CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 24 février 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 19918/92                       by 1) Firma "Brauerei Feldschlösschen                       Ferdinand Geidel KG"; 2) Charlotte DAVIES;                       3) Gerhard GEIDEL; 4) the estate of                       Louise GEIDEL; and 5) Margarete LANDGRAF                       against Germany         The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 24 February 1997, the following members being present:              Mr.    S. TRECHSEL, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  B. MARXER                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs.   M. HION            Mr.    R. NICOLINI              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 28 March 1992 by Firma "Brauerei Feldschlösschen Ferdinand Geidel KG", Charlotte Davies, Gerhard Geidel, the estate of Louise Geidel, and Margarete Landgraf against Germany and registered on 29 April 1992 under file No. 19918/92;         Having regard to:   -      the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of       the Commission;   -      the observations submitted by the respondent Government on       5 December 1994 and the observations in reply submitted by the       applicants on 18 February 1995 and 13 June 1996;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The first applicant, a limited partnership, was the owner of a brewery situated in Werdau/Sachsen (Saxony).   The other applicants are partners of that company, holding the majority of the shares (85.6%). The fourth applicant is the estate after a partner who died in 1982. All applicants are represented by the third applicant, formerly a manager of the applicant company, who resides in Bad Kreuznach.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.     A.     Particular circumstances of the case         The Geidel family had for many generations been the proprietor of the first applicant company.         On 15 February 1946 the Werdau District Court convicted the second applicant and the meanwhile deceased partner of having kept explosives in their home and sentenced them each to 18 months' imprisonment.   Upon appeal, the Zwickau Regional Court reduced the sentence on 18 July 1946 to nine months' imprisonment.         Meanwhile, on 30 June 1946 the "Feldschlösschen" brewery was found to be without owner (herrenlos) and was expropriated without compensation by the authorities of the then Soviet occupied zone of Germany.         The applicants' efforts to recuperate their property after German unification were to no avail.         In order to halt the intended sale of the brewery by the Fiduciary Office (Treuhandanstalt) the first applicant brought injunction proceedings against this office before the Berlin Regional Court (Landgericht).   On 17 December 1990 the latter rejected the action as being inadmissible.   The Court considered that the matter fell within the competence of the Administrative Courts.         Upon appeal the action was dismissed by the Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht). A subsequent constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) was rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on 31 January 1992.   The Court considered that, as reprivatisation had been effected, the previous decision rejecting the claim for an injunction was justified and did not violate any constitutional rights.         On 18 August 1993 the Chemnitz Regional Court (Landgericht) quashed the criminal convictions of 1946 and declared the rehabilitation of the second applicant and of the meanwhile deceased partner.   The Court considered that the sentences had aimed at the political persecution of the two persons.   Thus, after the war a communist action group had intended to liberate the brewery from its "fascist proprietors".   The incriminating explosives found had clearly been foisted (unterschoben) on the two convicted persons.   The Court did not deal with the request for the restitution of the expropriated property.         The second and fourth applicants filed an objection against this decision, claiming that the expropriation of the first applicant amounted to a penal measure which became the object of rehabilitation. The objection was dismissed by the Regional Court on 19 October 1994 on the ground that the expropriation of the first applicant had not been caused by a criminal conviction nor any other measure concerning criminal proceedings.         The further appeal of the second and fourth applicants was dismissed on 23 January 1995 by the Dresden Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).   The Court found that only criminal judgments or measures could be the object of a rehabilitation according to the 1992 Criminal Rehabilitation Act (Strafrechtliches Rehabilitierungsgesetz). However, the expropriation of the first applicant had been a purely administrative measure.         Before German unification, the third applicant also instituted proceedings requesting equalisation payments for the expropriated property.   In view of the reduced value calculated, he filed an action in 1980 with the Frankfurt Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) which determined certain equalisation payments.   Apparently not all payments were issued, and the applicant introduced a new action on 16 December 1992 with the Frankfurt Administrative Court.   These proceedings are still pending.     B.     Relevant Domestic Law and Practice     a)     German Unification Treaty         The applicants' complaints relate to the Treaty on German Unification of 31 August 1990 (Einigungsvertrag, hereinafter referred to as Unification Treaty) according to which expropriations carried out on the basis of Soviet occupational powers between 1945 and 1949 shall not be reversed.         Other expropriations effected in the German Democratic Republic without compensation subsequent to 1949 fall, according to the Unification Treaty, under the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen).   This Act provides, in principle, for the return of confiscated property, including businesses, where this is still possible and does not violate user rights acquired in good faith.   If a return is excluded compensation has to be paid in accordance with SS. 6(7) and SS. 9 et seq. while for certain cases mentioned in S. 4 (1) and (2) new legislation was envisaged.         