CEDHCASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG9
CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 décembre 1996
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:1217JUD002094092
- Date
- 17 décembre 1996
- Publication
- 17 décembre 1996
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
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Procédure
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Question juridique
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Solution
source officielleViolation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses award - domestic proceedings
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.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }         In the case of Duclos v. France (1),           The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court A (2), as a Chamber composed of the following judges:           Mr   R. Bernhardt, President,         Mr   L.-E. Pettiti,         Mr   C. Russo,         Mr   A. Spielmann,         Mr   A.N. Loizou,         Mr   M.A. Lopes Rocha,         Mr   J. Makarczyk,         Mr   P. Jambrek,         Mr   P. Kuris,   and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy Registrar,           Having deliberated in private on 30 August and 26 November 1996,           Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: _______________ Notes by the Registrar   1. The case is numbered 90/1995/595/682-684.   The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number).   The third number indicates the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and the last two numbers indicate its position on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.   2.   Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9).   They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently. _______________   PROCEDURE   1.       The case was referred to the Court by the French Government ("the Government") on 11 October 1995, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47).   It originated in three applications (nos. 20940/92, 20941/92 and 20942/92) against the French Republic lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") under Article 25 (art. 25) by a French national, Mr Alain Duclos, on 17 August, 29 September and 13 October 1992 respectively.   The Commission ordered that the three applications be joined.           The Government's application referred to Article 48 of the Convention (art. 48).   The object of the application was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1).   2.       In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30), the President of the Chamber having granted him legal aid on 7 February 1996 (Rule 4 of the Addendum to Rules of Court A).   3.       The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr L.-E. Pettiti, the elected judge of French nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)).   On 3 November 1995, in the presence of the Registrar, the President of the Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr B. Walsh, Mr C. Russo, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr S.K. Martens, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr P. Jambrek and Mr P. Kuris (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43).   Subsequently Mr J. Makarczyk and Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha, substitute judges, replaced Mr Martens, who had resigned, and Mr Walsh, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).   4.       As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Bernhardt, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the applicant and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38).   Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the registry received the applicant's and the Government's memorials on 3 May 1996.   On 14 May the Secretary to the Commission indicated that the Delegate did not wish to reply in writing.   5.       On 12 July 1996 the Commission produced the file on the proceedings before it, as requested by the Registrar on the President's instructions.           On 5 August 1996 the President sent questions to the Government and the applicant (Rule 41 para. 1).   Replies were received at the registry on 20 and 22 August respectively.   6.       In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 28 August 1996.   The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.           There appeared before the Court:   (a) for the Government       Mr   B. Nedelec, magistrat, on secondment to the Legal         Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,        Agent,     Mrs M. Hourt, magistrat, on secondment to the Legal         Services Department, Ministry of Justice,             Counsel;   (b) for the Commission       Mr   P. Lorenzen,                                         Delegate;   (c) for the applicant       Mr   M. Puechavy, of the Paris Bar,                        Counsel.           The Court heard addresses by Mr Lorenzen, Mr Puechavy and Mr Nedelec.   AS TO THE FACTS   I.       Background to the case   7.       Mr Alain Duclos was employed as company secretary by the LVI Normandie company.   On 23 April 1980 he was injured in a road accident that obliged him to take sick leave and, since it counted as an "industrial accident", was covered by social security.   