CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 11 avril 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                    EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      Application No. 26695/95                  Hristos Sidiropulos and 5 others                               against                               Greece                      REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                     (adopted on 11 April 1997)                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The application           (paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The proceedings           (paras. 5-10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The present Report           (paras. 11-15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 16-30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        A.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 16-25). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4        B.    Relevant domestic law           (paras. 25-30). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 31-79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 31). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8        B.    Points at issue           (para. 32). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8        C.    As regards Article 11 of the Convention           (paras. 33-59). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8             CONCLUSION           (para. 60). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14        D.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           (paras. 61-64). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14             CONCLUSION           (para. 65). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15        E.    As regards Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention           (paras. 66-69). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15             CONCLUSION           (para. 70). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page        F.    As regards Article 14 of the Convention           (paras. 71-74). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16             CONCLUSION           (para. 75). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16        G.    Recapitulation           (paras. 76-79). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17   APPENDIX I:     DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO                THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . . . . 18   APPENDIX II:    FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION OF                THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THESSALONIKI                OF 8 MAY 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31   APPENDIX III:   ORIGINAL TEXT OF RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW                PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35   APPENDIX IV:    EXTRACTS FROM PRESS REPORTS RELIED ON                BY THE DOMESTIC COURTS . . . . . . . . . . . 37   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The application   2.    The applicants are six Greek citizens residing in Florina, Greece: Hristos Sidiropulos, an electrician born in 1949 in Kastoria, Greece, Petros Dimtsis, a professor born in 1957 in Florina, Stavros Anastasiadis, a farmer born in 1944 in Florina, Anastasios Bules, a farmer born in 1941 in Florina, Stavros Sovitslis, a farmer born in 1950 in Florina, and Dimitrios Seltsas, a dentist born in 1956 in Florina.   They were represented before the Commission by Mrs. I. Kurtovik, a lawyer practising in Athens.   3.    The application is directed against Greece.   The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. L. Papidas, President of the Legal Advisory Council of State (Nomiko Simvulio tu Kratus), Mr. P. Kamarineas, Member (Simvulos) of the Legal Advisory Council of State, and Mrs. F. Dedoussi (Legal Assistant) of the Legal Advisory Council of State.   4.    The case concerns the refusal of the Greek courts to register an association formed by the applicants and the fairness of the related proceedings.   The applicants invoke Articles 1, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention.   B.    The proceedings   5.    The application was introduced on 16 November 1994 and registered on 14 March 1995.   6.    On 26 June 1995 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.   7.    The Government's observations were submitted on 29 November 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.   The applicants replied on 6 March 1996 after an extension of the time-limit.   8.    On 24 June 1996 the Commission declared the application admissible insofar as it had been introduced by the six above-mentioned applicants.   It struck the application out of its list of cases insofar as it had been introduced by a seventh applicant who had died in the meantime.   9.    The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the parties on 10 July 1996 and they were invited to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished.   The parties have not availed themselves of this possibility.   10.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   11.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             Mr.   S. TRECHSEL, President           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                J.-C. SOYER                H. DANELIUS                F. MARTINEZ                C.L. ROZAKIS                L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                B. CONFORTI                I. BÉKÉS                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY                G. RESS                A. PERENIC                C. BÎRSAN                P. LORENZEN                K. HERNDL                E. BIELIUNAS                E.A. ALKEMA                M. VILA AMIGÓ           Mrs. M. HION           Mr.   R. NICOLINI   12.   The text of this Report was adopted on 11 April 1997 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        (i)   to establish the facts, and        (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   14.   The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto as Appendix I.   15.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   16.   