CEDHCASELAW;REPORTS;ENG3
CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 25 février 1997
- ECLI
- ECLI:CE:ECHR:1997:0225REP002429494
- Date
- 25 février 1997
- Publication
- 25 février 1997
droits fondamentauxCEDH
Source : DILA / Judilibre · open data
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Solution
source officielleViolation of Art. 6-1+6-3-c;No violation of Art. 6-1+6-3-b;No violation of Art. 6-1+6-3-e;No violation of Art. 5-2
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.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                   EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      Application No. 24294/94                            Mosses Twalib                               against                               Greece                      REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                     adopted on 25 February 1997                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The application           (paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The proceedings           (paras. 5-10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The present Report           (paras. 11-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 16-35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3        A.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 16-29). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3        B.    Relevant domestic law           (paras. 30-35). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 36-84) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 36). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6        B.    Points at issue           (para. 37). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6        C.    As regards Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention           (paras. 38-56). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6             CONCLUSION           (para. 57). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        D.    As regards Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (b) of the Convention           (paras. 58-62). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             CONCLUSION           (para. 63). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12        E.    As regards Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (e) of the Convention           (paras. 64-74). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12             CONCLUSION           (para. 75). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page        F.    As regards Article 5 para. 2 of the Convention           (paras. 76-79). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14             CONCLUSION           (para. 80). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15        G.    Recapitulation           (paras. 81-84). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. S. TRECHSEL, MRS. J. LIDDY AND MM. B. MARXER, N. BRATZA, G. RESS AND K. HERNDL . . . . 16   APPENDIX      : DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE                ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . . . 17   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The application   2.    The applicant is a Tanzanian citizen, born in 1957 and resident in Tanga, Tanzania. He was represented before the Commission by Mr. S. Tsakyrakis, a lawyer practising in Athens, Greece.   3.    The application is directed against Greece. The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. L. Papidas, President of the Legal Advisory Council of the State (Nomiko Simvulio tu Kratus), Mr. M. Apessos, Senior Adviser (Paredros) of the Legal Advisory Council of the State, and Mrs. M. Basdeki, Legal Assistant (Dikastikos Antiprosopos) of the Legal Advisory Council of the State.   4.    The case concerns the fairness of criminal proceedings against the applicant and the alleged failure of the authorities to inform him in a language he understood of the reasons for his arrest. The applicant invokes Articles 6 and 5 para. 2 of the Convention.   B.    The proceedings   5.    The application was introduced on 6 April 1993 and registered on 7 June 1994.   6.    On 13 January 1995 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.   7.    The Government's observations were submitted on 9 May 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.   The applicant replied on 25 June 1995. On 26 May 1995 the Commission granted the applicant legal aid for the presentation of his case.   8.    On 26 February 1996 the Commission declared the application admissible.   9.    The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 7 March 1996 and they were invited to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished. The applicant submitted observations on 10 July 1996, to which the Government did not reply.   10.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   11.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             Mr.   S. TRECHSEL, President           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A. WEITZEL                J.-C. SOYER                H. DANELIUS                F. MARTINEZ                C.L. ROZAKIS                L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                B. MARXER                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                B. CONFORTI                N. BRATZA                I. BÉKÉS                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY                G. RESS                A. PERENIC                C. BÎRSAN                P. LORENZEN                K. HERNDL                E. BIELIUNAS                E.A. ALKEMA                M. VILA AMIGÓ           Mrs. M. HION           Mr.   R. NICOLINI   12.   The text of this Report was adopted on 25 February 1997 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        (i)   to establish the facts, and        (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   14.   The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto.   15.