The Unification Treaty was adopted by the parliaments of both German States and became binding law in the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990.         The international matters concerning German unification were agreed upon in negotiations between the two German States and the four Allied Powers.    In the Treaty of 12 September 1990 on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, the sovereignty of a united Germany was recognised.   In connection with the signing of this treaty the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the former German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed a Joint Letter (Gemeinsamer Brief) to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers confirming the property regulation reached in the Joint Declaration of 15 June 1990 and aimed at being incorporated in the Unification Treaty.         On 27 September 1994 the Federal German Parliament adopted two laws regulating the legal consequences of expropriations in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic in respect of which the restitution of property was excluded.   Both laws entered into force on 1 December 1994.   They are the Compensation Act (Entschädigungsgesetz) concerning expropriations effected in the German Democratic Republic after 1949 in respect of which the 1990 Act regulating unresolved property questions had reserved further legislation; and the Equalisation Act (Ausgleichsgesetz) providing for equalisation payments to persons who had been expropriated between 1945 and 1949.   This Act also provides, under certain circumstances, for the possibility of acquiring agricultural land at a price below market value and the return of moveable property.     b)     Relevant Legal Texts         In the course of the unification negotiations involving the former German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the former four occupational powers (France, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.), the then existing two German Governments issued a Joint Declaration on 15 June 1990 with a view to settling unresolved property questions (Vermögensfragen).         The relevant parts of the Joint Declaration of 15 June 1990 read as follows:   [Translation]         "In seeking a solution to the property issues to be settled, both       Governments assume that it is necessary to achieve a socially       just balance of conflicting interests. Legal certainty and legal       clarity, as well as the right to possess property are the       principles that guide the Governments of the German Democratic       Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in seeking a       solution to outstanding property issues. Only in this way will       it be possible to ensure once and for all that there will be no       litigation on these issues in a future united Germany.         The two German Governments agree on the following basic points:         1.    Expropriations carried out on the basis of occupation law       or the authority resulting from the occupational power (1945       until 1949)   shall not be reversed.   The Governments of the       Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic see no       possibility of reviewing the measures taken at that time.   The       Government of the Federal Republic of Germany takes cognisance       of this in the light of historical developments.   It is of the       opinion that a final decision on any indemnification to be paid       by the State must be left to a future all-German Parliament ..."   [German]         "Bei der Lösung der anstehenden Vermögensfragen gehen beide       Regierungen davon aus, daß ein sozial verträglicher Ausgleich       unterschiedlicher Interessen zu schaffen ist.   Rechtssicherheit       und Rechtseindeutigkeit sowie das Recht auf Eigentum sind       Grundsätze, von denen sich die Regierungen der Deutschen       Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei       der Lösung der anstehenden Vermögensfragen leiten lassen.   Nur       so kann der Rechtsfriede in einem künftigen Deutschland dauerhaft       gesichert werden.         Die beiden deutschen Regierungen sind sich über folgende Eckwerte       einig:         1.    Die Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher bzw.       besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage (1945 bis 1949) sind nicht mehr       rückgängig zu machen.   Die Regierung der Sowjetunion und der       Deutschen Demokratischen Republik sehen keine Möglichkeit, die       damals getroffenen Maßnahmen zu revidieren.   Die Regierung der       Bundesrepublik Deutschland nimmt dies im Hinblick auf die       historische Entwicklung zur Kenntnis.   Sie ist der Auffassung,       daß einem künftigen gesamtdeutschen Parlament eine abschließende       Entscheidung über etwaige staatliche Ausgleichsleistungen       vorbehalten bleiben muß."         The Joint Declaration became part of the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 which contains, inter alia, the following provisions relating to property questions:   [Translation]         "Article 3 - Entry into force of the Basic Law         Provided that there is no provision in this Treaty to the       contrary, when the accession takes effect the Basic Law of the       Federal Republic of Germany ... shall enter into force, together       with the amendments contained in Article 4, in the Länder of       Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt       and Thuringia, as well as in the part of Berlin to which it has       not applied hitherto.         Article 4 - Amendments to the Basic Law due to the accession         The Basic Law shall be amended as follows: ...         4.    The present wording of Article 135 (a) shall become       paragraph 1 of that Article.   The following paragraph shall be       inserted after paragraph 1:         '(2) Paragraph 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to liabilities of       the German Democratic Republic or its controlling authorities and       liabilities incurred by the Federation..... in connection with       the transfer of assets of the German Democratic Republic to the       Federation... as well as to liabilities resulting from measures       taken by the German Democratic Republic or its controlling       authorities.'         