On 18 April 1990 the applicants, who claim to be of "Macedonian" ethnic origin and to have a "Macedonian national conscience", together with 49 other persons, decided to establish a non-profit making association (somatio) entitled "Home of Macedonian Civilisation" ("Stegi Makedoniku Politismu"). The seat of the association would be Florina in   a prefecture in the north of Greece bordering "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". Its aims, according to Article 2 of its charter, were "(a) the cultural, intellectual and artistic development of its members and of the people of Florina in general as well as the development of a spirit of co-operation, solidarity and love between them, (b) the cultural decentralisation and the protection of the intellectual and artistic manifestations and traditions, the monuments of civilisation and in general the preservation and development of folk culture, and (c) the protection of the natural and cultural environment of the region".   17.   On 12 June 1990 the applicants, who constituted the provisional management committee of the association, applied to the Multi-Member First Instance Civil Court (Polimeles Protodikio) of Florina for registration under Article 79 of the Civil Code.   18.   On 9 August 1990 the first instance court, having heard the applicants, refused their application on the ground that "the real aim of the association was not the one mentioned in Article 2 of its charter; it was to promote the idea that a Macedonian minority existed in Greece and this was against the national interest of Greece and, consequently, against the law".   19.   On 7 September 1990 the applicants appealed. On 8 May 1991 the Court of Appeal (Efetio) of Thessaloniki, having heard the applicants, rejected their appeal (the full text of the appeal court's decision appears in Appendix II). The court considered that, when examining an application for the registration of an association, it was not bound by ordinary rules concerning the burden of proof. When hearing such applications, the court should not and could not limit itself to the evidence proposed by the parties. In the particular case the court accepted the following as true, on the basis that it was a matter of public knowledge.   20.   The area which corresponds to the Greek province of Macedonia has always been Greek. The fact that part of its population speaks a second language, which is in essence Bulgarian mingled with Slavonic, Greek, Vlach and Albanian, is not proof of Slav or Bulgarian descent. The Socialist Republic of Macedonia aimed at the creation of a Slav Macedonian state so as to gain access to the Aegean Sea. To this effect it attempted to win over the Greek inhabitants of Greek Macedonia who speak the above-mentioned second language. Acting in compliance with a directive issued by Slav organisations abroad the applicants established the "Home of Macedonian Civilisation" to further this goal.   21.   The court further relied on reports, which had appeared in the Ethnos newspaper on 5 February 1991 and in the Ellinikos Vorras newspaper on 12 May 1991, according to which two of the applicants took part in a meeting of the Conference for the Security and Cooperation in Europe in Copenhagen where they disputed the fact that Greek Macedonia was Greek, making a distinction between Greeks and Macedonians.   22.   The court considered that the latter fact together with the name of the association and the contents of its charter rendered its aims dubious. There existed a danger that the association would be used to trap young persons in the non-existent Slav-Macedonian minority, since Article 3 para. 2 of the charter provided that the youth of Florina would become members of the youth section of the association. Moreover, the court considered it suspicious that, although Article 4 of the charter provided that all members should accept the principles of the association, no mention of these principles was ever made in the charter. The title of the association itself could create confusion, because initially it created the impression that it referred to the Greek civilisation of Macedonia, while in reality it referred to a Slav civilisation, which, however, did not exist in the area. In the light of all the above, the court concluded that the applicants used the word "Macedonian" to contest the Greek identity of Macedonia and its inhabitants. The court was satisfied that the objective of the applicants was to undermine the territorial integrity of Greece and upheld the decision of the lower court, notwithstanding the fact that the latter was based on "a shorter and partially different reasoning".   23.   On 20 June 1991 the applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation (Arios Pagos) relying, inter alia, on Articles 2, 4, 5 and 12 of the Greek Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Convention. They submitted that, contrary to the law, the court of appeal (a) did not limit itself to reviewing the lawfulness of the establishment of the association but exercised a much wider review as to the expediency of its establishment based on the presumed intentions of its founders, (b) took into consideration matters that had not been submitted by the parties, (c) took into consideration matters of essential importance without ordering the taking of evidence, (d) distorted the content of the association's charter, and (e) did not provide sufficient reasons for its decision.   24.   In a memorial submitted to the Court of Cassation on the occasion of the hearing the applicants specified that it was the decision of the court of appeal which violated their rights under Articles 2, 4, 5 and 12 of the Greek Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Convention. They further submitted that, by taking into consideration matters of essential importance without ordering the taking of evidence, the court of appeal violated the applicants' right to a fair trial.   25.   In a judgment delivered on 16 May 1994, the Court of Cassation considered that the first, second, third and fourth grounds of appeal were unsubstantiated. In any event, it considered that the lower court could take into consideration matters which had not been submitted by the parties and that the "matters of material importance" referred to were either matters of public knowledge or proved on the basis of documents, namely the press reports mentioned in the decision. The Court of Cassation further considered that the decision of the court of appeal was adequately reasoned. It also noted that the applicants had not alleged that the decision of the court of appeal violated Articles 2, 4, 5 and 12 of the Constitution. In the applicants' submission, it was the decision of the first instance court which had failed to respect the above-mentioned provisions. However, even if the aim of the applicants had been to attack the constitutionality of the decision of the court of appeal, this ground of appeal would have had to be rejected as unsubstantiated. On the basis of all the above, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants' appeal in cassation.   