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   16.   In 1986 the applicant was found guilty of drug-related offences by the five-member Court of Appeal (pentameles efetio) of Athens and given a prison sentence. On 3 November 1989 he was released from prison and expelled from Greece.   17.   On 16 February 1990 Mr. G.C. was arrested at the Athens airport for transporting drugs. The applicant's telephone number was found on G.C. On the same day the police went to a hotel in Piraeus where the applicant was staying and found him in possession of a passport which appeared to have been forged. The applicant was arrested and transported to Athens where he was examined by the police still on 16 February 1996. A report was drawn up in which it is indicated that the applicant, who claimed not to understand Greek but to speak English,   was assisted by Mr. H.L., an English-speaking police officer acting as interpreter. In the report it is also stated that the applicant was questioned on the reasons for his arrest and the forged passport which had been found in his possession. According to the report, the applicant provided extensive explanations as to his movements after he had been released from prison on 3 November 1989 and as to his acquaintance with Mr. V, a third person who had also been arrested. The applicant denied all involvement in drug-trafficking. On 17 February 1990 the applicant was again examined by the police.   18.   On 18 February 1990 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor who instituted criminal proceedings against him for forgery and various drug-related offences.   19.   The applicant was subsequently taken to the investigating judge who read the charges out to him. A report concerning the applicant's appearance before the investigating judge was drawn up in which it is indicated that the applicant was assisted by an English-speaking lawyer acting as interpreter. On 20 February 1990 the applicant appeared before the investigating judge and gave a statement. A report was drawn up in which it is indicated that the applicant was assisted by Mr. A, a lawyer practising in Athens, and by an English-speaking clerk of the court, acting as interpreter. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand.   20.   On 21 June 1991 the applicant appeared together with three others before the three-member Court of Appeal (trimeles efetio) of Athens, which was competent to hear the case because of the nature of the charges involving, inter alia, drug-trafficking and trading. A court- appointed interpreter was present. The applicant declared that he was represented by Mr. A who was on strike and asked for an adjournment. Similar requests were submitted by the applicant's co-accused. The court decided to adjourn the examination of the case.   21.   The applicant re-appeared before the same court on 12 July 1991. A court-appointed interpreter was present. As the applicant was not represented by counsel, the court asked Mr. N, who was the lawyer of one of the applicant's co-defendants, to act on the applicant's behalf. N accepted and, according to the minutes of the hearing, "a short interval" was ordered to enable him to consult the case-file.   22.   The trial was concluded on 16 July 1991 and the applicant was found guilty of importing and transporting drugs and using forged documents. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of 6,000,000 drachmas for the drug-related offences and to eight months imprisonment for using forged documents. The applicant appealed.   23.   The applicant's appeal was heard by the five-member Court of Appeal of Athens on 18 March 1993. He was again assisted by a court- appointed interpreter and Mr. E.L., a lawyer made available to him by a humanitarian organisation. The court upheld the applicant's conviction, but reduced his sentence to twelve years and three months imprisonment and to a fine of 5,000,000 drachmas. The decision of the court was published on the day of the hearing and finalised (katharographi) on 4 May 1993.   24.   On 26 March 1993 the applicant lodged with the prison authorities an appeal in cassation. He filled in a standard form. Under the heading "grounds of appeal", the applicant mentioned that these would be set forth in a memorial to be submitted by his counsel. Under the heading "lawyer to whom notifications should be made" (antiklitos) the applicant mentioned Mr. P, a lawyer residing in Athens.   25.   On 8 June 1993 the applicant addressed via the prison authorities a petition to the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation (Arios Pagos) inquiring whether legal aid counsel could be appointed to assist him in the preparation of his appeal. The prison authorities acknowledged receipt of the petition.   26.   On 12 July 1993 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's appeal in cassation as inadmissible on the ground that he had not submitted any grounds of appeal.   27.   On 4 April 1994 the applicant addressed a second petition to the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation referring to his financial situation and inquiring about any developments in his case. The prison authorities acknowledged receipt.   28.   On 27 April 1994 the applicant was informed by the prison authorities that his appeal had been rejected.   29.   In a letter dated 23 February 1995 and addressed to the Government's Agent, the Deputy Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation stated that he had not been able to trace any petition addressed by the applicant to either the President or the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation asking for legal aid. He further submitted that the courts were under no legal obligation to appoint legal aid counsel for accused persons who appealed in cassation. Neither was any other public authority. As a result, even if the applicant had submitted a petition for legal aid, the authorities of the Court of Cassation would have been under no obligation to reply.   B.    Relevant domestic law   30.   