5.    The following new Article 143 shall be inserted into the       Basic Law:         '(1) The law in the territory mentioned in Article 3 of the       Unification Treaty may only deviate from the provisions of this       Basic Law for as long as it takes, as a result of the differing       conditions in the two countries, to achieve full adaptation to       the legal order enshrined in the Basic Law, but until 31 December       1992 at the latest.   Deviations shall not infringe Article 19       para. 2 and shall be compatible with the principles enshrined in       Article 79 para. 3.         (2)   Deviations from SS. II, VIII, VIDI a, IX, X and XI shall be       permissible until 31 December 1995 at the latest.         (3)   Irrespective of paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 41 of the       Unification Treaty and the provisions enacted for its       implementation shall apply to the extent that they provide   that       interference with property in the territory mentioned in       Article 3 of that Treaty shall not be reversed.'         Article 41 - Settlement of property issues         1.    The Joint Declaration on outstanding property issues made       on 15 June 1990 by the Governments of the Federal Republic of       Germany and the German Democratic Republic (annex III) is a       constituent part of this Treaty ...         3.    Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany shall not enact       any legal rules that conflict with the Joint Declaration       mentioned in paragraph 1."   [German]         "Artikel 3 - Inkrafttreten des Grundgesetzes         Mit dem Wirksamwerden des Beitritts tritt das Grundgesetz für die       Bundesrepublik Deutschland ... in den Ländern Brandenburg,       Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen       sowie in dem Teil des Landes Berlin, in dem es bisher nicht galt,       mit den sich aus Artikel 4 ergebenden Änderungen in Kraft, soweit       in diesem Vertrag nichts anderes bestimmt ist.         Artikel 4 - Beitrittsbedingte Änderungen des Grundgesetzes         Das Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird wie folgt       geändert: ...         4.    Der bisherige Wortlaut des Artikels 135 a wird Absatz 1.       Nach Absatz 1 wird folgender Absatz angefügt:         `(2) Absatz 1 findet entsprechende Anwendung auf       Verbindlichkeiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik oder       ihrer Rechtsträger sowie auf Verbindlichkeiten des Bundes       oder.... die mit dem Übergang von Vermögenswerten der Deutschen       Demokratischen Republik auf Bund, Länder und Gemeinden im       Zusammenhang stehen, und auf Verbindlichkeiten, die auf Maßnahmen       der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik oder ihrer Rechtsträger       beruhen.'         5.    In das Grundgesetz wird folgender neuer Artikel 143       eingefügt:         '(1) Recht in dem in Artikel 3 des Einigungsvertrags genannten       Gebiet kann längstens bis zum 31. Dezember 1992 von Bestimmungen       dieses Grundgesetzes abweichen, soweit und solange infolge der       unterschiedlichen Verhältnisse die völlige Anpassung an die       grundgesetzliche Ordnung noch nicht erreicht werden kann.       Abweichungen dürfen nicht gegen Artikel 19 Abs. 2 verstoßen und       müssen mit den in Artikel 79 Abs. 3 genannten Grundsätzen       vereinbar sein.         (2)   Abweichungen von den Abschnitten II, VIII, VIII a, IX, X       und XI sind längstens bis zum 31. Dezember 1995 zulässig.         (3)   Unabhängig von Absatz 1 und 2 haben Artikel 41 des       Einigungsvertrags und Regelungen zu seiner Durchführung auch       insoweit Bestand, als sie vorsehen, daß Eingriffe in das Eigentum       auf dem in Artikel 3 dieses Vertrags genannten Gebiet nicht mehr       rückgängig gemacht werden.'         Artikel 41 - Regelung von Vermögensfragen         (1)   Die von der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und       der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik abgegebene       Gemeinsame Erklärung vom 15. Juni 1990 zur Regelung offener       Vermögensfragen (Anlage III) ist Bestandteil dieses Vertrages ...         (3)   Im übrigen wird die Bundesrepublik Deutschland keine       Rechtsvorschriften erlassen, die der in Absatz 1 genannten       Gemeinsamen Erklärung widersprechen."     c)     Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 23 April 1991         On 23 April 1991 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) rejected several constitutional complaints of persons who had their real estate in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany confiscated between 1945 and 1949.   The complainants had alleged that the regulation in the Unification Treaty excluding the return of property confiscated between 1945 and 1949 under the Soviet occupation regime and providing for possible compensation payments but not for full reparation violated several constitutional rights.         The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the complaints as being unfounded.         The Court found that the expropriations in question, even where carried out by German authorities, had been effected on behalf of the Soviet occupation authorities and were consequently based on the sovereign power of the occupation force (besatzungshoheitliche Grundlage).   The competence of the Federal Government to conclude the Unification Treaty and to include in it the amendments to the Basic Law necessitated by the unification followed from the Government's constitutional obligation to attain German unification.   The manner in which the amendments had been made violated neither formal nor substantive law.         The Court held that the regulation in question did not violate any of the complainants' constitutional rights as they no longer had any legal position that could have been affected by it.         The expropriations had been considered legitimate (rechtmäßig) by the Soviet and the German Democratic Republic authorities.   The Federal Republic of Germany could not be held responsible for measures taken at a time when the Basic Law was not even in force.   Under the law then existing in the zones occupied by the Western Allied Powers the complainants had also lost their legal position with regard to the confiscated property. According to this law confiscations effected by a foreign State were   to be considered valid (wirksam) if effected within that State's sovereign powers.         