B.    Relevant domestic law   26.   Article 4 para. 1 of the Constitution provides the following:        "All Greeks are equal before the law."   27.   Article 12 para. 1 of the Constitution provides the following:        "Greeks have the right to form non-profit associations and      unions, in compliance with the law, which, however, may      never subject the exercise of this right to prior      permission."   28.   The Civil Code provides in respect of non-profit making associations the following:        Article 78        "An association of at least twenty persons with a non-      profit making aim acquires legal personality upon      registration in a special book kept by the competent first      instance civil court."        Article 79        "The founders of the association or its administration      apply to the competent first instance civil court to have      the association registered in the special book. The      application must be accompanied by the act establishing the      association, a list of the names of its administration and      its charter which must be dated and signed by its members."        Article 80        "The charter of the association must specify the following:      (a) the aim, name and seat of the association, (b) the      conditions of admission, withdrawal and expulsion of the      members and their rights and obligations ... Otherwise it      is not valid."        Article 81        "The first instance civil court accepts the application if      it is satisfied that all the conditions set by the law are      met ..."        Article 105        "The first instance civil court orders the dissolution of      the association ... (c) if the association pursues other      aims than those specified in its charter, or if the aim or      the functioning of the association has become illegal,      immoral or against the public order."   29.   The Code of Civil Procedure provides the following in respect of the special procedure (ekusia dikeodosia) according to which courts examine, inter alia, applications for the registration of associations:        Article 744        "The court may proprio motu order any measures which could      lead to the establishment of relevant facts, even if the      latter have not been the subject matter of the parties'      submissions ..."        Article 759 para. 3        "Notwithstanding the legal rules concerning proof, the      court may order proprio motu whatever it considers      necessary for the establishment of the facts."   30.   Moreover, Article 336 para. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the following in respect of all proceedings before the civil courts:        "The court may take into consideration, proprio motu and      without taking evidence, facts which are so generally known      that there can be no reasonable doubt as to their truth."   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   31.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaints that their application to establish an association was not examined in a fair manner by the courts, that the refusal of the application in question amounted to an unjustified interference with their rights to freedom of conscience, expression and association, and that they were discriminated against in the enjoyment of the above-mentioned rights because of their ethnic origin, their association with a national minority and their beliefs and national conscience.   B.    Points at issue   32.   The issues to be determined are the following:   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 11 (Art. 11) of the      Convention,   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the      Convention,   -     whether there has been a violation of Articles 9 and 10      (Art. 9, 10) of the Convention and   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the      Convention taken in conjunction with the above-mentioned      provisions.   C.    As regards Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention   33.   Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:        "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and      to freedom of association with others, including the right to      form and to join trade unions for the protection of his      interests.        2.    No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these      rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary      in a democratic society in the interests of national security or      public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others. ..."   34.   The applicants submit that they were prohibited from establishing a cultural association. They argue that the interference with their right to freedom of association was not provided by law. They contend that, under Greek law and in particular Article 12 (Art. 12) of the Constitution, the domestic courts should have limited their review to ascertaining that the conditions set forth in Articles 78-80 of the Civil Code were fulfilled and that the stated aims of the association were not illegal, or against morality or public order. They could not engage in speculation as to the real aims of the association. Nor could they decide on the expediency of its establishment on the basis of the presumed intentions of its founders.   35.   The applicants further submit that, according to the case-law of the Greek courts, a judge, when applying the special procedure for examining applications for the registration of associations, may order proprio motu whatever measures he considers necessary for the establishment of the truth. He cannot, however, rely on documents or evidence which have not been officially submitted to the court or on his private knowledge. Moreover, he cannot consider that certain material facts have been established without ordering, even proprio motu, the taking of evidence. It cannot be considered that the propositions on which the national courts based their decisions in the case were "common knowledge". Part of the information invoked was derived from certain racist newspapers. The reasoning in the courts' decisions is limited to a historical analysis and certain unfounded disparaging remarks for the applicants. No attempt was made by the courts to link the above in a reasoned manner with the charter of the association and the rejection of the request for its registration. The Court of Cassation, in upholding these decisions, violated national law.   36.   