His condition following the accident was declared stable on 29 August 1980.           On 31 July 1980, during his rehabilitation, the applicant began to suffer again from injuries he had sustained in an industrial accident on 23 March 1976.   These had been declared fully healed on 11 May of that same year.   His condition following the relapse was declared stable on 15 September 1981 (social-security department decision of 10 December 1981).   8.       The applicant returned to work in September 1980 but had several relapses, inter alia on 1 October 1980 (no sick leave taken), 30 September 1981 (sick leave until 4 October), 13 November 1981 (sick leave until 20 February 1982) and 2 March 1982 (sick leave until 9 July 1982).   9.       In a letter of 14 December 1981 his employer gave him notice of his "dismissal on structural economic grounds" with effect from 15 March 1982.   10.      He was registered as being "temporarily disabled" during the periods when he was on sick leave and from the date of his dismissal until July 1982.   11.      On 24 September 1981 the Occupational Counselling and Rehabilitation Board (commission technique d'orientation et de reclassement professionnel, COTOREP) of the Employment Office for the département of Seine-Maritime had registered the applicant as a class B disabled worker for a five-year period.   According to the applicant, this was equivalent to a degree of permanent partial disablement of between 67% and 85%.           On 17 August 1984 the Regional Disablement Board (commission régionale d'invalidité et d'incapacité permanente, CRIIP) for the region of Haute-Normandie assessed the degree of the applicant's disablement at 50% (on the basis of the accidents of April 1980 and 1976).   It rejected his application for an allowance for disabled adults on the ground that the degree of disablement was not sufficient.           On 5 July 1985 Mr Duclos obtained a card certifying 60% disablement from the Ministry of Health and Social Security; it was valid from 26 February 1985 to 26 February 1988.   II.      The proceedings instituted by the applicant   12.      The applicant instituted proceedings against the Dieppe Health Insurance Office (Caisse primaire d'assurance maladie, CPAM).   He contested the way in which it had calculated the daily allowance it paid him in respect of the periods during which he was temporarily disabled.           He also brought proceedings in the courts seeking to benefit under a "disablement insurance" policy which his former employer had taken out with an insurance company, the Union des assurances de Paris ("the UAP").           Lastly, he asked the courts to settle the dispute between him and the Dieppe Family Allowances Office (Caisse d'allocations familiales, CAF) as to whether or not the drop in his earnings should be taken into account for the purposes of calculating his family allowance.       A.   The proceedings against the Dieppe CPAM   13.      During the periods when the applicant was "temporarily disabled" (see paragraph 10 above) the Dieppe CPAM paid him daily allowances as a substitute income calculated on the basis of his salary as supplemented by the benefits in kind shown on his pay slips (a flat and a company car).           On 2 June 1982 he applied to the CPAM for a reassessment of his daily allowances as he considered that they did not accurately reflect the benefits in kind.   In a letter of 8 June 1982 the head of the industrial accidents department refused his application.           1.   Before the Dieppe CPAM review board and the Paris and             Rouen social-security appeal tribunals   14.      The Dieppe CPAM review board did not reply to an application for reassessment which Mr Duclos made to it on 21 July 1982.   15.      On 29 March 1983 the applicant appealed to the Paris social-security appeal tribunal ("the Paris tribunal").   On 7 February 1984 the parties were summoned to a hearing on 2 March 1984. At the end of this hearing the Paris tribunal allowed an application by the CPAM and transferred the case to the Rouen social-security appeal tribunal ("the Rouen tribunal"), which had to determine related applications.           The case file was transferred to the Rouen tribunal on 24 July 1984.   The hearing originally set down for 17 June 1986 was adjourned until 4 November 1986.   The tribunal dismissed Mr Duclos's case in a judgment of 16 December - served on 30 January 1987 - on the ground that he had failed to establish that the CPAM's calculation was erroneous.           2.   In the Rouen Court of Appeal   16.      On 6 February 1987 Mr Duclos appealed against the judgment of 16 December 1986 to the Rouen Court of Appeal.   The CPAM filed its pleadings on 2 October 1987.           A hearing was held on 13 October 1987. The Government maintained before the Court that the applicant had requested an adjournment.   The applicant denied that he had done so, however, and the Government were unable to indicate the basis for their assertion.           A further hearing was held on 6 September 1988 during which Mr Duclos lodged his pleadings.           On 11 October 1988 the Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision.           3.   In the Court of Cassation   17.      On 15 November 1988 the applicant filed an application with the Fees Exemption Board of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar for exemption from paying fees.   