Furthermore, unless damage was caused by its own organs, the Federal Republic was not bound fully to compensate damage resulting from World War II.   In respect of compensation payments for such damage the Federal Republic had a wide margin of appreciation and could take into account other expenditures and budgetary requirements.         The Constitutional Court furthermore found that there was no violation of the right to equal treatment.   It relied on evidence given by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, and other high-ranking officials, showing in the Court's opinion that the Soviet Union had agreed to German unification on the condition that the legality of the confiscations effected between 1945 and 1949 would not be put in question, which meant that they should not be reversed.   It had also been the object of the German Democratic Republic to   ensure in the Unification Treaty that social peace on its territory was maintained after unification.   This condition therefore had to be accepted by the Federal Government in order not to endanger the process of unification.   The regulation whereby property owners whose property had been confiscated between 1945 and 1949 were treated differently from those whose property had been confiscated thereafter was, in these circumstances, sufficiently justified.         The Federal Constitutional Court also denied discrimination in that the complainants would eventually only receive limited compensation payments but not full reparation.   It pointed out that it would be discriminatory totally to exclude any kind of compensation for those who lost property between 1945 and 1949.   Nevertheless, the fact that the complainants were treated less favourably than other owners was justified in view of the economic crisis in the former German Democratic Republic.   In assessing the level of compensation payable, the legislator had a large discretionary power and could, inter alia, take into account what funds were available and also the need to cope with the necessity of fulfilling new tasks arising for example from the necessity to reconstruct the new Federal States (Länder).     COMPLAINTS         The applicants complain that the refusal of the German authorities, after German unification, to return to them their unlawfully confiscated property amounts to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.         The applicants submit that the expropriation in 1946 was unlawful; for instance, they were never served an expropriation decision.   The expropriation was also invalid under international law in that it contradicted the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War.         The applicants point out that restitution should also be granted as the expropriation in 1946 of the first applicant stood in direct connection with the criminal convictions of the second and fourth applicants.   However, the latter have meanwhile been rehabilitated.         The applicants contend that in its decision of 31 January 1992 the Federal Constitutional Court relied on its equally incorrect decision of 23 April 1991.         The applicants further complain that the expropriations effected after 1949 resulted in full compensation.   They submit that there is no logic in this difference of treatment.         Finally, the third applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings instituted in 1992 before the Frankfurt Administrative Court.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 28 March 1992 and registered on 29 April 1992.         On 6 January 1992 the Commission decided to join and communicate the related Applications Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92.         The Government's observations were submitted on 23 April 1993 and supplemented on 30 September 1993.         On 30 August 1994 the Commission decided to join the present application with Applications Nos. 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92 and to communicate it without requesting further observations from the Government.         The Government submitted further observations on 5 December 1994.         The applicants submitted observations in reply on 18 February 1995.         On 12 May 1995 the applicants requested that the application be separated from the other applications.         On 8 December 1995 the Commission decided to separate the application from Applications Nos. 19048/91/ 19049/91, 19342/91 and 19549/92.   The latter applications were declared inadmissible on 4 March 1996.         On 13 June 1996 the applicants filed further observations.     THE LAW   1.     The applicants complain that the refusal of the German authorities, after German unification, to return to them their unlawfully confiscated property amounts to a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.   This provision states:              "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful       enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his       possessions except in the public interest and subject to the       conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of       international law.              The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way       impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems       necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the       general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other       contributions or penalties."         The applicants contend in essence that the expropriation of their property resulted in a continuous violation of their property rights and that the Unification Treaty, by excluding both restitution and full reparation, violates their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         The respondent Government contend that in the light of the unification negotiations as a whole there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union accepted German unification only on the condition that expropriations carried out between 1945 and 1949 should not be reversed.   The Government consider that Germany also has to respect its obligations under the Unification Treaty vis-à-vis the present Russian Federation.   In this respect it is submitted that from the Russian point of view the expropriations in question were meant as a punishment for war criminals and Nazis as well as a measure establishing a new peaceful social order.         