The applicants also affirm that their association had no links with "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and stress that it was set up long before the declaration of independence of that country. In any event, a court cannot base its decision on a particular interpretation of certain historical events which it considers to be established facts without ordering the taking of evidence.   37.   The applicants further contend that the aims of their association were lawful. They involved the study of the local culture of the area of Florina, in which, as it is well-known, a distinct linguistic, cultural and historic group of people, to which the applicants belong, lives. The study of the local culture is protected by the Constitution, the Convention, other international human rights instruments and the agreements of the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe in which Greece participates. In accordance with these agreements, every person has the right to consider that he belongs to a particular group.   38.   As regards the necessity of the interference with their right to freedom of association, the applicants submit that, if the aims of the association turned out to be unlawful or against morality or public order, the State could protect itself using the means provided by national law. The courts could order the dissolution of the association under Article 105 of the Civil Code. It follows that the interference with their right to freedom of association was not necessary in a democratic society.   39.   The Government contend that the interference with the applicants' right to freedom of association was justified under para. 2 of that provision. They submit that the national courts had the power under Greek law to examine whether the aims of the association were unlawful or against public order. The Court of Cassation interpreted the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure correctly when it rejected the applicants' appeal in cassation. The domestic courts had the power to take into consideration certain incontrovertible facts and in particular the threat which certain recent acts of "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" posed for the national integrity and the cultural heritage of Greece. They also had the power to take into consideration certain publications in the Greek and Yugoslav press concerning the applicants.   40.   The Government argue that it is clear from the applicants' submissions before the Commission that their real aim was to establish an association on behalf of the minority of the Slavs of Skopje in order to protect the cultural traditions of Skopje, which are in reality of Bulgarian and Yugoslav origin. The Government affirm that such a minority and such cultural traditions do not exist in Greece. It transpires, however, from the applicants' submissions before the Commission that the real aims of the association were different from those mentioned in its charter. In any event, the domestic courts have exclusive competence to establish that the real aim of the association is different from the aim mentioned in its charter, provided that the courts do not act in a discriminatory manner.   41.   The Government argue, in the alternative, that the domestic courts were correct in concluding that the intention of the applicants was to assist various Slav associations operating outside Greece in their attempt to undermine the territorial integrity of Greece. The domestic courts have found that the case concerned the national security of Greece. It follows that they have exclusive competence in the matter. In any event, the courts heard the applicants and it was lawful under domestic law not to order the taking of evidence. The judges did not review the expediency of the establishment of the association, but did their duty to protect the existence of their country.   42.   The Government conclude that the interference with the applicants' right to freedom of association was necessary in a democratic society to protect national security, public order and the rights and freedoms of the Greek people in its entirety. The Greek people has the right to protect Macedonia which belongs to it historically and culturally and lies within its territory and which the Slavs of Skopje want to appropriate for themselves.   43.   The Commission must first examine whether there has been an interference with the applicants' right to freedom of association. The Commission recalls in this connection that, in accordance with its case-law, a refusal of the authorities to register an association does not necessarily involve an interference with the right of its members under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention where the association is nevertheless free to continue its activities (No. 14233/88, Dec. 5.6.91, D.R. 70 p. 218; No. 18874/91, Dec. 12.1.94, D.R. 76 p. 44; and No. 27608/95, Dec. 29.11.95, unpublished).   44.   The Commission notes that the applicants argue that the courts' refusal of registration meant that they were effectively prohibited from establishing such an association. Moreover, the Government have not contested that the courts' decisions in this matter constituted an interference with the applicants' right under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention. The Commission considers that the parties' failure to dispute the issue cannot be disassociated from the particular context of the case involving an association which, in the words of the Government, the judges had a duty not to register in order "to protect the existence of their country". In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the courts' refusal of registration constitutes an interference with the applicants' right to freedom of association under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention.   45.   The Commission considers that such an interference is contrary to Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention unless it is "prescribed by law", directed at one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 and is "necessary in a democratic society" for achieving them.   46.   The Commission notes that the parties are in disagreement on whether the extent of the control exercised by the courts over the aims of the association was in accordance with domestic law. However, it does not consider it necessary to rule on the question whether the interference in issue was "prescribed by law" in this instance because, in any event, it was incompatible with Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention on other grounds (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Manoussakis and others v. Greece judgment of 26 September 1996, to be published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions).   