The application was refused on 24 October 1989, as Mr Duclos was informed in a letter of 8 November 1989, on the following ground:           "An examination of the contested decisions shows that they         were made in the proper form and that legal reasons were given         for them.   Accordingly, no useful purpose would appear to be         served by seeking review of them by the Court of Cassation."   18.      The applicant nevertheless appealed on points of law on 22 December 1989.   He filed his pleadings on 21 May 1990 and the CPAM lodged its submissions on 20 August 1990.   The case file was transferred to a reporting judge on 2 April 1991 and he made his report on 16 May 1991. The hearing was held on 9 January 1992, and on 20 February 1992 the Court of Cassation (Social Division) dismissed the appeal on the basis that the ground raised by Mr Duclos was inadmissible as it did no more than criticise the assessment made by the courts below of the evidence before them.       B.   The proceedings against the UAP   19.      The applicant's employer had taken out three successive disablement insurance policies with the UAP.   The first was valid from 1 July 1973 to 31 December 1980, the second from 1 January to 30 September 1981 and the third took effect on 1 October 1981.   All three provided that managers injured in industrial accidents or suffering from occupational diseases should receive a daily allowance in the event of "temporary total disablement" and an annuity in the event of "permanent total or partial disablement".   These sums would be paid in addition to social-security benefits.           The first two policies provided (in clauses 26-6° and 10 respectively):           "If, after an apparent recovery, an employee has returned to         work and suffered a relapse within two months, he will         continue to receive benefits under this policy as if he had         been absent from work for one continuous period only, the         period for which he returned to work being deemed to be a mere         break in payment of benefits.   Where, on the other hand, an         employee has returned to work for more than two months, he is         deemed to have contracted a new illness or suffered a further         accident."           1.   Before the urgent-applications judge of the             Paris tribunal de grande instance   20.      On 3 April 1982, when he was "temporarily totally disabled", Mr Duclos sent a letter to the UAP requesting payment of the "additional" daily allowances provided for in the first policy.   The UAP asked him for his social-security payment advice slips to prove that he was unfit for work and informed him that it could not pay advances on benefits.   The applicant did not have the advice slips as the CPAM was taking a long time to pay the "main" daily allowance.   21.      On 4 June 1982 Mr Duclos sought from the urgent-applications judge an order that the UAP should pay an advance of 13,960 French francs (FRF) on the "additional" allowances for the period between 15 March and 15 April 1982 and for payment of the same amount on the 15th of each month.   At the hearing on 24 June 1982 his lawyer produced the social-security advice slips in respect of the "main" daily allowances paid up to 1 June 1982.   The UAP submitted that it was necessary above all to determine which of the three successive insurance policies was applicable.           On 1 July 1982 the urgent-applications judge held that he did not have jurisdiction, on the following ground:           "It is apparent from the documents produced that the         resolution of the present dispute entails construing the         contracts concluded by Alain Duclos's employer with the UAP.           It is not for the urgent-applications judge to determine such         an issue, which should go to full trial given that, since the         applicant instituted the present proceedings, he has received         a social-security payment corresponding to his daily         allowances until 15 June 1982 and has accordingly reduced his         claim to FRF 8,146.16."           2.   In the Paris tribunal de grande instance   22.      Mr Duclos's registration as being temporarily totally disabled was cancelled and on 9 July 1982 the CPAM stopped paying him the "main" daily allowances.   As the applicant was registered as being permanently disabled, he was entitled to an annuity from the social-security department.   23.      In a letter of 15 May 1981 Mr Duclos enquired of the UAP about eligibility for the "additional" annuity payable in the event of permanent disablement (see paragraph 19 above).   The insurance company replied that he had to provide proof of at least 33% permanent disablement.   24.      By summons served by a bailiff on 26 August 1983 the applicant instituted proceedings against the UAP in the Paris tribunal de grande instance.   He referred to the first policy and submitted that he was bound not by the policy in its entirety but only by the summary of cover given to him by his employer.   His main claims were for payment of the "additional" annuity, the balance outstanding on his daily allowances as "reassessed" and continuation of the "reimbursement of expenses" cover.   25.      The preparation of the case for trial was terminated by an order of 2 July 1984.           