Article 340 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in the cases of the most serious crimes (kakuryimata) the president of the first instance court is under an obligation to appoint counsel for the accused who is not represented. Counsel is chosen from a list of lawyers drawn up by the local Bar in January each year. Article 376   of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in the cases of the most serious crimes the president of the appeal court has to appoint counsel for the accused who is not represented, upon the latter's request. As for the rest, Article 340 para. 1 applies mutatis mutandis.   31.   Article 473 paras. 1 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that persons who appeal in cassation must lodge their appeal within ten days from the finalisation of the judgment (katharographi), i.e. the entering of the judgment in a special book at the registry of the criminal court. In accordance with Article 474 of the Code, the appeal is lodged by making a declaration to this effect before one of various public authorities, including the director of the prison where the appellant is detained. A report is drawn up which must contain the grounds of the appeal. Article 473 para. 2 of the Code provides for a further twenty-day time-limit within which accused persons may appeal in cassation against their convictions by making a declaration to this effect to the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation.   32.   Article 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains an exhaustive enumeration of the grounds for appealing in cassation. These include a number of procedural irregularities and the wrong interpretation or application of substantive criminal law. In accordance with Articles 476 para. 1 and 513 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the Court of Cassation, an appeal in cassation which does not contain any grounds is inadmissible (Court of Cassation decisions No. 1438/86, Pinika Hronika vol. 37 p. 170, No. 73/87, Pinika Hronika vol. 37 p. 314, and No. 182/87, Pinika Hronika vol. 37 p. 605).   33.   In accordance with Article 509 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant may submit "additional grounds" of appeal by lodging a supplementary memorial with the office of the Attorney General of the Court of Cassation not later than fifteen days before the hearing.   However, according to the constant case-law of the Court of Cassation, "additional grounds" may be taken into account only if at least one admissible and sufficiently substantiated ground is set out in the initial memorial of appeal in cassation (Court of Cassation decisions Nos. 242/1951, 341/1952, 248/1958, 472/1970, 892/1974, 758/1979, Nomiko Vima 1980 p. 56, 647/1983, 1438/1986 and 1453/87, Pinika Hronika vol. 38 p. 191). Notwithstanding this case-law, an accused person may use the time-limit of Article 473 para. 2 of the Code to supplement an appeal in cassation lodged before one of the authorities mentioned in Article 474 of the Code, "when the latter does not contain any sufficiently substantiated grounds of appeal".   34.   Under Article 513 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the parties to an appeal in cassation must be represented by counsel at the hearing before the Court of Cassation. The Court of Cassation has held that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for legal aid for appeals in cassation and that Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the Convention does not apply in the proceedings before the Court of Cassation, as these do not involve the determination of a criminal charge (Court of Cassation decisions No. 381/1982, Pinika Hronika vol. 32 p. 928, No. 724/1992, Pinika Hronika vol. 32 p. 656, and No. 1368/92).   35.   In accordance with Article 546 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a conviction becomes final when there is no appeal against the relevant decision, or when the accused has not availed himself of the possibility of appealing, or when the accused has appealed within the time-limit provided by law and his appeal has been rejected.   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   36.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaints that he was not notified of the charges in a language he could understand when he was arrested, that he was not assisted by an interpreter when he was first examined by the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, that the lawyer assigned to him by the first instance court did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and that he was not granted legal aid for the preparation and hearing of his appeal in cassation.   B.    Points at issue   37.   The issues to be determined are        - whether there has been a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention as a result of the unavailability of legal aid for the applicant's appeal in cassation,        - whether there has been a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-b) of the Convention in that the lawyer assigned to the applicant by the first instance court did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence,        - whether there has been a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (e) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-e) of the Convention in that the applicant was not assisted by an interpreter when he was first examined by the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge and        - whether there has been a violation of Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention in that the applicant was not notified of the charges in a language he could understand when he was arrested.   C.    As regards Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the      Convention   38.   Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention provides as follows:        "1.   In the determination ... of any criminal charge against      him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal      established by law.        3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following      minimum rights:        ...             