As regards the applicants' submission that the expropriations violated international law, the respondent Government refer to the findings of the Federal Constitutional Court, according to which, under German international expropriation law, the taking of property carried out by another State is always to be considered effective if the State concerned has remained within its powers, i.e. within its territorial sovereignty.   The Government stress that the   Federal Constitutional Court also denied the incompatibility of the property regulations contained in the Unification Treaty with the notion of public order, having regard to the fact that the expropriations were carried out decades ago by another State.         The respondent Government finally   point out that, according to the Compensation and Equalisation Acts of 27 September 1994, equalisation payments can be claimed by persons whose property expropriated in the former Soviet occupied zone of Germany or in the former   German Democratic Republic is not returned.   Under certain conditions this new legislation also allows the acquisition of limited pieces of agricultural or forestry land.         The Commission recalls its decision of 4 March 1996 concerning Applications Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92 (Mayer et al. v. Germany, D.R. 85-A, p. 5), where it dismissed similar complaints as being inadmissible.   It considers that the present case is not essentially different from the above cases.   a)      The Commission first notes that the original deprivation of the applicants' property occurred at the instance of the Soviet occupying forces in Germany, more than forty years ago, at a time when the Federal Republic of Germany did not even exist.         Even if it is true that, as the Federal Constitutional Court observed in its decision of 23 April 1991, the authorities of both German States subsequently recognised the validity of the expropriations in question, the German authorities can in no way be held responsible for the deprivation of property as such, which is not imputable to them.         In this respect, therefore, the Commission lacks competence ratione personae to examine the circumstances in which the expropriation was carried out.   b)     The Commission further observes that the expropriation took place before the entry into force of the Convention, which was on 3 September 1953, and before the ratification of Protocol No. 1 by the Federal Republic of Germany, which was on 13 February 1957.         It is true that the expropriation continued to produce effects after the above dates and also after 3 October 1990, when the Unification Treaty entered into force and when the territory where the property concerned was situated became part of the Federal Republic of Germany to which the Convention and its Protocols are applicable.         The Commission has, therefore, considered the notion of a continuing violation of the Convention and its effects as to temporal limitations of the competence of Convention organs (cf. Eur. Court HR, Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 41, to be published in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996).         The Commission recalls that a deprivation of ownership or other rights in rem is in principle an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of "deprivation of right" (cf. No 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14, p. 146).         In the aforementioned judgment, which concerned a continuous denial of access to property in Northern Cyprus, the Court rejected the objection ratione temporis raised by the Turkish Government (Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) judgment, op. cit., paras. 42-47).   The Court found that Mrs Loizidou could not be deemed to have lost title to her property as a consequence of the 1985 Constitution of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (the "TRNC"), as no legal validity for the purposes of the Convention could be attributed to any expropriations under the 1985 Constitution of the "TRNC".   In this respect, the Court noted that the international community did not regard the "TRNC" as a State under international law and that the Republic of Cyprus had remained the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus - itself.         In the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, there was, from the outset, an interference with property rights in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), engaging the responsibility of Turkey, which also was held responsible for a continuing violation of the said provision on account of the complete negation of Mrs Loizidou's property rights in the form of a total and continuous denial of access and a purported expropriation without compensation (cf. Loizidou (Merits) judgment, op. cit., paras. 48-64).         In the present case, the deprivation of the applicant's property occurred at the instance of the Soviet occupying forces in Germany at a time when the Federal Republic of Germany had not yet been established and the Convention as well as Protocol No. 1 had not yet entered into force.   Between 1945 and 1949 there could not be any interference with property rights in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which could entail the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany and give rise to a continuing violation.   The Commission considers that the applicant did not retain any title to his property.       Accordingly the Commission lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis regarding the expropriation of the applicant's property in 1945.   c)     The applicants may be understood as complaining that they retained an entitlement to the property in question, the expropriation carried out between 1945 and 1949 having been unlawfully effected.   In particular, the applicants point out that the expropriation in 1946 of the first applicant stood in direct connection with the criminal convictions of the second and fourth applicants.   However, the latter have meanwhile been rehabilitated.         