The UAP submitted that it was the third policy, valid from 1 October 1981, which was applicable as the applicant had had a relapse in November 1981.   26.      Mr Duclos replied on 6 August 1984 and applied to set aside the order whereby the preparation of the case for trial had been terminated.   27.      Following a hearing on 19 September 1984 the tribunal de grande instance allowed the application on 17 October 1984 as follows:           "The need to consider the case as a whole and to observe due         process are sufficient grounds for the application to set         aside the order whereby the preparation of the case for trial         was terminated.           The facts set out in the two parties' pleadings do not appear         to match those established by the documents produced in         evidence either in substance or in their dates ...   They         completely contradict one another as regards the length of         time for which the applicant returned to work in         September 1980 and the dates of his relapses.           Moreover, the applicant failed to produce either medical         documents such as would provide evidence of the periods of         work or of ill health, or the payment advice slips from the         UAP company, which might specify both the dates of those         periods and the relevant insurance policies.           Lastly, only part of the correspondence between the         UAP company and Alain Duclos was submitted.           In such circumstances it is impossible to verify the         submissions of the parties, especially as the UAP company did         not reply to Alain Duclos's most recent letters and Mr Duclos         is now relying on a decision of the Regional Disablement Board         of 10 September 1984 assessing his permanent disablement at         50%, it having risen successively from 0% to 12% and then 20%;           It is thus necessary to reopen the preparatory stage and to         set the case down for the earliest possible procedural hearing         in order to prepare the case for trial.           ..."   28.      At the hearing on 7 January 1985 the applicant filed pleadings and produced the documents requested.   A hearing was held on 29 April 1985.   On 29 May 1985 the tribunal de grande instance held that the UAP was bound to cover Mr Duclos under and to the extent of the second insurance policy.   It said:           "...           It has been established that Mr Duclos returned to work and         was deemed to be in a stable condition on 29 August 1980.   The         degree of his permanent partial disablement was estimated at         less than the 33% entitling him to cover under [the         first contract].           Admittedly, he denies that [the whole of the contract] applies         to him, but, contrary to his assertions, ..., the `summary of         cover provided under the contract' given to the insured         parties, which is by definition incomplete and simplified,         does not prevail over the contract itself.           Under clause 26-6° [of the first contract] only a relapse         obliging an insured party to take sick leave can interrupt the         two-month period.   Once that two-month period has elapsed, the         employee is deemed to have suffered a further accident ...           The relapse on which Mr Duclos relies in his application for         a declaration that the first contract was still valid, a         relapse which did not entail his taking such leave, is         therefore of no effect as it does not satisfy that         requirement.           It has been established that the relapse obliging Mr Duclos to         take sick leave in September 1981, when the second policy -         valid from 1 January 1981 to 30 September 1981 - was in force,         clause 10 of which reproduced clause 26-6° of the previous         policy, was followed by several others but he never returned         to work for more than two months.           ..."           As regards the amount of the annuity payable by the UAP, the court held that:           "Clause 3-2° [of the second contract] states that the insured         is deemed to be permanently partially disabled if he is placed         in disablement class 2 by the social-security department ...           Mr Duclos produced evidence to show that the         social-security department assessed his permanent partial         disablement at 50%, which is equivalent to being placed in         disablement class 1 under Article L. 130 of the         Social Security Code;           That rate is not binding on the UAP for the purpose of         calculating the annuity payable under the contract and it is         necessary to order a medical report ..."           The court therefore appointed an expert whose instructions were to:           "procure and consider all the necessary medical documents;           examine Mr Duclos and assess the present degree of his         permanent partial disablement, distinguishing between the         effects of the accidents of 23 March 1976 and 23 April 1980."           As regards Mr Duclos's application concerning the daily allowances, the court held that "the decision as to which contract applie[d] entail[ed] [its] dismissal ..." inasmuch as the application was based on the first policy.   