c.    to defend himself in person or through legal      assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means      to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the      interests of justice so require."   39.   The applicant complains that, although he was indigent and the interests of justice required that he should be legally represented, he was not granted legal aid for his appeal in cassation. That he did not have sufficient means to obtain legal assistance for the preparation and presentation of his appeal in cassation transpires from the following facts. The applicant was arrested three months after he had been released from prison and during that period of time he had been unemployed. No money was found in his possession. Before the first instance court he was represented by counsel appointed by the court and before the court of appeal by counsel made available to him by a humanitarian organisation. The applicant does not question the fact that the name of Mr. P appeared under the heading "person to whom notifications should be made" (antiklitos) on the appeal form which the applicant submitted on 26 March 1993. However, Mr. P was not the applicant's authorised representative before the Court of Cassation. He was simply a lawyer who used to visit the prison where the applicant was being detained. The applicant mentioned his name on the form at random after he had been told by the prison staff that it was a necessary formality to mention - for notification purposes - a lawyer's name on the form, even if that lawyer was not going to act in the case. Finally, the applicant stresses that the Commission was satisfied that he was indigent when it granted him legal aid for the presentation of his application.   40.   The applicant further submits that the interests of justice required that he should be represented by counsel when appealing in cassation. Under Greek law the applicant had to be so represented at the hearing before the Court of Cassation. Although no grounds of appeal were mentioned on the form he submitted on 26 March 1993, counsel could have lodged an additional memorial with grounds of appeal which the Court of Cassation could examine ex officio. Moreover, he could lodge a new appeal within the time-limit provided under Article 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which started running from the notification of the finalised judgment to the applicant. There was at least one valid ground of appeal which counsel could have raised: the applicant was represented at first instance by Mr. N who was also the lawyer of Mr. V. However, according to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and legal theory, the appointment of the same lawyer as counsel to accused persons with conflicting interests renders the proceedings null and void.   41.   The Government argue that the applicant was not indigent, because he was represented by counsel of his own choice at the pre-trial stage as well as before the first instance court and the court of appeal. Furthermore, he was involved for a long period of time in drug- trafficking. In any event, the applicant, when lodging his appeal, was represented by a lawyer of his own choice, Mr. P, the name of whom he had mentioned on the appeal form.   42.   The Government further argue that the appointment of counsel was not necessary in the interests of justice because the applicant's appeal was bound to fail, since the memorial he lodged on 26 March 1993 did not contain any grounds of appeal. The applicant was debarred under Greek law from raising additional grounds at a later stage.   43.   The Commission recalls that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-3) are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings stated in paragraph 1 (Eur. Court HR, Granger v. United Kingdom judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 174, p. 17, para. 43). As a result, the Commission considers it appropriate to examine the applicant complaints from the angle of paragraphs 3 (c) and 1 taken together.   44.   The Commission also recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not compel States to set up courts of appeal in cassation. Nevertheless, a State which does institute such courts is required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these courts the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6 (Art. 6) (Eur. Court HR, Delcourt v. Belgium judgment of 17 January 1970, Series A no. 11, p. 14, para. 25). In the Convention system the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to free legal assistance is one element, amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal proceedings. Sub-paragraph (c) of Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3-c) attaches two conditions to this right: that the person concerned has not sufficient means to pay for a defence lawyer and that "the interests of justice" require that he should be legally represented (Eur. Court HR, Pham Hoang v. France judgment of 25 September 1992, Series A no. 243, p. 23, para. 39). The Commission further recalls that the Court has recognised that in certain cases indigent accused persons who have no legal training must, if they wish to appeal in cassation, have the benefit of free legal assistance in presenting and developing the appropriate arguments on complex issues (see above-mentioned Pham Hoang judgment, p. 23, para. 40).   45.   The Commission also notes the importance of the appeal in cassation in the Greek criminal justice system, this being a remedy intended to ensure that substantive criminal law has been correctly interpreted and applied in a particular case and that the procedural rights of the accused have been respected (see para. 32). Moreover, in the vast majority of cases this is the last remedy to which an accused person may have resort before his conviction and sentence become final (see para. 35). Finally, lodging and presenting an appeal in cassation is a highly technical matter. This is the reason why the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the appellant must be represented by counsel at the hearing before the Court of Cassation (see para. 34).   