CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 24 février 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                      Application No. 25043/94                  by Friedrich-Carl KRUG VON NIDDA UND VON FALKENSTEIN                  against Germany        The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 24 February 1997, the following members being present:              Mr.    S. TRECHSEL, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  B. MARXER                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  P. LORENZEN                  K. HERNDL                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  M. VILA AMIGÓ            Mrs.   M. HION            Mr.    R. NICOLINI              Mr.    H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 17 May 1994 by Friedrich-Carl Krug von Nidda und von Falkenstein against Germany and registered on 31 August 1994 under file No. 25043/94;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant, a German citizen born in 1935. is a businessman residing in London.   Before the Commission he is represented by Mr Th. Huth, a lawyer practising in Königstein in Germany.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.   A.     Particular circumstances of the Case        The applicant's parents owned a manor situated at Frohburg in the Geithain district.   The applicant's family left Germany in 1939 in view of Nazi persecution.        After German unification (see below, Relevant domestic law and practice), the applicant, as the only heir, requested the return of the manor, including a castle, some 982 hectares of real property, livestock and movable property such as furniture and paintings.        The request was rejected by the Geithain Regional Office (Landratsamt) on 26 May 1992 on the ground that the property had been expropriated in accordance with the decree of 10 September 1945 on agrarian land reform.   This expropriation had been carried out on the basis of Soviet occupational powers, and a restitution was therefore excluded in accordance with the undertakings accepted by Germany in the Treaty on German Unification.   Therefore the Act regulating unresolved property questions (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen), providing, in principle, for the return of confiscated property, did not apply since S. 1 para. 8 (a) of the Act expressly excluded land expropriated between 1945 and 1949.        The applicant unsuccessfully filed an appeal (Widerspruch) against this decision with the Saxony Regional Council (Landesamt).        On 8 December 1993 the applicant lodged an action against Saxony (Sachsen) before the Leipzig Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) claiming the return of his property.   However, he did not pursue his action as it offered no prospects of success in view of the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 23 April 1991.   This decision confirmed the constitutionality of the property regulation in question (see below, Relevant domestic law and practice).   B.    Relevant Domestic Law and Practice   a)    German Unification Treaty        The applicant's complaints relate to the Treaty on German Unification of 31 August 1990 (Einigungsvertrag, hereinafter referred to as Unification Treaty) according to which expropriations carried out on the basis of Soviet occupational powers between 1945 and 1949 shall not be reversed.        Other expropriations effected in the German Democratic Republic without compensation subsequent to 1949 fall, according to the Unification Treaty, under the Act Regulating Unresolved Property Questions (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen).   This Act provides, in principle, for the return of confiscated property, including businesses, where this is still possible and does not violate user rights acquired in good faith.   If a return is excluded compensation has to be paid in accordance with Sec. 6(7) and Secs. 9 et seq. while for certain cases mentioned in Sec.4 (1) and (2) new legislation was envisaged.        The Unification Treaty was adopted by the parliaments of both German States and became binding law in the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990.        The international matters concerning German unification were agreed upon in negotiations between the two German States and the four Allied Powers.    In the Treaty of 12 September 1990 on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany, the sovereignty of a united Germany was recognised.   In connection with the signing of this treaty the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the former German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed a Joint Letter (Gemeinsamer Brief) to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers confirming the property regulation reached in the Joint Declaration of 15 June 1990 and aimed at being incorporated in the Unification Treaty.        On 27 September 1994 the Federal German Parliament adopted two laws regulating the legal consequences of expropriations in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic in respect of which the restitution of property was excluded.   Both laws entered into force on 1 December 1994.   They are the Compensation Act (Entschädigungsgesetz) concerning expropriations effected in the German Democratic Republic after 1949 in respect of which the 1990 Act regulating unresolved property questions had reserved further legislation; and the Equalisation Act (Ausgleichsgesetz) providing for equalisation payments to persons who had been expropriated between 1945 and 1949.   This Act also provides, under certain circumstances, for the possibility of acquiring agricultural land at a price below market value and the return of moveable property.   b)    Relevant Legal Texts        In the course of the unification negotiations involving the former German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the former four occupational powers (France, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.), the then existing two German Governments issued a Joint Declaration on 15 June 1990 with a view to settling unresolved property questions (Vermögensfragen).        