Nevertheless, as the court found that "the principle that Mr Duclos had a claim [under this policy had not been] disputed by the UAP", it ordered the UAP to pay the applicant an advance of FRF 10,000.           Lastly, the court ordered Mr Duclos to make an interim payment of FRF 1,400 on account towards the costs of the expert's report.   This was to be deposited with the registry by 15 July 1985.   The court ordered that its judgment was to be enforceable immediately, notwithstanding the lodging of an appeal.           3.   In the Paris Court of Appeal               (a) Judgment of 23 June 1987   29.      On 3 July 1985 the applicant was granted legal aid, and on 11 July 1985 he brought the case before the Paris Court of Appeal as he considered that he was covered by the first policy.   The UAP, regarding itself as bound by the third contract, had done likewise on 3 July.           On 28 August the judge in charge of preparing the case for trial asked the applicant to file his pleadings by 7 November 1985, and Mr Duclos filed them on 2 September 1985.   On 10 December his lawyer sent the following letter to the president of the relevant division of the Court of Appeal:           "...           I wish to draw to your attention the fact that Mr Duclos is         disabled as a result of a serious car accident and that he has         four dependent children.   The proceedings against the UAP         represent his only hope of securing reasonable living         conditions in material terms.           Given the pressing nature of the case, I would be much obliged         to you if you would consider allocating the case to the         division that hears urgent applications.   Failing this, I         would be grateful if on 9 January, when the time-limit given         to the respondent expires, you would set the earliest date         possible for terminating the preparation of the case for trial         and for the hearing.           ..."   30.      On 20 November 1985 the judge in charge of preparing the case for trial ordered the UAP to file its pleadings by 9 January 1986, and it did so on 12 December 1985.           On 19 December 1985 the parties were instructed that the preparation of the case for trial would be concluded on 13 May 1986 and that the hearing would be held on 28 October 1986.           The applicant filed pleadings on 13 May 1986.   On an application by him, the conclusion of the preparation of the case was adjourned until 19 June.           On 16 June 1986 the UAP likewise applied for an adjournment of the closing date, which was put back to 8 July.           On 7 July, at the UAP's request, the date was further put back to 9 September.   The insurance company filed pleadings on 8 September.           On 9 September the applicant secured a further adjournment until 16 September.   The UAP filed pleadings on 12 September 1986.           On 16 September Mr Duclos secured an adjournment until 30 September.   On the same day he lodged submissions in reply to the UAP's submissions of 8 and 12 September 1986 to supplement his own submissions of 13 May 1986.   He sought, inter alia, reimbursement of the interim payment for the expert's report which the trial judge had ordered him to make.   He also applied again for an adjournment, and the closing date was set at 14 October.           On 13 October, on an application by the UAP, the closing date was put back to 21 October.   31.      The hearing was held on 28 October 1986, and on 23 June 1987 the Paris Court of Appeal delivered the following judgment:           "It is not possible to determine from the medical documents         adduced in evidence whether, as maintained by the appellant,         he suffered permanent partial disablement of more than 33%         throughout 1980 without a break or whether, on the contrary,         Mr Duclos must be regarded as having subsequently contracted         a new illness or suffered a further accident.           The court below ordered a medical report, which is still         necessary and relevant, regardless of whether the insured is         covered by the first, second or third insurance policy, and         Mr Duclos is not justified in maintaining that the report is         superfluous on the ground that the UAP wrote to him on         3 March 1982 that `as a general rule insurers accept the         social-security department's findings and adopt its         [criteria]'.           On the contrary, the expert's task will have to be completed         before it can be said under which policy the UAP must cover         the insured.           ...           It is in the interests of the proper administration of justice         for the case as a whole to be heard by this court in order         that it may be finally disposed of.           For these reasons           The Court,           ...           Sets aside that part of the impugned judgment in which it is         held that the UAP company must cover Mr Duclos under and to         the extent of the [second insurance policy].           