statements, seven of which had been made by the senior executives. The summaries were prepared directly in continuation of the meetings in which the statements were made, and in co-operation with the persons making the statements. The persons making the statements had the opportunity to suggest amendments. The final summary was co-signed by the person making the statement after being annotated as having been read through and found to be correct.         As a result of the inspections, the Price Directorate on 4 October 1991 reported inter alia the three applicant companies to the Oslo Police which commenced an investigation of the matter. Økokrim, the authority investigating and prosecuting economic and environmental crime in Norway, filed charges on 16 June 1993 under section 52, cf. sections 24 and 42, of the Prices Act and section 1, cf. section 3, of the Regulations of 1 July 1960 on Restraint of Competition on Prices and Profits (forskrift av 1 juli 1960 om konkurrencereguleringer av priser og avanser) against the managing directors of the companies (the three individual applicants), for having violated during the period from 1983 to 1990, in particular aggravating circumstances, the prohibition on competitive restraint through various forms of price collaboration. On 12 August 1993 charges were brought also against the three applicant companies. The main proceedings in the criminal case commenced before the Oslo City Court (byrett) on 18 April 1994.         Prior to that, in presenting its list of evidence to the City Court, Økokrim had stated its intention to submit summaries of the statements obtained by the price authorities. The accused parties demanded that the summaries be precluded as evidence. Pursuant to section 272 subsection 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven) the City Court held a session to consider the question of preclusion, and on 22 December 1993 gave its ruling with the following conclusion:   (Translation)         "Statements taken by the Price Directorate by virtue of       section 7 of the Regulations Enforcement Act and section 15       of the Prices Act will be precluded from being presented as       evidence in the criminal case.         This preclusion relates to all forms of their submission as       evidence - direct reading aloud or in other more indirect       manners."         The City Court found that the statements should be considered as having been made "in the context of the case", cf. the final sentence of sections 290, 296 and 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court also held - referring among other things to the fact that they had been made according to duty and under penalty of the law - that the statements could not be used to confront the applicants and the witnesses concerned with their previous submissions while giving evidence during the main hearing.         An appeal was lodged by Økokrim with the Eidsivating High Court (Eidsivating lagmannsrett) against the ruling of the City Court. Following an oral hearing the High Court concluded, on 28 February 1994, as follows:   (Translation)         "The statements submitted which were taken by the Price       Directorate and the National Price Inspectorate pursuant to       section 7 of the Regulations Enforcement Act of 9 July 1948       and section 15 of the Prices Act, are precluded as       documentary evidence in the criminal case. The statements       may be used as evidence to the extent foreseen in       sections 290, 296 and 297 of the Code of Criminal       Procedure."         The High Court agreed with the City Court that the statements made to the price authorities should be regarded as having been made in the context of the case, but did not find any basis for refusing their use during the main hearing in the way foreseen by sections 290, 296 and 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.         The applicants and Økokrim appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court (Højesterett). On 25 March 1994 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court (Højesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) granted leave to appeal to both parties.         In the decision of 13 May 1994 Judge Bugge stated on behalf of the unanimous Court inter alia as follows:   (Translation)         "This case concerns statements made to the civil servants            of the price authorities at a time when the case            was    stillatthe inspection and examination            stage, long beforeany criminal investigation was            embarked upon. There will often be such a stage            within the area of regulatory legislation. The            inspecting authorities in charge of the            enforcement need to go into the matter for the            purpose of clarifying the factual circumstances            before an investigation ofany offences can be            considered. Some regulatory Acts, such as the            price and competition legislation,            expresslyprovide justification for the duty to            supply information and make statements, under            penalty of the law, without the need for me here            to go into the individual rules of law. It is            possible to speak of a certain 'tension' between            the rules relating to the duty to supply            information within or outside of criminal            proceedings. I consider it quite clear,however,            that one cannot deduce from the rules governing            criminal procedure any general ban against using            information supplied by virtue of such a duty as            evidence in a subsequent criminal case.         [The applicants] have argued that a ban as stated will in       this case need to follow from the investigative powers of       the price legislation itself. Reference is made to the fact       that the duty to supply information under section 15 of the       Prices Act is linked to the kind of information required by       the Price Directorate 'to enable it to carry out its tasks       under this Act', cf. the corresponding wording in section 7       of the Regulations Enforcement Act. I hold this to be       untenable. According to section 5 of the Act the task of       the Price Directorate is, among other things, to 'assist in       implementing the Act'. It is evident that the Directorate       is entitled - indeed obliged - to report any matters of a       criminal nature and also, in that event, to leave to the       Police any informative material compiled during the       investigative examinations. I fail to find any basis for an       interpretation of the Prices Act and the Regulations       Enforcement Act which would preclude the prosecution from       using this material as evidence in the criminal case. The       defence counsel has referred to opinions expressed in the       decisions in Rt 1976, p. 1219 and p. 1446 where mention is       made of the dissimilarities between the duty to supply       information at the investigative stage and in the criminal       case. Also here I fail to find any support for the       submission made by [the applicants].       ...       [As regards the relationship with the Human Rights       Conventions] this aspect of the case has been argued more       extensively before the Supreme Court than before the lower       bodies.         [The applicants] submit that - regardless of the conclusion       arrived at under domestic law - it follows from the rules       of law which may be deduced from the European Convention on       Human Rights (ECHR) and the UN International Covenant on       Civil and Political Rights, both of which Norway has       acceded to, that the statements must be precluded as       evidence in the criminal case. At any rate, this should       apply to the statements made by [the applicants].         To this I would remark initially that I agree that       Norwegian courts must apply the procedural rules in the       area of criminal law in such a manner as to render the       trial compatible with our obligations under the treaties,       and that it may be necessary to set aside the Norwegian       rules in the event of conflict, cf. section 4 of the Code       of Criminal Procedure. ...         [The applicants] have invoked three grounds on which the       use of the statements as evidence in the criminal case       would be contrary to the conventions.         The first one is the requirement in Article 6 para. 2 of       the ECHR that a person who is accused shall be presumed       innocent until proved 'guilty according to law'. It is       submitted that a conviction which for evidence relies       on statements which [the applicants] have made to the price       authorities will not meet the basic requirements which must       apply in respect of the presentation of evidence in a       criminal case.         The second ground is the principle of 'equality of arms'       which is deemed part of the requirement of a fair trial,       laid down in Article 6, more specifically para. 3 (d), of       the ECHR. It is argued that when the presentation of       evidence in a case is going to build substantially on       statements taken from witnesses without [the applicants]       having been represented, then that will not meet the       requirement which states that the indicted parties and the       prosecution authority should have been allowed equal       opportunity to safeguard their interests.         The third ground is the ban on an accused or indicted       person being forced to testify against himself or to plead       guilty - 'self-incrimination' - expressed in Article 14       para. 3 (g) of the UN Covenant. This ban must be considered       to apply also within the scope of the ECHR. It is       maintained that the statements, if used as evidence, will       in fact entail that [the applicants] will have been forced       to 'incriminate' themselves. It is no excuse that the       formal rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning       the duty of [the applicants] to make a statement otherwise       meet the requirements of the Convention. [The applicants]       invoke in particular the ruling by the European Court of       Human Rights of 25 February 1993 in Funke v. France which       is alleged to have put an end to permitting information       provided under a duty, sanctioned by a threat of       punishment, to make a statement to a public investigative       authority to be used as evidence in a criminal case. [The       applicants] have also referred to the decision reached by       the Commission of Human Rights on 13 October 1992 in the       case of K v. Austria, and to decisions by the EC Court of       18 October 1989 in the case of Orkem v. The Commission and       of 10 November 1993 in the case Otto BV v. Postbank NV.         Before the Supreme Court, Økokrim has contested that it is       possible to infer from any of the said treaty texts or       court rulings any ban on the statements being presented as       evidence. This also applies to the judgment in the Funke       case which, in the opinion of the prosecution, is       distinguishable in several ways from the problems involved       in the present case.         I for my part fail to see that the first two grounds have       any merit. If the indicted parties, in an ordinary trial,       were to be found by the City Court to be guilty as charged,       it cannot possibly be said that their guilt has not been       'proved according to law' - due to the statements made to       the price authorities having been available as evidence in       the case. As has been stated, the statements did come about       in a completely lawful manner. Nor can there be any grounds       for saying that the tenet of 'equality of arms' has been       violated, having regard to the fact that [the applicants]       and their counsel will have had the opportunity in the       normal way, to question in court any witnesses called       against them and themselves to call any defence witnesses       they want. In my view, the minimum requirements posed by       Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the ECHR must thereby have been       satisfied. The third ground, the ban on self-incrimination,       deserves somewhat closer consideration.         