The relevant parts of the Joint Declaration of 15 June 1990 read as follows:   [Translation]        "In seeking a solution to the property issues to be settled, both      Governments assume that it is necessary to achieve a socially      just balance of conflicting interests. Legal certainty and legal      clarity, as well as the right to possess property are the      principles that guide the Governments of the German Democratic      Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany in seeking a      solution to outstanding property issues. Only in this way will      it be possible to ensure once and for all that there will be no      litigation on these issues in a future united Germany.        The two German Governments agree on the following basic points:        1.     Expropriations carried out on the basis of occupation law      or the authority resulting from the occupational power (1945      until 1949)   shall not be reversed.   The Governments of the      Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic see no      possibility of reviewing the measures taken at that time.   The      Government of the Federal Republic of Germany takes cognisance      of this in the light of historical developments.   It is of the      opinion that a final decision on any indemnification to be paid      by the State must be left to a future all-German Parliament ..."   [German]        "Bei der Lösung der anstehenden Vermögensfragen gehen beide      Regierungen davon aus, daß ein sozial verträglicher Ausgleich      unterschiedlicher Interessen zu schaffen ist.   Rechtssicherheit      und Rechtseindeutigkeit sowie das Recht auf Eigentum sind      Grundsätze, von denen sich die Regierungen der Deutschen      Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei      der Lösung der anstehenden Vermögensfragen leiten lassen.   Nur      so kann der Rechtsfriede in einem künftigen Deutschland dauerhaft      gesichert werden.        Die beiden deutschen Regierungen sind sich über folgende Eckwerte      einig:        1.     Die Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher bzw.      besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage (1945 bis 1949) sind nicht mehr      rückgängig zu machen.   Die Regierung der Sowjetunion und der      Deutschen Demokratischen Republik sehen keine Möglichkeit, die      damals getroffenen Maßnahmen zu revidieren.   Die Regierung der      Bundesrepublik Deutschland nimmt dies im Hinblick auf die      historische Entwicklung zur Kenntnis.   Sie ist der Auffassung,      daß einem künftigen gesamtdeutschen Parlament eine abschließende      Entscheidung über etwaige staatliche Ausgleichsleistungen      vorbehalten bleiben muß."        The Joint Declaration became part of the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 which contains, inter alia, the following provisions relating to property questions:   [Translation]        "Article 3 - Entry into force of the Basic Law        Provided that there is no provision in this Treaty to the      contrary, when the accession takes effect the Basic Law of the      Federal Republic of Germany ... shall enter into force, together      with the amendments contained in Article 4, in the Länder of      Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt      and Thuringia, as well as in the part of Berlin to which it has      not applied hitherto.        Article 4 - Amendments to the Basic Law due to the accession        The Basic Law shall be amended as follows: ...        4.     The present wording of Article 135 (a) shall become      paragraph 1 of that Article.   The following paragraph shall be      inserted after paragraph 1:        '(2)   Paragraph 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to liabilities of      the German Democratic Republic or its controlling authorities and      liabilities incurred by the Federation..... in connection with      the transfer of assets of the German Democratic Republic to the      Federation... as well as to liabilities resulting from measures      taken by the German Democratic Republic or its controlling      authorities.'        5.     The following new Article 143 shall be inserted into the      Basic Law:        '(1)   The law in the territory mentioned in Article 3 of the      Unification Treaty may only deviate from the provisions of this      Basic Law for as long as it takes, as a result of the differing      conditions in the two countries, to achieve full adaptation to      the legal order enshrined in the Basic Law, but until 31 December      1992 at the latest.   Deviations shall not infringe Article 19      para. 2 and shall be compatible with the principles enshrined in      Article 79 para. 3.        (2)    Deviations from Sections II, VIII, VIII a, IX, X and XI      shall be permissible until 31 December 1995 at the latest.        (3)    Irrespective of paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 41 of the      Unification Treaty and the provisions enacted for its      implementation shall apply to the extent that they provide   that      interference with property in the territory mentioned in      Article 3 of that Treaty shall not be reversed.'        Article 41 - Settlement of property issues        1.     The Joint Declaration on outstanding property issues made      on 15 June 1990 by the Governments of the Federal Republic of      Germany and the German Democratic Republic (annex III) is a      constituent part of this Treaty ...        3.     Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany shall not enact      any legal rules that conflict with the Joint Declaration      mentioned in paragraph 1."   [German]        "Artikel 3 - Inkrafttreten des Grundgesetzes        Mit dem Wirksamwerden des Beitritts tritt das Grundgesetz für die      Bundesrepublik Deutschland ... in den Ländern Brandenburg,      Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen      sowie in dem Teil des Landes Berlin, in dem es bisher nicht galt,      mit den sich aus Artikel 4 ergebenden Änderungen in Kraft, soweit      in diesem Vertrag nichts anderes bestimmt ist.        Artikel 4 - Beitrittsbedingte Änderungen des Grundgesetzes        Das Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird wie folgt      geändert: ...        4.     Der bisherige Wortlaut des Artikels 135 a wird Absatz 1.      