Holds that a medical report is necessary before judgment can         be given and, deciding to hear the case as a whole, upholds         the judgment of the court below in so far as Dr ... was         appointed as an expert and widens his remit by instructing         him, once he has obtained the necessary documents and informed         the parties of that fact, to determine whether, having regard         to the origin, nature and after-effects of Mr Duclos's         accidents of 23 April and 31 July 1980, there was an `apparent         recovery' within the meaning of clause 26-6° of [the first         insurance policy] and what could have been the degree of         permanent partial disablement on 30 December 1980 as a result         of the first accident or of each accident, in order to enable         the Court to determine under which policy the UAP must cover         him.           Holds that the expert is to lodge his report with the         Court registry within four months of the date on which the         case is referred to him.           ..."               (b) Judgment of 3 May 1989   32.      On 5 November 1987 the expert reported that he was unable to carry out his instructions as Mr Duclos, despite having been summoned by ordinary letter and then by registered letter, had neither appeared nor given notice that he was unable to attend.           In pleadings submitted by Mr Duclos to the Court of Appeal on 19 May and 6 December 1988 and 6 March 1989 he claimed that, inasmuch as he had been granted legal aid, he had wrongly made to the expert the interim payment ordered by the Paris tribunal de grande instance.   He had requested reimbursement from the expert several times in October and November 1985 and March 1986, and on 23 November 1987 he had brought proceedings against him in the District Court of the 18th administrative district of Paris in order to recover the money. Mr Duclos also stated that he had been turned away when, in response to the expert's invitation, he and another doctor had gone to the expert's surgery on 30 October 1980.   Further, he asked the Court of Appeal to declare the medical report unnecessary inasmuch as he had proved his permanent partial disablement by producing, inter alia, the COTOREP's decision of 24 September 1981 and the CRIIP's decision and inasmuch as a medical examination nine years after the first accident would not enable them to establish the original date of his disablement.   Lastly, he asked the Court of Appeal to try the "main" case against the UAP and the "subsidiary" case against the expert simultaneously.   33.      On 21 February 1988 the parties were ordered to file their pleadings by 21 April 1988.   34.      Mr Duclos lodged pleadings on 19 May 1988.   35.      On 19 July 1988 the parties were instructed that the preparation of the case for trial would be concluded on 6 December 1988 and that the hearing had been set down for 1 February 1989.   The UAP lodged its pleadings on 18 August and 30 September.   36.      On 6 December Mr Duclos lodged pleadings and asked for an adjournment of the conclusion of the preparation of the case for trial, which was put back to 10 January 1989.   The UAP lodged its pleadings on 2 January 1989.           On 10 January 1989 the applicant applied for an adjournment until the end of March of both the conclusion of the preparatory stage and the trial.   The closing date was set at 24 January.   He made similar applications on 23 January, and the closing date was set at 7 March and the hearing adjourned until 21 March.           The UAP filed its pleadings on 20 February 1989 and the applicant filed his on 6 March.   On 7 March the UAP made an application identical with one made by Mr Duclos on the previous day for an adjournment of the conclusion of the preparatory stage.   The order terminating the preparation of the case for trial was made on 21 March 1989.   37.      Following a hearing on 21 March 1989, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal in a judgment of 3 May 1989 - served on the parties on 9 June - as follows:           "...           The Court has been unable, by reason of the appellant's         refusal, to obtain the information which could have been         provided by an expert's report, which it had held to be         necessary for deciding the case.   Accordingly, Mr Duclos has         failed to satisfy the burden of proof that rests on him and,         as matters stand, his application must be dismissed and he         must be ordered to return the sum he received by way of an         advance."           4.   In the Court of Cassation   38.      On 2 August 1989 Mr Duclos applied to the legal aid office of the Court of Cassation for legal aid, which was granted on 11 January 1990.   The applicant was notified on 7 February 1990.   39.      Mr Duclos lodged an appeal on points of law on 9 March 1990. He submitted that the Court of Appeal had wrongly failed to respond to his submissions regarding the pointlessness of the medical report and those in which he had asked the court to hear the cases against the UAP and against the expert simultaneously.   He filed his full pleadings on 7 August 1990 and the UAP filed its pleadings in reply on 26 September 1990.   The applicant also submitted a memorandum dated 20 January 1991.           The case was allocated to a reporting judge on 3 July 1991 and he filed his report on 24 September 1991.   40.      