Under Article 14 para. 3 (g) of the UN Covenant, anybody       (in the English text) 'in the determination of any criminal       charge against him' is entitled to not 'being forced to       witness against himself or to plead guilty'. Any such       explicit provision does not exist in ECHR. The Court of       Human Rights has, however, taken as its basis that a       similar warranty of legal protection also applies within       the area of the ECHR, associated with the 'fair trial'       concept. A corresponding basis has, incidentally, been       applied by the EC Court of Justice.         The ban on anybody being forced to admit his own guilt thus       applies in determining 'a criminal charge' against the said       person, and that must mean when a criminal case has been       opened. This requirement, as I have pointed out above, is       met in our Code of Criminal Procedure. It is, however,       argued by [the applicants] that in the Funke case, the       Court of Human Rights has given a wider scope to the ban so       that also the use of 'self-incriminating' information which       an accused person has been ordered to provide at an earlier       stage of the case - at the 'investigative' stage - must be       deemed to be contrary to the Convention.       ...       The Funke case related to presentation of documents, not to       the question of the duty to make a statement. The way I       understand the judgment, what the Court ruled on directly       was the actual fine being imposed on Mr. Funke to force him       to comply with the presentation order; the issue of whether       the use of documents in a subsequent criminal case against       Mr. Funke would have been regarded as contrary to the       Convention, is not mentioned. ... The Funke judgment thus       does not touch on what is the crux of the matter in our       case, since the statements were taken at a time when [the       applicants] were not accused or suspected of any criminal       act. As mentioned, Norwegian criminal procedural law       ensures the personally indicted parties the right to       'remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating       themselves'.         In any circumstances I fail to find justification in the       brief reasons given by the Court in the Funke case, as [the       applicants] would do, for drawing the conclusion that it       would be contrary to the 'fair trial' concept to use the       summaries of statements with which our case is concerned as       evidence in the criminal case. Far less can it be inferred       that the actual duty to make a statement under the rules of       the prices and competition legislation would be contrary to       the Convention. That would be ascribing to the judgment       far-reaching - and in my opinion unpredictable - effects on       Norwegian domestic law. The defence counsel, on being asked       during the appeals proceedings, has incidentally indicated       that [the applicants] do not contest as such the duty to       make a statement to the price authorities.         The other European Court rulings which have been referred       to during the closing arguments, each of which has its own       special features, I see no reason to go into. None of them       can in my view provide any basis for ascertaining that it       would be contrary to Norwegian obligations under the       conventions if use were to be made of the statements as       evidence in the criminal case.       ...         The question is then whether the statements must be seen as       having been made in the context of the case, so that they       cannot be presented as ordinary documentary evidence, but       merely be used for 'confrontation' in accordance with       sections 290, 296 and 297 of the Code of Criminal       Procedure. The last-mentioned provision has not,       incidentally, been claimed to be relevant to the case.         The principal stand-point of [the applicants] is that the       statements cannot be permitted to be used in this manner       either; they must be precluded altogether. Their appeal is       however not accepted on this point. [The applicants] have       in this connection also submitted that section 290, second       sentence, and section 296 subsection 2, second sentence,       only provide authority for confrontation with written       declarations made voluntarily, not duty-bound declarations       made by the indicted person. Reference is made to the fact       that the wording of the Code treats written declarations as       being equal to statements to the police which will indeed       have been made voluntarily. I do not agree with this       understanding of the law.         In the alternative, [the applicants] will accept, as       mentioned, the decision by the High Court on this count.         It is then the appeal lodged by Økokrim which remains to be       decided upon.       ...         As will be evident from the review made by the Appeals       Selection Committee into the past history of the       investigative powers in the price laws in the ruling in       RT 1976, pp. 1446 and following, it has long been       recognised that the duty to supply information at the       investigative stage applies without the restrictions which       otherwise apply pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure       once a criminal case has been opened. I would also refer to       what is said on the subject in Rt 1976 p. 1219, at p. 1221.       