47.   The Commission also notes that the domestic courts refused to register the association because they considered that its real aim was to question the Greek character of the Greek province of Macedonia with a view to undermining the territorial integrity of Greece. The Commission considers that it follows that the interference was directed at the protection of national security and public safety and the prevention of disorder, all of which are legitimate aims set   out in paragraph 2 of Article 11 (Art. 11-2) of the Convention.   48.   Concerning the issue whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society", the Commission recalls that, in accordance with its case-law, freedom of association, as enshrined in Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress (TBKP, Sargin and Yagci v. Turkey, Comm. Report 3.9.96, para. 76, unpublished). It follows that the exceptions to freedom of association under the second paragraph of Article 11 (Art. 11) must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established, as in the case of freedom of expression which also constitutes an essential foundation of a democratic society (see Eur. Court HR, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2) judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p. 29, para. 50).   49.   The Commission also recalls that the adjective "necessary", within the meaning of Article 11 para. 2 (Art. 11-2) of the Convention, implies the existence of a "pressing social need" (see Sargin and Yagci v. Turkey, Comm. Report, loc. cit., referring to Eur. Court HR, Lingens v. Austria of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 25, para. 39, and Handyside v. United Kingdom judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23, para. 49). The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists and, where matters of national security are concerned, this margin is wide (see Eur. Court HR, Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 25, para. 59). However, the States' margin of appreciation always goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, including those given by independent courts. Even in matters of national security, it remains ultimately for the Government to satisfy the Commission that an interference is reconcilable with freedom of association as protected by Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention. It follows that the Commission cannot accept the Government's argument that, because the case concerned the national security of Greece, the domestic courts had exclusive competence in the matter.   50.   The Commission must exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and, in doing so, it will look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole in order to determine whether it was "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" and whether the reasons adduced by the domestic authorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient". Moreover, the Commission has to satisfy itself that the national authorities based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Jersild v. Denmark judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298, pp. 23 and 24, para. 31).   51.   The Commission notes in this connection that the aims of the applicants' association, as stated in its charter, were lawful. Moreover, it considers that nothing in the charter could justify a different conclusion. However, inquiring into the real aims of the association is not in itself incompatible with the Convention, since it cannot be excluded that the establishment of an association may raise serious public order questions. As a result, the Commission cannot agree with the applicants who argue that the competence of the courts in this matter should have been limited to establishing the lawfulness of the aims of the association as stated in its charter. Nor can the Commission agree with the Government who argue that the domestic courts had exclusive competence to establish that the real aims of the association were different from the aims mentioned in its charter, provided that they did not act in a discriminatory manner. Accepting such a proposition would have amounted to the Commission effectively relinquishing its supervisory jurisdiction.   52.   As a result, the Commission must examine the courts' decisions in depth to identify the factual considerations on which they based the conclusion that the applicants' real aim in setting up the association was to question the Greek character of the Greek province of Macedonia with a view to undermining the territorial integrity of Greece. The Commission's examination will focus on the reasoning of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal, which replaced the reasoning of the First Instance Civil Court of Florina and which was upheld by the Court of Cassation (see paras. 22 and 25).   53.   The Commission notes that, in order to reach this conclusion, the domestic courts invoked two elements, the first of which was the existence of a directive issued by Slav organisations abroad. The applicants argue that this directive did not form part of the case-file in the proceedings before the domestic courts and the Government have not disputed this. However, the Government have produced before the Commission a press report to which the domestic courts made reference and which contains an extract from the relevant directive. According to this extract, the aim of the association was "in a lawful manner to question the denial of the rights of the Macedonians by the Greek State".   54.   Secondly, the domestic courts relied on press reports on the presence of two of the applicants at a meeting of the Conference for the Security and Cooperation in Europe in Copenhagen where, in the words of the appeal court, "they disputed that Greek Macedonia was Greek, making a distinction between Greeks and Macedonians". The Commission has had the benefit of examining these reports, which were produced by the Government before it. It emerges that at the above- mentioned meeting the applicants declared that they were "citizens of Greece, albeit of a Macedonian ethnic origin, and denounced that the Greek State oppressed the Macedonians of the Aegean Macedonia depriving them of all their human rights".   55.   