CEDHCASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG3
CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 13 janvier 1997
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:1997:0113DEC002571194
- Date
- 13 janvier 1997
- Publication
- 13 janvier 1997
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
Mes notes
privées · visibles par vous seulRésumé structuré
version préliminaireFaits
Non déterminable à partir du texte fourni.
Procédure
Non déterminable à partir du texte fourni.
Question juridique
Non déterminable à partir du texte fourni.
Solution
source officielleAdmissible
Résumé généré automatiquement — à vérifier avec la décision originale.
Analyse IA non disponible
Générez un résumé intelligent de cette décision
Texte intégral
.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                         AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 25711/94                       by C. M. L.-O.                       against Switzerland         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 13 January 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs.   J. LIDDY, Acting President            MM.    S. TRECHSEL                  E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs.   M. HION              Mr.    M. de SALVIA, Deputy Secretary to the Commission         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 22 October 1994 by C. M. L.-O. against Switzerland and registered on 18 November 1994 under file No. 25711/94;         Having regard to:   -      the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       21 June 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicant on 19 August 1996;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:     THE FACTS         The applicant, a Portuguese citizen born in 1967, is a secretary residing at Urdorf in Switzerland.   Before the Commission she is represented by Mr A. von Albertini, a lawyer practising in Zurich.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:         On 15 December 1990 the applicant was driving her car in Zurich. The road was covered with ice and snow; her car got onto the other side of the road where she touched one car and then collided with a second car driven by M.   The latter was seriously injured.         On 19 March 1991 the Zurich Police Judge's Office (Polizeirichteramt) transmitted the file to the District Attorney's Office (Bezirksanwaltschaft) for further investigation as to whether the applicant had committed the offence of negligent serious bodily injury (fahrlässige schwere Körperverletzung) according to Section 125 para. 2 of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).         On 5 April 1991 the Zurich District Office (Statthalteramt) transmitted the file to the District Attorney's Office for further investigations as to any offences against the Federal Road Act (Strassenverkehrsgesetz).         On 3 June 1991 the District Attorney's Office transferred the file back to the Police Judge's Office.         On 13 August 1991 the Zurich Police Judge convicted the applicant of a breach of traffic rules, namely of not mastering her vehicle as she had not adapted her speed to the road conditions (Nichtbeherrschen des Fahrzeuges infolge Nichtanpassens der Geschwindigkeit an die Strassenverhältnisse); and sentenced her to a fine of 200 SFr.   The decision noted in particular that on 15 December 1990 the road had been covered with ice and snow; and that the applicant's car had got onto the other side of the road and first touched one car and then collided with another.         On 25 January 1993 the District Attorney's Office issued a penal order (Strafbefehl).   In view of the collision with the car driven by M., resulting in his injury, the applicant was convicted of having negligently caused the offence of bodily injury (fahrlässige Körperverletzung) and sentenced to a fine of 2,000 SFr.         The applicant objected thereto whereupon criminal proceedings were instituted before the Zurich District Court (Bezirksgericht).   On 11 March 1993 the Court convicted the applicant of negligent bodily injury and sentenced her to a fine of 1,500 SFr.   The judgment stated, inter alia:   <Translation>         "The Police Judge who issued the fine contested by the applicant       had to examine the situation within the context of proceedings       concerning a regulatory offence.   Certainly, no second regulatory       offence proceedings may be instituted on the basis of the same       incident and in view of the principle 'ne bis in idem'.   The       summary and limited examination of that type of procedure       nevertheless permits the act, which was prosecuted with a mere       fine, once again to be prosecuted and punished as a crime or as       an offence, to the extent that this more severe examination is       factually or legally required.   In this case the original fine       order and the concomitant punishment shall be annulled."   <German>         "Der Polizeirichter, welcher die von der Angeklagten vorgebrachte       Bussenverfügung erliess, hatte den fraglichen Sachverhalt im       Rahmen eines Übertretungsstrafverfahrens zu würdigen, sodass mit       Sicherheit aufgrund des nämlichen Vorfalles und im Sinne des 'ne       bis in idem'-Grundsatzes kein zweites Übertretungsverfahren       eingeleitet werden darf.   Die summarische und beschränkte Prüfung       dieser Verfahrensart lässt es hingegen zu, dass die mit einer       blossen Busse geahndete Tat noch einmal als Verbrechen oder       Vergehen verfolgt und bestraft wird, sofern ein rechtlicher oder       tatsächlicher Gesichtspunkt diese erschwerte Beurteilung       verlangt; in diesem Fall wird die ursprüngliche Bussenverfügung       und die mit ihr ausgesprochene Strafe aufgehoben."         The decision further stated, inter alia:   <Translation>         "The fine of 200 SFr pronounced in the order of the Police       Judge's Office of the Zurich Municipality of 13 August 1991 shall       be annulled and - to the extent that it has already been paid -       shall be deducted from the present fine, the latter therefore       being reduced to 1,300 SFr."   <German>         "Die mit Verfügung des Polizeirichteramtes der Stadt Zürich vom       13.8.91 ausgefällte Busse von Fr. 200.- wird aufgehoben und -       sofern bereits bezahlt - auf den vorliegenden Bussenbetrag       angerechnet, sodass sich dieser auf Fr. 1,300.- reduziert."         The applicant's appeal was dismissed on 7 October 1993 by the Zurich Court of Appeal (Obergericht).   The Court held, inter alia:   <Translation>         "The question arises which conclusions must be drawn from the       erroneous conduct of the Police Judge in respect of the question       at issue.   It is clear that the Police Judge in his decision of       13 August 1991 only assessed from a criminal law point of view       the fact that the applicant did not master the vehicle, not the       resulting bodily injury of the victim ...   However, in order to       determine the breach of traffic rules the Police Judge was       entitled and obliged entirely to examine and completely to assess       from a criminal law point of view the facts introduced as the       object of the proceedings; if he nevertheless failed to transmit       the file despite a negligent serious bodily injury which was       apparent, this does not lead to the quashing of the decision of       the Police Judge - the decision still stands.   It has not been       claimed, and does not transpire from the file, that the decision       at issue has serious faults which would possibly bring about the       complete nullity."   <German>         "Es stellt sich die Frage, welche Schlüsse aus dem fehlerhaften       Vorgehen des Polizeirichters für die hier interessierende Frage       zu ziehen sind.   Fest steht, dass der Polizeirichter in seiner       Verfügung vom 13. August 1991 nur das Nichtbeherrschen des       Fahrzeuges, nicht aber die dadurch verursachte Körperverletzung       beim Geschädigten strafrechtlich gewürdigt hat ...   Zwecks       Beurteilung der Verkehrsregelnverletzung war der Polizeirichter       jedoch berechtigt und verpflichtet, die als Prozessgegenstand       eingeführten Tatsachen in strafrechtlicher Hinsicht gänzlich       auszuloten und vollständig zu beurteilen; dass er trotz einer im       Raume stehenden fahrlässigen schweren Körperverletzung die       Überweisung der Akten versäumte, führt daher noch nicht zur       Aufhebung der polizeirichterlichen VerfÜgung - diese hat nach wie       vor Bestand.   Irgendwelche schwerwiegende Mängel der fraglichen       Verfügung, die allenfalls die vollständige Nichtigkeit zur Folge       haben könnten, sind weder geltend gemacht noch aus den Akten       ersichtlich."         The Court of Appeal then confirmed the deduction of 200 SFr from the fine of 1,500 SFr, considering that the applicant should not be punished more severely than if both offences had been dealt with together in one set of proceedings.         Against this decision the applicant filed pleas of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden) both with the Court of Cassation (Kassationsgericht) of the Canton of Zurich and with the Federal Court (Bundesgericht).   The Court of Cassation dismissed the plea of nullity on 27 April 1994.   Against this last decision the applicant also filed a public law appeal (staatsrechtliche Beschwerde) with the Federal Court.         On 17 August 1994, the Federal Court dismissed both the applicant's public law appeal and her plea of nullity, both decisions being served on 25 August 1994.         According to the Federal Court's decision concerning the applicant's plea of nullity, it had to be assumed that the Police Judge, when issuing his fine on 13 August 1991, had not been aware of M.'s serious injury; otherwise, he would not have been competent to issue the fine and he would have been obliged to return the file to the District Attorney's Office.   The Federal Court concluded that "the previous court had avoided the effects of a double punishment by considering the fine issued by the Police Judge of 200 SFr when determining the new fine" ("die Wirkungen einer Doppelbestrafung hat die Vorinstanz dadurch vermieden, dass sie die vom Polizeirichter ausgesprochene Busse von Fr. 200.- bei der Bemessung der neuen Busse berücksichtigt hat").   COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains of a breach of Article 4 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7.   She submits that on 13 August 1991 she was convicted for not mastering her vehicle.   Subsequently, further criminal proceedings were instituted for the same incident.   Thus, M.'s injury was the direct result (kausale Folge) of the applicant disregarding the traffic regulations.   The penal order issued on 25 January 1993 therefore breached the principle of ne bis in idem.   The applicant points out that in its decision of 17 August 1994 the Federal Court itself confirmed this breach of ne bis in idem by referring to "the new fine".   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 22 October 1994 and registered on 18 November 1994.         On 9 April 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.         The Government's written observations were submitted on 21 June 1996.   The applicant replied on 19 August 1996.   THE LAW         The applicant complains of a breach of Article 4 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1).   She submits that on 13 August 1991 she was convicted for not mastering her vehicle.   Subsequently, further criminal proceedings were instituted for the same incident.   The resulting penal order issued on 25 January 1993 therefore breached the principle of ne bis in idem.         Article 4 paras. 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1, P7-4-2) states:         "1.   No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in       criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for       an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or       convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that       State.         