46.   The Commission recalls that on 26 March 1993 the applicant announced to the prison authorities his wish to appeal in cassation. He filled out a standard appeal form which he deposited on the same day. At the time, the applicant was clearly no longer represented by the lawyer who had been instructed by the humanitarian organisation to represent him before the appeal court. The Commission considers that he was not represented by Mr. P either. Although the applicant mentioned the name of Mr. P on the standard appeal form, he did so under the heading "person to whom notifications should be made". In the Commission's view and contrary to what the Government contend, this cannot be equated with designation as legal counsel. Moreover, Mr. P was different from the various lawyers who had until then been involved in the applicant's case and no evidence has been submitted that he ever accepted to act on the applicant's behalf.   47.   The question which must be, therefore, examined is whether the applicant was entitled under Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention to free legal assistance for the purposes of his appeal in cassation. The Commission will first determine whether the applicant had "sufficient means" within the meaning of that provision. The Commission notes that the question of the applicant's means at the material time was never examined by the Greek authorities. According to Greek law, in a serious criminal case, such as the applicant's one, the first instance court had to appoint counsel for an accused who was not represented whatever his or her means might have been. The appeal court did not have to examine the question of the applicant's means either, because the applicant appeared before it assisted by counsel provided by a humanitarian organisation. The Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation to whom the applicant applied for legal aid did not examine his request for the reasons stated in the letter his deputy addressed to the Agent of the Greek Government on 23 February 1995.   48.   As a result, the Commission like the European Court of Human Rights in the Pakelli case (Eur. Court HR, Pakelli v. Germany judgment of 25 April 1983, Series A no. 64) is faced with the difficult task of having to determine a largely factual issue for the first time more than three years after the end of the domestic proceedings. The Commission will have to determine the issue on the basis of all available indications, without requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was indigent at the material time (see above- mentioned Pakelli judgment, p. 16, para. 34).   49.   The Commission notes that there are a number of indications that the applicant was indeed in need of legal aid when he lodged his appeal in cassation, as stated by him in the petition which he addressed to the Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation on 8 June 1993. Thus, the applicant was represented before the first instance court by court- appointed counsel and before the appeal court by a lawyer made available to him by a humanitarian organisation. Moreover, when appealing in cassation, the applicant had already spent more than three years in jail. Finally, the Commission itself decided to grant the applicant legal aid for the presentation of his case before it.   50.   In addition, the Commission finds no clear indications pointing in the other direction. The fact that a lawyer who had not been appointed by the courts entered one appearance on behalf of the applicant before the investigating judge at the early stages of the investigation cannot constitute persuasive evidence that the applicant had at the time sufficient means to pay for his legal defence. Neither can the Commission draw any broad conclusions, as it is invited to do by the Government, from the applicant's previous criminal record.   51.   Given the various indications that the applicant had no sufficient means when lodging his appeal in cassation and in the absence of any clear indications to the contrary, the Commission regards the first of the two conditions of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention as satisfied.   52.   The Commission will then examine whether the "interests of justice" required that the applicant should be legally represented. The Commission has taken note of the assurances offered by the applicant's lawyer that, although no valid grounds of appeal were mentioned on the form submitted on 26 March 1993, this did not entail, as the Government contend, that the applicant was debarred from lodging a formally admissible appeal in cassation. The applicant's lawyer argues that court-appointed counsel could have lodged an additional memorial with grounds of appeal which the Court of Cassation could examine ex officio or a new appeal within the time-limit of Article 473 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Commission also notes that the Government have not attempted to provide a detailed answer to this argumentation.   53.   In any event, the Commission does not consider it necessary to establish to what extent the applicant's failure to mention grounds of appeal in the form he submitted without legal assistance on 26 March 1993 might have prejudiced his chances of submitting a formally admissible appeal with the assistance of counsel at a later stage. In this connection, the Commission recalls that, when the applicant first manifested his wish to lodge an appeal in cassation, the possibility of lodging a formally admissible appeal was not a priori excluded because the time-limit prescribed by law had not expired (see paras. 24 and 31). Moreover, the applicant was a layman and a foreigner who was apparently not familiar with the rules of Greek criminal procedure. As a result, he could not be expected to know which grounds of appeal, if any, he could raise and when.   54.   