The Commission, having examined the evidence which had been placed before the domestic courts, considers that it has not been established that the applicants harboured separatist intentions. It is not, therefore, necessary to decide whether this would have justified an interference with the right to freedom of association.   56.   It is true that the domestic courts, on the basis of the evidence before them, could have reached the reasonable conclusion that the real aim of the association was to promote the idea that a "Macedonian" minority exists in Greece and that the rights of the members of such a minority are not fully respected. However, the Commission considers that this could not have justified in itself a restriction in the applicants' right to freedom of association. According to the case-law of the Court, a democratic society must, in principle, tolerate the free discussion not only of ideas which are favourably received or are regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also of ideas that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population (Eur. Court HR, Handyside v. United Kingdom judgment of 29 April 1976, Series A no. 24, para. 49, p. 23). The Commission, applying this principle, has considered that imposing a prison sentence on a person who, in the context of an election campaign, used the term "Turk" in respect of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace could not be regarded as a "necessary" measure in the democratic society (Sadik Ahmet v. Greece, Comm. Report 4.4.95, para. 53, to be published in Eur. Court HR, Reports 1996-I). In the particular circumstances of the case, the Commission notes that, although the applicants have stated that they have "a Macedonian national conscience", there is no indication that they have advocated the use of violence or of undemocratic or unconstitutional means (see, mutatis mutandis, TBKP, Sargin and Yagci v. Turkey, Comm. Report, op. cit., para. 82).   57.   Moreover, the Commission considers that the domestic courts could have sought to clarify the question of the real aims of the applicants by ordering proprio motu the taking of further evidence into the matter, as they had the power to do under domestic law.   58.   However, what the Commission considers of primary importance is that domestic law put at the disposal of the courts effective means which would have enabled them to ensure that the applicants' association, once established, would not have engaged in illegal activities. Under Article 105 of the Civil Code, the courts may order the dissolution of an association if the aim or functioning of the association has become illegal, immoral or against the public order (see para. 28).   59.   In the light of all the above and the domestic margin of appreciation notwithstanding, the Commission is not satisfied that the reasons adduced by the domestic authorities to justify the interference with the applicants' freedom of association were "relevant and sufficient"; nor was the interference "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued". It follows that it has not been established that the measure complained of was "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".        CONCLUSION   60.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention.   D.    As regards Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention   61.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,      everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an ...      impartial tribunal..."   62.   The applicants argue that their case was not heard by impartial tribunals. They submit that the courts were hostile towards them because of their ethnic origin and national conscience. In substantiation of their claim, they rely on passages of the decisions where the courts assert that the Slav-Macedonian minority is non- existent and conclude that the applicants acted against the interests of Greece to further the aims of a foreign power. The applicants also submit that they did not have a fair hearing because, contrary to the law, the courts did not limit themselves to reviewing the lawfulness of the establishment of the association but exercised a much wider review as to the expediency of its establishment based on the presumed intentions of its founders. The courts also took into consideration matters that had not been submitted by the parties as well as things of material importance without ordering the taking of evidence.   63.   The Government submit that the courts were impartial, that the applicants were heard and that national law was correctly applied.   64.   The Commission does not consider it necessary to examine whether Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention applies in the proceedings in question. The Commission recalls that, when examining the applicants' complaints under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention, it had to pronounce on whether it was justifiable for the domestic courts to reach certain conclusions on the basis of the material before them without ordering further evidence. Since the Commission has found that Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention has been violated on the basis, inter alia, that the domestic courts should not have reached these conclusions, it considers that it is not necessary to examine whether there has also been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        CONCLUSION   65.   The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case it is not necessary to examine whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   E.    As regards Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, 10) of the Convention   66.   These articles, insofar as relevant, provide as follows:        Article 9   (Art. 9)        "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience      and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion      or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others      and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief,      in worship, teaching, practice and observance.        2.    Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be      subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are      necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public      safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or      for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."        Article 10 (Art. 10)        "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This      right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and      impart information and ideas without interference by public      au