2.    The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent       the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal       procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or       newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect       in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of       the case."         The Government submit that the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.   The question arises whether Article 4 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1)is already breached if the same set of facts is examined in two different procedures, or whether it is breached if a person is punished twice for the same offence.   The latter situation would raise no issue in the present case as the applicant was convicted on 13 August 1991 for a breach of traffic rules; and on 25 January 1993 for negligently having committed bodily injury.         In the Government's opinion, even if Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1) required that the same set of facts should not be examined in different proceedings, this provision would not be breached in the circumstances of the present case which resulted from a misunderstanding.   Thus, on 19 March 1991 the Zurich Police Judge's Office transmitted the file to the District Attorney's Office as the former was not competent to examine a possible offence of bodily injury.   On 3 June 1991, the file was referred back to the Police Judge's Office as the District Attorney considered that no proceedings would be instituted against M.   It was probably by mistake, therefore, that the Police Judge's Office not only terminated the proceedings against M., but also against the applicant.         The Government recall that on 25 January 1993 a penal order was issued against the applicant since, as the District Court later confirmed, the offence was sufficiently severe to require prosecution despite the previous administrative proceedings.   In its judgment of 25 January 1993 the District Court nevertheless annulled the fine of 200 SFr previously imposed by the Police Judge's Office.   While it is true that the Zurich Court of Appeal found on 7 October 1993 that the fine of the Police Judge "still stands", this caused the applicant no prejudice whatsoever.   Indeed, the Court of Appeal also confirmed the deduction of the fine of 200 SFr.   The Court of Appeal found that in fact the offences committed by the applicant should have been dealt with in one set of proceedings.         In the Government's submission, the fact that the Court of Appeal did not formally annul the fine of the Police Judge cannot in itself breach Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1).   Thus, the rights enshrined in the Convention are not intended to be theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective (see Eur. Court HR, Artico v. Italy judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A, no. 37, p. 16, para. 33).   The principle ne bis in idem should not be interpreted as permitting a person to benefit from a procedural error.         The applicant contends that the text of Article 4 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1) leaves no room for interpretation: it prohibits trial or punishment for a criminal offence for which the applicant has already been finally convicted.   Thus, the principle ne bis in idem is violated if the same facts are examined in the course of two separate proceedings.   In the applicant's opinion, her rights are also protected if the judge in question mistakenly issues a court order.   The District Court judge was competent to issue the decision, and it cannot be said that there was a fundamental defect in the proceedings, as stated for instance in para. 2 of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1).         The applicant considers in the light of ne bis in idem that the fact that a fine has been imposed on a motorist for contravening traffic regulations will render it impossible for a criminal court to convict a motorist for manslaughter.   The fact that a party benefits from a procedural error, as submitted by the Government, does not preclude invocation of ne bis in idem.   The applicant further notes that the Government correctly state that the Zurich Court of Appeal did not formally set aside the fine imposed by the Police Judge's Office. The conviction of 13 August 1991 constitutes a "final conviction" within the meaning of Article 4 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1), and therefore stands in the way of a further conviction.         Finally, the applicant questions why the Government refer to the Convention organs' case-law that the Convention rights are intended to be practical and effective.   The purpose of this remark is obviously to call in question the applicant's interest in her legal rights. However, after conviction by the Police Judge's Office the applicant was again involved in a further trial resulting in an additional fine. It cannot therefore be said that the rights invoked were theoretical and illusory.           The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the case raises complex issues of law and of fact under the Convention which should depend on an examination of the merits of the application as a whole.   The Commission concludes, therefore, that the application is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.         For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the       merits of the case.           M. de SALVIA                           J. LIDDY       Deputy Secretary                     Acting President       to the Commission                    of the Commission  Citations
Aucune citation répertoriée pour cette décision.
Décisions connexes
Aucune décision similaire identifiée pour le moment.
Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG
- Formation
- 3
- Date
- 13 janvier 1997
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1997:0113DEC002571194
Données disponibles
- Texte intégral