Nach Absatz 1 wird folgender Absatz angefügt:        `(2)   Absatz 1 findet entsprechende Anwendung auf      Verbindlichkeiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik oder      ihrer Rechtsträger sowie auf Verbindlichkeiten des Bundes      oder.... die mit dem Übergang von Vermögenswerten der Deutschen      Demokratischen Republik auf Bund, Länder und Gemeinden im      Zusammenhang stehen, und auf Verbindlichkeiten, die auf Maßnahmen      der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik oder ihrer Rechtsträger      beruhen.'        5.     In das Grundgesetz wird folgender neuer Artikel 143      eingefügt:        '(1)   Recht in dem in Artikel 3 des Einigungsvertrags genannten      Gebiet kann längstens bis zum 31. Dezember 1992 von Bestimmungen      dieses Grundgesetzes abweichen, soweit und solange infolge der      unterschiedlichen Verhältnisse die völlige Anpassung an die      grundgesetzliche Ordnung noch nicht erreicht werden kann.      Abweichungen dürfen nicht gegen Artikel 19 Abs. 2 verstoßen und      müssen mit den in Artikel 79 Abs. 3 genannten Grundsätzen      vereinbar sein.        (2)    Abweichungen von den Abschnitten II, VIII, VIII a, IX, X      und XI sind längstens bis zum 31. Dezember 1995 zulässig.        (3)    Unabhängig von Absatz 1 und 2 haben Artikel 41 des      Einigungsvertrags und Regelungen zu seiner Durchführung auch      insoweit Bestand, als sie vorsehen, daß Eingriffe in das Eigentum      auf dem in Artikel 3 dieses Vertrags genannten Gebiet nicht mehr      rückgängig gemacht werden.'        Artikel 41 - Regelung von Vermögensfragen        (1)    Die von der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und      der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik abgegebene      Gemeinsame Erklärung vom 15. Juni 1990 zur Regelung offener      Vermögensfragen (Anlage III) ist Bestandteil dieses Vertrages ...        (3)    Im übrigen wird die Bundesrepublik Deutschland keine      Rechtsvorschriften erlassen, die der in Absatz 1 genannten      Gemeinsamen Erklärung widersprechen."   c)    Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 23 April 1991        On 23 April 1991 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) rejected several constitutional complaints of persons who had their real estate confiscated in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany between 1945 and 1949.   The complainants had alleged that the regulation in the Unification Treaty excluding the return of property confiscated between 1945 and 1949 under the Soviet occupation regime and providing for possible compensation payments but not for full reparation violated several constitutional rights.        The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the complaints as being unfounded.        The Court found that the expropriations in question, even where carried out by German authorities, had been effected on behalf of the Soviet occupation authorities and were consequently based on the sovereign power of the occupation force (besatzungshoheitliche Grundlage).   The competence of the Federal Government to conclude the Unification Treaty and to include in it the amendments to the Basic Law necessitated by the unification followed from the Government's constitutional obligation to attain German unification.   The manner in which the amendments had been made violated neither formal nor substantive law.        The Court held that the regulation in question did not violate any of the complainants' constitutional rights as they no longer had any legal position that could have been affected by it.        The expropriations had been considered legitimate (rechtmäßig) by the Soviet and the German Democratic Republic authorities.   The Federal Republic of Germany could not be held responsible for measures taken at a time when the Basic Law was not even in force.   Under the law then existing in the zones occupied by the Western Allied Powers the complainants had also lost their legal position with regard to the confiscated property. According to this law confiscations effected by a foreign State were   to be considered valid (wirksam) if effected within that State's sovereign powers.        Furthermore, unless damage was caused by its own organs, the Federal Republic was not bound fully to compensate damage resulting from World War II.   In respect of compensation payments for such damage the Federal Republic had a wide margin of appreciation and could take into account other expenditures and budgetary requirements.        The Constitutional Court furthermore found that there was no violation of the right to equal treatment.   It relied on evidence given by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, and other high-ranking officials, showing in the Court's opinion that the Soviet Union had agreed to German unification on the condition that the legality of the confiscations effected between 1945 and 1949 would not be put in question, which meant that they should not be reversed.   It had also been the object of the German Democratic Republic to   ensure in the Unification Treaty that social peace on its territory was maintained after unification.   This condition therefore had to be accepted by the Federal Government in order not to endanger the process of unification.   The regulation whereby property owners whose property had been confiscated between 1945 and 1949 were treated differently from those whose property had been confiscated thereafter was, in these circumstances, sufficiently justified.        The Federal Constitutional Court also denied discrimination in that the complainants would eventually only receive limited compensation payments but not full reparation.   It pointed out that it would be discriminatory totally to exclude any kind of compensation for those who lost property between 1945 and 1949.   Nevertheless, the fact that the complainants were treated less favourably than other owners was justified in view of the economic crisis in the former German Democratic Republic.   In assessing the level of compensation payable, the legislator had a large discretionary power and could, inter alia, take into account what funds were available and also the need to cope with the necessity of fulfilling new tasks arising for example from the necessity to reconstruct the new Federal States (Länder).     COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.   He alleges discrimination in respect of the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.   He submits that he was refused restitution of his family's land and property on the ground that it had been expropriated by the Soviet occupational powers between 1945 and 1949.   However, under the relevant legislation only owners of property expropriated after 1949 by the authorities of the former German Democratic Republic are entitled to such restitution.     THE LAW   1.    The applicant alleges a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which states:              "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.              The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems      necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the      general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other      contributions or penalties."        The applicant contends in essence that the expropriation of his property resulted in a continuous violation of his property rights and that the Unification Treaty, by excluding both restitution and full reparation, amounts to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).        The Commission recalls its decision of 4 March 1996 concerning Applications Nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92 (Mayer et al. v. Germany, D.R. 85-A, p. 5), where it dismissed similar complaints as being inadmissible.   It considers that the present case is not essentially different from the above cases.   a)     The Commission first notes that the original deprivation of the applicants' property occurred   at the instance of the Soviet occupying forces in Germany, more than forty years ago, at a time when the Federal Republic of Germany did not even exist.        Even if it is true that, as the Federal Constitutional Court observed in its decision of 23 April 1991, the authorities of both German States subsequently recognised the validity of the expropriations in question, the German authorities can in no way be held responsible for the deprivation of property as such, which is not imputable to them.        In this respect, therefore, the Commission lacks competence ratione personae to examine the circumstances in which the expropriations were carried out.   b)    The Commission further observes that the expropriation took place before the entry into force of the Convention, which was on 3 September 1953, and before the ratification of Protocol No. 1 by the Federal Republic of Germany, which was on 13 February 1957.        It is true that the expropriation continued to produce effects after the above dates and also after 3 October 1990, when the Unification Treaty entered into force and when the territory where the property concerned was situated became part of the Federal Republic of Germany to which the Convention and its Protocols are applicable.        The Commission has, therefore, considered the notion of a continuing violation of the Convention and its effects as to temporal limitations of the competence of Convention organs (cf. Eur. Court HR, Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 41, to be published in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996).        The Commission recalls that a deprivation of ownership or other rights in rem is in principle an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of "deprivation of right" (cf. No 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14, p. 146).        In the aforementioned judgment, which concerned a continuous denial of access to property in Northern Cyprus, the Court rejected the objection ratione temporis raised by the Turkish Government (Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) judgment, op. cit., paras. 42-47).   The Court found that Mrs Loizidou could not be deemed to have lost title to her property as a consequence of the 1985 Constitution of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (the "TRNC"), as no legal validity for the purposes of the Convention could be attributed to any expropriations under the 1985 Constitution of the "TRNC".   In this respect, the Court noted that the international community did not regard the "TRNC" as a State under international law and that the Republic of Cyprus had remained the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus - itself.        In the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, there was, from the outset, an interference with property rights in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), engaging the responsibility of Turkey, which also was held responsible for a continuing violation of the said provision on account of the complete negation of Mrs Loizidou's property rights in the form of a total and continuous denial of access and a purported expropriation without compensation (cf. Loizidou (Merits) judgment, op. cit., paras. 48-64).        In the present case, the deprivation of the applicant's property occurred at the instance of the Soviet occupying forces in Germany at a time when the Federal Republic of Germany had not yet been established and the Convention as well as Protocol No. 1 had not yet entered into force.   Between 1945 and 1949 there could not be any interference with property rights in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which could entail the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany and give rise to a continuing violation.   The Commission considers that the applicant did not retain any title to his property.      Accordingly the Commission lacks jurisdiction ratione temporis regarding the expropriation of the applicant's property in 1945.   c)    The applicant may be understood as complaining that he retained an entitlement to the property in question, the expropriation carried out between 1945 and 1949 having been unlawfully effected.        According to the Convention organs' case-law, a person can only claim to be victim of a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) if the measure complained of affected his "possessions" or his "property" within the meaning of this provision. A person complaining of an interference with his property must show that such right existed (No. 7694/76, Dec. 14.