The Commission further notes that these grounds of appeal could have been based either on the alleged violation of the applicant's Convention rights or on other alleged procedural irregularities constituting violations of national law, such as that suggested by his representative before the Commission (see para. 40). It also notes that the applicant had received on appeal a sentence of twelve years and three months' imprisonment. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that "the interests of justice" required that the applicant should receive timely, independent, professional advice on how to proceed with his intended appeal in cassation. As a result, the Commission considers that the second of the two conditions of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention was also satisfied in the applicant's case.   55.   However, the Commission notes that under Greek law no legal aid is available to accused persons who wish to appeal to the Court of Cassation. So much is expressly accepted by the Deputy Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation in the letter he addressed to the Government's Agent on 23 February 1995 (see para. 29) and in which he stated that applications by accused persons for legal aid for appealing to the Court of Cassation did not even call for a reply. Moreover, support for the Deputy Public Prosecutor's position as to the unavailability of legal aid can be found in the case-law of the Court of Cassation (see para. 34).   56.   It is, therefore, clear that it was impossible for the applicant to obtain legal aid for his appeal in cassation. However, the applicant did not have sufficient means and the interests of justice required that he should receive professional advice in connection with his intended appeal. It follows that there was a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention.        CONCLUSION   57.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention taken together with para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-1+6-3-c) of that provision.   D.    As regards Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (b) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-b) of the      Convention   58.   Article 6 para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-3-b) of the Convention provides as follows:        "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following      minimum rights:        ...             b.    to have adequate time and facilities for the      preparation of his defence."   59.   The Commission recalls that at the admissibility stage   the Government argued that the Commission was not competent to examine the applicant's complaints that the lawyer whom the first instance court had assigned to him did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, because the applicant had not raised them before the Court of Cassation. The Commission also recalls that, in its admissibility decision of 26 February 1996, it considered that, in the circumstances of the case, given in particular the non-availability of legal aid in cassation proceedings, the issue concerning exhaustion of domestic remedies was related to the substance of the applicant's complaints. The Commission has now concluded that the unavailability of legal assistance for the applicant's appeal in cassation constituted a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that it is not precluded under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention from examining the merits of the applicant's complaints.   60.   The applicant submits that the lawyer assigned to him by the first instance court, Mr. N, did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. The applicant claims that initially N objected to his being appointed applicant's counsel. However, he accepted to represent the applicant when the president of the court drew his attention to the fact that, should the hearing be adjourned, the applicant would have to be provisionally released, given the statutory prohibition of holding an accused person on remand for more than 18 months. The applicant claims that N was given less than an hour to consult the case-file. He also submits that the decision which the first instance court reached without giving him all his fair trial rights had a prejudicial impact on the subsequent proceedings. According to the applicant "it is reasonable to think that an accused with a previous sentence of drug-related offences who arrives at the Court of Appeal with a sentence to life has not many chances to be totally acquitted".   61.   The Government argue that the first instance court could not afford to adjourn the trial further, because of the statutory limits on pre-trial detention. The time put at the disposal of Mr. N was sufficient, because N was largely familiar with the case, being the representative of one of the applicant's co-accused.   62.   Given the link between the right to a fair trial in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention and the more specific guarantees of Article 6 para. 3, the Commission considers it appropriate to examine the applicant's complaints from the angle of paragraphs 3 (b) and 1 (Art. 6-3+6-1-3-b) taken together. The Commission notes that the charges against the applicant were re-examined in full by the court of appeal before which he was represented by a different lawyer. Although the applicant claims that his first instance conviction had a prejudicial impact on the subsequent proceedings, he does not complain that his lawyer was in any manner prevented from representing him effectively at the appeal hearing. It follows that the applicant had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and that his right to a fair trial was not violated in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis,   No. 7628/76, Dec. 9.5.77, D.R. 9 p. 169).        CONCLUSION   63.   The Commission concludes, by 24 votes to 6, that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention taken together with para. 3 (b) (Art. 6-1+6-3-b) of that provision.   