Following a hearing on 5 March 1992, the Court of Cassation (Social Division) delivered a judgment on 16 April 1992 in which it dismissed his appeal on the following grounds:           "... the Court of Appeal was not bound to rule on ineffective         pleadings and as it was not seised of the case between the         appellant and the expert, it was merely exercising its power         to assess the evidence before it when it ordered an expert's         report."       C.   The proceedings against the Dieppe CAF   41.      As a married man with four children, the applicant received a family allowance, the amount of which varies according to the household's income.   42.      The Dieppe CAF made a deduction of 30% from the applicant's income when calculating his entitlement to the allowance from 10 July 1982, the date on which he started claiming unemployment benefit from the Association for Industrial and Business Employment (Association pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce, ASSEDIC).   In a letter of 19 May 1983 it informed the applicant - who had claimed that he had been unemployed since 15 March 1982 - that it could not accede to his request for a 100% deduction to be applied in the calculation of his allowance for the period from 1 March to 30 June 1982.           1.   Before the Benefit Payments Board of the Dieppe CAF and             the Rouen social-security appeal tribunal   43.      On 18 July 1983 Mr Duclos submitted his complaint to the Benefit Payments Board of the Dieppe CAF, which ruled against him on 3 October 1983.   He was advised of this in a letter of 17 November.   44.      On 13 December 1983 he appealed to the Rouen social-security appeal tribunal.           Following a hearing on 18 February 1986, the tribunal delivered a judgment on 18 March 1986 - served on the parties on 16 May - in which it dismissed his appeal on the following grounds:           "As provided in social-security circular no. 39 of         13 August 1980, a 30% abatement will be applied to the         base-year income of those who are unemployed, or that income         will be disregarded, depending on the individual's         circumstances.           Article 5-1 of social-security circular no. 33 of         13 August 1980 provides that `the persons concerned are those         who are totally unemployed and are not in receipt of benefit         or are no longer eligible for benefit as they have exhausted         their right to it ... their entire means shall be         disregarded'.           From 2 March to 2 July 1982 Mr Duclos received         daily allowances in respect of the industrial accident and his         name was removed from the ASSEDIC's register.           He was not, therefore, a totally unemployed person not in         receipt of benefit and cannot seek to have his means for this         period disregarded.           It has been established that from 1 July 1982 a 30% abatement         was applied to his income on the ground that the ASSEDIC paid         him special allowances.   His appeal is unfounded."           The judgment was served on the parties on 16 May 1986.           2.   In the Rouen Court of Appeal   45.      On 21 May 1986 the applicant appealed to the Rouen Court of Appeal.   He was awarded full legal aid on 20 March 1987.           On 23 July 1987 the parties were informed that the hearing would be held on 13 October 1987.   The CAF lodged pleadings on 9 October.           The Government maintained before the Court that at the hearing the applicant had requested an adjournment.   The applicant denied that he had done so, however, and the Government were unable to indicate any basis for their assertion.           A hearing was held on 6 September 1988 at which Mr Duclos made his submissions.   In a judgment of 11 October 1988 the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal tribunal's judgment.           3.   In the Court of Cassation   46.      On 15 November 1988 the applicant filed an application with the Fees Exemption Board of the Conseil d'Etat and Court of Cassation Bar for exemption from paying counsel's fees.   The Board refused his application on 24 October 1989, as Mr Duclos was informed in a letter of 13 December, on the following ground:           "An examination of the contested decision shows that it was         made in the proper form and that legal reasons were given for         it.   Accordingly, no useful purpose would appear to be served         by seeking review of it by the Court of Cassation."   47.      The applicant nevertheless appealed on points of law on 4 December 1989.   He filed pleadings on 3 May 1990 and the CAF replied on 4 July.   On 2 April 1991 the case file was transferred to a reporting judge, who filed his report on 16 May 1991.   The hearing was held on 20 February 1992, and the Court of Cassation (Social Division) dismissed the appeal on the following ground in a judgment of 2 April 1992:           "... the courts below, having found that the name of         Mr Duclos, who had received daily allowances from 2 March to         9 July 1982 in respect of the recurrence of the condition         originally caused by his industrial accident, had been removed         from the ASSEDIC's register for that period, justified their         decisions in law." ਊrticles de loi cités
Article 6 CEDHArticle 6-1 CEDH
Citations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG
- Formation
- 9
- Date
- 17 décembre 1996
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:1217JUD002094092
Données disponibles
- Texte intégral