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 131).        In this respect, the Commission recalls   that "possessions"   may be either "existing possessions" (cf. Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, para. 48) or valuable assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he has at least a "legitimate expectation" that they will realise (cf. Eur. Court HR, Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v. Ireland judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51, and Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, p. 20, para. 31).        By contrast,   the hope of recognition of the survival of a former property right which has not been susceptible of effective exercise for a long period (Nos. 7655-7657/76, Dec. 4.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 111) or a conditional claim which has lapsed as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition (No. 7775/77, Dec. 5.10.78, D.R. 15, p. 143) are not to be considered as "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (P1-1).        The present case does not concern any "existing possessions" of the applicant.   His properties were expropriated a long time ago and he has been unable for decades to exercise any owner's rights in respect of the properties concerned.   It appears that in the German legal order these expropriations were considered as legally valid even before the conclusion of the Unification Treaty.   The provisions of the Treaty cannot therefore be seen as legalising the deprivation of the applicant's property and thereby as being the source of the deprivation for the purposes of German law.        It remains to be examined whether the applicant could have any "legitimate expectation"   to realise claims, either based on a right to compensation for the loss of his property   which continued to exist until the entry into force of the Unification Treaty and was affected thereby, or created by the fact that public-law bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany acquired part of the expropriated estates by virtue of the unification.        As regards any possible compensation claim generated by the loss of the property, the Commission refers to its constant jurisprudence according to which it is not competent ratione temporis and ratione materiae to examine complaints relating to the refusal or denial of compensation claims based on facts that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention with respect to the State concerned (see No. 7694/76, Dec. 14.10.77, D.R. 12, p. 131; No. 7742/76, Dec. 4.7.78, D.R. 14, p. 146). The Commission would add with regard to the particular facts of the present case that the Federal Republic of Germany was not responsible for the expropriations in question and that therefore any compensation claims which might have existed prior to the Unification Treaty would not have been directed against that State.        As regards the existence of any claim based on the fact that, in consequence of the unification, part of the property concerned passed into the hands of public-law bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Commission notes the finding of the Federal Constitutional Court that despite this fact there existed no claim under German law for the restitution of the available properties and that this situation was, from the viewpoint of constitutional law, unobjectionable.   There is nothing to show that this finding is arbitrary and incompatible with the applicable provisions. In particular it does not appear that the conclusion of the Federal Constitutional Court was based on the Unification Treaty itself and that, without the provisions of that Treaty, the situation under German constitutional law would have been judged otherwise. Therefore it cannot be said that the Treaty interfered with any pre-existing legal position of the applicant in this respect either.        It follows that the applicant had no "existing possessions"   nor any legally recognised compensation claims when the Unification Treaty came into force.   In these circumstances it cannot be found that the regulation of property questions in the Unification Treaty amounted to an interference with any of the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).        This part of the application is therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.    The applicant alleges discrimination in respect of the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions in that, unlike owners of property expropriated by the authorities of the German Democratic Republic after 1949, he cannot claim restitution or reparation.   He invokes Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Art. 14+P1-1).        Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:        "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground      such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other      opinion, national or social origin, association with a national      minority, property, birth or other status."        The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the "rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not presuppose a breach of one or more of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous -, there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see Eur. Court HR, Inze v. Austria judgment of 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 17, para. 36).        As the Commission has found above that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) is not applicable to the facts of which the applicant complains, he cannot claim to have been discriminated against in the enjoyment of his   property rights within the meaning of this provision (see Eur. Court HR, Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 23, para. 50).        The remainder of the application must therefore also be rejected, according to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2), as being incompatible with the provisions of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.           H.C. KRÜGER                           S. TRECHSEL          Secretary                             President      to the Commission                     of the Commission