In this respect the question arises whether the international instruments governing the behaviour of belligerent States, such as the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War, can be invoked by individuals with reference to acts performed subsequent to the end of hostilities. Doubts also exist in regard to the question whether an act allegedly performed in violation of the Hague Convention must be deemed null and void, or whether it merely obliges the State responsible to pay compensation where appropriate.         According to the Convention organs' case-law, a person can only claim to be a victim of a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) if the measure complained of affected his "possessions" or his "property" within the meaning of this provision. A person complaining of an interference with his property must show that such right existed (No. 7694/76, Dec. 14.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 131).         In this respect, the Commission recalls   that "possessions"   may be either "existing possessions" (cf. Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, para. 48) or valuable assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a "legitimate expectation" that they will realise (cf. Eur. Court HR, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51, and Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, p. 20, para. 31).         By contrast,   the hope of recognition of the survival of a former property right which has not been susceptible of effective exercise for a long period (Nos. 7655-7657/76, Dec. 4.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 111) or a conditional claim which has lapsed as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (No. 7775/77, Dec. 5.10.78, D.R. 15, p. 143) are not to be considered as "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (P1-1).         The present case does not concern any "existing possessions" of the applicants.   Their property was expropriated a long time ago and they have been unable for decades to exercise any owners' rights in respect of the property concerned.   It appears that in the German legal order these expropriations were considered as legally valid even before the conclusion of the Unification Treaty.   The provisions of the Treaty cannot therefore be seen as legalising the deprivation of the applicants' property and thereby as being the source of the deprivation for the purposes of German law.         It remains to be examined whether the applicants could have any "legitimate expectation"   to realise claims, either based on a right to compensation for the loss of their property which continued to exist until the entry into force of the Unification Treaty and was affected thereby, or created by the fact that public-law bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany acquired part of the expropriated estate by virtue of the unification.         As regards any possible compensation claim generated by the loss of the property, the Commission refers to its constant jurisprudence according to which it is not competent ratione temporis and ratione materiae to examine complaints relating to the refusal or denial of compensation claims based on facts that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention with respect to the State concerned (see No. 7694/76, Dec. 14.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 131; No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14, p. 146). The Commission would add with regard to the particular facts of the present case that the Federal Republic of Germany was not responsible for the expropriations in question and that therefore any compensation claims which might have existed prior to the Unification Treaty would not have been directed against that State.         As regards the existence of any claim based on the fact that, in consequence of the unification, part of the property concerned passed into the hands of public-law bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Commission notes the findings, on the one hand, of the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision of 23 April 1991 that despite this fact there existed no claim under German law for the restitution of the available properties and that this situation was, from the viewpoint of constitutional law, unobjectionable.   On the other hand, the Dresden Court of Appeal found on 23 January 1995 that only criminal judgments or measures could become the object of a rehabilitation, and that the expropriation of the first applicant had been a purely administrative measure.         There is nothing to show that these findings are arbitrary and incompatible with the applicable provisions. In particular it does not appear that the conclusion of the Federal Constitutional Court was based on the Unification Treaty itself and that, without the provisions of that Treaty, the situation under German constitutional law would have been judged otherwise. Therefore it cannot be said that the Treaty interfered with any pre-existing legal position of the applicants in this respect either.         It follows that the applicants had no "existing possessions"   nor any legally recognised compensation claims when the Unification Treaty came into force.   In these circumstances it cannot be found that the regulation of property questions in the Unification Treaty amounted to an interference with any of the applicants' rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).         This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.     The applicants may be understood as complaining of discrimination in respect of the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions in that, unlike owners of property expropriated by the authorities of the German Democratic Republic after 1949, they cannot claim restitution or reparation.         The Commission has examined this complaint under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1). Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:         "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this       Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground       such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other       opinion, national or social origin, association with a national       minority, property, birth or other status."         The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the "rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not presuppose a breach of one or more of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see Eur. C