It has not been deemed an obstacle to this if the       administration on its part has had more or less       well-founded suspicions of anything criminal. The question       of whether the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down limits       for the way in which the information may be used in a       subsequent criminal case has, however, not been discussed       in any of these rulings, and no case-law which otherwise       voices an opinion on the issue appears to exist.         Like the High Court, I have concluded that the statements       in our case must be deemed to be statements made 'in the       context of the case' within the meaning of the Code of       Criminal Procedure and that, consequently, they may be used       during the main proceedings merely within the scope laid       down by sections 290 and 296, i.e. for 'confrontation' with            the oral evidence given by the indicted parties and       the   witnesses.        ...         I ... fail to see that it is unnatural to bring these provisions       to bear on statements made to the price authorities in the course       of their investigative efforts. It is true that the primary       aim of making inspections is not to prepare the ground for       a criminal case. However, when the inspection nevertheless       results in criminal proceedings being opened, good reasons       speak in favour of applying the provisions concerning       out-of-court statements also to statements being made at       the investigative stage.         I consequently conclude that neither [the applicants']       appeal nor that of Økokrim can succeed, and I vote for       [dismissing the appeals]."         As indicated above the criminal case against the applicants commenced in the Oslo City Court on 18 April 1994. During these proceedings the applicant directors were heard as well as 51 witnesses and two expert witnesses. In accordance with the above Supreme Court decision the statements obtained by the price authorities were not admitted as documentary evidence. Furthermore, none of the applicant directors was confronted with their previous submissions to the price authorities during the City Court proceedings. They submit, however, that thirteen of the witnesses heard were confronted with their previous statements made during the price authorities' inspections while giving evidence in court.         On 16 May 1994 the case was adjourned in so far as it concerned the fourth applicant due to serious illness in his family.         The proceedings in the City Court came to an end on 16 June 1994 following which judgment was pronounced on 12 July 1994. On the basis of an evaluation of the available evidence the City Court found the fifth and sixth applicants guilty of the charge of unlawful price collaboration and sentenced both of them to a fine of 75,000 NOK. Pursuant to section 53 of the Price Act a penalty was imposed on the applicant companies. They were sentenced to pay a fine of 1,000,000 NOK, 250,000 NOK and 400,000 NOK respectively. In addition, the applicant companies were ordered to pay a total of 5,160,000 NOK considered to be the gain obtained from the transactions found to be illegal.         On 15 July 1994 Økokrim appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court in so far as it concerned the sentences imposed. By letters of 26 and 27 July and 3 August 1994 the applicants, except the fourth applicant whose case had been adjourned, also lodged an appeal requesting a new trial in the High Court or an examination by the Supreme Court referring to procedural errors, incorrect application of the law and the sentences. Further written observations were submitted by Økokrim on 22 August 1994, by the third and sixth applicants on 26 August 1994 and by the second and fifth applicants on 31 August 1994.         On 24 November 1994 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court decided to accept the parties' appeal in so far as it concerned sentencing. The applicants' request for a new trial in the High Court as well as their appeals concerning alleged procedural errors and incorrect application of the law were, however, rejected. The applicants were informed of the decision on 14 February 1995. They were also informed that the President of the Supreme Court had appointed counsel for them and that, in so far as they had information of relevance to the case which was not already in the file, they should contact their counsel. Finally, they were informed that the case would be dealt with as soon as possible without further notice to them.         The date of the hearing in the Supreme Court was decided by the office of the Court after consultation with the prosecution and the applicants' counsel. On 21 March 1995 the parties were informed that the case was scheduled for hearing on 21 November 1995.         The case was heard by the Supreme Court on 21 November 1995. During the proceedings in the Supreme Court no use was made of the statements obtained by the price authorities. On the basis of the available evidence the Supreme Court upheld the sentence imposed on the applicant directors. As regards the applicant companies the Supreme Court upheld the High Court judgment in so far as it concerned the confiscation of the illegal gain but the fines were increased to 5,500,000 NOK, 1,350,000 NOK and 2,700,000 NOK respectively.         Following the above judgment Økokrim presented, on 4 January 1996, the fourth applicant, whose case had been adjourned in the City Court, with the option (forelegg) of accepting a fine of 75,000 NOK corresponding to the fines imposed on the other applicant directors. The fourth applicant accepted the option. The proceedings against him were accordingly discontinued.     COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complain that the Supreme Court, through its decision of 13 May 1994 to permit the compulsory statements obtained by the price authorities under penalty of criminal punishment to be used as evidence against them in the criminal case, violated Article 6 of the Convention. More specifically they complain:   a)     that their right under Article 6 para. 1 to be protected against self-incrimination has been breached;   b)     that their right under Article 6 para. 2 to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law has not been observed since the statements in question were obtained for an administrative purpose and under different conditions than statements given as evidence in a criminal case;   c)     that their right under Article 6 para. 3 (d) to "equality of arms" has been breached since they were not assisted by defence counsel when the price authorities obtained the statements and that the opportunity to perform a meaningful cross-examination of witnesses was therefore limited; and   d)     that, even if none of the above incidents would qualify as violations of the Convention in themselves, their right under Article 6 to a fair trial based on an overall assessment has been violated.   2.     All applicants, except the fourth applicant, further complain that the Supreme Court's Appeals Selection Committee's rejection of their request for a retrial and its decision to limit their appeal violate their right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.3.     Finally, the applicants complain, under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7, that it was impossible for the Supreme Court "to make an informed appeals decision on the meting out of punishment and profit divestiture, as long as the applicants' calls for review [were] limited as thoroughly as in the present case".   THE LAW   1.     The applicants complain that the alleged use during the criminal proceedings in question of certain statements made by the applicant directors and other employees of the applicant companies to the price authorities violated in various ways Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which in so far as relevant to the complaints made reads as follows:         "1.   In the determination of ... any criminal charge       against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...       by [a] ... tribunal established by law.       ...         2.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be       presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.         3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the       following minimum rights:       ...              d.     to examine or have examined witnesses against       him and to obtain the attendance and examination of       witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as       witnesses against him;       ..."   a)     All applicants complain that their right under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention to be protected against self-incrimination has been breached. In support of this allegation they refer to the fact that the Supreme Court, through its decision of 13 May 1994, legalised the use of the compulsory statements obtained by the price authorities in the subsequent criminal cases against them.         The Commission recalls that the first, second and third applicants are companies which in their own legal capacity were found guilty of the charges brought against them. The question arises therefore whether or to what extent these companies can incriminate themselves through statements made by their employees. The Commission furthermore recalls that the case against the fourth applicant was adjourned and eventually discontinued following his acceptance of the option presented to him on 4 January 1996. In respect of this applicant the question arises whether he has exhausted the domestic remedies at his disposal. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the Commission does not consider it necessary to examine these questions further because it finds that the applicants' complaint is in any event manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.         The Commission recalls that as a general rule questions concerning evidence are for the national courts to determine. Article 6 (Art. 6) does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under domestic law (see e.g. Eur. Court HR, Schenk v. Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, para. 46). The Commission must however determine whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in which the prosecution obtained and used evidence, were fair as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. In this context, the Commission recalls that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights which are not theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective; this is of particular relevance to the rights of the defence given the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial (see e.g. Eur. Court HR, Artico v. Italy judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 16, para. 33).         The Commission observes that the right to silence is not expressly guaranteed by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention and accepts that the right may not be unqualified. However, the privilege against self-incrimination is an important element in safeguarding an accused from oppression and coercion during criminal proceedings. The very basis of a fair trial presupposes that the accused is afforded the opportunity of defending himself against the charges brought against him and the position of the defence is undermined if the accused is under compulsion, or has been compelled, to incriminate himself (cf. Eur. Court HR, Funke v. France judgment of 25 February 1993, Series A no. 256, para. 44, p. 22).   The privilege against self-incrimination is also closely linked to the principle of presumption of innocence protected in Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2) of the Convention in that it reflects the principle that the State shall bear the general burden of establishing the guilt of an accused, in which process the accused is entitled not to be required to furnish any involuntary assistance by way of a confession.         Whether a particular applicant has been subject to compulsion to incriminate himself and whether the use made of the incriminating material has rendered criminal proceedings unfair will, however, depend on an assessment of the circumstances of each case as a whole.         