E.    As regards Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (e) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-e) of the      Convention   64.   Article 6 para. 3 (e) (Art. 6-3-e) of the Convention provides as      follows:        "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following      minimum rights:        ...             e.    to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he      cannot understand or speak the language used in court."   65.   The Commission recalls that at the admissibility stage the Government argued that the Commission was not competent to examine the applicant's complaints concerning assistance by an interpreter when he was first examined by the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the only reason given being that the applicant had not raised these complaints before the Court of Cassation. In its admissibility decision the Commission considered that the issue was related to the substance of the applicant's complaints. The Commission has now concluded that the unavailability of legal assistance for the applicant's appeal in cassation constituted a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention. As a result, it may examine the merits of the applicant's complaints.   66.   The applicant complains that no interpreter was made available to him during his examination by the police, that he was forced to sign some documents which he could not understand and that a police officer who did not speak English, by the name of K.P., signed the documents instead of a translator. He also claims that, when he was brought before the public prosecutor, he was assisted by an interpreter who spoke very little English and showed no interest. Finally, he claims that no interpreter was made available to him when he appeared before the investigating judge on 20 February 1990.   67.   The Government submit that, when the applicant was first examined by the police on 16 February 1990, he was assisted by Mr. H.L., an English-speaking police officer, as mentioned in the relevant report. They also claim that the same police officer assisted the applicant when he was examined by the police for the second time on 17 February 1990. The Government further submit that an interpreter was made available to the applicant when he appeared before the investigating judge on 18 February 1990 and 20 February 1990. They refer to the relevant reports.   68.   The Commission considers that it should examine the applicant's complaints from the angle of paragraphs 3 (e) and 1 of Article 6 (Art. 6-3-e+6-1) of the Convention taken together. Moreover, the Commission recalls that, according to the case-law of the Court, the right, stated in paragraph 3 (e) of Article 6 (Art. 6-3-e), to the free assistance of an interpreter applies not only to oral statements made at the trial hearing but also to documentary material and the pre-trial proceedings. Paragraph 3 (e) signifies that a person "charged with a criminal offence" who cannot understand or speak the language used in court has the right to the free assistance of an interpreter for the translation of all those documents or statements in the proceedings instituted against him which it is necessary for him to understand or to have rendered in the court's language in order to have the benefit of a fair trial. According to the same case-law, the obligation of the competent authorities is not limited to the appointment of an interpreter but, if they are put on notice in the particular circumstances, may also extend to a degree of subsequent control over the adequacy of the interpretation provided (see Eur. Court HR, Kamasinski v. Austria judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A no. 168, p. 35, para. 74).   69. The Commission notes that the parties do not dispute that the applicant needed the assistance of an interpreter in his contacts with the Greek authorities and that the applicant's command of the English language at the time of his arrest was sufficient to enable him to communicate with these authorities through interpreters translating from English to Greek and vice versa.   70.   The Commission has examined the police report concerning the applicant's examination on 16 February 1990, the day of his arrest. The Commission has no reason to doubt the authenticity of this report. The report provides a number of details concerning the applicant's movements after he was released from prison on 3 November 1989 which could not have been known to the police. Moreover, it does not implicate the applicant in drug-trafficking. The report states that all the questions put to the applicant and all the answers provided by the latter were translated from Greek into English and vice versa. Furthermore, the report was signed by a police officer who acted as interpreter. In the light of all the above, the Commission considers that the applicant has not substantiated his allegations that he was not assisted by an interpreter during his examination by the police on 16 February 1990.   71.   The Commission further notes that the applicant himself accepts that, when he appeared before the public prosecutor on 18 February 1990, he was assisted by an interpreter. Although the applicant claims that the interpreter "spoke very little English and showed no interest", the Commission notes that the applicant does not claim to have taken any steps towards complaining to the prosecutor about the alleged inadequacy of the interpretation.   72.   The Commission also notes that the Government have submitted copies of the reports concerning tArticles de loi cités
Article 6-1+6-3-c CEDHArticle 6-1 CEDHArticle 6-3-c CEDHArticle 6 CEDH
Citations
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Synthèse
- Juridiction
- CEDH
- Chambre
- CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG
- Formation
- 3
- Date
- 25 février 1997
- Matière
- droits fondamentaux
Référence
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1997:0225REP002429494
Données disponibles
- Texte intégral