In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant directors and the other employees of the applicant companies were required by law to answer the questions put to them by the price authorities during their pretrial inspections. However, the Supreme Court ruled that these statements could not be used as documentary evidence in the criminal proceedings but only, if necessary, in order to confront a witness or the accused with this statement while giving oral evidence in court. In fact none of the applicants were confronted with their statements made to the price authorities. Consequently, these statements were not brought to the trial court's attention. Furthermore, the fact that a number of witnesses were confronted with their own previous statements does not, in the Commission's view, infringe upon the applicants' privilege against self-incrimination.         In these circumstances the Commission finds that the applicants were not, in respect of the criminal proceedings, compelled to incriminate themselves, nor did their statements to the price authorities play any significant role as part of the evidence against them at the trial. Thus, the statements obtained did not impair their ability to defend themselves against the criminal charges brought. Accordingly, this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   b)     As regards the applicants' reference to their right to be presumed innocent the Commission recalls that the trial court examined the statements of 53 witnesses and documentary evidence from which, however, the applicants' statements to the price authorities had been expressly excluded by the Supreme Court decision of 13 May 1994. The Commission finds that the applicants' convictions were based on an evaluation of the witnesses' statements and the available documentary evidence. Especially, there is no element which indicates that the trial court in fulfilling its functions started from the presumption that the applicants had committed the acts with which they were charged. An examination of this complaint therefore likewise fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention and in particular of Article 6 para. 2 (Art. 6-2).   c)     In so far as the applicants have relied on their right to equality of arms the Commission has not found any elements which could lead to the conclusion that this aspect of a fair trial was set aside during the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, in so far as the applicants appear to refer to an alleged inequality during the pretrial inspections carried out by the price authorities, the Commission finds that Article 6 (Art. 6) does not apply to these proceedings as they neither determined a civil right nor a criminal charge. This part of the applicants' application does not, therefore, disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention either.   d)     Summing up, the Commission recalls that the guarantees in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-2, 6-3) of the Convention as submitted by the applicants, are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1. The Commission has considered the particular aspects and incidents invoked by the applicants in respect of their trial in the Oslo City Court, and has found that these do not assume such importance as to constitute a decisive factor in the general appraisal of the trial. In addition an examination of the conformity of the trial as a whole with the rules laid down in Article 6 (Art. 6)   of the Convention as to its fairness has not disclosed any appearance of a violation of this provision either.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     All applicants, except the fourth applicant, further complain that the Supreme Court's Appeals Selection Committee's rejection of their request for a retrial and its decision to allow the appeal only to a limited extent violates Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. They assert in particular that the appeals procedure must be fashioned in such a way that it is possible to see that justice is done at the appellate level. In the present case they complain that the Appeals Selection Committee did not offer any grounds for its decision and that they were not offered sufficient possibilities of presenting the grounds for their appeals.         The Commission recalls that the Appeals Selection Committee was called upon to decide whether the applicants' request for a new trial in the High Court or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should be granted. The issue therefore arises whether the Committee can be said to "determine" the criminal charge against the applicants. In the present case, however, the Commission finds it can leave this question open and proceed on the assumption that Article 6 (Art. 6) applies.         The manner of application of Article 6 (Art. 6)   to proceedings before appeal courts depends on the special features of the proceedings in the domestic legal order seen in their entirety and the role of the appellate court therein. Regard must be had to the nature of the appeal system, to the scope of the appeal court's powers and to the manner in which the applicants' interests were actually presented and protected before the appeal court, particularly in the light of the nature of the issue to be decided (cf. for example Eur. Court HR, Fejde v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-C, p. 67, para. 27).         In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicants' case was heard in the Oslo City Court from 18 April to 12 July 1994. As already established above nothing has emerged from the examination of this case which indicates that the applicants were not afforded all the guarantees secured by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention during this trial.         As regards the "appeal proceedings" the Commission recalls that the Appeals Selection Committee was called upon to decide whether or not to grant leave to appeal. The limited nature of this issue does not,